Opinion
No. X02 CV 02-4000570-S
January 10, 2005
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment
The issue in these motions for summary judgment is the retroactivity of our Supreme Court's decision in Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003), which held that a common-law negligence action exists against those responsible for the sale of alcoholic beverages to a person who causes injury to another as result of the effects of the alcohol. Our appellate courts have not resolved this issue and the Superior Courts are divided. Compare Estate of Ridgaway v. Silk, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. 013518 (April 28, 2004, Quinn, J.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 872) (nonretroactive), with Raposa v. Lyman, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 182731 (December 3, 2003, D'Andrea, J.T.R.) (retroactive).
I
On October 7, 2001, three young men were killed and one young man was seriously injured in a one-car accident in the town of Seymour. The plaintiffs in these two cases are the estate administrators of two of the deceased as well as the injured survivor. They have sued, among others, one of the establishments where the plaintiff's decedents and the injured plaintiff (together "the plaintiffs") consumed alcohol just before the accident. Also named as defendants are the permittee and the bartender of that establishment (together "the defendants"). The plaintiffs allege recklessness, negligence, and, in the Blackwell case, a violation of the dram shop act. See General Statutes § 30-102 (2003).
The defendants move for summary judgment on the negligence count only. See Kowal v. Hofner, 181 Conn. 355, 359-62, CT Page 2230 436 A.2d 1 (1980) (permitting actions based on reckless misconduct). They rely on Quinnett v. Newman, 213 Conn. 343, 568 A.2d 786 (1990), which was the prevailing decision when the accident occurred in 2001 and which held that the legislature, in the dram shop act, had preempted the field, thereby barring a negligence action. The plaintiffs rely on Craig v. Driscoll, supra, in which the Supreme Court on February 4, 2003 overruled Quinnett's holding that the legislature had preempted the field, decided that the sale of alcohol to an apparently intoxicated person could become the proximate cause of injuries to a third person, and thereby permitted a right of action in common-law negligence. The plaintiffs argue that Craig applies retroactively to these cases. Because the defendants do not dispute the facts for the purposes of this motion, but instead raise the purely legal issue of whether the negligence counts state a cause of action, the court can decide the issue on summary judgment. See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 32 n. 17, 699 A.2d 964 (1997); Drahan v. Board of Education, 42 Conn.App. 480, 498 n. 17, 680 A.2d 316, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921, 682 A.2d 1000 (1996).
II
The plaintiffs initially suggest, because the cause of action in Craig arose as a result of an automobile accident in 1996, that the Supreme Court has already held that a cause of action for negligence necessarily exists for victims of alcohol-related accidents occurring in 2001. That is not the case. The general rule is that our Supreme Court's "decision will apply to the parties involved in the case in which the decision was reached." George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 326, 736 A.2d 889 (1999). This rule ensures that the party that persuades the court to rule in its favor receives "the fruits of his or her effort." Id. But that rule, designed for the benefit of the immediate parties, does not require the retroactive operation of decisions for all other cases.
On the contrary, there are several additional factors to consider before a new decision should apply retroactively to other cases. Our Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test borrowed from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Thus, "[a] common-law decision will be applied nonretroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 377-78 n. 18, 703 A.2d 117 (1997). Reflecting the wording of this three-part test, the Court has stated that, with regard to all pending cases: "judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retroactively . . . ". . ." Myrone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 10-11, 770 A.2d 725 (1998).
The plaintiffs suggest that the Chevron Oil test is no longer valid because the United States Supreme Court has renounced it and held that all rulings on federal law in civil cases must receive full retroactive effect in pending cases. See Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993). On questions of state law such as the present one, however, the court is bound by the rulings of our state Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court applies the approach taken by the state Supreme Court, which has not abandoned the Chevron Oil test. See Denardo v. Bergamo, No. 17200, slip op. at 7 (Conn. January 18, 2005 advance sheets) (citing Chevron Oil as governing the retroactivity of nonjurisdictional decisions).
No dispute exists concerning the first factor, because the Craig court explicitly overruled Quinnett. The second factor is whether, "given its prior history, purpose and effect, retroactive application of the rule would retard its operation." Ostrowski v. Avery, supra, 243 Conn. 377-78 n. 18. The threshold issue is the identity of the appropriate "rule" within the meaning of this factor. The leading case to hold that Craig is not retroactive, Estate of Ridgaway v. Silk, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 013518, correctly viewed the relevant "rule" as the "rule as set forth in Craig v. Driscoll." Id. The court stated: "furtherance of the rule as set forth in Craig v. Driscoll would significantly frustrate the objectives of our legislature and would be contrary to the public policy of this state." Id.
In Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 487 A.2d 181 (1985), in which our Supreme Court first quoted the Chevron Oil test, the court stated that the second factor required a court to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Neyland v. Board of Education, supra, 195 Conn. 179 (quoting. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra, 404 U.S. 106-07).
The court referred to the legislature because of the recent enactment of Public Acts 2003, No. 03-91, which amended the dram shop act to increase the limit of liability from $20,000 to $250,000 per person and explicitly barred negligence actions arising from the sale of liquor to adults. The new legislation effectively overruled Craig for cases arising after June 1, 2003. See Public Acts 2003, No. 03-91.
This court, however, disagrees with the ultimate application of the second prong of the Chevron Oil test in Estate of Ridgaway. The question is whether retroactive application of the rule would retard the rule's operation, not whether it would conflict with statutes or other public policy. Although it may be rare that retroactive application of a new rule would retard its own operation, the test is an important one and should be applied as stated.
In Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court did find that retroactive operation of a new rule would retard its operation. The issue was the retroactivity of the Court's decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), which held that state law remedies rather than those found in admiralty law applied to personal injury cases arising from locations governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Court held that retroactive operation of Rodrigue would retard its operation because it would create a state statute of limitations bar to an injured party's suit and thus run contrary to the purpose of the decision, which was "to aid injured employees by affording them comprehensive and familiar remedies." Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S. 108.
The purpose of the Craig decision was to "provide an avenue to recover full compensation, but only upon establishing the requisite culpability and causation." Craig, supra, 262 Conn. 328. It would decidedly further this purpose to hold Craig retroactive, since doing so would allow victims, upon proof that the excessive sale of alcohol caused their injuries, to recover full compensation, unlimited by the dram shop act. Thus, the defendants cannot prove that retroactive treatment of Craig would retard its operation.
The third factor is whether "retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship." It is true, as the defendants highlight, that there is some inequity in subjecting bar owners, who purchased insurance based on the law as it existed before Craig, to the unexpected and increased possibility of payment of full compensation for resulting injuries. But there may also be inequity in limiting the recovery of the victims of a catastrophic alcohol-related auto accidents occurring prior to the Craig decision to the old dram shop cap of $20,000 when persons injured in the four months after the February 4, 2003 Craig decision can recover an unlimited amount and persons injured after the June 1, 2003 amendment of the dram shop act can recover up to $250,000. While it is difficult to balance these inequities precisely, the comparative equities and tragic accidents in these cases make it less certain that retroactive operation of Craig would subject tavern owners to "substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship."
In any event, regardless of the resolution of the third factor, the Chevron Oil test requires a party attempting to prove the prospective operation of a common-law decision to establish all three factors and, as discussed, the defendants cannot satisfy the second. In general, moreover, the defendants have advanced no compelling reason to overcome the presumption of retroactivity. Accordingly, the court concludes that Craig applies retroactively to this case.
III
The court denies the motions for summary judgment. It is so ordered.
Carl J. Schuman Judge, Superior Court