Opinion
B294251
06-28-2021
CLAUDIA BLIDARU, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE GUIDANCE CHARTER SCHOOL et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Walsh & Associates, Dennis J. Walsh and George E. Ordonez for Defendants and Appellants. Urbanic & Associates and James Urbanic; Gladius Law and Alyssa K. Schabloski for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Holly E. Kendig, Judge. Affirmed as to Kamal L. Al-Khatib, dismissed as to The Guidance Charter School.
Walsh & Associates, Dennis J. Walsh and George E. Ordonez for Defendants and Appellants.
Urbanic & Associates and James Urbanic; Gladius Law and Alyssa K. Schabloski for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EGERTON, J.
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (f) provides that a special motion to strike under California's anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute “may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.”
Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff Claudia Blidaru sued her former employer, The Guidance Charter School (GCS), and its Executive Director, Kamal L. Al-Khatib, alleging defendants defamed her in a report prepared as part of an internal investigation of Blidaru's conduct at GCS. Fifty-one days after service of her initial complaint, Blidaru served defendants with her amended complaint, again alleging defendants defamed her in the investigation report. Sixty-five days after mail service of the amended complaint, defendants filed a special motion to strike the defamation claim, arguing the investigation report constituted protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court determined defendants filed the motion more than 60 days after service of the initial complaint and denied the motion as untimely under section 425.16, subdivision (f).
Defendants appeal the order denying their special motion to strike. Blidaru has moved to dismiss GCS's appeal on the ground that the Franchise Tax Board suspended GCS's corporate powers. (See Rev. & Tax Code, §§ 23301, 23301.5; see Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 641 (Newport II).) GCS admits that its corporate powers have been suspended and that it has not obtained a certificate of revivor. (Cf. Peacock Hill Assn. v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 369, 373-374; Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1215 (Newport I).) We therefore grant Blidaru's motion and dismiss GCS's appeal.
However, we deny Blidaru's request for appellate sanctions against GCS. (See § 907 [“When it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just.”].) As the trial court's minute order shows, GCS's counsel advised the court that GCS's corporate status had been suspended, and defendants acknowledged in the reply brief filed on behalf of Al-Khatib that GCS remained in suspended status. Moreover, because Al-Khatib and GCS jointly filed the underlying anti-SLAPP motion and the current appeal, and Al-Khatib's appeal remains viable regardless of GCS's corporate status, there has been no prejudicial delay due to GCS's appeal. Finally, Blidaru does not argue the appeal is frivolous and, on the record presented, we cannot say every reasonable attorney would agree the appeal is totally without merit. (See In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 [“an appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment-or when it indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit”].) Accordingly, Blidaru's request for appellate sanctions is denied. (Cf. Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 287 (Olsen) [dismissing entire appeal and imposing sanctions where appellant “made no colorable showing” that the trial court's denial of his untimely anti-SLAPP motion was an abuse of discretion].) We also grant Blidaru's request for judicial notice of the public charter school records related to GCS, records of the Secretary of State related to GCS's corporate status, and the trial court's January 13, 2021 minute order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
As for the remaining appeal, Al-Khatib argues the filing of Blidaru's amended complaint reset the 60-day period to file his special motion to strike. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to accept the late filing. We conclude the court correctly enforced the anti-SLAPP statute's deadline and we find no abuse of discretion. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the relevant period, GCS was a nonprofit public benefit corporation chartered by the Palmdale Unified School District. Al-Khatib was GCS's Executive Director and had the authority to hire, discipline, and terminate principals at the school. In July 2017, GCS hired Blidaru as the elementary school principal.
In September 2017, Al-Khatib received complaints from Blidaru and from the Head of GCS's Arabic Department, in which each alleged the other had created a hostile work environment. In response, Al-Khatib appointed an “Ad-Hoc Committee” of GCS administrators to investigate the complaints and prepare a report of “Findings and Recommendations.” When the committee completed the report, Al-Khatib presented it to GCS's Board of Directors. On October 6, 2017, Al-Khatib presented Blidaru with a “Notice of Early Termination Without Cause” terminating her employment with GCS.
Blidaru sued GCS and Al-Khatib, asserting causes of action for wrongful termination, defamation, and other employment, contract, and tort claims. In support of her defamation cause of action, paragraph 69 of Blidaru's initial complaint alleged: “Defendants[ ] prepared a report that contained false, factual statements regarding Plaintiff's performance, ability to perform her work, her interactions with her subordinates, her behavior, and her conduct. These statements included, but were not limited to: [¶] a. That Plaintiff created a hostile work environment; [¶] b. That Plaintiff created a division among staff affecting the moral[e] of the school; [¶] c. That Plaintiff's conduct will negatively impact teaching and learning; [¶] d. That Plaintiff has not demonstrated school leadership; [¶] e. That Plaintiff was demonstrating incompetent behavior; [¶] f. That Plaintiff failed to act responsibly; [¶] g. That Plaintiff failed to take steps to bridge communication; [¶] h. That Plaintiff admitted to not communicating; [¶] i. That Plaintiff left [the Head of the Arabic Department] out of decisions regarding the Arabic [D]epartment; [¶] j. That Plaintiff is impervious to constructive criticism; [¶] k. That Plaintiff failed to maintain a safe and hostile free environment.”
On January 29, 2018, Blidaru served GCS and Al-Khatib with the initial complaint.
The parties' counsel had several discussions regarding the complaint, including the defamation cause of action. On March 19, 2018, defendants' counsel informed Blidaru's counsel that the phrase “were not limited to” needed to be stricken from paragraph 69 to “avoid ambiguity” and to confirm the statements in subparagraphs a through k were the only alleged defamatory statements. On March 20, 2018, defendants' counsel confirmed defendants would not demur to the initial complaint if the requested changes were made. Defendants' counsel did not disclose that defendants intended to file a special motion to strike the defamation claim.
On March 21, 2018, Blidaru served defendants by mail with her first amended complaint. Paragraph 69 of the amended complaint alleged: “Defendants[ ] prepared a report that contained false, factual statements regarding Plaintiff's performance, ability to perform her work, her interactions with her subordinates, her behavior, and her conduct. These statements included words, statements, and phrases expressly or to the effect that: [¶] a. Plaintiff created a hostile work environment; [¶] b. Plaintiff created a division among staff affecting the moral[e] of the school; [¶] c. Plaintiff's conduct will negatively impact teaching and learning; [¶] d. Plaintiff has not demonstrated school leadership; [¶] e. Plaintiff was demonstrating incompetent behavior; [¶] f. Plaintiff failed to act responsibly; [¶] g. Plaintiff failed to take steps to bridge communication; [¶] h. Plaintiff admitted to not communicating; [¶] i. Plaintiff left [the Head of the Arabic Department] out of decisions regarding the Arabic [D]epartment; [¶] j. Plaintiff is impervious to constructive criticism; [¶] k. Plaintiff failed to maintain a safe and hostile free environment.”
On March 30, 2018, Blidaru served defendants with deposition notices for eight witnesses. On April 24, 2018, Blidaru served defendants with written discovery requests, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents.
On April 26, 2018, the parties filed a joint status conference statement. With respect to anticipated motions, defendants reported they “anticipate[d] filing a motion to strike punitive damages” and “a motion for summary judgment/adjudication.” Defendants did not notify the court or Blidaru that they intended to file an anti-SLAPP motion.
On May 9, 2018, defendants filed a motion to strike the amended complaint's request for punitive damages. On May 23, 2018, Blidaru filed her opposition to the motion to strike.
The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike the punitive damages request, with 15 days leave to amend. Blidaru filed her second amended complaint on June 21, 2018-nearly a month after defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion targeting the first amended complaint's defamation claim. On appeal, Al-Khatib argues Blidaru's second amended complaint exceeded the scope of the trial court's order by adding allegations to the defamation claim. We agree with Al-Khatib that these new allegations cannot be considered in determining whether the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute were satisfied. (See Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [allowing the plaintiff “leave to amend the complaint once the court finds the prima facie showing has been met would completely undermine the statute by providing the pleader a ready escape from section 425.16's quick dismissal remedy”].) Beyond that, the scope of the amendment is not properly before us in this appeal.
On May 11, 2018, defendants served Blidaru with form interrogatories.
On May 25, 2018, defendants filed their special motion to strike the amended complaint's defamation cause of action. Defendants argued the claim arose from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) because the statements alleged in paragraph 69 of the amended complaint “were contained within the Ad-Hoc Committee Report which was given to [GCS's] Board concerning issues relating to questions about the leadership of [the] K-5 Principal and administrative difficulties the Principal was having with her staff.” Defendants did not explain why they filed the motion when they did, nor did they address the 60-day deadline under section 425.16, subdivision (f).
Section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines an “ ‘act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue' ” to include: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” Defendants argued the meeting of a charter school's board of directors, like GCS's board, constituted an official proceeding authorized by law. Thus, defendants argued the investigation report submitted to and considered by the GCS board was protected under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
On August 8, 2018, Blidaru served defendants with a motion to strike the anti-SLAPP motion as untimely and to impose sanctions for undue delay. She also served defendants with an ex parte application to have the motion heard on shortened time.
In their opposition to the ex parte application, defendants acknowledged they “could have filed an anti-SLAPP motion as related to the original complaint, ” but they maintained that, “in an effort to lessen the amount of litigation, and in an effort to reduce the burden on [the trial court], Defendants elected to file the anti-SLAPP motion once the First Amended Complaint was filed.” Regarding the timing of their pending motion, defendants argued they “could not have filed the anti-SLAPP motion earlier because they were engaged in a good-faith meet [and] confer effort with Plaintiff's attorney to avoid having to file a demurrer to the complaint.”
The trial court denied Blidaru's ex parte application to shorten time.
After a hearing, the trial court denied defendants' anti-SLAPP motion as untimely. The court noted that defendants' moving papers did not provide any justification for the untimely motion and that defendants did not address timeliness until their reply brief. The court emphasized it was “only in the earlier filed ex parte papers” that defendants offered “some explanation as to why [the] motion was filed when it was.” The court found that argument was “not persuasive, ” observing, “[m]eeting and conferring on other discovery or pleadings motions is not an excuse.” Because defendants provided “no reasonable justification for why [the] motion was filed late, ” the court denied their special motion to strike as untimely.
DISCUSSION
1. Al-Khatib's Special Motion to Strike Was Untimely
“Section 425.16 ‘provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.' [Citation.] ‘The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and deter “lawsuits [referred to as SLAPPs] brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” [Citation.] Because these meritless lawsuits seek to deplete “the defendant's energy” and drain “his or her resources” [citation], the Legislature sought “ ‘to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without great cost to the SLAPP target' ” [citation]. Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation. [Citation.] In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit.' ” (Newport II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 642.)
Consistent with this purpose, section 425.16, subdivision (f) provides: “The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” (Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 782 (Platypus).) Thus, the statute imposes a time limit for bringing a special to strike-“[a] party may not file an anti-SLAPP motion more than 60 days after the filing of the complaint, unless the trial court affirmatively exercises its discretion to allow a late filing.” (Id. at p. 775; Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1217; Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 840 (Lam) [trial court can deny an anti-SLAPP motion filed after the 60-day deadline as “untimely, even though the moving papers had a clerk's file stamp on them”].) The trial court's determination that Al-Khatib's motion was untimely is a question of law we review de novo. (Starview Property, LLC v. Lee (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 203, 208 (Starview Property).)
“The term ‘the complaint' ” in section 425.16, subdivision (f) “has been interpreted to include amended complaints.” (Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1217, citing Lam, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) This construction “is intended to prevent sharp practice by plaintiffs who might otherwise circumvent the statute by filing an initial complaint devoid of qualifying causes of action and then amend to add such claims after 60 days have passed.” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1192, fn. 11 (Hewlett-Packard); Lam, at pp. 840-841 [observing, “the purpose of the anti-SLAPP suit law would be readily circumventable if a defendant's only opportunity to strike meritless SLAPP claims were in an attack on the original complaint, ” as “[c]auses of action subject to a special motion to strike could be held back from an original complaint, ” only to be added to “a later complaint that had been amended to contain some”].)
However, the rule that an amended complaint reopens the time to file an anti-SLAPP motion is not absolute. As the Hewlett-Packard court recognized, a “rule automatically reopening a case to anti-SLAPP proceedings upon the filing of any amendment [would] permit[ ] defendants to forgo an early motion, perhaps in recognition of its likely failure, and yet seize upon an amended pleading to file the same meritless motion later in the action, thereby securing [a] ‘free time-out' ” to delay proceedings in the trial court. (Hewlett-Packard, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192, fn. 11; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318 [immediate appeal from denial of an anti-SLAPP motion stays trial court proceedings, amounting to “a free time-out in the trial court” for a dilatory defendant].) Conversely, a rule “properly tailored” to the objective of ending SLAPP suits early without great cost “would permit an amended pleading to extend or reopen the time limit only as to newly pleaded causes of action arising from protected conduct.” (Hewlett-Packard, at p. 1192, fn. 11.)
In Newport I, the court addressed the issue we face in this case: Is an anti-SLAPP motion untimely when it targets a cause of action in an amended complaint that was included in an earlier complaint? Relying on the reasoning in Hewlett-Packard, the Newport I court concluded “a defendant must file an anti-SLAPP motion within 60 days of service of the first complaint (or cross-complaint, as the case may be) that pleads a cause of action coming within [the anti-SLAPP statute] unless the trial court, in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, permits the motion to be filed at a later time.” (Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219.) “An amended complaint reopens the time to file an anti-SLAPP motion without court permission only if the amended complaint pleads new causes of action that could not have been the target of a prior anti-SLAPP motion, or adds new allegations that make previously pleaded causes of action subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Ibid., italics added; see also id. at p. 1217.)
Applying this rule, the Newport I court held the defendants' motion was untimely with respect to two claims included in an earlier complaint because the basis for those claims that made them subject to the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion-the settlement of an unlawful detainer action-had been alleged in the earlier complaint. (Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1220.) Our Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on review, holding: “[S]ection 425.16, subdivision (f), should be interpreted to permit an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it could not have been brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions that could have been brought earlier (subject to the trial court's discretion to permit a late motion).” (Newport II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 645.)
Al-Khatib's anti-SLAPP motion, like the motion in Newport I, targeted a cause of action that was included in Blidaru's initial complaint. And, like the relevant causes of action in Newport I, the basis for the defamation claim that Al-Khatib argues renders it subject to an anti-SLAPP motion-the investigation report containing the allegedly defamatory statements-was alleged in Blidaru's initial complaint. In both the initial complaint and the amended complaint, Blidaru alleged “Defendants[ ] prepared a report that contained false, factual statements regarding Plaintiff's performance, ability to perform her work, her interactions with her subordinates, her behavior, and her conduct.” (Italics added.) The amended complaint modified the next sentence to replace the phrase “included, but were not limited to” (as Al-Khatib's counsel had requested to forbear his demurrer), but it did not change the critical allegation that the investigation report contained the allegedly false and defamatory statements. Because Al-Khatib's anti-SLAPP motion could have been brought against the initial complaint, the trial court correctly concluded it was untimely under section 425.16, subdivision (f). (See Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219; Newport II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 645-646.)
Al-Khatib contends the rule adopted in Newport I and Newport II does not apply to this case because Blidaru amended her complaint within 60 days of serving the initial complaint and before he made an appearance in the case. The distinction makes no difference. The holding in Newport I was not based upon the procedural posture of the case or whether the defendant had made an appearance. The holding was based upon the court's statutory construction of the term “ ‘the complaint' ” in section 425.16, subdivision (f), which Newport I and other courts had interpreted to include an amended complaint only when the “ ‘initial complaint [was] devoid of qualifying causes of action.' ” (Newport I, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1217-1218, quoting Hewlett-Packard, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192, fn. 11, italics added; Lam, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) Blidaru's initial complaint was not devoid of the qualifying cause of action Al-Khatib targeted with his anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, the trial court properly applied Newport I and Newport II in concluding Al-Khatib's “belated” motion “could have been brought earlier.” (Newport II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 645; cf. Starview Property, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 209 [following Newport I and Newport II, holding trial court erred in determining anti-SLAPP motion was untimely because motion targeted new claims for relief added to amended complaint].)
Relying on JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468 and Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655 (Dickinson), Al-Khatib argues he could not have filed an anti-SLAPP motion against Blidaru's initial complaint because the filing of her amended complaint would have rendered the motion moot. The cases are inapposite and, in any event, neither case can displace the rule our Supreme Court adopted in Newport II. In Colton, the court considered whether the filing of an amended complaint “removing... allegations of protected conduct as a basis for liability” renders “moot a later-filed anti-SLAPP motion based on the original complaint.” (Colton, at p. 470, italics added.) The Colton court concluded the amended pleading did render the subsequently filed anti-SLAPP motion moot, but emphasized that a party may not, in response to an anti-SLAPP motion, amend the complaint “to subvert or avoid a ruling” on a special motion to strike. (Id. at p. 478.) Al-Khatib did not file his anti-SLAPP motion before Blidaru amended her complaint and Blidaru's amended complaint did not remove the allegations of protected conduct. Colton is inapposite.
So is Dickinson. In Dickinson, the court held the rule precluding a plaintiff from amending a complaint to avoid a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion did not preclude the plaintiff from amending her complaint to add a new party, even though the defendant named in the original complaint had already filed a special motion to strike. (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 676.) Because the amendment did not purport to moot the pending anti-SLAPP motion, the Dickinson court held it did not implicate the rule stated in Colton. (Dickinson, at pp. 677-679.) Again, Al-Khatib's anti-SLAPP motion was not pending when Blidaru amended her complaint and Blidaru's amended pleading did not seek to moot a pending special motion to strike by removing allegations of protected conduct. Dickinson is entirely irrelevant to our review of the trial court's ruling.
The trial court correctly concluded the anti-SLAPP motion was untimely under the 60-day deadline set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (f). Thus, consideration of the motion was “subject to the trial court's discretion to permit a late” filing. (Newport II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 645.)
2. The Trial Court Reasonably Exercised Its Discretion to Reject Al-Khatib's Late Motion
Section 425.16, subdivision (f) “expressly provides that a late anti-SLAPP motion shall not be filed unless the court affirmatively exercises discretion to permit it to be filed.” (Olsen, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) While the trial court “enjoys considerable discretion” in determining whether to allow a belated filing, it must nevertheless be mindful that the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to allow prompt dismissal of SLAPP suits, and the statutory deadline is intended “to avoid tactical manipulation of the stays that attend anti-SLAPP proceedings.” (Platypus, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 787, 783; San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 624; Morin v. Rosenthal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 681 (Morin).) Thus, the court “ ‘must be wary about freely granting a party the right to file an anti-SLAPP motion past the 60-day deadline.' ” (San Diegans, at p. 624.) “In determining whether to permit a late motion, the most important consideration is whether the filing advances the anti-SLAPP statute's purpose of examining the merits of covered lawsuits in the early stages of the proceedings. [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the length of the delay, the reasons for the late filing, and any undue prejudice to the plaintiff.” (Ibid.; see Platypus, at pp. 775-787.)
In refusing to allow the belated motion, the trial court emphasized Al-Khatib failed to “provide any justification for the untimely motion” in his moving papers, the issue of timeliness was “not briefed until the reply, ” and it was only in Al-Khatib's opposition to Blidaru's ex parte application that he offered any “explanation” for the motion's timing. As for that explanation, the trial court found it was “not persuasive, ” remarking that “[m]eeting and conferring on other discovery or pleadings motions is not an excuse” for filing an anti-SLAPP motion nearly 120 days after receiving service of the initial complaint.
Al-Khatib contends the trial court failed to acknowledge the case was “at its infancy stages.” He notes “no discovery responses had been exchanged [and], aside from the motion to strike the punitive damages claim, no other motions had been filed.” As for prejudice to Blidaru, he estimates, without evidence, Blidaru's counsel had spent “no more than approximately 10 hours litigating this matter.” Because, in Al-Khatib's telling, “the parties had spent minimal hours on discovery and motions, ” he maintains it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny him leave to file the late motion. We disagree.
Al-Khatib's argument fails to offer any justification for filing his anti-SLAPP motion eight weeks after the 60-day deadline passed. As for the justification he offered below, we agree with the trial court that meeting and conferring on discovery and pleading motions is not an excuse that compels a belated filing to be accepted.
Morin is instructive. Thirty-two days after the plaintiff in Morin filed his complaint, the defendants removed the action to federal bankruptcy court, where they filed anti-SLAPP motions about a week later. (Morin, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) One week after the bankruptcy court remanded the action, the defendants moved to transfer the case from the superior court's west district to its central district. (Ibid.) Two months later, the court granted the transfer motion and, five days after that, the defendants filed an affidavit of prejudice against the assigned central district judge. (Ibid.) Three weeks later, the case was assigned to a new judge. (Ibid.) Five days later, the defendants refiled their anti-SLAPP motions. (Ibid.) The trial court rejected the motions as untimely, observing that, even with tolling during the bankruptcy proceeding, the defendants had waited approximately six weeks after the 60-day period expired to file the motions. (Id. at p. 679.) The defendants appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by requiring them to file their anti-SLAPP motions while their motion to transfer districts was pending. (Id. at pp. 679-680.) The appellatecourt affirmed.
The Morin court acknowledged the case's procedural history “might have” caused it to exercise the “statutory discretion differently, ” but this did not mean “the trial court's decision ‘exceed[ed] the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.' ” (Morin, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) Critically, “instead of attempting to promptly expose and dismiss [the plaintiff's] suit as a SLAPP, [the] defendants chose to devote their time, energy and resources to moving the case from state court to federal court and, after remand from the federal court, moving the case from one branch of the superior court to another and then from one judge to another in the chosen branch.” (Ibid.) Given all the time the defendants' “procedural maneuvering” had consumed, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce the 60-day deadline, even while the defendants' motion to transfer was pending. (Ibid.)
Al-Khatib waited 56 days after the 60-day deadline expired to file his anti-SLAPP motion-two weeks longer than the defendants in Morin delayed. During that time, the parties engaged in numerous discussions about the pleadings, including Blidaru's defamation claim; they exchanged written discovery; they filed a joint status conference statement (with Al-Khatib giving no notice of his intention to file an anti-SLAPP motion); and Al-Khatib filed a motion to strike Blidaru's punitive damages claim, which she opposed. Although Al-Khatib demanded Blidaru amend her defamation cause of action to avoid a demurrer, he never suggested to Blidaru that the claim constituted a SLAPP, he never asked her to dismiss it voluntarily, and he took no action prior to filing his belated special motion to strike to have the purported SLAPP dismissed at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. Indeed, unlike in Morin, where the plaintiff knew the defendants intended to seek dismissal of his suit because the defendants had filed anti-SLAPP motions in the federal court, Blidaru had no notice of Al-Khatib's intention to strike her defamation claim until he served her with his motion 116 days after service of the initial complaint. (Cf. Morin, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 678 [noting it was “undisputed the original SLAPP motions were filed in the bankruptcy court within the 60 day time period”].) Given these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court's decision to decline to permit Al-Khatib's belated filing exceeded the bounds of reason. (See ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Kamal L. Al-Khatib's anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. The Guidance Charter School's appeal is dismissed. Plaintiff Claudia Blidaru is entitled to her costs.
We concur: EDMON, P. J., LAVIN, J.