Opinion
June 6, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The three-year Statute of Limitations period, applicable in conversion and replevin actions (CPLR 214), ordinarily runs from the date the conversion takes place. However, where possession is originally lawful, a demand is necessary. The period within which the action must be commenced is computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete (see, CPLR 206 [a]; Al-Roc Prods. Corp. v Union Dime Sav. Bank, 74 A.D.2d 834, appeal dismissed 50 N.Y.2d 928; Federal Ins. Co. v Fries, 78 Misc.2d 805; 23 N.Y. Jur 2d, Conversion, § 62).
In the instant action, the plaintiff's right to demand the relinquishment of the subject chattel was complete on December 14, 1982, the date it was sold to the defendant at a Sheriff's sale. Therefore, the plaintiff's causes of action sounding in conversion and replevin, which were interposed in September of 1986, were properly deemed to be barred by the three-year limitations period. Bracken, J.P., Brown, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.