Opinion
April 24, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The doctrine of absolute privilege is founded "upon the personal position or status of the speaker and is limited to the speaker's official participation in the processes of government" (Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 209; see also, Doran v. Cohalan, 125 A.D.2d 289, 290, lv dismissed 69 N.Y.2d 984). "[A]n official [who] is a principal executive of State or local government or is entrusted by law with administrative or executive policy-making responsibilities of considerable dimension" will be provided complete immunity from liability for defamation (Stukuls v. State of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 278) regarding statements or comments uttered "during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties" (Clark v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 613, 617; see also, Cosme v. Town of Islip, 63 N.Y.2d 908, 909; Baumblatt v. Battalia, 134 A.D.2d 226, 228, 229).
Robert Funicello, as an executive officer of a local government, enjoyed an absolute privilege (see, Clark v. McGee, supra; Village Law § 4-400). When presented with evidence that the plaintiff could be involved in ticket fixing and towing kickback schemes, he acted properly in presenting these matters to a closed session of the village board of police commissioners. Accordingly, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contention. Lawrence, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.