Summary
finding that a deceased plaintiff's Title VII claim survived the plaintiff's death and granting the plaintiff's estate's motion to substitute
Summary of this case from Salazar v. LockeOpinion
No C 03-3174 VRW.
December 8, 2010
ORDER
On March 3, 2010, plaintiffs moved to substitute the estate of Judy Longo for the individual claims of deceased plaintiff Judy Longo. Doc #302. On June 3, 2010 the court granted plaintiffs' motion in part, allowing the estate to pursue Longo's section 1983 claim. Doc #343. In conjunction with that order, the court ordered supplemental briefing whether the estate is entitled to pursue Longo's Title VII claim. Id at 4.
In their supplemental brief, plaintiffs argue that Longo's Title VII claim is remedial in nature; as such, it survives under common law and the court should allow the estate to pursue Longo's Title VII claim. Doc #347 at 2.
Defendants maintain that while Title VII may have been remedial when first enacted in 1964, the compensatory and punitive damage provisions added in 1991 are penal in nature. Doc #348 at 4. Defendants contend that because Longo sought pain and suffering damages under the 1991 amendments, as opposed to the traditional reinstatement and back-pay remedies available since 1964, she is in effect seeking relief under the "penal" aspects of Title VII and that her claim is therefore extinguished. Id at 4.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the substitution of parties in certain circumstances, including where a party dies and her claim is not extinguished. FRCP 25(a)(1). FRCP 25, however, does not resolve the substantive question whether the claim survives the original plaintiff's death. Robertson v Wegmann, 436 US 584, 587 (1978). Title VII contains no specific survivability provisions. 42 USC § 2000e et seq; see also Estate of Maakestad v Mayo Clinic Arizona, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 55452, *2 (D Ariz). As both parties acknowledge, in the absence of a specific survivability provision, federal common law governs the survivability of claims that are based on federal statutes.Heikkila v Barber, 308 F2d 558, 561 (9th Cir 1962); Doc ##347 at 2; 348 at 2.
Under common law, a claim does not survive plaintiff's death if it is based on a statute that is penal in nature; conversely, claims arising from remedial statutes survive. See Schreiber v Sharpless, 110 US 76, 80 (1884). In determining whether a statute is remedial or penal in character, courts employ a three-factor test which evaluates whether: (i) the purpose of the statute is to redress individual wrongs or more general wrongs to the public, (ii) recovery runs to the harmed individual or to the public, and (iii) recovery under the statute is totally disproportionate to the harm suffered. See Murphy v Household Finance Corp, 560 F2d 206, 209 (6th Cir 1977); Kilgo v Bowman Transportation, Inc, 789 F2d 859, 876 (11th Cir 1986).
The first factor, whether the statute's purpose is to redress individual wrongs, favors plaintiffs. Prior to its 1991 amendment, Title VII's remedial nature was well-established. SeeFranks v Bowman Transportation Co, 424 US 747, 764-66 (1976) (discussing Title VII's "make whole" objective); Kilgo, 789 F2d at 876. Contrary to defendants' assertion, the 1991 amendments did not change the overall nature of Title VII. See Lee v Sullivan, 787 F Supp 921, 933 (ND Cal 1992) (Brazil, MJ); see also Murphy, 560 F2d at 210 (Specific damage provisions will not "convert an otherwise remedial statute into a penal one."). Defendants here argue that Longo's claim for pain and suffering is meant to punish her former employers for their behavior rather than aimed at making Longo whole. Longo's claim for pain and suffering, however, seeks to redress an individual wrong. In short, the court finds that Title VII, including its pain and suffering damages provision, remains remedial in nature after the 1991 amendment. The first factor, therefore, favors plaintiffs.
Since Longo does not seek punitive damages under Title VII, the court need not address whether a punitive damage claim might survive.
The second factor, whether recovery runs to the individual or to the public, also favors plaintiffs. Rather than to the public, damages recovered for Longo's pain and suffering claim would flow directly to her (or to her estate).
The third factor, whether the recovery authorized by Title VII is disproportionate to the harm, requires slightly closer scrutiny. The 1991 amendment authorizes a plaintiff to pursue punitive damages. 42 USC § 2000e et seq. Punitive damages are a classic form of recovery disproportionate to harm. See, for example, Cooper Industries v Leatherman Tool Group, 532 US 424, 432 (2001) (finding that punitive damages "operate as `private fines' intended to punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing" rather than compensate for harm). But as plaintiffs and defendants agree, Title VII specifically excludes government entities from liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, while the result may differ in cases where plaintiffs seek punitive relief from non-government entities, the statute does not actually authorize recovery disproportionate to the harm in this case. See 42 USC § 2000e et seq. Because Title VII only authorizes compensatory damages, which are proportional to the harm, the third factor thus also favors plaintiffs. See 2d Restatement of Torts § 903 (American Law Institute 1979) (noting that compensatory damages "give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered" and "differ from punitive damages, both in the reason for their existence and in the method for their computation.").
All three factors of the Murphy-Kilgo test having been satisfied, the court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion to substitute Longo's estate with respect to her Title VII claim, Doc #302. The court notes before closing, however, that this order resolves merely the survivability of plaintiff's claim. It does not address the question whether the estate may or does state a claim for relief in this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.