Summary
In Bolinger v. Bolinger, (1990) 49 Ohio St.3d 120, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court * * * to formulate an equitable division of the marital assets commences when either party files a complaint for divorce and a division of the marital property."
Summary of this case from Davis v. Hallum-DavisOpinion
No. 88-1802
Submitted November 22, 1989 —
Decided February 28, 1990.
Domestic relations — Divorce — Subject-matter jurisdiction of trial court to award permanent alimony and to formulate equitable division of marital assets commences, when.
O.Jur 3d Family Law §§ 978, 1039, 1045.
The subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court to award permanent alimony and to formulate an equitable division of the marital assets commences when either party files a complaint for divorce and a division of the marital property. (R.C. 3105.011, 3105.17 and 3105.18, construed.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 3843.
Petitioner-appellant, Judith Bolinger, and respondent-appellee, George Bolinger, were married in 1953. This marriage produced five children. At the time this action began, only one of the children had not attained the age of majority.
In October 1981, the parties separated and appellant filed a complaint in the court of common pleas for alimony only, custody and support of the minor child, and a temporary restraining order requesting that appellee be prohibited from disposing of the marital assets of the parties. On October 27, 1981, the trial court granted the temporary restraining order against appellee, and on December 30, 1981, the court ordered appellee to pay appellant temporary alimony and child support, and granted appellant custody of the minor child.
On January 20, 1982, the appellee filed an answer and a counterclaim for divorce, alleging extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty by appellant. Then, on August 17, 1982, the appellant filed a motion with the trial court requesting that appellee be found in contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support in accordance with the prior court order. In November 1982, appellee responded by filing a motion for a reduction in the amount of temporary alimony and child support based on a change of financial circumstances. Following a hearing on the contempt motion, the trial court determined appellee's arrearages and continued the matter to permit appellant to present evidence on appellee's ability to pay his arrearages in temporary alimony and child support.
Subsequently, on August 8, 1983, a hearing was held by the trial court. Upon an agreed stipulation of the parties, the appellant was granted leave to file an amended complaint for divorce on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for one year. By journal entry dated March 27, 1985, the appellant was granted a divorce on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for one year. The trial court reduced the prior temporary alimony award and ordered appellee to pay accumulated arrearages in alimony and child support. The court also divided the marital assets and made a distribution of these assets to the parties.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The appellate court held that "[i]n view of the fact that the amended complaint for divorce was never filed by * * * [appellant], the trial court was without authority to entertain * * * [appellant's] request for a divorce or to enter judgment on the basis of such complaint. * * * Given the absence of * * * [appellant's] amended complaint for divorce, the trial court was without authority to enter an order for permanent alimony or to formulate an equitable division of the parties' marital property."
On remand, the cause was scheduled for a pretrial conference on December 16, 1986. At that time, the trial court noted that the original complaint for divorce had been amended by appellant. In an amended judgment entry dated January 29, 1987, the trial court granted the appellant a divorce, and essentially reinstated all the other orders and findings rendered in the prior journal entry that awarded alimony and divided the marital property. This judgment was rendered without the trial court's receiving any further evidence.
Upon further appeal, the court of appeals once again reversed and remanded. The appellate court held that since the parties did not stipulate the earlier testimony rendered in the first proceeding, "* * * the trial court was obligated to rehear the case in its entirety."
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Patrick J. Alcox, for appellant.
Donald W. Hill, for appellee.
The determinative issue before us is whether the trial court was obligated to retry the entire case on remand, or whether the original award of alimony and property division was proper irrespective of the propriety of the original divorce decree. Since we believe that the original award of alimony and division of marital assets was proper in any event, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals below.
The appellee-husband contends that the trial court was duty-bound to retry the entire case ( i.e., the divorce, property settlement, and alimony award) on remand because the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court in a divorce action is markedly different from that in an alimony-only action. The appellant-wife counters that the appellee's argument claiming a distinction in the jurisdiction of a domestic relations court between a divorce action and an alimony-only action is basically superfluous because the domestic relations court always possesses jurisdiction to make a division of property in either case. In support of her argument, appellant relies on our prior decisions in Goetzel v. Goetzel (1959), 169 Ohio St. 350, 8 O.O. 2d 355, 159 N.E.2d 751; and Griste v. Griste (1960), 171 Ohio St. 160, 12 O.O. 2d 176, 167 N.E.2d 924.
R.C. 3105.011 provides as follows:
"The court of common pleas including divisions of courts of domestic relations, has full equitable powers and jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters. This section is not a determination by the general assembly that such equitable powers and jurisdiction do not exist with respect to any such matter."
R.C. 3105.17 states in pertinent part:
"Either party to the marriage may file a complaint for divorce or for alimony, and when filed the other may file a counterclaim for divorce or for alimony. The court of common pleas may grant alimony on a complaint or counterclaim, regardless of whether the parties are living separately at the time the complaint or counterclaim is filed * * *."
R.C. 3105.18 provides in relevant part:
"(A) In divorce, dissolution of marriage, or alimony proceedings, the court of common pleas may allow alimony it considers reasonable to either party.
"The alimony may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing a sum of money, payable either in gross or by installments, as the court considers equitable."
The foregoing statutory sections make it abundantly clear that the court of common pleas has wide latitude in determining the appropriateness of as well as the amount of alimony, regardless of whether the complaint and counterclaims request alimony only, a divorce, or both a divorce and alimony. In Goetzel, supra, this court held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
"Under Section 3105.17 and 3105.18, Revised Code, a court has the same power in awarding alimony only that it does in awarding alimony where a divorce is granted."
In Griste, supra, this court stated in the syllabus:
"1. Under the provisions of Section 3105.20, Revised Code, in any matter concerning domestic relations, the court shall not be deemed to be deprived of its full equity powers and jurisdiction.
"2. The exercise of the full equity powers and jurisdiction in an alimony or divorce action includes the authority to determine the rights of the parties to alimony and a division of property. ( Clark v. Clark, 165 Ohio St. 457, approved and followed.)"
Although the Revised Code has been amended since the decision in Griste, supra, the language of R.C. 3105.011 appears to encompass the main thrust of the Griste opinion, as well as the true meaning of former R.C. 3105.20. In sum, we believe that the law enunciated in Griste is good law and is applicable to the cause sub judice.
In our view, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this cause in order to make a division of property and to make an alimony award. See R.C. 3105.18. Moreover, given the fact that appellee filed a counterclaim for divorce, it is clear that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction in making its original property settlement and alimony award. Since it appears that the original property distribution was otherwise valid, the trial court was not obligated to retry the entire case, including the property distribution, upon remand. In such cases, we are of the opinion that the trial court should not have to "reinvent the wheel" simply because a divorce was granted to a party who did not properly request one. In our view, judicial economy demands that in these types of cases the trial court need only correct on remand that which constituted error in the original proceedings. Since the original alimony award and property settlement were well within the court's jurisdiction under the statutory provisions cited above, there was no need for the court to retry that portion of the case. Even if the trial court was somehow obligated to do more than what it did upon remand, the practical difficulties in doing so would militate against such a requirement since, as in this cause, the property had already been valuated and distributed several years before and thus was not available for revaluation and redistribution.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that under R.C. 3105.011, 3105.17 and 3105.18, the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court to award permanent alimony and to formulate an equitable division of the marital assets commences when either party files a complaint for divorce and a division of the marital property.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the decision of the trial court is hereby reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.