Opinion
Civ. File No. 03-6084 (PAM/RLE).
August 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brenda Blake sued Defendant U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank") for sexual harassment and retaliation under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et seq. ("MHRA"). Specifically, she alleges that Donovan Williams, another U.S. Bank employee, sexually harassed her and that U.S. Bank terminated her because she reported the harassment. U.S. Bank now moves for Summary Judgment on all counts. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Blake began working for U.S. Bank on March 24, 2003, as manager of an in-store branch in Oakdale, Minnesota. As the in-store branch manager, Blake was responsible for overseeing the Oakdale branch, including duties such as payroll and scheduling of branch employees.
In-store branches are those that are located within retail establishments, such as grocery stores. Traditional branches are free standing facilities in a dedicated bank building.
A. The Training Sessions
At the beginning of her employment, Blake attended online computer training at the U.S. Bank branch located in St. Louis Park, Minnesota. Donovan Williams, the in-store manager of the St. Louis Park branch, mentored Blake through the training by providing her instruction on topics such as bank procedures and managerial duties, and by completing a checklist of topics about which Blake was trained. Blake and Williams also commuted together between the St. Louis Park and Oakdale branches everyday after Blake completed her online training. Both Blake and Williams reported directly to Gene May, the District Manager for In-Store Branches.
During the training period, Williams allegedly subjected Blake to unwelcome attention. He made several inappropriate comments about Blake's marital status and physical appearance, and insinuated that Blake should date him. Williams also asked Blake personal questions, including whether Blake dated outside her race and what type of clothing she wore on the weekends. Williams also once asked whether Blake had a chance to "break in" a new bed. In addition, Williams often asked Blake to have lunch with him and once invited Blake to have a drink with him after work.
The parties disagree as to how long the training period lasted. Blake testified in her deposition that the training and her exposure to Williams's unwelcome conduct lasted approximately three weeks. (Gillette Aff. Ex. 1 at 96-97 (Blake Dep.).) U.S. Bank contends that Blake interacted with Williams for only one week. For purposes of this Motion, the Court concludes that Blake was subjected to the unwelcome conduct for approximately three weeks.
Williams also allegedly touched Blake in ways that she felt were inappropriate. He allegedly once touched her back while she walked through a door. He also allegedly once touched her knee and once tickled her waist while she was driving. On another occasion, Williams allegedly massaged Blake's shoulders while she completed her computer training. Although Blake was uncomfortable when the contact occurred, she did not indicate that she felt it was inappropriate at that time. However, she did request that Williams stop touching her for various reasons, such as her fear that the tickling would cause her to run off the road and that the massage would make her sleepy.
After Williams asked Blake to join him for lunch one day, Blake declined and informed Williams that she wanted to keep their relationship strictly professional. Williams never again engaged in unwelcome comments or conduct toward Blake. Instead, Williams refused to speak to her.
B. Blake's Report of Unwelcome Conduct
A day or two after Williams refused to speak to Blake, Blake called May, complained that Williams's conduct made her uncomfortable, and stated that she did not want to train with Williams again. May immediately relayed Blake's complaint to Human Resources Generalist Leslie Siegel. He also assigned another in-store manager to mentor Blake while she finished her computer training so that Blake would not encounter Williams again.
Within two hours of Blake's initial complaint, Siegel telephoned Blake and requested that they meet immediately to discuss Blake's concerns. During the meeting, Blake identified specific incidents involving Williams and explained how Williams's conduct had made her uncomfortable. Blake also informed Siegel that she witnessed Williams inappropriately touch Jennifer Ford, another U.S. Bank employee. Siegel responded by informing Blake that she would investigate the matter.
Siegel then interviewed Williams and three other U.S. Bank employees, including Ford. Williams admitted some of the behavior, but denied others. Ford reported that Williams had flirted with her, once rubbed her shoulders and touched her hair, and implied that he found Ford attractive. Ford also disclosed that she had told Williams that he had been "too touchy" but that she had not complained to anyone about his conduct.
Contrary to Blake's assertion, the fact that Williams denied some of the allegations against him does not make this case inappropriate for summary judgment. Rather, the court construes all facts most favorably to Blake, as the nonmoving party, and therefore concludes for purposes of this decision that all of the conduct about which Blake complains did indeed occur.
At the close of the investigation, Siegel concluded that Williams's conduct was inappropriate, but that it did not constitute sexual harassment. Siegel discussed her conclusions with May, who decided to give Williams a written warning.
C. Remedial Action by U.S. Bank
Siegel prepared the written warning, which May reviewed. May delivered the warning to Williams a week after Blake's complaint. During the disciplinary meeting, May instructed Williams not to have any contact with either Blake or Ford, and that any further inappropriate conduct could result in his termination. Siegel conducted a brief sexual harassment training session and prohibited Williams from engaging in any retaliation. Williams attended two additional sexual harassment training sessions in July 2003 and September 2003, and his promotion to a lead branch manager position was delayed.
Blake did not complain about any further inappropriate behavior by Williams. However, two weeks after her initial complaint, Blake informed Siegel that she was uncomfortable hearing Williams's voice during a conference call of in-store branch managers. Siegel and May met with Blake in late April 2003. At that meeting, Blake requested a transfer to a traditional branch position where she would not be exposed to Williams.
This is the only contact that Blake had with Williams after her complaint. At an all-branch meeting in August 2003, Blake saw Williams across a room but did not come into actual contact with him.
Under U.S. Bank policy, Blake was ineligible to post for a new position, as she had been in her role for less than twelve months. However, May waived this requirement so that Blake could apply for a new position. May and Siegel inquired whether Blake was interested in a banker or teller position. She was not, as those would have resulted in a reduction in pay. Blake stated that she preferred to fill a branch manager position. However, she was told that no manager positions were open and that she was unqualified to fill a branch manager position.
Blake ultimately expressed interest in a sales and service manager position. Siegel forwarded Blake's resume and application to Lynn Groll, the branch manager of the traditional branch located in Minnetonka, Minnesota. Niether May nor Siegel informed Groll that Blake had complained of sexual harassment. Rather, both simply indicated that Blake believed that the traditional branch environment was a better fit than an in-store environment.
D. The Sales and Service Manager Position
Blake began as a sales and service manager of the Minnetonka branch on June 2, 2003, receiving the same salary and benefits as her previous position. Blake contends that her transition to the Minnetonka branch was difficult, as she often had to fill in for tellers and was unable to perform managerial duties. Blake performed the same duties as her predecessors in the sales and service manager position.
From August 4 to August 8, 2003, Blake performed Groll's duties while Groll was on vacation. During that time, Blake had disciplinary issues with two Minnetonka branch employees: a teller coordinator and a teller. On August 4, 2003, Blake contacted Siegel about performance problems she was having with the teller coordinator. Siegel instructed Blake to wait until Groll returned from vacation before implementing any corrective action against the coordinator. Despite that instruction, Blake prepared a memorandum stating that human resources had approved a demotion of the teller coordinator effective immediately. Blake left the memorandum under a pile of papers in Groll's unlocked office.
After the teller failed to report to work on August 5, 2003, Blake telephoned the teller and informed her that she would not receive pay for the missed day. When the teller confronted Blake the next day, Blake called Siegel. Blake used a speaker phone to place the call. When the teller attempted to pick up the phone to speak with Siegel privately, Blake removed the phone from the teller's hands and placed it back on speaker phone. Siegel was unaware that the conversation was taking place in an open space and continued to discuss the personnel matter. Other employees overheard the conversation.
Upon returning from vacation and learning of these incidents, Groll met with Blake. Groll explained the inappropriateness of Blake's behavior in dealing with these employment issues. Blake admitted that she had acted improperly. Groll then contacted Siegel and Jay Gikas, the District Manager for Traditional Branches, both of whom supported Groll's decision to terminate Blake. Groll terminated Blake on August 13, 2003.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, only disputes of facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Id. Employment discrimination cases often "turn on inferences rather than direct evidence," and therefore this Court heeds the warning of the Eighth Circuit that "the court must be particularly deferential to the party opposing summary judgment" in employment discrimination cases. Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1997)).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2003). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings — it must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
B. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Both Title VII and the MHRA prohibit employment discrimination based on sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08(2). When the discrimination is latent, a plaintiff may still prevail by showing that inappropriate conduct created a hostile work environment. Henthorn v. Capitol Communications, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2004)); Minn. Stat. § 363A.03(13). To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII and the MHRA, Blake must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her protected status, (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of her employment, and (5) U.S. Bank knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2004) (citingCarter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999)). U.S. Bank argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Blake cannot establish a prima facie case. Because U.S. Bank took appropriate remedial action, Blake's claim fails as a matter of law.
Courts apply the same standards to hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII and the MHRA. See Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1124 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2000).
The fifth element of a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim requires Blake to show that U.S. Bank knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take proper remedial action. Meriwether, 326 F.3d at 994. Prompt remedial action shields an employer from liability when the harassing conduct is committed by a coworker rather than by a supervisor. Id. In assessing the reasonableness of an employer's response to a complaint of sexual harassment, courts consider (1) the temporal proximity between the notice and any remedial action, (2) the disciplinary or preventative measures taken, and (3) whether the measures ended the harassment. Id.
This standard differs from cases involving supervisor harassment. In those cases, an employer has an affirmative defense if it can show it exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and promptly corrected any harassment that did occur. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). Blake accepts that Williams was not her supervisor and therefore argues against the application of the Ellerth-Faragher defense. (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 16.) Thus, the remedial response of the employer is an element of the prima facie case, rather than an affirmative defense.
Blake does not argue that U.S. Bank's response to her complaints was untimely. Rather, she believes that U.S. Bank's response was inadequate. Specifically, she speculates that Williams would not have been disciplined if he had not admitted some parts of Blake's complaint. However, the record reveals that Williams was indeed disciplined for his actions, and that the discipline imposed on Williams ended the harassment.
An employer need not fire or take any other particular type of action against an alleged harasser. Rather, the law only requires that the employer take such action as is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Bailey v. Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 468-49 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distrib., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992)). U.S. Bank took prompt remedial action in an effort to end the alleged harassment. Immediately after Blake reported the unwelcome behavior, U.S. Bank underwent an investigation, which included interviewing Blake and Williams, as well as other U.S. Bank employees who had relevant information. U.S. Bank instructed Williams not to have further contact with Blake and assigned Blake a new trainer. U.S. Bank also disciplined Williams, required him to undergo sexual harassment training, and warned him that he would be terminated if another incident occurred. Williams never acted inappropriately towards Blake again. When Blake complained again that even hearing Williams's voice made her feel uncomfortable, U.S. Bank accommodated Blake's request for a transfer and waived its tenure requirement.
U.S. Bank's remedial actions were prompt and effective as a matter of law. Because Blake failed to establish the fifth element of the prima facie case, summary judgment on the discrimination claims is appropriate.
C. Retaliation
Blake also claims that U.S. Bank retaliated against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and Minn. Stat. § 363A.15. Both Title VII and the MHRA prohibit retaliation against employees who oppose discrimination. To prevail on these claims, Blake must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the adverse employment action and the protected activity.Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2004); Henthorn, 359 F.3d at 1028. Because Blake cannot satisfy either the second or third element of the prima facie case, the retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
1. Blake's Termination
U.S. Bank argues that Blake cannot show causation between her harassment complaint and her termination. It maintains that Groll alone decided to terminate Blake and Groll did not know that Blake had complained of sexual harassment when the termination occurred. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (to satisfy third element of retaliation prima facie case, plaintiff must present evidence that decisionmaker knew that plaintiff had engaged in statutorily protected activity) (citations omitted).
However, Blake asserts that Gikas and Siegel wielded influence over Groll in the discharge decision. Under the cat's paw rule, "an employer cannot shield itself from liability for an unlawful termination by using a purportedly independent person as the decisionmaker where the decisionmaker merely serves as the conduit, vehicle, or rubber stamp by which another achieves an unlawful design." Dedmon v. Staley, 315 F.3d 948, 949 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2003). No evidence exists that either Gikas or Siegel effected the discharge decision. To the contrary, Groll decided to terminate Blake after receiving several complaints from branch employees about Blake's inappropriate behavior. Groll conferred with Gikas and Siegel only to confirm that termination was warranted. No reasonable juror could find that Gikas or Siegel manipulated Groll into believing that the discharge was appropriate. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 725 (8th Cir. 1998) (cat's paw theory fails when purported decision maker made an independent determination as to whether termination was appropriate).
In addition, the time frame between Blake's complaint and her termination — four months — is insufficient to satisfy the third element of the prima facie case. See Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 2003) ("time interval of more than two months is too long to support an inference of causation"); Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 1999) (four-month gap weakens the inference of retaliation that arises when an adverse employment action occurs shortly after a complaint); Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis, 267 F. Supp. 1004, 1012-13 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.) (no question of fact as to whether there was a causal connection existed when four months separated protected activity and adverse employment action).
2. The Transfer
Blake argues that other conduct associated with her transfer also constituted adverse employment actions sufficient to maintain a retaliation claim. Specifically, Blake contends that she suffered an adverse employment action when May and Siegel suggested that she transfer to positions that paid less than the in-store manager position. Blake refused all lower paying jobs and ultimately was placed in a position where she received the same pay and benefits as the in-store branch position. The mere suggestion that Blake should apply for a lower paying position cannot constitute an adverse employment action, as it had no consequence on the terms or conditions of Blake's employment.See Sowell v. Alumnia Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 2001) (because the work policy the plaintiff complained of was never put into practice against her, she did not suffer an adverse employment action). Likewise, the ultimate transfer cannot constitute an adverse employment action. See Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1999) (transfer of claimant at her request after allegations of sexual harassment is not an adverse employment action).
Finally, Blake argues that she suffered an adverse employment action because she did not perform managerial duties and was effectively relegated to a teller position at the Minnetonka branch. An adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage. Minor changes that merely inconvenience an employee or alter an employee's work responsibilities do not constitute an adverse employment action. Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Saulsberry v. St. Mary's Univ., 318 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Certain employment actions cannot be characterized as adverse. Such actions include changes in the terms, duties, or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage to the employee . . . or disappointment with changes in one's employment situation"). As a sales and service manager, Blake performed the same responsibilities and tasks as her predecessors in that position, and received the same pay and benefits as her previous position. Moreover, the record shows that Blake did perform managerial duties, such as addressing employee disciplinary issues. Indeed, these managerial duties ultimately precipitated her termination. Thus, Blake's argument on this point fails. Because Blake is unable to establish a prima facie case, her retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and upon all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Docket No. 22) is GRANTED.