Opinion
Case No. 01-CV-74969-DT
September 13, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Randolph Biernat, a state prisoner presently confined at the Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner pleaded no contest to six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of child sexually abusive activity in Wayne County Circuit Court in 1994. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 50 to 100 years imprisonment on the first six counts and to 12 to 20 years imprisonment on the seventh count in 1999. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises an involuntary plea claim and a sentencing claim. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner's convictions arise from his sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over the course of seven years. Petitioner was charged with six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of child sexually abusive activity in October, 1993. Petitioner pleaded no contest to the charges in the Wayne County Circuit Court on February 4, 1994. The trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Petitioner at the plea hearing:
The Court: Sir, did you sign this plea form?
Defendant Biernat: Yes, sir.
The Court: It states here that you plead no contest — I'm going to write that in — to six counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree and one count of producing sexually explicit material . . . the first six counts carr[y] any number of years up to life. Count VII carries up to twenty years. They wrote in life. I'll cross that out. And you waive the following rights:
The right to a jury trial or trial by the Court with the prosecutor's consent; the right to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to confront and question the witnesses against you; the right to have the Court compel witnesses to come to court and testify for you; the right to testify at your trial; the right to remain silent and not have your silence used against you. Do you understand all that, sir?
Defendant Biernat: Yes, sir.
* * *
The Court: Are you pleading no contest freely, willingly, knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly, yes or no?
Defendant Biernat: Yes.
The Court: And you understand you could be sentenced as though you plead guilty or were found guilty. Do you understand that?
Defendant Biernat: Yes, sir.
2/4/94 Plea Tr., pp. 2-4.
Sentencing was scheduled for May 3, 1994. On that date, Petitioner's wife, Mary Biernat, delivered a letter to the court stating that Petitioner would not appear for sentencing because he did not want to go to prison. Petitioner then became a fugitive and fled to Canada. He settled in Vancouver, British Columbia and fraudulently obtained government identification and social services. In March, 1999, Petitioner was featured on the television show "America's Most Wanted." He was subsequently arrested by Canadian authorities in April, 1999 and returned to Michigan. On September 15, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his plea. At a hearing on October 12, 1994, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 50 to 100 years imprisonment on the six first-degree criminal sexual conduct charges and to 12 to 20 years imprisonment on the child sexually abusive activity charge.
Following sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, asserting several claims of error. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence. People v. Biernat, No. 223271 (Mich.Ct.App. July 11, 2000) (unpublished). Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Biernat, 463 Mich. 948, 620 N.W.2d 853 (Dec. 27, 2000).
Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on December 21, 2001, asserting the following claims: (1) his conviction was obtained by a no contest plea not made voluntarily or with understanding of the consequences of the plea, and (2) his grossly disproportionate sentence violated due process under the 5th and 14th Amendments and the 8th Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on July 23, 2002, asserting that Petitioner's claims should be denied for lack of merit.
II. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because Petitioner filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
This Court further presumes the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
A. Involuntary Plea Claim
Petitioner first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because his no contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that he was not informed of the minimum sentence or that he was not eligible for a probationary sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed this issue as a matter of state law, concluding that the trial court properly advised Petitioner of the consequences of his plea, but did not specifically address the issue as a matter of federal law. See Biernat, No. 223271 at *1. Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. See, e.g., Harris v. Stoval, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). This independent review requires the federal court to "review the record and applicable law to determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. This independent review "is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA." Id.
A plea is voluntary if it is not induced by threats or misrepresentations and the defendant is made aware of the direct consequences of the plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). The voluntariness of a plea "can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 749. The plea is intelligent and knowing where there is nothing to indicate that the defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of his or her mental faculties, is aware of the nature of the charges, and is advised by competent counsel. Id. at 756. The plea must be made "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id. at 748.
Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with the principles set forth in Brady and constitutes a reasonable application thereof. The trial court record reveals that Petitioner was an educated adult at the time of his plea, and was represented by legal counsel and conferred with counsel during the plea process. The trial court advised Petitioner of his trial rights and the fact that he would be giving up those rights by pleading no contest to the charges. The court also informed Petitioner that by pleading no contest he faced a maximum sentence of life imprisonment on the criminal sexual conduct charges and a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment on the remaining charge. No mandatory minimum sentences were applicable to the charged offenses. Petitioner acknowledged his understanding and acceptance of the consequences of his plea. Petitioner stated that he understood the plea and that he was pleading no contest of his own free will. He also indicated that no promises or threats had been made to him to induce him to enter his plea.
Petitioner does not offer the testimony of defense counsel, or any other corroborating evidence, to support an assertion that he was misled or confused about the consequences of his plea. The fact that Petitioner was subsequently dissatisfied with his sentence or may have hoped for more lenient treatment does not render his plea unknowing or involuntary. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. As aptly stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when faced with a challenge to a plea bargain:
If we were to rely on [the petitioner's] alleged subjective impression rather than the record, we would be rendering the plea colloquy process meaningless, for any convict who alleges that he believed the plea bargain was different from that outlined in the record could withdraw his plea, despite his own statements during the plea colloquy . . . indicating the opposite. This we will not do, for the plea colloquy process exists in part to prevent petitioners. from making the precise claim that is today before us. "[W]here the court has scrupulously followed the required procedure, the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that court's inquiry."Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, Petitioner's letter to the trial court at the time he fled the jurisdiction indicates that he understood that he faced prison time, as opposed to probation. The record thus establishes that Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
B. Sentencing Claim
Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because his concurrent sentences of 50 to 100 years imprisonment on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions are disproportionate, violate due process, and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner's sentence was appropriate under Michigan law, but did not specifically address the issue as a matter of federal law. See Biernat, No. 223271 at *1-2. Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. See Harris, 212 F.3d at 943.
To the extent that Petitioner claims that his sentence is disproportionate under state law, he fails to state a claim for federal habeas relief. See Atkins v. Overton, 843 F. Supp. 258, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1994). A petitioner has no state-created interest in having the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines applied rigidly in determining his sentence. Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (E.D. Mich. 1987). There is no federal constitutional right to individualized sentencing. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner alleges that his sentence violates due process or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, he is also not entitled to habeas relief. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for a first offense of possession with intent to distribute more than 650 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Following Harmelin, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that "there is no requirement of strict proportionality; the Eighth Amendment is offended only by an extreme disparity between crime and sentence." United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit has also stated that "[f]ederal courts will not engage in a proportionality analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or life in prison without possibility of parole." United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to disturb an HIV-positive defendant's sentence of 110 months imprisonment with four years of supervised release for one count of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver).
Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 50 to 100 years imprisonment on his first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions. The maximum sentence for such crimes is life imprisonment. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b. As noted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the trial court exceeded the state sentencing guideline range based upon the nature and duration of Petitioner's crimes, the injury to his victim, his conduct following his convictions, and his failure to appreciate the seriousness of his crimes. This Court finds that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing Petitioner's sentence and there is no extreme disparity between Petitioner's crime and his sentence so as to offend due process or the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.