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affirming district court's conclusion that taxpayer had a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy under Vermont law and noting that "Boivin has admitted on appeal that Vermont state courts are empowered to consider constitutional claims; this is all that is necessary for the state court's remedies to be adequate under the [TIA]."
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No. 08-3977-cv.
February 17, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Sessions, C.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court judgment is AFFIRMED.
Mark A. Boivin, pro se, Addison, VT, for Appellants.
Mark J. Di Stefano, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, VT, for Appellee William Johnson.
Donald R. (Tad) Powers, Middlebury, VT, pro se.
James W. Runcie, Ouimette Runcie, Vergennes, VT, for Appellees Kermit Blaisdell and Vermont Appraisal Company.
Sandra A. Strempel, Dinse, Knapp McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Appellee Michael R. O'Brien.
James F. Carroll, English Carroll Boe P.C., Middlebury, VT, for Appellees Town of Addison, Richard Pratt, Alyce Lane, William F. Munoff, and Elizabeth Pratt.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark A. Boivin and Paul A. Boivin, individually and doing business as No-Mon-Ne Farm Association, acting pro se, appeal from the July 15, 2008, 2008 WL 2787345, judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Sessions, C.J.) dismissing their complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.
Preliminarily, we dismiss the appeals of Paul A. Boivin and No-Mon-Ne Farm Association as neither of these appellants has filed a brief. Although Mark A. Boivin purported to file a brief on behalf of the other appellants, as a pro se litigant, he may represent only himself. See Berrios v. New York City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2009). We lack jurisdiction to review the district court's order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), to the extent that it remanded the case to state court. Although § 1443 provides an exception to the prohibition on appellate review of remand orders, the present suit is not encompassed by this exception. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966) (holding that § 1443 is limited to cases brought under laws "providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality" and does not apply to "broad contentions under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
This Court reviews de novo a district court's decision dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). After having reviewed Boivin's contentions on appeal and the record of proceedings below, we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough opinion. Additionally, we find no merit to Boivin's claim that the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, as Boivin did not request a hearing in district court. Additionally, Boivin has admitted on appeal that Vermont state courts are empowered to consider constitutional claims; this is all that is necessary for the state court's remedies to be adequate under the Tax Injunction Act. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven , 889 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding remedies are adequate if the state provides "a full hearing and judicial determination at which [a taxpayer] may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We have considered all of Boivin's arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.