Opinion
No. 78-760
Decided July 24, 1980. Rehearings denied August 14, 1980 and August 28, 1980. Certiorari denied November 3, 1980.
Alleging that she had sustained chemical burns when she fainted and her face came in contact with unknown substance on floor of lavatory in college dormitory, plaintiff brought action against college and janitorial service company. From dismissal of her complaint, plaintiff appealed.
Reversed
1. NEGLIGENCE — Res Ipsa Loquitur — Applicability — Plaintiff Not Required — Show Exclusive Control — Eliminate All Possibilities — Required — Prima Facie Case — Eliminating Other Causes. To establish that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in negligence action, plaintiff was not required to establish that instrumentality was under defendant's exclusive control or to eliminate all possibilities other than defendants' negligence; plaintiff needed only to present a prima facie case sufficiently eliminating responsible causes other than the negligence of defendants.
2. Res Ipsa Loquitur — Applicability — College Student — Face Burned — Unknown Substance — Not Required — Show Substance's Identity. To establish applicability of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with respect to chemical burns sustained by college student when she fainted and her face came in contact with unknown substance on floor of lavatory in her dormitory, student was not required to show what was on the floor that caused the burns, but merely had to present evidence that chemical burns would not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of someone's negligence.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur — Applicability Established — Defendants — Must Show — Not Negligent — Preponderance of Evidence. Where plaintiff has established applicability of res ipsa loquitur, she no longer bears the burden of going forward with evidence to establish a prima facie case on issue of negligence; rather defendants must show that they were not negligent by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Action Against — College and Janitorial Service — Res Ipsa Loquitur — — Applicable — Respondeat Superior Theory — Not Required — Relationship Between Defendants — Significance Limited. Since doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in action by college student against college and janitorial service for chemical burns sustained when she fainted and her face came into contact with unknown substance on the floor of lavatory in her dormitory, plaintiff did not need to rely on theory of respondeat superior in order to prove case against the college; rather, the burden was on college to prove that it used due care, and only if its evidence indicated both its own non-negligence and the negligence of the janitorial service was the nature of the relationship between the college and the janitorial service a matter of significance.
5. COSTS — Require Plaintiff — Pay Transportation — Defense Counsel — New York — Conduct Deposition — Abuse of Discretion. Trial court abused its discretion in ordering plaintiff in personal injury action to pay for defense counsel's transportation to New York State to depose one of plaintiff's treating physicians in that defendants presented no evidence of unnecessary inconvenience, expenses, or hardship other than the costs of the plane trip itself and no reason appeared why defendants could not have employed New York counsel to take routine depositions of treating physician who was unavailable for trial.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Clifton A. Flowers, Judge.
Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, C. Willing Browne, for plaintiff-appellant.
Kane, Donley Wills, Lee Wills, for defendant-appellee Colorado College.
Lowell Fortune, P.C., Jeffrey H. Thorpe, for defendant-appellee White Wing Services, Inc.
Ellen M. Berrey sued White Wing Services, Inc., Colorado College, and Red Top, Inc., for negligence. Her complaint against Red Top was dismissed prior to trial. She appeals the judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor of the remaining defendants at the close of her case. She argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We reverse.
Berrey, a student at Colorado College, received second and third degree chemical burns when she fainted and her face came into contact with an unknown substance on the floor of a lavatory in her dormitory. White Wing Services was under contract with Colorado College for janitorial services, including the maintenance of the lavatory. The evidence showed that the lavatories were used by the students residing in the dormitory and their guests.
[1] The trial court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because it found that Berrey had failed to establish that the instrumentality causing the harm was under the exclusive control of the defendants. Berrey argues first that Colorado law does not require that she establish that the instrumentality was under the defendants' exclusive control. We agree. Berrey need only present a prima facie case sufficiently eliminating responsible causes other than the negligence of the defendants. See Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 198 Colo. 113, 596 P.2d 1189 (1979).
[2) The defendants speculated that Berrey's burns might have been caused by some unidentified action on the part of other students or their guests who had access to the lavatory. Nevertheless, while other responsible causes are to be sufficiently eliminated, a plaintiff need not eliminate all possibilities other than the defendants' negligence in order to have the issue submitted to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Gordon v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 42 Colo. App. 426, 599 P.2d 953, cert. granted (1979). Once the jury has been instructed on the doctrine, it must determine whether to apply it to the facts presented. See Colo. J.I. 9:17 (2d ed. 1980).
The court also found res ipsa loquitur inapplicable because Berrey failed to show that the accident would ordinarily not occur in the absence of someone's negligence. The court indicated that in order to establish that the accident would ordinarily not occur in the absence of someone's negligence, Berrey was required to show what was on the floor that caused the burn. We disagree.
[3] Berrey presented testimony by the employees of White Wing and Colorado College that no one in their experience had ever received chemical burns from contact with a bathroom floor at the college. It is not material to Berrey's case what substance was on the floor. Therefore, Berrey was not required to establish what was on the floor which caused her burns. Rather, Berrey merely had to present evidence, as she did, that the chemical burns would not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of someone's negligence. See Bloxsom, supra.
[4] Alternatively, Berrey argues that the trial court erred in determining that she had not established a prima facie case of negligence by the defendants. In connection with this argument, she contends that the court also erred in ruling that White Wing was an independent contractor rather than an employee of Colorado College. In view of our determination that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, we need not address these issues. On retrial, given the same evidence justifying the application of res ipsa loquitur, Berrey will no longer bear the burden of going forward with evidence to establish a prima facie case on the issue of negligence. Rather, Colorado College and White Wing Services must show that they were not negligent by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colo. J.I. 9:17 (2d ed. 1980).
Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here, Berrey need not, on retrial, rely on the theory of respondeat superior in order to prove a case against Colorado College. The liability of the College does not necessarily depend upon the negligence of White Wing Services. The burden is on the College to prove that it used due care. Only if the College's proof tends to show the non-negligence of the College as well as the negligence of White Wing is the nature of the relationship between Colorado College and White Wing a matter of significance.
[5] Berry further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay for defense counsel's transportation to New York City to depose one of her treating physicians. We agree. The defendants presented no evidence of unnecessary inconvenience, expense, or hardship other than the cost of the plane trip itself. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136, 429 P.2d 279 (1967). No reason appears in the record why these defendants, under the circumstances of this case, could not have employed competent New York counsel to take routine depositions of a treating physician who was unavailable for trial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial consistent with the views expressed herein.
JUDGE BERMAN concurs.
JUDGE RULAND dissents.