From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Blind Brook Club, Inc. v. Murray

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Nov 9, 1998
255 A.D.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

Opinion

November 9, 1998

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Silverman, J.).


Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action ( see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment ( see, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The defendant Harold Goldberg is the owner of a parcel of property in Rye Brook, New York, and the defendant Peter Murray is the contract vendee of that property. After the defendants sought permission to subdivide the parcel into five lots, the plaintiff, the owner of an adjacent lot, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring, inter alia, that a restrictive covenant burdened the parcel, and to permanently enjoin the defendants from subdividing the parcel.

Restrictive covenants are generally disfavored and are to be strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce them ( see, Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 234; Huggins v. Castle Estates, 36 N.Y.2d 427). However, where proved by clear and convincing evidence, they are to be enforced pursuant to their clear meaning ( see, Witter v. Taggart, supra; Huggins v. Castle Estates, supra; Thrun v. Stromberg, 136 A.D.2d 543). Here, in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Rather, the interpretation of the covenant proffered by the defendants — that the limitation at issue was merely permissive and that unlimited subdivision and residential development of the property was therefore permissible — is clearly untenable in light of the clear and unambiguous language used. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in granting judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

Ritter, J. P., Thompson, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Blind Brook Club, Inc. v. Murray

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Nov 9, 1998
255 A.D.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
Case details for

Blind Brook Club, Inc. v. Murray

Case Details

Full title:BLIND BROOK CLUB, INC., Respondent, v. PETER MURRAY et al., Appellants

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Nov 9, 1998

Citations

255 A.D.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
679 N.Y.S.2d 671

Citing Cases

Fader v. Taconic Tract Development, LLC

would not be violated by the proposed construction. “The law has long favored free and unencumbered use of…

Ezekills Constr. v. Saskas

A restrictive covenant "may not be given an interpretation extending beyond the clear meaning of its terms" (…