Opinion
2d Civil No. B217945 Super. Ct. No. CIV242460
11-22-2011
CHAD BIGGINS, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. MICHAEL K. NEWLEE, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. MAQGUIDE.COM, INC., Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Chad Biggins, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant Chad Biggins. Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Filomena E. Meyer, Frances O'Meara for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant Michael K. Newlee. J.J. Little & Associates, P.C., James J. Little for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent Maqguide.com , Inc.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
(Ventura County)
This is a dispute between two attorneys over contingency fees arising from the settlement of a lawsuit prosecuted on behalf of their mutual client. A jury awarded both attorneys recovery in quantum meruit. The jury also held one of the attorneys liable for inducing breach of contract and interfering with contract.
We reverse the judgment for inducing breach of contract and interfering with contract. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
Defendant, cross-complainant and respondent Maqguide.com, Inc., (Maqguide) is in the business of matching medical device manufacturers in Mexico with sellers in the United States. Jeffrey L. Madison is president of Maqguide. Avail Medical Products, Inc. (Avail), contracted to pay Madison a sales commission on enema kits it manufactured for EZEM, Inc., (EZEM). Avail, however, refused to pay Madison.
Madison consulted with Michael Newlee, a lawyer with 25 years experience and a personal friend. On March 30, 2004, Madison entered into a written retainer agreement with Newlee. Under the agreement, Newlee would receive 40 percent of any recovery resulting from a judgment. Newlee sent a draft complaint and a demand letter to Avail. The letter and draft complaint did not result in a resolution of the matter.
In April 2004 Madison contacted Chad Biggins. Biggins had been recommended to Madison as an attorney with experience litigating claims under Civil Code section 1738.10 et seq., statutes governing wholesale sales representatives.
Biggins testified that Madison told him he had an attorney friend, Newlee, who was helping him. He said Newlee drafted a complaint and sent a demand letter, but that he did not want to take the case. He said Newlee was just helping out as a friend.
Biggins testified he called Newlee, who told him he had his own agreement with Madison. Biggins sent an email dated May 7, 2004, to one of Madison's employees. The email stated in part, "[Newlee] stated that you already have a fee agreement with him." Biggins said he emailed Madison asking about an agreement with Newlee. Biggins said Madison assured him he had no agreement with Newlee.
On May 20, 2004, Biggins and Madison entered into a written retainer agreement. The agreement provided Biggins would receive 40 percent of any recovery after litigation or arbitration is initiated. Biggins filed a complaint against Avail in San Diego Superior Court.
Biggins claims the agreement provides that his fees do not extend to cover the fees of any other counsel. But Biggins misrepresents the agreement. The agreement states in part: "Client understands that Attorney is not licensed to practice law in any state other than California and Ohio. As such, Attorney may be required to retain local counsel for purposes of advising Client on another state's law and to and [sic] enter another state's court pro hac vice (for purposes of this case only). Client understands that this Agreement does not extend to or include the fees which may be charged by such local counsel." It is clear the provision to which Biggins refers applies only to local counsel retained to advise on another state's law or to enter another state's court, factors not present here.
On June 1, 2004, Newlee emailed Biggins stating, "I'm not sure what my role is in this case." Biggins forwarded the email to Madison with a note stating Biggins's understanding that Newlee was not going to be involved. Madison responded that he would like Newlee to stay on the case in a supporting role, and that the role would be defined the following week.
Newlee's role was not defined in June 2004. On December 2, 2005, Newlee emailed Madison, "O.K. I'm in. 10% of [Biggins's] cut no matter what the verdict, and 10% of [Madison's] cut, under a million, or 5% of [Madison's] cut over a million." Biggins accepted by email, asking Newlee whether he wanted to confirm the agreement by letter. Newlee replied, "I'm fine with the documentation we have now, via e mail."
Newlee formally associated into the case in January 2006. The trial began in March 2006. Madison was so disappointed by Biggins's opening statement that he asked Newlee to take over the trial. Biggins states only that "Newlee co-chaired the trial[.]" The trial resulted in a million-dollar verdict in favor of Madison.
Thereafter, Biggins settled a separate action against EZEM for $20,000. Biggins claimed $8,000 in fees for that action. Newlee does not claim any fees from the EZEM settlement.
On July 6, 2006, Madison settled with Avail for $775,000 for the Avail action. Avail sent a single check for $795,000, covering both the Avail and EZEM settlements.
On July 7, 2006, Newlee emailed Biggins: "We have a dispute over our division of attorneys fees in this case. My understanding of our 'agreement' differs dramatically from yours. Regardless of our differing views, the fact is that [Madison] did not sign anything approving a fee split between us . . . and doesn't approve of your proposed split[.] There is also the issue of MY fee agreement with [Madison], entered into prior to your agreement and never abrogated."
It was Newlee and Madison's contention that the fee-sharing agreement outlined in the emails of December 2005 limiting Newlee to 10 percent of Biggins's fees was unenforceable. Newlee suggested that the 60 percent of the settlement indisuputably belonging to Madison be given to Madison forthwith. The remaining 40 percent would be deposited in an interest-bearing account until the dispute between Newlee and Biggins could be resolved. Biggins rejected the idea. Eventually, the court ordered Biggins to endorse the settlement check and that a disputed portion of the settlement proceeds be placed in a blocked account.
Biggins filed the instant action against Madison, Newlee and Maqguide. The original complaint alleged causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud, conversion, inducing breach of contract, constructive trust, interference with contract, common counts and negligent misrepresentation.
Newlee cross-complained for quantum meruit and declaratory relief. Madison and Maqguide cross-complained for malpractice.
The trial court sustained Newlee's demurrer on the cause of action for conversion. The court also granted Newlee's motion for summary adjudication on the causes of action for fraud.
In addition, the trial court granted Newlee's and Madison's motions in limine. The court barred reference to the fee-sharing agreement contained in the emails of December 2005. The court found the agreement was unenforceable as failing to comply with California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 2-200 (hereafter rule 2-200).
The court found Madison's and Newlee's threats to complain to the State Bar were privileged. The court ruled Biggins could not argue to the jury that the complaint to the State Bar was an attempt at extortion. Biggins could only tell the jury that Madison complained to the State Bar and the complaint was rejected or not acted on.
The court granted Newlee's and Madison's motions for nonsuit on the fraud and aiding and abetting extortion causes of action.
The matter went to the jury on causes of action for breach of contract against Madison, quantum meruit against Newlee, interference with contract and inducing breach of contract against Newlee, quantum meruit against Biggins and malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against Biggins.
The jury found: Madison breached his contract with Biggins, and awarded Biggins $26,689.11; Newlee was entitled to $77,500 and Biggins was entitled to $232,500 on the quantum meruit causes of action; Newlee induced a breach of contract and interfered with contract for which the jury awarded $100,000 against Newlee. The jury found for Biggins on Madison's and Maqguide's malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.
Newlee and Biggins appeal.
DISCUSSION
Newlee's Appeal
I
Newlee contends the judgment against him for inducing breach of contract and interference with contract is erroneous as a matter of law.
In Applied Equipment Corporation v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 514, our Supreme Court stated: "[C]onsistent with its underlying policy of protecting the expectations of contracting parties against frustration by outsiders who have no legitimate social or economic interest in the contractual relationship, the tort cause of action for interference with a contract does not lie against a party to the contract. [Citations.]"
Here Newlee is no mere outsider in the contractual relationship. He had an agreement with Biggins for the division of fees. That the agreement is unenforceable does not mean Newlee lacks economic interest in the contractual relationship. Newlee still has a quantum meruit cause of action to recover a portion of the fees. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attorneys, § 425, p. 542.) For the same reason that no cause of action lies against a party to the contract, Newlee's interest in the fees bars any cause of action against him for interference with or inducing breach of contract.
Biggins claims Newlee has no interest in the $8,000 fee Biggins earned for settling the EZEM case. But even if Newlee had no economic interest in any of the fees from either case, he would still be protected. Not only is a party to a contract exempt from liability for interference or inducing breach, the attorney for the party is exempt as well.
In Schick v. Lerner (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1321, plaintiff sued an attorney for inducing breach of contract based on the advice the attorney gave his client, a contracting party. The trial court sustained the attorney's demurrer without leave to amend. In affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: "Plaintiff's attempt to plead a cause of action against Lerner for inducing a breach of contract is barred as a matter of law. Contrary to the argument advanced by plaintiff, absent extraordinary circumstances, an attorney may not be held liable for urging a client to breach a contract with some third party. [Citation.] As we discuss in greater detail, infra, public policy dictates that attorneys must remain free to counsel their clients without fear of subjecting themselves to liability as a result of the proper discharge of their professional obligations. Clients as well must feel free to seek out an attorney's advice on any issue at any time. 'Any rule to the contrary would constitute a serious impairment to the attorney-client relationship, and a resulting deleterious effect on the administration of justice. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1329, quoting Wolfrich Corp. v. United Services Automobile Assn. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1211.)
Biggins's reliance on Di Loreto v. Shumake (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 35, is misplaced. There an attorney for a party to a contract was found liable for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. But the case discussion was limited to whether damages for emotional distress was warranted. The case did not discuss whether an attorney for a party to a contract can be liable for interference with or inducing breach of the contract. A case is not authority for matters not discussed therein. (Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Bar-C Properties (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 652, 660.)
In Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590, 600-601, the court held that a complaint alleging interference with a contract stated a cause of action against attorneys for a party to the contract. But the court did not discuss the public policy that attorneys must remain free to counsel their clients without fear of liability. Schick is better decided. We decline to follow Weiss.
Here Newlee was Madison's attorney during the attorney fee dispute. He cannot be liable for inducing breach of or interfering with the contract Madison had with Biggins. The award of damages for interference with and inducing breach of contract must be reversed.
II
Newlee contends Biggins's misconduct entitles him to a new trial on the quantum meruit cause of action.
The trial court granted Newlee's motion in limine barring Biggins from referring to the unenforceable December 2005 fee agreement. Newlee points to numerous instances where Biggins violated that ruling.
A showing of misconduct creates a presumption of prejudice. (Whitlock v. Wheeler (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 162.) But here the presumption is rebutted by the verdict. The December 2005 agreement provides that Newlee will receive 10 percent of Biggins's fee. Newlee claims the jury followed the agreement when it awarded him $77,500. But $77,500 is 10 percent of the entire Avail settlement. It is 25 percent of Biggins's fee. Had the jury been persuaded by Biggins's alleged misconduct, it would have awarded only 10 percent of Biggins's fee.
Biggins Appeal
III
Biggins contends the trial court erred when it sustained Newlee's demurrer on his cause of action for conversion.
Biggins's sixth cause of action for conversion alleged: Biggins owned or had the right to possess $310,000; Newlee intentionally prevented Biggins from having access to the $310,000 for a significant period of time; Biggins did not consent; Biggins was harmed; Newlee's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.
Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 699, p. 1023.)
Newlee's demurrer requested that the court take judicial notice that Biggins had to be ordered to endorse the Avail settlement check and ordered that the proceeds be deposited in Newlee's trust account subject only to court ordered distributions. Thus Newlee did not wrongfully exercise dominion over Biggins's property.
Biggins claims that after the court order, Newlee removed the money from his trust account and placed it in a private account solely under his name. But Biggins fails to mention that a hearing was held on November 20, 2006. Newlee explained that he wanted to transfer the money from his trust account to an interest-bearing account. Newlee did not claim the account was his personally, or that it was outside the jurisdiction of the court. He blamed Wells Fargo Bank for the state of the title on the account. Even Biggins admitted that Wells Fargo Bank was difficult to deal with. The trial court did not find nefarious conduct had occurred. The court ordered that by November 27, 2006, the name on the account be changed to reflect Biggins and Newlee as cotrustees and that the account is blocked.
Although the account was in Newlee's name, at least temporarily, Newlee did not claim the account was his to do with as he pleased. Instead, he implicitly recognized the continuing jurisdiction of the court over the account. Biggins does not claim Newlee made any unauthorized withdrawals. Newlee did not exercise the type of dominion and control over the account that would support a cause of action for conversion.
IV
Biggins contends the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to Newlee's cross-complaint. Newlee cross-complained in quantum meruit and for declaratory relief.
Biggins asserts a complaint for quantum meruit must allege that services were rendered to the defendant. (Citing Parker v. Solomon (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 125, 134-135.) He points out that Newlee does not allege he rendered any services to Biggins.
But a party seeking recovery in quantum meruit need only show circumstances such that services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefore was to be made. (Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf (2004) 32 Cal.4th 453, 458.) Thus quantum meruit is appropriate in an action between attorneys to divide fees for services rendered to a mutual client. (Id. at p. 461.) That is what Newlee alleges here.
Biggins appears to argue, without citation to authority, that Newlee cannot seek both recovery on the basis of quantum meruit and also seek recovery on his contract with Madison or by asserting a lien for fees. But a demurrer searches the face of the complaint for defects. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 947, p. 360.) Here Newlee's cross-complaint does not seek recovery for breach of contract or a lien. It seeks only recovery in quantum meruit and for declaratory relief based on quantum meruit. Biggins's demurrer was properly overruled.
V
Biggins contends the trial court erred in granting Newlee's motion for summary judgment on Biggins's fourth cause of action for fraud.
Biggins cause of action alleged that in May 2005 Newlee told Biggins that he did not represent Madison in the underlying dispute; it was not until after the case settled in July 2006 that Newlee disclosed his fee agreement with Madison; Newlee did not initially disclose the fee agreement in order to induce Biggins to prosecute the case and advance costs; and Newlee used the Madison fee agreement as a basis for asserting a lien on the settlement proceeds.
Fraud requires misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 772, p. 1121.)
Summary judgment is granted only if all papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence set forth in the papers except where such inferences are contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.)In examining the supporting and opposing papers, the moving party's affidavits or declarations are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.)
The moving party has the initial burden of showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) Where the moving party has carried that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) Our review of the trial court's grant of the motion is de novo. (Id. at p. 767.)
Here it is undisputed that as early as May 7, 2004, Newlee told Biggins that he had a fee agreement with Madison. In fact, Biggins sent an email to Madison on that date confirming "[Newlee] stated that you already have a fee agreement with him." Biggins did not enter into a written retainer agreement with Madison until May 20, 2004. Shortly thereafter, on June 1, 2004, Newlee emailed Biggins stating he was not sure what his role in the case is. Biggins forwarded the email to Madison. Madison replied that he wanted Newlee involved in the case.
Biggins's own emails show he was aware from the beginning that Newlee had a fee arrangement with Madison and that Newlee would be involved in the case. Any self-serving declaration by Biggins to the contrary is belied by the emails. (See Barton v. Elexys Internat., Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1191 [declarations directly contradicting discovery responses are disregarded].)
In any event, even if Newlee had hidden the existence of his agreement with Madison, Biggins fails to explain how he was damaged. Newlee did not sue on the Madison contract, he sued in quantum meruit. Newlee may have used the Madison contract to assert a lien and have his name placed on the settlement check. But Newlee was clearly entitled to a portion of the settlement proceeds. If the assertion of the lien damaged Biggins, Biggins does not explain how.
For the same reason, there is no merit to Biggins's contention that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on fraud allegations against Madison. Even assuming Madison told Biggins he had no contract with Newlee, Biggins does not explain how he was damaged. Biggins was induced by Madison's alleged misrepresentation to take a case for which Biggins received substantial compensation. That Biggins did not receive the entire 40 percent called for by his contract is the result of Biggins's agreement with Newlee, not Madison's alleged misrepresentation.
VI
Biggins contends the trial court erred in granting Newlee's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the fee-sharing agreement. The trial court found that the fee-sharing agreement did not conform to rule 2-200. Rule 2-200(A)(1) provides in part that a member of the State Bar "shall not divide a fee for legal services with a lawyer who is not a partner of, associate of, or shareholder with the member unless: [¶] . . . [t]he client has consented in writing thereto after a full disclosure has been made in writing that a division of fees will be made and the terms of such division[.]"
Biggins claims the December 2005 emails constitute a valid fee-sharing agreement and Madison's consent. The emails are as follows:
Biggins to Madison November 21, 2005: "I would like to go ahead and get Newlee on board if possible and continue with our discovery plans. Could you run your proposal for 10% from you, 10% from me and for his contribution to be limited to $10,000? Thanks[.]"
Newlee to Madison December 2, 2005: "Ok, I'm in. 10% of Chad's cut no matter what the verdict, and 10% of your cut, under a million, or 5% of your cut, over a million."
Madison to Biggins December 2, 2005: "Brother Chad, [p]lease work this out with brother Mike."
Biggins to Newlee and Madison December 8, 2005: "Thank you very much for joining the fight Mike. I don't think more of an agreement is necessary but if you want, you can write a letter confirming any details you feel necessary."
Newlee to Biggins December 9, 2005: "I'm fine with the documentation we have now, via e mail."
Madison's proposal as delineated in Biggins's email of November 21, 2005, differs substantially from the proposal in Newlee's email to Madison of December 2, 2005, stating, "OK, I'm in." Madison's response to Newlee's email is, "Brother [Biggins], [p]lease work this out with brother [Newlee]." "Please work this out" is far from the requirement of rule 2-200 that the client consent in writing "after a full disclosure has been made in writing that a division of fees will be made and the terms of such division[.]" The fee-sharing agreement is invalid and unenforceable.
Biggins argues he is entitled to a jury determination of the validity of the fee-sharing agreement. But he can point to no written consent that might meet the requirements of rule 2-200. The contract is unenforceable as a matter of law.
Biggins argues even if the agreement is unenforceable, it is still relevant as evidence of fraud. But fraud requires a showing of justifiable reliance; that is, a showing it was reasonable for the plaintiff to accept the defendant's representations without independent inquiry or investigation. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332.) Biggins, as an attorney, is presumed to know the requirements of rule 2-200 and the consequences of the failure to meet those requirements. (See Margolin v. Shemaria (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 891, 901.) There could be no justifiable reliance on the agreement.
VII
Biggins contends the trial court erred in granting Newlee's and Madison's motion in limine to exclude evidence of extortion.
The alleged extortion involves Newlee's and Madison's statements that they will report Biggins to the State Bar. But such statements are covered by the litigation privilege. (Civ. Code § 47, subd. (b); Chen v. Fleming (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 36, 40.)
Biggins's reliance on Cohen v. Brown (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 302, is misplaced. There plaintiff, an attorney, alleged among other causes of action, that defendant committed extortion by filing a false State Bar complaint. Defendant moved for dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that extortion was not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and therefore would not support a motion to dismiss under the statute. (Id. at pp. 316-318.) But the court also made it clear that the anti-SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege are not coextensive. The court noted "'the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute[s] are substantively different statutes that serve quite different purposes[.]'" (Id. at p. 319, quoting Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.)
Here we are not concerned with the anti-SLAPP statute. Nothing in Cohen convinces us the litigation privilege does not apply.
Biggins points out that the privilege was not pled as an affirmative defense. But here the privilege appears on the face of the complaint. An absolute privilege appearing on the face of the complaint need not be pled. (See Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 604.)
VIII
Biggins contends the trial court erred when it granted Maqguide's motion for nonsuit: "'"A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit [or directed verdict] if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] 'In determining whether plaintiff's evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded[.]' [¶] In reviewing a grant of nonsuit [or directed verdict], we . . . will not sustain the judgment '"unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law."'" [Citation.]'" [Citation.]" (Baker v. American Horticulture Supply, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1072, quoting Colbaugh v. Hartline (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1521.)
Biggins stated causes of action against Maqguide for quantum meruit and aiding and abetting fraud. The trial court found there was no evidence to support either cause of action.
In support of his quantum meruit cause of action Biggins points to his testimony that he had to revive Maqguide because it was suspended. He claims on appeal that it was not a requirement for prosecuting Madison v. Avail. But Biggins testified that reviving Maqguide was an issue he had to take care of in defeating Avail's motion for summary judgment. Thus, contrary to Biggins's argument, it was a requirement for prosecuting the Avail case.
Biggins also points to Maqguide's name on the Avail settlement check and that Maqguide sued him for malpractice as evidence that Maqguide was his client. But such evidence does not show how much, if any, work Biggins performed for Maqguide outside of the Avail case. Biggins cannot prevail in an action based on quantum meruit without some evidence of the amount and value of his work. Biggins points to no such evidence.
Biggins points to Maqguide's name on the Avail settlement check as evidence Maqguide aided and abetted Madison and Newlee in committing fraud. But a name on a check is not alone substantial evidence of aiding and abetting a fraud. Biggins points to no evidence that Maqguide even asked that its name be included on the check. Moreover, as we have previously stated, there is no evidence of fraud.
IX
Biggins contends the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on the fifth cause of action, alleging promissory fraud and the thirteenth cause of action alleging promissory estoppel against Newlee and Madison.
These causes of action were based on the December 2005 fee-sharing agreement. Biggins argues only that the court erred in determining the fee-sharing agreement was unenforceable. As we have previously discussed, the trial court was correct.
X
Biggins contends the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on the causes of action alleging aiding and abetting extortion. But as we have previously said, the alleged extortion was privileged.
The judgment against Newlee for interference with and inducing breach of contract is reversed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Newlee.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P.J. We concur:
COFFEE, J.
PERREN, J.
Harry J. Walsh, Judge
Frederick H. Bysshe, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Chad Biggins, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant Chad Biggins.
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Filomena E. Meyer, Frances O'Meara for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant Michael K. Newlee.
J.J. Little & Associates, P.C., James J. Little for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent Maqguide.com, Inc.