Opinion
2:23-cv-06036-RMG-MGB
04-24-2024
Azeez Sayfa Al-Din Bey, Plaintiff, v. North Charleston Police Department, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Azeez Sayfa Al-Din Bey (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the City of North Charleston Police Department (“Defendant”) alleging unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that on October 12, 2022, seven officers with Defendant North Charleston Police Department arrested him “after [he] was vacating the premises that [he] was asked to leave. [He] was arrested for assault on police while resisting arrest.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff states that he is “constantly being harassed and stalked by the Police Department in Charleston.” (Id.) Based on these limited allegations, the Complaint demands $3 million in damages “for the year [Plaintiff] spent incarcerated” and the “personal property lost” (id. at 5) pursuant to the Zodiac Constitution and 42 U.S.C § 1983 (id. at 3).
Upon reviewing these initial allegations, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 8.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned afforded him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to submit an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his Complaint. (Id. at 3.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow these instructions within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id. at 3-4.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not comply with or otherwise respond to the undersigned's instructions.
In an abundance of caution, the undersigned issued a second order affording Plaintiff another opportunity to submit an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.) Unfortunately, Plaintiff never filed an amended pleading and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, the instant action remains limited to the claims presented in the original Complaint as summarized above. (Dkt. No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite receiving ample time to comply with this Court's instructions, Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in his initial pleading. As a result, this action remains subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
Turning first to Plaintiff's reference to the Zodiac Constitution, federal courts have routinely dismissed claims based on treaties, declarations, and/or resolutions regarding Moorish heritage as frivolous. See Nasi El for Collins v. South Carolina, No. 2:22-cv-506-BHH-MHC, 2022 WL 2835752, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2022) (collecting cases), adopted sub nom. El v. South Carolina, 2022 WL 2835373 (D.S.C. July 20, 2022). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, any such claims are subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2.)
With respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this statute “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, Plaintiff appears to allege claims of unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, both of which fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, while the Complaint also references the Fifth Amendment (Dkt. No. 1 at 3), the pleading does not make any factual allegations that would support a cognizable claim under the same. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2 n.1.) See Viverette v. Strickland, No. 5:22-CT-3342-M-RJ, 2023 WL 2760400, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2023) (noting that “[d]ressing a Fourth Amendment claim up in due process language does not transform it” into a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment violation) (referencing Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 885 (4th Cir. 2022)).
As a threshold matter, courts have routinely held that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds” do not qualify as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. Glenn v. Walters, No. 7:18-cv-275-HMH-KFM, 2018 WL 2122895, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 2118025 (D.S.C. May 8, 2018). Because the North Charleston Police Department is “a facility, building, or group of people,” it does not constitute a person for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical building or the staff and collection of officials it houses. Madison v. Shell, No. 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA, 2022 WL 17156885, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 17128451 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2022); see also Miller v. Rock Hill Police Dep't, No. 2:09-cv-737-JFA-RSC, 2009 WL 1160181, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2009) (explaining that whether a plaintiff uses the term “police department” in an attempt “to name the building where police officers work or to name the police department staff as a whole,” in either instance, “such an entity is not a ‘person' amenable to suit under [§ 1983]”), aff'd, 333 Fed.Appx. 703 (4th Cir. 2009). Consequently, the North Charleston Police Department is not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Elder v. Hayden Fam., No. 9:22-cv-1666-TMC-MHC, 2022 WL 18674842, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2022) (collecting cases), adopted, 2023 WL 1971974 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2023).
To the extent the North Charleston Police Department is considered a municipal entity, the Complaint still fails to state an actionable claim to relief under § 1983. Indeed, a municipality or local government unit may be held liable under § 1983 only where the deprivation of a constitutional right is “caused by action taken ‘pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature. . . .'” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Because the Complaint does not allege that the officers acted pursuant to a municipal policy or practice in arresting Plaintiff, the pleading fails to demonstrate municipal liability and any such claim is likewise subject to summary dismissal.
Nevertheless, even if the North Charleston Police Department was subject to suit, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a constitutional violation for “unlawful arrest” or “malicious prosecution” under § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 5.) “An unlawful arrest claim asserts a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of a person.” Hurlbert v. City of N. Charleston, No. 9:09-cv-1084-HMH-BM, 2010 WL 1492868, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2010) (internal citation omitted), aff'd, 390 Fed.Appx. 270 (4th Cir. 2010). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the arrest was not supported by probable cause. Robinson v. Best, No. 4:21-cv-44-D, 2023 WL 5616172, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2023). A malicious prosecution claim is also a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure, but it “incorporates certain elements of the common law tort.” Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2000). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant caused a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and that the criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022) (“A plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”).
As the undersigned previously explained (Dkt. No. 8 at 3), the Complaint does not provide any context or insight whatsoever regarding the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's arrest or the legal proceedings that followed-and most importantly, how they ended. Due to the cursory, conclusory nature of Plaintiff's allegations, this Court simply cannot discern an actionable Fourth Amendment violation from the pleading and any such claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (finding that a complaint fails to state a claim where it offers merely “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]”) (referencing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a Pro se plaintiff “must meet certain minimum standards of rationality and specificity” in filing a complaint); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 127778 (stating that the court cannot serve as a “mind reader” or “construct full-blown claims” on a Pro se plaintiff's behalf).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The Clerk of Court shall not forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).