Opinion
No. 03-CV-3752
November 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Bilal has filed a civil rights action against Defendants Vaughn, Lorenzo, Arroyo, and Baker, employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendants move to dismiss the instant case with prejudice on grounds that Plaintiff has neither exhausted his administrative remedies nor stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment for which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed below, we grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate order follows.
I. Factual Background
According to Plaintiff's pro se Complaint, filed on August 11, 2003, and Response to Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 10, 2003, Plaintiff currently is an inmate at a SCI-Somerset, a Pennsylvania state prison. Plaintiff used to be housed at SCI-Graterford, another Pennsylvania state prison. Plaintiff has filed a § 1983 claim against four officials at SCI-Graterford, in their individual capacities, including the Superintendent, two Deputy Superintendents, and a Counselor.
While at SCI-Graterford, and since September 2001, Plaintiff had been housed in administrative segregation to protect him from two other inmates in the general population that wished to kill him. On October 23, 2002, while in the law library at the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU), another inmate housed on that block, who had a reputation for being dangerous and who had killed other inmates, held Plaintiff hostage for three hours. Plaintiff blames Defendant Arroyo, who knew of the inmate's reputation, for allowing the dangerous inmate to be in the same room as Plaintiff. In light of this traumatic experience, and according to prison policy, on October 31, 2002, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the prison. The grievance included a request that, for fear of his life, he be transferred to another facility. However, because he did not submit the grievance within the requisite time, it was denied. Plaintiff has submitted various requests regarding the appeal of his grievance; however, all such correspondence has gone unanswered.
On October 31, 2002, Defendant Lorenzo spoke with Plaintiff about the hostage incident in the RHU. At that time, Plaintiff again requested that he be transferred to another facility. The following day, on November 1, 2002, the prison officials granted Plaintiff's request to be transferred. Immediately after this decision, officials placed Plaintiff in protective custody because three inmates had threatened his life.
On November 4, 2002, Defendant Lorenzo informed Plaintiff that he had the option of being housed in the Temporary Housing Unit, a unit within the general population. Because his return to the general population serves as the basis for this suit, it appears that Plaintiff accepted this option.
On November 6, 2002, during a "yearly review," Defendant Baker and one other prison official spoke with Plaintiff about the hostage incident. According to Plaintiff, during that conversation, Defendant Baker threatened Plaintiff to prevent him from complaining about the prison and informed Plaintiff that if he filed suit, he "will regret it."
At some, as yet unknown time, Plaintiff was returned to the general population, where the inmates that wished him dead remained housed. Plaintiff then wrote to two state legislators regarding the matter. Shortly thereafter, on January 7, 2003, Plaintiff was transferred from SCI-Graterford to SCI-Somerset.
Plaintiff appears to file this § 1983 suit on grounds that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Defendants Baker, Arroyo, and Lorenzo voted to place Plaintiff among the general population, where there was a threat on his life. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Baker's alleged threats to discourage Plaintiff from filing a suit and Defendant Arroyo's disregard for Plaintiff's life when he allowed a very dangerous inmate to be in the same room with Plaintiff violated the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Superintendent Vaughn violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights when he allowed other staff members to place him among the general population. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an injunction.
Despite requesting nominal damages in his questionnaire, based on Plaintiff's Response to Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, it now appears that he seeks only compensatory and punitive damages.
II. Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. See also Gravson v. Mawiew State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 107 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendants move to dismiss the instant action on three grounds: (a) Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, as required under § 1983; (b) Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; and (c) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. While we are not satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to do everything possible to exhaust all administrative remedies, we do agree with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, either under the Eighth Amendment or by any other constitutional means, for which relief can be granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, we grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, by consequence of the liberal federal pleading requirements, to survive Rule 12(b)(6), the Plaintiff's complaint need only provide notice to the defendant of the claims against him or her. Seville Industrial Machine Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 1984),cert. denied. 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S.Ct. 1179, 84 L.Ed.2d 327 (1985). Thus, dismissal is restricted to those instances where it is clear that relief could not be granted based on the facts presented by the plaintiff. In making this determination, this Court is required to accept as true all allegations made by the plaintiff, as well as any reasonable inferences thereof. Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
However, we need not acknowledge the Plaintiff's bald assertions or legal conclusions. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally, we note that we are required to holdpro se complaints, such as that at present, to lower standards than those to which we hold lawyers' pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
Plaintiff claims that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Defendants exercised deliberate indifference to his safety and welfare when they removed him from protective custody to the general population, where there were known threats to Plaintiff's life. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Baker and Arroyo further violated the Eighth Amendment when Baker threatened Plaintiff regarding filing suit, and Arroyo allowed a known dangerous inmate to be in the same room as Plaintiff. Because we find that Plaintiff has suffered no injury for which relief can be granted, these allegations do not meet the notice requirements for § 1983. Thus, we grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
In his Response to Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed November 10, 2003, Plaintiff alleges violations of other constitutional amendments, including the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as assorted state tort claims. Because Plaintiff failed to mention any of these allegations in his Complaint, we have considered them only because Plaintiff proceeds pro se. Upon review, we find these averments to be groundless. Thus, we address only the Eighth Amendment claim.
The Supreme Court has recognized an obligation on the part of prison officials "to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Hudson v. Palmer. 46 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). A failure to do so violates the rights afforded them under the Eighth Amendment.
The test for determining whether a prison official has violated an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights involves two prongs. First, under an objective analysis, the harm alleged must be sufficiently serious that the prison official's act or omission resulted in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting various Supreme Court cases) (internal quotes omitted). In other words, here, Plaintiff must prove that the conditions of his confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm.
Second, Plaintiff must show a deliberate indifference on the part of the prison official to the inmate's safety or health. Id. In other words, Plaintiff must show recklessness, or a knowing disregard on behalf of the defendants, of "the excessive risk to [the] inmate's health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
Under the liberal pleading requirements, mandating only that the individual defendants be placed on notice of the allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as to the incident in RHU and his transfer to general population, Plaintiff appears to satisfy this two-part test. Plaintiff has alleged that both his three-hour captivity by a fellow inmate and his return to general population posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Additionally, as to Defendants Arroyo, Baker, and Lorenzo, their conversations with Plaintiff about his captivity and subsequent decision to place him in general population, might show their awareness of the threats on Plaintiff's life.
Plaintiff's complaint with respect to Defendant Baker's alleged threats regarding Plaintiff's prospective law suit clearly fails both prongs of the Eighth Amendment test and thus could be dismissed on this ground alone.
Contrary to Defendants' assertions (see Defs.' Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dis. at 6), Plaintiff does allege in his grievance complaint (see PL's Mot. in Opp. at Exh. A) that inmates housed in general population have threatened his life. Moreover, the risk to his safety if housed among the general population could perhaps be inferred from his placement in protective custody. Additionally, because we read Plaintiff's complaint as identifying the incident in RHU as a separate violation of his rights, which we find meets the liberal notice requirements, Plaintiff need not allege that James Dale was housed in general population at the time prison officials transferred Plaintiff.
With regards to the Superintendent, keeping in mind the very low burden that Plaintiff must meet at this stage, based on Plaintiff's claims that on two separate dates in December he wrote to Defendant Vaughn about being transferred, we could infer that he had actual knowledge of the substantial risk to his safety. We might also infer actual knowledge based on the Plaintiff's status of being in administrative segregation and protective custody.
However, even if we give Plaintiff the full benefit of all inferences, he cannot succeed on any claim for damages because he cannot allege or point to any actual injury. He has neither alleged that he suffered any injury while the inmate held him hostage in the law library of the RHU, nor has he alleged any actual injury from being housed in the general population. In fact, in his Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states clearly that he seeks relief for "emotional injuries," rather than for any actual physical injury. (Pl.'s Resp. at 1.) As such, he cannot obtain relief in the form of compensatory damages.See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that absent an allegation of a physical injury, a plaintiff cannot obtain compensatory damages under § 1983).
In Allah, where the Third Circuit barred the Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages after suffering emotional injury for alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the court noted the Supreme Court's finding that "substantial damages may only be awarded to compensate for actual injury suffered as a result of the violation of a constitutional right." Id. at 250 (citing Memphis Cmtv. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986)).
In his supplemental Response, Plaintiff further requests both punitive damages and an injunction, demanding that the defendants resign from their positions at the prison and that they make a formal apology to Plaintiff. (PL's Resp. at 5-6.) Under § 1983, punitive damages maybe awarded where the plaintiff shows, on the part of the defendants, conduct "motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625. 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983):Allah, 226 F.3d at 251-52 (internal quotes omitted). The Plaintiff's allegations here do not rise to this level, especially considering the timely decision by the defendants to fulfill Plaintiff's request for a transfer and Plaintiff's admission that the decision to place him in general population was an option to him. (See Pl's Resp. at 3.)
Finally, we note the implausibility of Plaintiff's request for an injunction. An injunction exists as an equitable remedy to prevent or correct an injury suffered by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's transfer to a different facility has mooted the need for such a remedy. In other words, even acknowledging as true Plaintiff's allegation that the defendants had actual knowledge of the risk to his safety, an injunction would not be appropriate where the defendants "were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and would not revert to their obduracy upon cessation of the litigation."Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846 n. 9. No such risk of harm exists because Plaintiff now resides in a different facility. Thus, there is no issue for the equity jurisdiction of this Court to address.
The Supreme Court has held that "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that [the] inmate face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847. The hostage incident with another inmate in the RHU, which represents the foundation for this suit, occurred on October 23, 2002. Within ten days, on November 1, 2002, prison officials approved Plaintiff's request for a transfer to another facility. (PL's CompL, Statement of Claim.) Plaintiff actually was transferred within two months of the approval of his request, on January 7, 2003 (PL's Resp. at ¶ 19), after having suffered no physical or other injury for which relief can be granted.
Accepting as true all of Plaintiff's allegations, we find that the actions of the defendants, especially their prompt response to Plaintiff's unfortunate encounter and request for transfer, and their continued success since 2001 at preventing any physical harm to Plaintiff by what appear to be numerous other inmates that wished him dead, fail to show any semblance of violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege an injury for which any kind of relief could be granted.
While this Court recognizes the low threshold that the plaintiff must meet to survive these early proceedings, we find that we can make no reasonable inferences from the allegations set forth by Plaintiff to allow us in good faith to recognize a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.