Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Argued and Submitted Nov. 3, 1999.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Harry L. Hupp, District Judge, Presiding.
Before BROWNING, TASHIMA, Circuit Judges, and KING, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
Plaintiffs Steve Schanes and Picture Entertainment Corporation appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of copyright infringement in favor of Defendants Shane Val Black and New Line Cinema Corporation, creators of The Long Kiss Goodnight. Defendants cross-appeal, contending that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant them attorney's fees. Defendants also assert that these appeals are improperly before this court because the parties have reached an enforceable settlement agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The parties are familiar with the facts, and we need not repeat them here.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., dismissed below as a defendant upon stipulation of the parties, also cross-appeals the district court's denial of attorney's fees.
We have the authority to determine the threshold question of whether the parties have entered into a binding settlement agreement, and we find that no binding settlement agreement was reached. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994).
We rely on basic principles of state contract law in the enforcement of settlement agreements. See Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir.1990). California "law is well settled that an attorney must be specifically authorized to settle and compromise a claim." Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650 (Cal.1985) (quotations and citations omitted). Under California law, an attorney has neither implied authority nor apparent authority to bind his client to a settlement agreement. See id . at 650, 653. The California Supreme Court has held that a substantial matter, such as a settlement agreement, requires that "a person dealing with an attorney, as dealing with any agent, must ascertain whether the agent has authority to do the purported act and assumes the risk if in fact the agent has no such authority." Id. at 652 (quotations and citations omitted).
Defendants relied on the purported settlement agreement to their own peril; they have not met their burden of proving that Scott Kadin, attorney for Plaintiffs, had express authority to bind his clients to a settlement agreement. Absent evidence of express authority, Kadin's good faith belief that his clients had agreed to the settlement is insufficient to bind Plaintiffs. Thus, no binding settlement having been reached, we have jurisdiction over these appeals.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir.1999). The district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants because Plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim that they owned the copyright to Jack Hunter. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (holding that plaintiffs must establish both copyright ownership and copying of protectable elements of copyrighted material).
Plaintiffs did not obtain ownership through the 1995 assignment because Blackthorne was suspended by the State of California in 1992 for nonpayment of its franchise taxes; therefore, it was ineligible to conduct business in 1995 while still suspended. See McLaughlin Land & Livestock Co. v. Bank of America, 94 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.1938) (holding that a suspended corporation is "incapable of exercising corporate powers for any business purpose"); Cal. Rev. & Tax.Code §§ 23301, 23301.5 (West 1992). Plaintiffs also did not acquire ownership through the 1989 corporate resolution because there was no written assignment of the copyright as required for a valid copyright transfer and the writing did not confirm a prior oral agreement. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a); Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1428 (9th Cir.1996). Further, Plaintiffs do not validly own the copyright simply because they registered with the United States Copyright Office, because the registration occurred more than five years after the first publication. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Because Plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding ownership, we need not address the issue of copying. See Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.1997).
The district court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the law under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505, by refusing to award Defendants attorney's fees. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir.1996). In denying Defendants' request for attorney's fees, the district court properly considered frivolousness, motivation, objective reasonableness, and deterrence. See id. at 558 (citing Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3rd Cir.1986)).
Finding nothing "exceptional" about the case, the district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.1997). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because there was no showing of bad faith on the part of Plaintiffs. See Moore v. Keegan Management Co. (In re Keegan Management Co.), 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir.1996).
The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and its denial of Defendants' request for attorney's fees are
AFFIRMED.