Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-CV-938
10-06-2020
DOMINIC BLACK, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., Defendant
Brann Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a second legally-mandated screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. Dominic Black is a state prisoner who previously, and unsuccessfully, petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole had violated his rights in the course of making some adverse parole determinations in his case. This court considered, and rejected, these claims. Black v. PA Parole Bd., No. 3:15-CV-949, 2019 WL 1714478, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Black v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 3:15-CV-00949, 2019 WL 1651379 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019).
Undeterred by this finding in the context of a federal habeas corpus petition that his constitutional claims lacked legal merit, Black reprised these allegations in a civil rights lawsuit, which sought damages from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and several individual parole officials for their roles in these parole determinations. On June 22, 2020, we recommended dismissal of this complaint, without prejudice to the plaintiff attempting to file an amended complaint. We made this recommendation finding that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and the doctrine of res judicata both called for dismissal of this complaint in its current form. (Doc. 11). On September 10, 2020, the district court adopted this Report and Recommendation and entered an order which stated, in part, that: “Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in Magistrate Judge Carlson's June 22, 2020 Report and Recommendation, provided that Plaintiff acts within 20 days of this dismissal Order.” (Doc. 26).
Black has not filed an amended complaint as directed by the district court, and the time for amending this pleading has now elapsed. Instead, Black has submitted an assortment of letters, along with a motion to reconsider which belatedly asked the court to reconsider its prior ruling without addressing the Eleventh Amendment and res judicata considerations which led to that ruling. (Docs. 27-29). In the absence of an amended complaint, or a coherent response to the constitutional and jurisprudential concerns previously described by the court, it is impossible for this case to proceed forward at this time. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case now be dismissed with prejudice and that Black's motion to reconsider be denied.
II. Discussion
While our initial screening analysis called for dismissal of this action, the Court provided the plaintiffs a final opportunity to further litigate this matter by endeavoring to promptly file a proper amended complaint. Having concluded that this pro se complaint was flawed in multiple and profound ways, we followed this course recognizing that, in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless it is clear that granting further leave to amend would be futile, or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Thus, in this case, the plaintiff was given this opportunity to further amend his complaint but has now forfeited this opportunity through his inaction. In this situation, where a wholly deficient complaint is dismissed without prejudice but the pro se plaintiff refuses or declines to timely amend the complaint, it is well within the court's discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice given the plaintiff's refusal to comply with court directives. Indeed, the precise course was endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 Fed.Appx. 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007). In Pruden, the appellate court addressed how district judges should exercise discretion when a pro se plaintiff ignores instructions to amend a complaint. In terms that are equally applicable here, the Court observed that:
The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed [the pro se plaintiff] twenty days in which to file an amended complaint. [The pro se plaintiff] failed to do so. Because [the pro se plaintiff] decided not to amend his complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed [the pro se plaintiff's] complaint with prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir.1996). The District Court expressly warned [the pro se plaintiff] that the failure to amend his complaint would result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. “[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other course the court could have followed.” Id. (quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir.1994)).Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 Fed.Appx. 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007).
Therefore, consistent with the prior practice of this court, it is recommended that the complaint now be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous without further leave to amend. See, e.g., Moore v. Primeramo, No. 4:17-CV-990, 2017 WL 5474548, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-990, 2017 WL 5473461 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017); Williams v. Harry, No. 1:16-CV-01759, 2017 WL 3454410, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017) (Kane, J.); Washington v. U.S.P. Canaan Kitchen/FBOP, No. 1:15-CV-849, 2015 WL 4663188, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2015) (Kane, J.);Wicks v. Barkley, 3:12-CV-02203, 2013 WL 5937066 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2013) (Mariani, J.); Davis v. Superintendent, SCI Huntingdon, 3:12-CV-01935, 2013 WL 6837796 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013) (Mariani, J.).
It is further recommended that Black's motion to reconsider (Doc. 29) be DENIED. The legal standards that govern motions to reconsider are both clear, and clearly compelling. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Typically such a motion should only be granted in three, narrowly defined circumstances, where there is either: “(1) [an] intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F.Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992). As the Third Circuit has aptly observed:
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677 (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985)). “Accordingly, a judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citation omitted).Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, it is well-settled that a mere disagreement with the court does not translate into the type of clear error of law which justifies reconsideration of a ruling. Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Furthermore, “[b]ecause federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Moreover, it is evident that a motion for reconsideration is not a tool to re-litigate and reargue issues which have already been considered and disposed of by the court. Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Rather, such a motion is appropriate only where the court has misunderstood a party or where there has been a significant change in law or facts since the court originally ruled on that issue. See Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983).
Judged by these standards, Black's motion to reconsider (Doc. 29) fails as a matter of law. Black's motion demands a great deal of the reader. It appears to consist of a series of legal aphorisms, many of which are entirely divorced from the facts of this case. None of the contentions made by Black refute, or even address in an intelligible fashion, the Eleventh Amendment and res judicata considerations that led to the dismissal of his original complaint. Nor does Black cite to any material change in the law or the facts that warrants reconsideration of this prior decision. Further, nothing in Black's pleading identifies a manifest injustice that now needs to be corrected. In the absence of any such showing, Black's motion to reconsider fails. That failure, coupled with Black's failure to timely file an amended complaint as he was ordered to do, now compels the dismissal of this case with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous for failure to state a claim. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion to reconsider (Doc. 29) be DENIED and this case be closed.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.