Opinion
No. 1:15-cv-1006
03-31-2017
JAMEL BILLUPS, and JACQUELINE ROSARIO, Plaintiffs v. CATHY UTZ, et al., Defendants
( ) MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants Ted Dallas, Cindi E. Horshaw, and Cathy A. Utz. (Doc. No. 36.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This action has its origins in a 2009 child abuse investigation of Plaintiffs Jamel Billups and Jacqueline Rosario. Specifically, the present case centers around whether state officials had the authority to summarily reinstate Plaintiffs' listing on ChildLine, the state's child abuse database, months after expunging the original listing. (See Doc. No. 35.)
A federal civil rights lawsuit Plaintiffs filed against medical practitioners and Franklin County affiliates regarding the initial child abuse investigation remains pending. Billups, et al., v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., et al., No. 11-cv-01784 (M.D. Pa.). Whether the report of abuse was justified is a question that remains controverted in related litigation in both the federal and Pennsylvania courts. See id.
On October 19, 2009, Franklin County's child protection agency received a report that Plaintiffs had abused their minor child, L.B.. (See Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 14, 18.) ChildLine was notified of the abuse allegation on October 19, 2009. (Id. ¶ 23.) On December 18, 2009, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas conducted a dependency hearing and made a factual finding that Plaintiffs had abused their child. (Id. ¶ 27.) As a consequence, on February 22, 2010, state authorities updated ChildLine to reflect a "founded" report of child abuse. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff Billups was criminally charged concerning the child abuse allegation, but a jury acquitted him of all charges after a full trial in December 2010. (See id. ¶¶ 55-56.)
The factual background is drawn from Plaintiffs' amended complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of this motion only.
On September 21, 2011, upon receipt of new exculpatory evidence, Plaintiffs appealed the ChildLine report to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"), an agency since renamed the Department of Human Services ("DHS"). (See id. ¶ 33.) The agency rejected Plaintiffs' appeal as untimely. (See id. ¶ 34.) The state agency's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals ("BHA") also rejected Plaintiffs' subsequent appeal on timeliness grounds (id. ¶ 37), and Plaintiffs appealed the BHA disposition to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on May 15, 2012 (id. ¶¶ 37-38).
During litigation in the Commonwealth Court, Plaintiffs and the state agency agreed to enter mediation and to stay the appeal in the Commonwealth Court while Plaintiffs sought an agency review by DPW or its designee pursuant to 23 Pa. Stat. 6341(a). (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) Defendant Cathy Utz, acting as the designee of the agency secretary, reviewed Plaintiffs' case. (Id. ¶ 42.) On June 7, 2013, Defendant Utz sent a letter to Plaintiffs informing them that, upon review, the secretary had decided to expunge the ChildLine report in accordance with the state statute. (Id.)
Officials from Franklin County sent Defendant Utz a letter of their own on June 28, 2013. (Doc. Nos. 10-3; 35 ¶ 47-48.) In the letter, signed by Franklin County child services director Douglas Amsley and Franklin County child services solicitor Brian Bornman, the county officials requested that Defendant Utz reconsider her decision to expunge the ChildLine reports based on "substantial misinformation" provided by Plaintiffs to the state agency. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 2.) According to the letter, Plaintiffs did not fully apprise the state agency of the exhaustive judicial proceedings that occurred in the wake of the dependency hearing - procedures which, as per the letter, deprived the state agency of jurisdiction over the claim. (Id.) Though not apparent from the text of the letter, Plaintiffs allege that the county officials sought reconsideration of the expunction because the county was defending Plaintiffs' civil rights lawsuit, and they "desire[d] to continue to have founded reports to use in their defense[.]" (Doc. No. 35 ¶ 61.)
On December 19, 2013, Defendant Utz sent Plaintiffs another letter. (Doc. Nos. 10-2; 35 ¶ 68.) According to the letter, the agency completed its review of Plaintiffs' file after receiving "additional medical information." (See Doc. No. 10-2 at 1.) Defendant Utz informed Plaintiffs that their request for expungement - that had already been granted on June 7, 2013 - was denied, and that, Plaintiffs would accordingly "remain listed as perpetrators of child abuse" on the agency's database. (Id.; see Doc. No. 35 ¶ 68.)
Since the reinstatement, proceedings in the state judicial and administrative systems have been ongoing. On June 5, 2014, the Commonwealth Court issued a sealed opinion ordering the case to be remanded to address the merits "based on [a physician's] false testimony at the dependency hearing." (See Doc. No. 35 ¶ 69.) Upon remand, the BHA conducted evidentiary hearings and determined that, while it retained jurisdiction over the ChildLine report itself, the BHA possesses no jurisdiction to determine whether Defendant Utz's reinstatement of the report was lawful. (Doc. No. 27-2.) On the request of Plaintiffs, the BHA stayed its determination on the merits of the report until this Court has adjudicated Plaintiffs' present federal complaint. (Id.; see Doc. No. 35 ¶ 76.)
Plaintiffs initiated the present action on May 23, 2015 (Doc. No. 1), and they filed their amended complaint on July 21, 2015 (Doc. No. 10). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the re-instatement of their ChildLine report without notice or the opportunity for a hearing, and without any express statutory authorization, violated due process protections found in both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, and that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to commit the violation. (Doc. No. 10 ¶ 81(a-b).) Plaintiffs also alleged that their re-listing on the database caused compensable injury to their reputations in violation of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, and that Defendants also engaged in a conspiracy to cause their reputation injury. (Id. ¶ 81(c-d).) In addition to damages, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to de-list them from the ChildLine database. (Id. ¶ 80.)
On August 4, 2015, Defendants Amsley, Bronman, and Franklin County (together, the "County Defendants") filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. No. 11.) Defendants Dallas, Horshaw, and Utz filed their own motion to dismiss on August 21, 2015. (Doc. No. 21.) On February 29, 2016, this Court granted in part the County Defendants' and Defendants Dallas, Horshaw, and Utz's motions to dismiss and granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Court's February 29, 2016 Memorandum. (Doc. No. 34.)
On March 20, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 35.) The second amended complaint adds eighteen allegations to the first amended complaint, though the remaining allegations are simply reiterations of the allegations made in the first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 79-97.) On April 4, 2016, the County Defendants and Defendants Dallas, Horshaw, and Utz each filed a second Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 36, 37.) Plaintiffs and the County Defendants have since stipulated to the dismissal of the County Defendants (Doc. No. 43), and Defendants Dallas, Horshaw, and Utz's motion to dismiss is now ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court's inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal, pleading requirements have shifted to a "more heightened form of pleading." See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Id. Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs' legal theories can be broken down into four broad claims: (1) substantive due process; (2) procedural due process; (3) state constitutional claims; and (4) conspiracy. (See Doc. No. 35.) Plaintiffs appear to bring their federal due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their Pennsylvania right to reputation and due process claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
A. Substantive due process
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for substantive due process for failing to articulate a fundamental property interest Defendants violated. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' second amended complaint "has added nothing than that which they pled in the First Amendment Complaint." (Doc. No. 38 at 6.) Plaintiffs' brief in opposition does not address their substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 40.)
To state a claim under the substantive due process clause for non-legislative acts, "a plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter that he has a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies." Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139-140 (3d Cir. 2000). An injury to an individual's right to a reputation, while cognizable under the Pennsylvania Constitution, is legally insufficient as a basis for substantive due process violation. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) ("To the extent Hill's substantive due process claim was based not only on loss of his job, but also on reputational injury that decreased his 'ability to earn a living,' it also fails.") (citing Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399-404 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Therefore, for the reasons detailed in its February 29, 2016 Memorandum, this Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's substantive due process claim for failure to allege a violation of a fundamental property interest.
B. Procedural due process
Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs' second amended complaint fails to adequately allege a federal procedural due process violation. (Doc. No. 38 at 6.) In their brief in opposition, Plaintiffs cite principles from Pennsylvania law and stress that no due process was afforded during the reinstatement proceedings. (Doc. No. 40 at 1, 9.)
"To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide 'due process of law.'" Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that "reputation alone is not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989).
"Rather, to make out a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest." Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (italics in original) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)). "To satisfy the 'stigma' prong of the test, it must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were made publicly, and (2) were false." Hill, 455 F.3d at 236. The "plus" of the "stigma- plus" analysis "had to be an alteration or extinguishment of 'a right or status previously recognized by state law.'" Id. at 237 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege both the loss of reputation and the deprivation of an opportunity to apply for a job for which Plaintiff Rosario had qualifications and interest. (Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 94, 79.) Specifically, Plaintiff Jacqueline Rosario allegedly viewed a job posting that required child abuse background clearance and did not apply for the job due to the "un-expunging" decision. (Id. ¶¶ 79, 84.) Plaintiffs claim that Rosario was "impeded from seeking employment opportunities" because of the ChildLine reports. (Id. ¶ 78.) In the employment context, Third Circuit jurisprudence can "be read broadly to require that the 'plus' be loss of a job in which the plaintiff had a protectible property interest." Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996)). Plaintiffs' assertion that Rosario was deprived of a chance to apply for a job does not satisfy the "plus" prong of the "stigma-plus" analysis. (Id. ¶¶ 79, 84, 90.) See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
Plaintiffs also allege, in a conclusory fashion, that the ChildLine report "burdens a person's fundamental right to the free exercise of religion, freedom of association, and freedom to raise their children as they see fit." (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 95.) Plaintiffs claim that the ChildLine report "can affect" fundamental freedoms and the Plaintiffs' "ability to fully participate in activities with their children in the non-employment context." (Id. ¶ 97.) Such references to the free exercise of religion, the right to raise children, and the freedom of association are too conclusory to adequately allege the "additional right or interest" required by the "stigma-plus" analysis. Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly demonstrate the deprivation of a cognizable interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs adequately allege a cognizable interested protected by the Due Process Clause, Plaintiffs have not cured the pleading deficiencies identified previously by the Court with respect to alleging a deprivation of procedural due process. In its February 29, 2016 Memorandum, this Court found that Plaintiffs did "not allege that the Commonwealth Court's merits review was an inadequate or an unavailable remedy, and they concede that the Commonwealth Court action allowed Plaintiffs to seek the principal redress that they seek here." (Doc. No. 33 at 12.) While in their brief in opposition Plaintiffs' strenuously contest whether they conceded that "the relief requested is available via the Commonwealth Court action" (Doc. No. 40 at 3), Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege in the second amended complaint the insufficiency of the available post-deprivation remedy. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. State Law Claims
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' reputation injury claim as inadequately supported by factual allegations and for failure to identify a cause of action for reputation injury. Defendants contend that the second amended complaint similarly fails to allege a cause of action for loss of reputation or lost employment opportunities. (Doc. No. 38 at 6-7.) Plaintiffs supplemented their first amended complaint with eighteen allegations that relate to their right to reputation claim. In their brief in opposition, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Pennsylvania's expanded child abuse clearance requirements necessitate that Defendants afford Plaintiffs the procedural safeguards they were allegedly denied. (See Doc. No. 40 at 4-10.)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has "held that the requirements of Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution are not distinguishable from those of the 14th Amendment, [and has] appl[ied] the same analysis to both claims." Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 255 n.6 (Pa. 1995) (citing R. v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 152-153 (Pa. 1993)). As a result, Pennsylvania "courts examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there is a life, liberty, or property interest that the state has interfered with; and the second examines whether the procedures attendant to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Com. v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 764 (Pa. 2013) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989)). This Court begins with whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a protected interest under Pennsylvania law.
1. Protected Interest
Plaintiffs argue that "reputation is an interest that is protected in Pennsylvania." (Doc. No. 40 at 5.) Defendants succinctly respond to this contention by stating that the second amended complaint does not state a legally viable claim (Doc. No. 36 at 2) and "does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a cause of action for loss of reputation" (Doc. No. 38 at 6).
Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." Pa. Const. art. I, § 1. Courts in Pennsylvania have cited Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution as establishing "reputation as one of the fundamental rights that cannot be abridged without compliance with state constitutional standards of due process and equal protection." Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 532 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa. 1987); see In re E.A., 82 A.3d 370, 385 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. Com., 607 A.2d 850, 855-56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). Although Section 1 of Article I does not use the term "due process," due process rights emanate from the Pennsylvania Constitution, R. v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 152 (Pa. 1994), and are inextricably intertwined with the right to reputation, Thomas v. Kane, 2016 WL 6081868, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 17, 2016). As a consequence, the "stigma plus" analysis applicable to a federal due process claim is not required under Pennsylvania law. D.C. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 150 A.3d 558, 566 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
For example, in R. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that a father, who appealed the denial of his request to expunge an "indicated" report of child abuse, had a protected reputation interest "affected by his expungement hearings." See R. v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa. 1994). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Utz "failed to afford Plaintiffs due process during her reconsideration of the expunged reports" and that the founded report of child abuse is still being reported. (Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 53, 81.) Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered a loss of "reputation, not just among prospective employers, but among their peers at school, church and in every social and community setting involving children." (Doc. No. 35 ¶ 94.) In support thereof, Plaintiffs cite twenty-seven "newly expanded" circumstances in which ChildLine clearances are required. (Id. ¶ 88.)
Therefore, given that reputation is an interest protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution and that the right to reputation may be affected by an expungement hearing concerning child abuse reports, R. v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d at 149, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a protected interest under Pennsylvania law.
2. Deprivation of a Protected Interest
The Court next determines whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the "procedures attendant to that deprivation were constitutionally" insufficient. Com. v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 764 (Pa. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
Due process "is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). The United States Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), instructed courts to weigh the following three factors to "determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case." Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Specifically, under the standard enunciated in Mathews, "a court is to weigh three factors: (1) 'the private interest that will be affected by the official action', (2) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used' and the value of 'additional or substitute procedural safeguards', and (3) the governmental interest, 'including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.'" Montanez v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
In R. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the Mathews analysis when it addressed a challenge under Pennsylvania law to the procedures employed during an expungement hearing. R., 636 A.2d at 142, 144, 150. In that case, a father appealed the denial of his request that DPW expunge an "indicated" report of child abuse. Id. at 144. In particular, the father argued that allowing his daughter to testify in camera at the expungement hearing denied him his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under Sections 1 and 11 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 146.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first performed its Mathews analysis to determine whether the father suffered a procedural due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. R., 636 A.2d at 153. The court then "adopt[ed] the Matthews methodology to assess due process claims brought under Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id.
First, as to the private right affected, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that the father's reputation is a protected interest under the Pennsylvania Constitution that "will be affected by his expungement hearings." Id. at 149. In assessing the extent that the father would be deprived of his reputation interest, the court turned its focus on the extent and the circumstances under which his identity "will be revealed." Id. at 149. Second, as to the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania court found that the father was afforded the basic guarantees of allowing the "accused to expose testimonial weaknesses" and to be apprised of "the evidence used to prove the government's case." Id. As to the third Mathews prong, the court cited the "urgent need of an effective child protective serve to prevent" abused children from suffering "further injury and impairment." Id. at 151 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302.) The court found that: "[I]n view of the narrow range of situations in which [the father's] identity is revealed and the governmental interest these few permissible disclosures are designed to serve, the deprivation itself was likewise very limited." Id. at 152. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately concluded that the father did not suffer a due process violation under either the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Here, as to the private interest affected, Plaintiffs allege that the "founded report of child abuse" is still being reported and that Pennsylvania has recently expanded "the use of the ChildLine child abuse registry background clearances from those seeking employment to those who volunteer in religious and non-religious organizations in which there is contact with children." (Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 82, 87.) However, as to the risk of an erroneous deprivation, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that the procedure afforded creates a risk that Plaintiffs "would suffer an erroneous deprivation." R., 636 A.2d at 151.
In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs' allegations center around the purported absence of process in Defendant Utz's decision to "un-expunge the founded reports." (Id. ¶ 78.) Plaintiffs allege that "Defendant Utz failed to afford the Plaintiffs' due process during her reconsideration of the expunged reports" by not providing Plaintiffs notice or an opportunity to be heard. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 53.) However, Plaintiffs also allege that they "requested a stay of the BHA matter pending resolution of this suit." (Id. ¶ 76.) In a prior submission, Plaintiffs filed a July 10, 2015 order by an administrative law judge granting Plaintiffs' motion to stay the BHA proceeding as to "the issue of whether or not the Department is correctly maintaining this founded report." (Doc. No. 27-2 at 1.)
Specifically, in their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that: (1) no authority permitted Defendant Utz to reconsider or reinstate the June 7, 2013 decision to expunge Plaintiffs' report of child abuse from the statewide registry (id. ¶¶ 42, 47, 60; see id. ¶ 50); (2) Defendant Utz "failed to send Plaintiffs a copy" of the June 28, 2013 letter from the County Defendants requesting that Defendant Utz reinstate the founded report (id. ¶¶ 49); and (3) Defendant Utz reconsidered her June 7, 2013 expungement of the founded reports in response to County Defendants' ex parte letter (id. ¶¶ 52, 54, 57). Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that, upon requesting that the BHA expunge the founded reports "in accordance with Defendant Utz' June 7, 2013 expungement letters," BHA purportedly responded that it "has no authority to review any action by the Secretary." (Id. ¶¶ 70-71.)
Since December 31, 2014, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6341 provides that: "[I]f the secretary refuses a request under subsection (a)(1)" - the subsection under which Defendant Utz allegedly expunged and/or "un-expunged" Plaintiffs' founded report (Doc. Nos. 10-1; 10-2 at 1) - "or a request for administrative review under subsection (a)(2), or does not act within the prescribed time, the perpetrator or school employee shall have the right to appeal and request a hearing before the secretary to amend or expunge an indicated report on the grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with this chapter ." 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6341 (emphasis added). As Plaintiffs concede in their brief in opposition, "[n]ow the Plaintiffs have the right to have a hearing on the merits at the BHA, that action is stayed." (Doc. No. 40.)
In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs make numerous citations to "23 Pa.C.S. § 6341." (Doc. No. 35.)
In its February 29, 2016 Memorandum, this Court found that Plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege that the available post-deprivation remedy is insufficient. The second amended complaint makes no additional allegations as to the inadequacy of the available post-deprivation remedy, a hearing on the merits before the BHA that is presently stayed. Again, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that could plausibly demonstrate that affording Plaintiffs additional procedural safeguards "during [Defendant Utz's] reconsideration of the expunged reports" - as opposed to now being afforded "a hearing on the merits before the BHA" - would "have reduced the risk that [Plaintiffs] would suffer an erroneous deprivation of [their] reputational interest." See R., 636 A.2d at 146, 151 ("The relevant inquiry, according to Matthews, is whether allowing [the additional procedural safeguard] would have reduced the risk that [one] would suffer an erroneous deprivation of his reputational interest."). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's right to reputation and procedural due process claims under Pennsylvania law for failure to adequately allege that the procedures available to Plaintiffs are constitutionally insufficient. See Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).
Having determined that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief on their substantive claims, the Court will not independently address their related conspiracy claims. See Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir.2000) (predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not sustain a civil conspiracy claim absent a substantive underlying claim); Young v. New Sewickley Tp., 160 Fed. Appx. 263, 266-67 (3d Cir.2005) (affirming dismissal of civil rights conspiracy claim when the underlying civil rights claim was properly dismissed).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint with prejudice. The Court declines to grant Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint as futile. An order consistent with this memorandum follows.