Opinion
No. 5-457 / 05-0432
Filed July 27, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, Judge.
The defendants appeal from a district court ruling that denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and quieted titled to a disputed parcel of property in the plaintiff. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Patrick O'Bryan, Des Moines, for appellant.
Adam P. McAuley, student intern, and Robert Oberbillig of Drake Legal Clinic, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Defendants Charles and Christine Romstad appeal from a district court ruling that denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the summary judgment motion of plaintiff Maria Bieniak, and quieted title to a disputed parcel of property in Bieniak. Because we conclude the validity of the defendants' title was subject to a disputed issue of material fact, we reverse the district court ruling and remand this matter for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The summary judgment record reveals the following undisputed facts. Mieczyslaw Bieniak and his first wife, Marie Bieniak, held as joint tenants with rights of survivorship property legally described as follows: "The East … of Lots 1 and 2, Devin Place Addition, now included and forming part of the City of Des Moines, Iowa" (Lots 1 and 2). In 1965 Mieczyslaw and Marie conveyed to the City of the Des Moines property legally described as "The South five (5) feet of the East … of Lot 1, Devin Place Addition, now included in and forming part of the City of Des Moines, Iowa" (South five feet of Lot 1).
Marie Bieniak died on June 14, 1974. Upon her death Mieczyslaw became sole owner of Lots 1 and 2, with the exception of the South five feet of Lot 1 previously conveyed to the City of Des Moines. Marie left a letter stating that she wished her son, Antoni Miszuk, to receive Lot 1, and her daughter, Stasia Clevenger, and Stasia's children, Charles and Christine Romstad, to receive Lot 2.
On August 21, 1974, Mieczyslaw executed a warranty deed that transferred Lot 1 to his step-son Antoni. On August 24, 1977, Mieczyslaw executed a warranty deed that purported to transfer the South five feet of Lot 1 to his step-daughter Stasia, and his step-grandchildren Charles and Christine. The following day, Mieczyslaw married his second wife, Maria. On September 1, 1977, a warranty deed was executed by Mieczyslaw and Maria that conveyed to themselves, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, Lots 1 and 2, except for the South five feet of Lot 1. This deed was recorded on September 29, 1977.
This deed was recorded on August 30, 1974.
On January 31, 1994, Stasia, Charles, and Christine recorded the warranty deed which purported to convey to them the South five feet of Lot 1. Sometime thereafter, Charles altered the 1977 warranty deed by hand. Charles altered the legal description so that the deed now conveyed Lot 2, instead of the South five feet of Lot 1. He made corrections to the spelling of the grantees' names, wrote the word "Corrected" above the title "Warranty Deed," and added the following unsigned notation: "Document Correction to Legal Description as intended and Legal Name Corrections." Mieczyslaw did not resign the deed or otherwise indicate in writing that he authorized the changes.
The altered deed was recorded in December 2001. At the same time Charles filed an affidavit of explanatory title stating, in pertinent part, that the legal description of the property had been altered to give effect to the original intent to the grantor, Mieczyslaw. The affidavit also noted Stasia had died in March 2001, and that Charles and Christine were her sole heirs.
In addition to the above-noted changes, the original file stamps and a handwritten date of 2-1-94 were crossed out, and a date of 12-20-01 was added.
Mieczyslaw died in February 2004. In August 2004 Maria filed an amended petition to quiet title to Lot 2 in herself, naming Charles and Christine as defendants. Charles and Christine filed a counterclaim, seeking to quiet title to Lot 2 in themselves. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their respective quiet title claims.
The district court denied Charles and Christine's motion, granted Maria's motion, and quieted title to Lot 2 in Maria. The district court concluded Christine and Charles's 1977 deed was not a valid conveyance of the disputed property. The court determined the 1977 deed was unambiguous on its face, and did not express any intent by Mieczyslaw to convey Lot 2 to Stasia, Charles, and Christine. The court also determined that neither the letter written by Mieczyslaw's first wife Marie, the changes Charles made to the 1977 deed, nor Charles's sworn statements, were "persuasive evidence" that Mieczyslaw had intended the 1977 deed to convey Lot 2 rather than the South five feet of Lot 1.
Charles and Christine appeal. They contend the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment and granting Maria's motion for summary judgment, because there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether Maria's deed was valid, or whether Mieczyslaw in fact intended to convey Lot 2 in the 1977 deed.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Even though quiet title actions are tried in equity, Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 2000), when the appeal stems from a summary judgment ruling our review is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Keokuk Junction Ry. Co. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000). In assessing the cross-motions for summary judgment, we view the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bearshield v. John Morrell Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997); City of West Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1996). Summary judgment was appropriately entered if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); City of West Branch, 546 N.W.2d at 600. "A fact is `material' . . . when its determination might affect the outcome of the suit." Baratta v. Polk County Health Servs., 588 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1999).
III. Discussion.
Parties seeking to quiet title to property in themselves bear the burden of proof, and must succeed on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the defending parties' title. State ex rel. Iowa Dep't of Natural Res. v. Burlington Basket Co., 651 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Iowa 2002). Although "[a]n action to quiet title `presupposes complete title in the plaintiff as against the defendant[,]' [t]he action cannot be sustained if the defendant proves some `real interest' — as distinguished from some `mere apparent or asserted right' — in the property." Krotz v. Sattler, 586 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).
Although Charles and Christine assert there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the deed conveying Lots 1 and 2 to Mieczyslaw and Maria was in fact a valid deed, they fail to support this contention with any reference to the summary judgment record that indicates the invalidity of Maria's deed. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( f) (requiring citation in argument to pertinent parts of record); In re Estate of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (noting that this court need not consider a claim unsupported by citation to relevant portions of record). In fact, the substance of their argument is directed, not to the validity of Maria's deed, but to the question of whether Maria understood her petition sought to quiet title to Lot 2. Charles and Christine point to excerpts of a deposition where Maria, who speaks no English, denied signing the petition.
Reviewing the brief and the record, we find two flaws with Charles and Christine's argument. First, we note they cite no authority on the question of whether and how a petition can be invalidated based on confusion, incompetence, or lack of intent by the signing party. This failure alone is a sufficient basis on which to reject their claim. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( c).
Moreover, the deposition evidence does no more than illustrate Maria's confusion and difficulty understanding the nature of the proceedings some two months after she signed the petition. The only evidence which speaks to Maria's understanding and intent at the time the petition was signed was an affidavit from a research assistant at the Drake Legal Clinic, which represents Maria in this matter. The affidavit states that Maria wanted to devise Lot 2 to other family members, and that she understood the nature of the petition at the time it was signed. While Charles and Christine criticize the affidavit because it was not made by Maria herself, the fact remains the only evidence which speaks to Maria's understanding and intent at the time the petition was signed supports a conclusion that there is not a defect in Maria's petition.
The affidavit states, in pertinent part:
3. Maria C. Bieniak was very clear in visiting with me that she wanted her property which is the subject of this case to go to her niece, Adela Heminover and Adela's family.
4. August 12, 2004, I met with Maria C. Beiniak and reviewed with her the Amended Petition. She understood the nature of the Quiet Title claim. She understood that the suit was to protect her interest in the property.
5. On October 18, 2004, prior to the deposition of Maria C. Beiniak, she knew who I was and also Robert Oberbilling [Maria's attorney]. It was clear to me that Maria became frightened during the deposition by the manner of questioning by the Court Reporter and the Interpreter, who did not interpret but instead explained what he believed Maria meant by her answers.
We therefore turn to the crux of the summary judgment rulings, which is the district court's conclusion that Charles and Christine's deed did not convey to them any interest in Lot 2, and that therefore Maria had established superior title to the property. Charles and Christine assert the district court erred in this regard, as there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether their deed in fact conveyed Lot 2. Specifically, they assert the record reveals a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether Mieczyslaw intended to convey to them Lot 2, rather than the South five feet of Lot 1.
In assessing what land was conveyed by the deed, Mieczyslaw's intent is the controlling consideration. Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1982). This intent is ascertained by applying general contract principles. Id. Thus, we look to both the language of the deed, as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed. See Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 2001). However, we note intent must be ascertained by looking, not to what the parties may have meant to say, but to what was meant by the words actually used. Bankers Trust Co. v. Woltz, 326 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1982). Thus, where a deed precisely and unambiguously describes the land to be conveyed, the deed is construed to convey only the land described, and nothing more. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 247, at 237 (2002); see also Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 797, 23 N.W.2d 837, 842 (1946).
Applying the foregoing standards, it is clear the deed executed in 1977 conveyed no interest in Lot 2. This is true even though the 1977 deed purported to convey land Mieczyslawno longer owned. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 262, at 245-46 (providing a latent ambiguity is not created merely because a description includes land the grantor has previously conveyed and no longer owns). Charles and Christine do not appear to dispute this conclusion, but assert the 2001 deed did validly convey title to Lot 2, and that the conveyance in the 2001 "corrected" deed relates back to the 1977 execution. However, they offer no controlling authority for this position.
The first case the defendants cite in support of their position, In re Estate of Clark, 447 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989), stands, in relevant part, for no more than the proposition that a title passing under the terms of a contract relates back to and thus passes on the date the contract was executed. This statement, however, presupposes one valid instrument. It does not speak to the relation-back of title in circumstances such as we have here, where a party seeks to have title purportedly conveyed by a subsequent or altered instrument relate back to the time the original instrument was executed. The defendants also cite to the case of Reeves v. Lyon, 224 Iowa 659, 277 N.W. 749 (1938), but fail to point this court to any specific portion of the case which supports their position. Upon review of the case we find no part which supports the defendants' claim that the 2001 deed relates back to the execution of the 1977 deed, and thus passes title to Lot 2 as if such title had been passed in 1977.
We note that a mistake in a description of land to be conveyed by a deed may be corrected by a subsequent deed, when that subsequent deed is executed by the same grantor. See 23 Am.Jur. 2d Deeds § 272, at 253. This subsequent deed, known as a confirmation or correction deed, when taken together with the original deed, operates to pass title to the land named in the subsequent deed. Id. Here, however, it is undisputed that the alterations appearing in the 2001 deed were made by Charles, and, more importantly, that the 2001 deed was never executed or otherwise formally ratified by Mieczyslaw. Thus, the 2001 deed cannot be considered a confirmation or correction deed sufficient to pass title to Lot 2 to the defendants.
The district court correctly noted the 1977 deed could be reformed if, due to mistake, it did not reflect the parties' true intent. See Iowa State Bank Trust Co. v. Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Iowa 2004); Kendall v. Lowther, 356 N.W.2d 181, 187 (Iowa 1984). A party seeking reformation of an instrument must present clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of the parties' intent, and that such intent existed prior to the execution of the instrument. See Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass'n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 636 (Iowa 1996). As the district court further noted, reformation is a decision vested within the discretion of the trial court, which may deny the remedy if it is inconsistent with the ends of justice. Iowa State Bank Trust Co., 683 N.W.2d at 108.
Here, the district court declined to reform the deed because it concluded Charles and Christine had not presented "persuasive evidence" that Mieczyslaw intended to convey Lot 2 to the defendants. The court appears to have independently assessed the weight and credibility of the evidence of Mieczyslaw's intent presented by Charles and Christine, and found it lacking. However, this matter was before the district court upon cross-motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the question before the court was not whether Charles and Christine had presented persuasive evidence of Mieczyslaw's intent. It was whether a reasonable fact finder could look to the record and, viewing it in the light most favorable to Charles and Christine, conclude Mieczyslaw intended the 1977 deed to convey Lot 2. See Hall v. Barrett, 412 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa App. 1987).
The summary judgment record contained the following relevant facts. The 1977 deed does not convey any interest in Lot 2, but purports to convey land previously deeded to the City of Des Moines. In addition, the deed that conveyed land to Mieczyslaw and Maria as joint tenants conveyed not only Lot 2, but also the remainder of Lot 1, which had been previously conveyed to Marie's son, consistent with her wishes. In addition, Charles supplied affidavits which attested that the changes he had made to the 1977 deed had been done at Mieczyslaw's instruction, in order to made the deed consistent with Mieczyslaw's original intent. Although these affidavits might well prove to be self-serving, they are nevertheless evidence of Mieczyslaw's intent at the time of execution that could be believed, or disbelieved, by a trier of fact.
The record in fact reveals that Mieczyslaw conveyed the entirety of Lot 1 to Marie's son, even though the South five feet of Lot 1 had been previously conveyed to the City of Des Moines. The validity of this conveyance is not at issue on appeal.
When we view the foregoing in the light most favorable to Charles and Christine, and indulging every legitimate inference the record will bear, Smith v. Shagnasty's Inc., 688 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 2004), we conclude the record does contain a genuine issue of material fact on the question of Mieczyslaw's intent. See McIlravy v. North River Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Iowa 2002) ("If reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of an issue, a genuine issue of material fact exists. . . ."). While the ultimate fact finder in this matter may not find Charles's attestations persuasive, a reasonable person could conclude that, in light of the remaining record, they provide clear and convincing evidence Mieczyslaw intended the 1977 deed to convey Lot 2, but mistakenly drafted the deed so that it conveyed the South five feet of Lot 1.
We recognize that, even if the district court sitting as fact finder determines there is clear and convincing evidence Mieczyslaw intended to convey Lot 2 to Charles and Christine, the court may still decline to reform the deed, concluding reformation would be inconsistent with the ends of justice. This subsequent conclusion is, however, clearly informed by the question of Mieczyslaw's intent. We further recognize that, even if the district court were to conclude the 1977 deed should be reformed, Maria is protected by Iowa's recording statute unless Charles and Christine can prove Maria is not a bona fide purchaser. This issue was not, however, reached by the district court, and Charles and Christine did not seek a ruling on the issue. We accordingly do not address it on appeal. See Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1995).
See Iowa Code § 558.41 (2003) ("An instrument affecting real estate is of no validity against subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice, . . . unless the instrument is filed and recorded. . . ."); Raub v. General Income Sponsors of Iowa, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1970) (noting that bona fide purchasers are protected under section 558.41, and that "[a] bona fide purchaser is one who takes a conveyance of real estate in good faith from the holder of legal title, paying a valuable consideration for it without notice of outstanding equities").
IV. Conclusion.
The record reveals a genuine issue of material fact regarding Mieczyslaw's intent when executing the 1977 deed. We accordingly conclude the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Maria. The district court's ruling is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.