Opinion
No. CIV. S-05-754 WBS PAN (JFM).
May 31, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Bhupat R. Bhatti alleges several causes of action against defendants, including violation of plaintiff's federal and state constitutional rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Compl.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), defendants County of Sacramento and Seleena Ulahannan now move for summary judgment, maintaining that Ulahannan is entitled to various immunities for her actions taken as a social worker. The court agrees that absolute and qualified immunity attaches to Ulahannan's conduct and that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the County defendant. For the following reasons, summary judgment is warranted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
As an initial matter, the court notes that defendants have raised dozens of "Objections to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts." But despite defendants' efforts to couch their arguments in terms of evidentiary objections, they largely attack only the sufficiency, not the admissibility, of plaintiff's facts. For example, under the heading "Objections" defendants repeatedly contend that plaintiff's evidence does not create "a substantial controversy of fact" or alternatively, a dispute of material fact. (Defs.' Objections No. 62.) These are simply arguments in furtherance of their motion for summary judgment — not evidentiary objections.
Moreover, with the exception of their objections to the declaration of Meena Kumari Bhatti (on which the court has not relied), defendants primarily target plaintiff's response to defendants' statement of undisputed facts and not the underlying affidavits on which these statements are based. A plaintiff's statement of disputed facts is not evidence, the admissibility of which can be challenged under the Federal Rules of Evidence.See also Perma Research Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that objections to an affidavit submitted on a motion for summary judgment "must be precise" and "specify which parts of the . . . affidavit should be stricken and why" (emphasis added)); 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., 10BFederal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (3d ed. 1998 Supp. 2005) ("[A] motion to strike should specify the objectionable portions of the affidavit and the grounds for each objection."). Consequently, defendants' "objections" are not well taken and are overruled.
Approximately two months after marrying Kulwinder Bhatti in India, plaintiff returned to the United States without his wife. (Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SUF") Nos. 1-2.) Eight months later, in November of 1997, Kulwinder gave birth to the couple's son, Ammon Bhatti. (Defs.' SUF No. 3.) Kulwinder raised Ammon in India, largely without plaintiff, until March 2003. (Defs.' SUF No. 4.) At that time, after two extended visits to India, plaintiff arranged for Kulwinder and Ammon to relocate to the United States. (Defs.' SUF No. 5.) The Bhattis then shared a home in Sacramento, California with plaintiff's brother, Sudesh Bhatti, and his family. (Defs.' SUF No. 6.)
On August 29, 2003, Ulahannan, a social worker for the County of Sacramento, responded to an Emergency Response Referral regarding the potential abuse of Ammon by his mother. (Defs.' SUF No. 43.) The referral alleged that Kulwinder emotionally abused, threatened to kill, and generally neglected her son. (Defs.' SUF No. 41.) When Ulahannan arrived at the Bhatti residence and interviewed Kulwinder and Ammon, both denied abuse on the part of Kulwinder. (Defs.' SUF No. 56.) However, both Kulwinder and Ammon alleged plaintiff was physically and emotionally abusive towards them. (Id.) During this conversation, Kulwinder advised Ulahannan that she was scared and desired to leave the Bhatti residence. (Defs.' SUF No. 56.)
Ulahannan then contacted plaintiff, who returned to the Bhatti residence for an interview. (Defs.' SUF No. 60.) During the course of this interview, Kulwinder again expressed her desire to leave the Bhatti residence and requested assistance from Ulahannan. (Defs.' SUF No. 67.) Some form of dispute between either Ulahannan and plaintiff or plaintiff and Kulwinder concerning control over passports followed and in response, Ulahannan requested and received assistance from law enforcement. (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' SUF Nos. 63-64.)
In Ulahannan's opinion, after over 3 hours of interviewing Kulwinder, Ammon, plaintiff, and plaintiff's brother, there was no evidence of the allegations of abuse made by the reporter — Kulwinder appeared stable and "very bonded" with her child. (Ulahannan Decl. ¶ 6.) In contrast, Ulahannan believed that she had uncovered evidence of domestic abuse perpetrated by plaintiff and that she faced a situation where the wife was anxious to leave a seemingly hostile environment. Accordingly, after a conference between Ulahannan's supervisor and the Emergency Response Program Manager, Kulwinder and Ammon were offered, and Kulwinder accepted, transportation from the home. Mother and son were eventually delivered to a Women Escaping A Violent Environment ("WEAVE") shelter. (Defs.' SUF No. 75.) While these plans were being formulated, plaintiff and his family vociferously objected to the "removal" of Ammon, who was crying and making declarations in Punjabi, a language not understood by Ulahannan.
The parties dispute the content of Ammon's statements. Plaintiff and his family members assert that Ammon was saying that he wanted to stay with "daddy" while Kulwinder claims that he said "I want to go with you." (Compare Sudesh Bhatti Decl. ¶ 16, with Kulwinder Bhatti Decl. ¶ 6.) Nevertheless, the parties do not dispute that Ulahannan did not know what Ammon was saying at this point.
This was not the first time that police had been to the Bhatti residence. Just three days prior, law enforcement officers had responded to another call, also made by plaintiff's sister-in-law Suzanne Bhatti, in which the caller made the same allegations against Kulwinder that prompted the August 29th CPS visit. (Defs.' SUF No. 20.) Like Ulahannan, the officers found no evidentiary support for Suzanne's accusations. (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' SUF No. 31.) However, plaintiff's complaint does not appear to implicate the officers involved in either visit.
In the months following the visits by law enforcement and CPS, plaintiff fought to regain custody over Ammon. His visitation rights were limited to one day a week. (Bhupat Bhatti Decl. ¶ 38.) Additionally, Family Court Services ("FCS") worker Joyce Medari recommended domestic violence counseling for plaintiff and his name was submitted to the Child Abuse Central Index in December, 2003. (Id. ¶ 38, 67.)
Eventually, plaintiff and Kulwinder sought to dissolve their marriage and the court settled, inter alia, the custody battle over Ammon. Plaintiff was awarded joint custody, consisting of "parenting time . . . every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m." (Zal Decl. Ex. 4 (In re Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 3-4 (Cal.Super.Ct. June 14, 2004).) Additionally, the court found that there was "no domestic violence" and further declared that the FCS report and CPS evaluations/findings were "unfounded" and "not to be used or considered in further evaluations or mediations." (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.)
Plaintiff's declaration that he "was afforded primary custody of Ammon" and that the evaluating psychologist "found that [he] was a much better parent than Kulwinder" is not supported by the evidence accompanying this motion or plaintiff's opposition. (See Bhupat Bhatti Decl. ¶ 39.) As noted above, the family court order plainly awards joint custody to Ammon's parents and allotted plaintiff only two out of seven days a week. Because the order does not specify guardians other than Kulwinder and Bhupat Bhatti, the court can only assume that Kulwinder has custody during the rest of the week. (Zal Decl. Ex. 4 (In re Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 3-4 (Cal.Super.Ct. June 14, 2004).) Although the order was temporary, plaintiff has not submitted evidence showing that it was amended. (But see Compl. ¶ 11 (alleging that plaintiff "presently has 70% physical custody of Ammon").)
Plaintiff next took his legal battle to federal court, where he filed the instant action on April 19, 2005. Plaintiff seeks $4 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages based on the following claims: (1) violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of his federal and state civil rights, actionable under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1 et seq.; (3) negligence; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that defendant Ulahannan is entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that plaintiff failed to plead, and alternatively cannot prove, aMonell claim against defendant County. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B. Section 1983 Claims
Defendants argue that qualified, and in some instances absolute, immunities bar plaintiff's § 1983 claim. The Ninth Circuit has held that social workers enjoy absolute immunity for "discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions", Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987)), and for "`quasi-judicial' actions in the context of child welfare proceedings," Caldwell v. LeFaver, 928 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the scope of this immunity is "extremely narrow." Miller, 335 F.3d at 898. Thus, while social workers may claim absolute immunity, for example, for decisions to institute dependency proceedings and for submissions made to a court, they are not similarly protected when they take actions to detain juveniles prior to any dependency proceedings. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2003); Miller, 335 F.3d at 898; cf. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutorial immunity, on which social worker immunity is partially based, does not extend to investigatory or administrative functions separate from a prosecutor's role as judicial a advocate).
More generally, social workers are also entitled to the immunities afforded to testifying witnesses. See Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "officer witnesses enjoy the same absolute immunity from liability under section 1983 that private witnesses enjoy"). Significantly, witnesses who simply testify in an adversarial setting are afforded immunity for their testimony — including false testimony. White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has extended witness immunity to adversarial pretrial proceedings and probation officers' pre-sentencing reports, which "serve a function integral to the independent judicial process"). In contrast, "those who play a role in initiating a prosecution — the complaining witness — [do] not enjoy immunity." White, 855 F.2d at 958. Therefore, to the extent that Ulahannan was not the "person `who actively instigated or encouraged [a] prosecution of the plaintiff'" she is entitled to absolute immunity. Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 783 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining complaining witness).
Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. With regard to the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff alleges an unreasonable seizure and detention of his son, Ammon. However, plaintiff does not have standing to claim a violation of his son's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure and therefore has no claim based on this theory. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (recognizing the "general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted"); Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). As to the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with his right to familial association by: (1) generating false reports, giving false testimony, hiding evidence, and distorting the child abuse investigation in an effort to keep Ammon out of plaintiff's custody; and (2) unlawfully seizing, detaining, and transporting his son to a WEAVE shelter.
Because plaintiff has a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the same conduct, however, this distinction is largely irrelevant because "the same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children. . . ."Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that "[t]he claims of the parents [for the wrongful seizure of their children] should properly be assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment standard for interference with the right to family association").
1. Ulahannan's False Reports and Testimony
Plaintiff alleges that, during the investigation into the abuse of Ammon and Kulwinder, Ulahannan generated false reports, gave false testimony, concealed evidence, and misrepresented the results of her investigation. (Compl. ¶ 13.) These claims appear to be based on the same factual predicate; namely that Ulahannan reported, and then testified in the Bhatti divorce proceedings, that some of her information about domestic abuse in the Bhatti household came from her interview with six-year-old Ammon, which was purportedly conducted in Hindi. Plaintiff maintains that Ammon did not speak Hindi, although his mother testified that "he could understand a little Hindi because Punjabi [his native tongue] and Hindi are pretty closely related." (Zal Decl. Ex. 3 (Kulwinder Dep. 12:1-3).) Additionally, even plaintiff admits that Ammon "began to learn the Hindi alphabet when he was about 4 [and a half]. . . ." (Bhupat Bhatti Decl. ¶ 61.)
Plaintiff also claims that his name was wrongly submitted to the Child Abuse Central Index, (compl. ¶ 13), but fails to identify the responsible actor. In the absence of allegations or evidence that Ulahannan was directly involved, the court assumes that this event was at most a consequence of Ulahannan's allegedly false reports and not something that she personally accomplished.
As an initial matter, the court questions whether the alleged conduct regarding Ulahannan's reports and testimony actually violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, which is a threshold question in a § 1983 case. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws.'"). The Ninth Circuit has held that "there is no constitutional due process right to have child witnesses, in [an] . . . abuse investigation, interviewed in a particular manner or pursuant to a certain protocol." Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the court in Devereaux rejected a parent's "claimed legal right to have [an] . . . abuse investigation conducted in such a manner to avoid leading questions, influencing or manipulating the child witnesses, or eliciting inconsistent statements." Id. at 1054.
Under an extension of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning then, the court would be justified in holding that even if Ulahannan could barely communicate with Ammon and manipulated his statements, this conduct did not violate plaintiff's rights under federal law. The Constitution does not provide plaintiff with a right to an error free abuse investigation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) ("Where a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required." (quotation omitted)); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The right to family integrity clearly does not include a constitutional right to be free from child abuse investigations.").
Although the court believes that Devereaux provides useful guidance, it is reluctant to base its decision entirely on the observations of the court made therein because (1) the case involved the alleged sexual abuse of a child, a fact that the court seemed particularly motivated by, and (2) the court was discussing the application of the qualified immunity doctrine, and not more generally whether parents can base a § 1983 claim on an allegedly inadequate, if not corrupt, investigation into accusations of abuse.
Even assuming that Ulahannan's conduct implicated plaintiff's constitutional rights, however, she is nonetheless entitled to absolute immunity for her conduct in reporting and testifying about alleged domestic abuse in the Bhatti home. Regarding her reporting activities, the court notes that absolute immunity attaches when social workers are engaged in "quasi-prosecutorial functions" — including instances "where a social worker contributes as an advocate to an informed judgment by an impartial decisionmaker." Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 333; see also Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 823 (citing Mabe for the proposition that "where there [are] allegations that social workers did not conduct their investigation properly and submitted false evidence during juvenile court proceedings, . . . social workers [are] entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were part of the initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings"). Relatedly, several courts have recognized that in preparing reports that will help the court in its fact-finding mission, government officials act in a quasi-judicial capacity. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 (9th Cir. 1986) (probation officers);Ward v. San Diego County Dep't of Soc. Sevs., 691 F. Supp. 238, 239, 241 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (guardian ad litem). Underlying these decisions is a recognition that "the threat of civil liability is not necessary" because the "judicial system provides procedural safeguards to protect against misconduct. . . ." Ward, 691 F. Supp. at 240-41 (citing Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1158). Consistent with these decisions and policy considerations, absolute immunity for Ulahannan's allegedly imperfect investigation and subsequent reports is warranted.
Indeed, in the proceedings at issue in this case, the family court commissioner illustrated how the system is designed to keep false reports in check when he determined that Ulahannan's reports were "unfounded" and "not to be used or considered in further evaluations or mediations." (Zal Decl. Ex. 4 (In re Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 6, 8 (Cal.Super.Ct. June 14, 2004).)
Regarding plaintiff's allegations that Ulahannan gave false testimony and misrepresented the results of her investigation while under oath in the family court proceedings, she is likewise entitled to absolute immunity. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that prosecution for perjury, not the imposition of civil liability, is sufficient to deter witnesses "from inflicting constitutional injury through false testimony." Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). In the context of a § 1983 suit, Ulahannan's testimonial acts, performed in an adversarial proceeding, constituted protected activities and she is therefore entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct.
2. Ulahannan's "Removal" of Ammon from the Bhatti Residence
Regarding plaintiff's claim of interference with familial association arising out of the transportation of Ammon from the Bhatti residence to the WEAVE shelter, defendants maintain that Ulahannan is entitled to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. The applicability of qualified immunity is determined through a two-step inquiry where the court asks: "(1) whether, `taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right'; and, if a violation of a constitutional right [can] indeed be found, (2) `whether the right was clearly established.'" Sissoko v. Rocha, 412 F.3d 1021, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). In other words, qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for a violation of plaintiffs' rights if "the official[s] objectively could have believed the conduct was lawful." Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving the qualified immunity of a social worker and a police officer); see also Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1059 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The question, in a qualified immunity legal analysis, boils down to `Should they have known better?'"). Significantly, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the claimed constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the allegedly illegal conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff describes a more complicated "conspiracy" in which Ulahannan allegedly planned to take Kulwinder and Ammon to a relative's house in Oakley, California, where others would assist Kulwinder in a scheme to take Ammon back to India. (Pl.'s SUF No. 86.) However, discovery is complete in the case and plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Ulahannan delivered Kulwinder and Ammon to a destination other than her CPS office or the WEAVE shelter, where she eventually left them. (July 14, 2005 Scheduling Order 2 (closing discovery on February 15, 2006).) Therefore, based on the facts before this court, Ulahannan's conduct appears to have been in accordance with state procedures for responding to domestic violence accusations. See Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 18294(h) (permitting social services workers to provide "[e]mergency transportation to the shelter, and when appropriate, arrangements with local law enforcement for assistance in providing such transportation").
The right claimed by plaintiff, the right to familial association, is a recognized substantive due process right unquestionably protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is well established that a parent has a `fundamental liberty interest' in `the companionship and society of his or her child' and that `[t]he state's interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under [ 42 U.S.C. §] 1983.'" (quoting Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654-55 (9th. Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original)). Decidedly less clear, as discussed above, is how this right can be violated, given that a parent's interest in the care, custody, and management of their child is not absolute. Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 333. A government actor can interfere with familial association in a reasonable manner depending on the strength of the government's interest in the situation. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138 (requiring reasonable cause to believe a child is in imminent danger before government officials can remove that child from its parent's custody); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) (acknowledging the substantive due process right to familial association must always be balanced against the government interest involved). Moreover, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty, `only against deprivations of liberty accomplished without due process of law.'" Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 145).
Here, Ulahannan's conduct did not unreasonably interfere with the Bhatti family's ability to associate. First, Ulahannan believed that an emergency situation existed, based on allegations of domestic abuse made by Kulwinder and under such circumstances, her interference was warranted. See Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 333 ("In an emergency situation, a state agency may remove children from their parents' custody when the children are subject to immediate or apparent danger or harm."). Second, Ulahannan did not actually remove Ammon from parental custody, as he remained in the physical custody of his natural mother at all times. (Kulwinder Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Additionally, neither Kulwinder nor Ammon were detained, seized, or otherwise held against their will by government officials when Kulwinder requested and accepted an offer of transportation away from an allegedly abusive environment. (Id. ¶ 6); see Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 334 (implicitly holding that a social worker does not violate a parent's right to family integrity by removing a child from one custodial parent's custody and placing the child with another person who has legal custody rights); see also Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 309(a) (outlining the required procedures that must be followed immediately after a child is taken into temporary custody and, significantly, noting that the social worker's procedural obligations are fulfilled once she releases the child to a parent). Ulahannan consequently did not violate plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights by transporting Ammon to the WEAVE shelter.
Moreover, even if Ulahannan's actions had violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that separating a child and one of his custodial parents from the other custodial parent who has been accused of domestic abuse violates a clearly established constitutional right. Cf. Manzano v. S.D. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he parental liberty interest in keeping the family unit intact is not a clearly established right in the context of reasonable suspicion that parents may be abusing children." (citation omitted)); Callahan v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 880 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (commenting that "in the context of child care workers investigating and bringing child abuse proceedings, there are no `clearly established' substantive due process rights held by parents"). Absent such authority, Ulahannan could have objectively believed that her actions were reasonable.
Specifically, Ulahannan acted on what she believed to be statements from Kulwinder and Ammon that plaintiff was abusive. (See Ulahannan Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. B 4-5.) She then provided emergency transportation as prescribed by California Welfare and Institutions Code § 18294. Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 18294(h) ("Such programs shall be designed to provide the following basic services to victims of domestic violence and their children: . . . (h) Emergency transportation to the shelter and, when appropriate, arrangements with local law enforcement for assistance in providing such transportation."); see also Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 334 (noting that when a social worker acts consistently with a state statute, this is an important consideration in deciding whether the social worker violated a clear constitutional right). Finally, she pursued this course of action with support from her supervisor and the program manager, suggesting that other social workers would have followed the same, objectively reasonable, course of conduct. (Id. ¶ 6.) Again, in the absence of any authority suggesting otherwise, which it was plaintiff's burden to produce, the court fails to see how these actions violated plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Ulahannan is consequently entitled to qualified immunity for the transportation of Ammon and his mother to the WEAVE shelter.
3. Liability of Defendant County Under § 1983
Although defendant Ulahannan is entitled to immunities, these personal exemptions do not extend from the individual government official to the municipality for which she works. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993) ("[U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit — either absolute or qualified — under § 1983."). Nevertheless, "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. With respect to claims against the county, plaintiff must instead allege that (1) the violation was committed pursuant to a formal county policy or a "longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the `standard operating procedure' of the local governmental entity",Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); (2) the individual who committed the tort was an official with final decision-making authority, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986); or (3) an official with final decision-making authority ratified a subordinate's action and its basis, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). See also Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1451 (E.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, "plaintiff must demonstrate that the official policy `evidences a "deliberate indifference"' to his constitutional rights." Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on the policy or custom theory of municipal liability and further contends in his opposition to this motion that defendant County, through Ulahannan's supervisor's actions, ratified her conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 15, 16.; Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 46.) In support of these arguments, plaintiff has conceived of five policies that "if shown to exist" amount to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 45 (emphasis added).) Specifically, plaintiff maintains that the following policies led to deprivation of his rights: (1) "A policy of failing to train [Ulahannan] and her supervisors"; (2) "A policy of allowing and supporting the violations of parents' rights by social workers"; (3) "A policy of covering up the violations of parents' rights by social workers"; (4) "A policy of falsifying evidence"; and (5) "A policy of committing perjury and condoning perjury." (Id.) In support of these theories, plaintiff does not direct the court to any tangible county policy but instead contends that the Ulahannan's supervisors, whom she consulted, "may be fairly said to represent the official policy of Sacramento County." (Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 46.) Alternatively, plaintiff contends that a custom can be inferred from the County's suspected failure to discipline or reprimand Ulahannan. (Id. at 47.)
a. Acts by a Final Policymaker
Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, "supervisor" is not inherently synonymous with "final policymaker." Rather, a final policymaker, for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability, is "some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area of a local government's business." Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124. Significantly, plaintiff has not provided any legal support, and merely assumes, that plaintiff's supervisor, Fermin Perez, and Melinda Lake, the Emergency Response Program Manager consulted during Ulahannan's response, serve in such a capacity. Although "the identification of policymaking officials is not . . . a question of fact in the usual sense," at a minimum the party seeking to avoid summary judgment must provide the court with the titles of those involved so that it can evaluate the viability of the non-movant's claims. See id. at 124-25 (holding that "the identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law"). Plaintiff has not even provided this basic information for Perez. Consequently, because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden, the court cannot deny summary judgment based on his final policymaker arguments.
b. Failure to Reprimand
Alternatively, plaintiff attempts to create a question of fact as to whether his injuries were the result of a county policy by arguing that the County ratified Ulahannan's conduct when it allegedly failed to reprimand Ulahannan or "admit that [her] conduct was in error." (Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 47.) Generally, "isolated instances of official misconduct are insufficient to establish municipal liability under Monell."Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to fire or reprimand officers in light of "a blatantly unconstitutional course of treatment" can serve as "persuasive evidence of deliberate indifference or of a policy encouraging such official misconduct." Id. at 520.
In Henry, several officers were involved in an incident where the plaintiff was held naked in a urine-stained padded cell, paraded through the station house naked, and made to suffer other indignities in an effort to get him to sign his traffic ticket. Id. Additionally, two other individuals testified that they had experienced similar treatment in the months following the plaintiff's arrest. Id. at 518. Despite having been sued for "a blatantly unconstitutional course of treatment" perpetrated by a host of officers, the municipality did not take any disciplinary action. Id. at 520. Based on these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that "[w]hen a county continues to turn a blind eye to severe violations of . . . constitutional rights — despite having received notice of such violations — a rational fact finder may properly infer the existence of a previous policy or custom of deliberate indifference." Henry v. County of Shasta, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) (amended opinion).
However, as the emphasized language suggests, the Ninth Circuit has applied this rule only "when there were very clear instances of abuse and gross recklessness." Harrington v. City of Napa, No. C 04-00958, 2005 WL 1656883, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2005). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has subsequently noted that failure to discipline a municipal actor for an isolated incident does not, standing alone, constitute ratification. Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 393 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing for supportSantiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989), where the First Circuit "refus[ed] to hold that the `failure of a police department to discipline in a specific instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell'")), rev'd on other grounds, Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004);see also Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that "fail[ure] to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smugglerespondeat superior liability into section 1983 law"). Therefore, Henry should not be broadly read to support the proposition that "post-event evidence . . . of a municipal defendant's policy or custom" can be used to create an issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Henry, 132 F.3d at 519. The holding is limited by its plain language to circumstances where officers "blatantly" violated constitutional rights.
As already noted, the court has doubts that plaintiff's constitutional rights were even violated here. Accordingly, any violation here was not blatant. Moreover, despite having the opportunity to depose Ulahannan, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that she was or was not reprimanded. He offers only speculation, which is insufficient to create a question of fact. (See Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 47 (noting only that "defendants have presented no evidence that [Ulahannan] was even reprimanded")); Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that "speculation . . . does not rise to the level of evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment"). Therefore, given that plaintiff has failed to show that the County had an actual policy that violated his rights or that, in ratifying Ulahannan's conduct, the County implicitly adopted such a policy, summary judgment for the County is warranted.
C. Remaining State Law Claims
Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where, as here, "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Factors for the court to consider in deciding whether to dismiss supplemental state claims include judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). "[I]n the usual case in which federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims." Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996)overruled on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). On prior occasions, this court has noted that some circuits have gone even farther and held that, absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances, federal courts should not retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th Cir. 1996); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
While litigation of a new suit in state court may somewhat inconvenience plaintiff, plaintiff has not argued that, in the event that the court decides to dismiss his federal claims, extraordinary or unusual circumstances nevertheless support continued federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) as to the remaining state law claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.