Opinion
Case No. A1-03-33
October 15, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary: The Court upheld the Social Security Commissioner's decision regarding the denial of the Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The primary basis of the Plaintiff's application was chronic pain. The Court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision that the Plaintiff did not meet the disability requirements of the Social Security Act.
The Plaintiff, Dean R. Berg, seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. For the reasons outlined below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Dean R. Berg, filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on December 27, 2000, and May 16, 2001, respectively (Tr. 92, 113-15, 459-62, 463). Berg had filed an application for DIB in 1997, which was denied by the State agency and the Social Security Administration initially and upon reconsideration, and in a decision after a hearing before an ALJ, dated August 18, 1998, which was affirmed by this Court in May 2001 (Tr. 17, 73-91). See also Berg v. Halter, Case No. A1-00-097, (D. N.D. May 9, 2001) (J. Conmy). Berg did not appeal this Court's order. Although Berg's current DIB and SSI applications allege an onset date of October 26, 1996, this Court's previous decision resolved Bergs entitlement to benefits through August 18, 1998 (Tr. 17, 135). Therefore, Berg's claim for benefits through that date for the purposes of DIB is subject to the doctrine of judicial res judicata. See United States v. Brekke, 97 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, Berg was last insured for the purposes of DIB on December 31, 2001 (Tr. 117). Thus, the relevant time period for the current DIB claim is between August 19, 1998 and December 31, 2001. Close The State agency and the Social Security Administration denied Berg's DIB and SSI applications initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 92, 93, 463, 464). On August 6, 2002, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at which Berg and his counsel appeared, as well as a Vocational Expert (Tr. 29-72). The ALJ issued a decision on September 4, 2002, finding that Berg was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 17-23). The Appeals Council denied Berg's request for review on January 24, 2003 (Tr. 5-6). The decision of the ALJ then became the final decision of the Commissioner. Berg sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decisions in a complaint filed on March 14, 2003, pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On August 4, 2003, the Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff, Dean Berg, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 8, 2003.
II. FACTS
Berg applied for DIB and SSI in December 2000 and May 2001 respectively, alleging an inability to work since October 26, 1996, due to chronic pain (Tr. 92, 113-15, 459-62, 463). Berg was 42 years old as of December 31, 2001, the date he was last insured for purposes of DIB, as well as on the date of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 113). Berg has a high school education and past work experience as a truck driver, a warehouse worker, a meter reader, a bartender, and a delivery driver (Tr. 132, 154, 177).
The record reveals that Berg has a history of non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, a September 1996 work-related accident in which he fell from a semi-trailer, mild degenerative changes in the thoracic spine, chronic thoracolumbar pain status post work-related injury, chronic pain syndrome, and "anxiety, depression and reduced self-esteem in response to disability and chronic pain" (Tr. 186-87, 192, 198, 243, 304, 321). Michael P. Martire, M.D., opined in June of 1998 that Berg's pain was "a combination of physical and psychological components. There, however, is no doubt the patient's pain is real" (Tr. 320). Dr. Martire opined that Berg could work in "the sedentary to light" range of work, and that he would need to change positions constantly (Tr. 320).
Berg has also been treated by a neuropsychologist, David A. Brooks, Ph.D. Berg complained of pain varying from 1 to 9.5 on a scale of 1 to 10 (Tr. 250-87). Berg told Dr. Brooks that he experienced little pain in the mornings and increasing pain throughout the day (Tr. 286). Dr. Brooks' progress notes revealed that Berg's depression levels according to Beck measures were "mild" or "moderate" on thirteen occasions and "severe" on eight occasions (Tr. 250-87, 350, 455, 457). Berg's anxiety levels were also "normal," "mild," or "moderate" on twelve occasions and "severe" on seven occasions (Tr. 250-87, 350). Berg's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores indicated "mild" or "moderate" symptoms on eleven occasions and "serious" or "major" symptoms on seven occasions (Tr. 250-87, 349, 351, 454, 457).
Throughout the course of his therapy, Dr. Brooks' progress notes indicated that Berg's speech was clear and at a normal pace (Tr. 250, 253, 454), and that no thought disorder was suspected (Tr. 250, 253, 351, 454). Dr. Brooks recommended continuing psychotherapy on an `intermittent' or "as needed" basis (Tr. 251, 254, 258, 260).
On February 2, 1999, Dr. Martire noted that Berg had difficulty ambulating for prolonged distances, but his neurological examination was negative (Tr. 317). On February 22, 1999, Dr. Brooks noted that Berg was "living with pain that [wa]s generally moderate, and at times moderate to severe" (Tr. 276).
On December 8, 1999, Berg underwent a Neuropsychological Pain Assessment by Dr. Brooks (Tr. 263-66). Dr. Brooks found that Berg's performance reflected good effort and motivation, and that Berg experienced "mild to moderate chronic pain with reactive depression and anxiety" (Tr. 266).
In a letter dated March 27, 2000, Dr. Martire opined that Berg was "disabled from gainful employment as a result of his chronic middle and low back pain," because Berg was "at the less then sedentary category" of work and was unable to do "any repetitive bending or lifting activities" (Tr. 312). Dr. Martire subsequently repeated his opinion that Berg was disabled in September 2000, July 2001, and March 2002 (Tr. 307, 309, 353). Dr. Martire again opined, on September 25, 2000, that Berg was "unable to do any prolonged sitting, bending, or lifting activities" (Tr. 310). He further noted that Berg's bilateral lower extremity muscle stretch reflexes, sensation, and muscle strength were all intact (Tr. 310).
Berg sought treatment at MedCenter One's emergency room on October 16, 2000, complaining of pain in the right lower back and a feeling of numbness and tingling in the right leg (Tr. 243). Stanley M. Renton, M.D., noted that Berg's range of motion in the lower back was "quite limited" and that he was tender over the right paravertebral muscles (Tr. 243). Power and reflexes in both lower extremities were within normal limits, and straight leg raising was positive on the right at 30 degrees and negative on the left at 60 degrees (Tr. 243).
On October 26, 2000, Denise McDonough, M.D., noted that Berg was not tolerating his back pain and that most of his complaints "seem to be real somatic and more because of depression than anything" (Tr. 205).
On November 22, 2000, Berg underwent a psychiatric evaluation by Albert Samuelson, M.D. (Tr. 196-96). During the exam, Dr. Samuelson noted that Berg's "body posturing d[id]not reveal evidences of serious splinting of his back nor overt pain," and that "[h]e highly dramatized the pain he experience[d]" (Tr. 197). Dr. Samuelson assessed psychogenic pain disorder, personality traits disturbance, chronic back pain with etiology undetermined, and extreme psychosocial stressors including poverty, economic problems, vocational problems, and access to medical care (Tr. 197).
At a January 9, 2001, medication review, Dr. Samuelson noted that Berg had a "dramatic bend when attempting to impress me with how disabled he was" (Tr. 195). Dr. Samuelson also noted that Berg was able to walk effortlessly and did not exhibit any outward evidences of severe splinting of his back or other back pain (Tr. 195).
On June 21, 2001, Rehabilitation Consultant Ken Litt opined that he did not feel that Berg would be able to perform "competitive employment" (Tr. 122). Mr. Litt noted that Berg might be able to find part-time entry-level work that would allow him to sit for short periods and walk for short periods, but he questioned whether this would result in being able to be considered gainful employment (Tr. 122).
On June 25, 2001, Berg stated that he took aspirin, tramadol hydrochloride (Ultram), A centrally acting synthetic opioid analgesic used for the management of moderate to moderately severe pain in adults. See Physician's Desk Reference, 2510 (57th ed. 2003). Close acetaminophen-caffeine-dihydrocodeine bitartrate (Panlor), and nabumetone (Relafen) A nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) used for acute and chronic treatment of signs and symptoms of osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis. PRD, 1617 (57th ed. 2003). Close for pain; Serzone, Used for the treatment of depression. PRD, 1106 (57th ed. 2003). Close Paxil, Used for the treatment of a major depressive disorder. PRD, 1603 (57th ed. 2003). Close and amitriptyline hydrochloride (Amitriptyline) for depression; and glyburide (Glucovance) Used in the management of type 2 diabetes. PRD, 1085 (57th ed. 2003). Close for diabetes (Tr. 131, 133).
In a letter dated June 25, 2001, Dr. Brooks stated that Berg was "not exaggerating symptomology and [wa]s not likely malingering" (Tr. 252).
On July 15, 2001, Berg's friend, Jim Sirtola, stated that Berg did light household chores, visited with friends, played cards, and attended church (Tr. 139). Berg also stated that Berg interacted well with people, although he was withdrawn (Tr. 140).
On July 19, 2001, Berg stated that his mother and neighbors helped with cooking, laundry and cleaning, but he stated that he checked the oil and put gas in his car (Tr. 144). Berg also stated that he was able to take care of his personal needs such as taking medication, taking a shower, and that he spent time stretching and trying to sleep during the day (Tr. 148).
On July 26, 2001, Dr. Martire opined that Berg was "at the less than sedentary category" of work because he was unable to sit more than six hours out of an eight-hour workday; could only rarely lift 10 to 15 pounds; was unable to do any repetitive bending or lifting activities; and needed to change positions frequently (Tr. 307). Dr. Martire noted that Berg felt Ultram and Panlor helped control his pain to a certain degree (Tr. 307).
A Physical Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) Assessment was completed on August 6, 2001 (Tr. 322-30). The State agency physician reviewed Berg's records and found that he could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit about six hours in an eight hour workday, and had unlimited ability to push and/or pull (Tr. 323). The physician found that Berg could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl (Tr. 324). There were no manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations established (Tr. 326).
A Psychiatric Review Technique Form was completed on August 8, 2001, and revealed that Berg has affective, anxiety, somatoform, and personality disorders (Tr. 311-44). A Mental RFC Assessment was also completed on August 8, 2001 (Tr. 345-48). Berg was found to be moderately limited in his abilities to understand and remember detailed instructions; carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others (Tr. 345-46). Berg was not significantly limited in any other mental capacity (Tr. 345-46).
On October 16, 2001, Dr. Martire examined Berg and found he had decreased thoracic and lumbar ranges of motion and was more markedly tender (Tr. 305). Dr. Martire gave Plaintiff injections of lidocaine hydrochloride (Xylocaine) (Tr. 305).
The record also indicates that Berg received chiropractic care at the Chuppe Chiropractic Clinic from March 28, 2002, through June 27, 2002 (Tr. 355-59, 440-53). He was assessed to have lumbar, thoracic, and cervical segmental dysfunction, intervertebral disc degeneration, cervicalgia, and sacroiliac joint dysfunction (Tr. 355-59, 440-53). Throughout the course of his chiropractic treatment, Berg's condition ranged from "slightly improved" to "feeling better" (Tr. 335, 356, 440, 441, 444, 445, 445, 447, 452, 453).
At the hearing on August 6, 2002, Berg testified that he could not sit or stand "too long" due to pain, and that he had dizziness and headaches (Tr. 36-37). Berg testified that his pain was generally at about a seven on a scale of one to ten (Tr. 38). He also testified that breathing techniques helped quite a bit (Tr. 38). He testified that he got a special license which allowed him to hunt deer (Tr. 46). Berg stated he attended church "quite regularly" (Tr. 49). He testified that he rested a lot throughout the day and that pain kept him awake (Tr. 49). He further testified that he could dress without assistance, and that he could bend and touch his toes while sitting, but not while standing (Tr. 50). He testified that he cooked, but currently did very little cooking (Tr. 51). He also testified that he was able to care for his personal hygiene and was able to drive (Tr. 51, 61). Berg also stated that walking made his condition worse (Tr. 54). He testified that his only symptoms from diabetes were high blood sugar levels and lightheadedness, the latter of which he was unsure whether it was caused by the diabetes (Tr. 56-57). Berg also stated that he did not require insulin injections (Tr. 56-57). Berg stated that he could lift a maximum of 60 or 70 pounds, and could lift 10 to 15 pounds on a frequent basis (Tr. 59-60). He testified that he had never been to an inpatient pain clinic, but that he used a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS) unit to control pain (Tr. 65).
Vocational Expert James Berglie also testified at the administrative hearing. When the ALJ offered Berglie a hypothetical question about a man of Berg's age, education, and work experience who could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, could stand for two hours out of an eight-hour workday, could not use ladders, ropes and scaffolds, could only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and was limited to non-technical and complex work, Berglie testified that Berg could perform unskilled sedentary work and a small portion of light work (Tr. 67). Berglie offered examples of jobs, including assembler, packager, parts sorter, attendant and information clerk (Tr. 68). He testified that these jobs were very common nationally, found "in the hundreds of thousands," and that regionally 1,200 to 6,000 jobs existed (Tr. 68).
On September 4, 2002, the ALJ issued a decision wherein he found that Berg had diabetes, degenerative disc disease, affective disorder, anxiety disorder, somatoform disorder and personality disorder, impairments which were severe but which did not meet or equal the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.P, app.1 (Tr. 23). The ALJ also found that Berg's allegations of disability were not fully credible (Tr. 23). The ALJ determined that Berg was unable to perform any of his past relevant work (Tr.23). He further found that Berg was a younger individual with a high school education, and that the issue of transferability of skills was not material (Tr. 23). Finally, the ALJ found that Berg could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the regional or national economy (Tr. 23). Thus, the ALJ's overall conclusion was that Berg was not disabled as of December 31, 2001, or thereafter (Tr. 23).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2000). The Act defines "physical or mental impairment" as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3), 1382c(3)(C). A claimant must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)-(f)(2003). Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the claimant's age, education, and work experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schwieker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
As to Berg's disability insurance benefits claim, the record reveals that Berg last met the special earnings requirements of the Act on December 31, 2001 (Tr. 116). For purposes of DIB, the plaintiff must establish the onset of disability on or prior to that date. See Battles v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 657, 659 (8th Cir. 1990); Sykes v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (2003). Therefore, the only relevant evidence is that which pertains to Berg's condition prior to December 31, 2001, the date he was last insured. See Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1391 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the issue was whether a Social Security disability claimant was disabled before the expiration of his insured status).
With respect to Berg's supplemental security income claim, the Plaintiff must establish disability as of the date of the application. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335 (2003) (claimant for SSI cannot be paid for any months before the month following the month he filed an application). However, Berg filed a previous application for DIB in 1997, which was denied by the State agency and the Social Security Administration initially and upon reconsideration, and in a decision after a hearing before an ALJ, dated August 18, 1998, which was affirmed by this Court in May 2001 (Tr. 17, 73-91). See also Berg v. Halter, Case No. A1-00-097, (D. N.D. May 9, 2001)(Conmy). Plaintiff did not appeal this Court's order. Although Plaintiff's SSI applications allege an onset date of October 26, 1996, this Court's previous decision resolved Plaintiff's entitlement to benefits through August 18, 1998 (Tr. 17, 135). Therefore, the only relevant evidence is that since August 19, 1998.
Berg does not contest the ALJ's findings that (1) he has not engaged in substantial employment since August 19, 1998, (2) he has severe impairments, (3) his impairments are not of "listing level" severity under Appendix 1 to Subpart P, 20 C.F.R. Part 404 and (4) he is unable to perform his past relevant work. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ's decisions regarding the first four steps of the five-step test are supported by substantial evidence.
However, Berg contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Berg's impairments do not prevent him from doing any other work. See Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003). Berg alleges that his pain precludes him from all gainful employment. Further, Berg contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Michael Maritre, and that the ALJ did not have substantial evidence to support his determination that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that claimant could perform despite his disability.
First, Berg asserts that the ALJ failed to give substantial weight to Dr. Martire's opinion and adopted the opinion of the State agency physician over the opinion of Dr. Martire. In his decision, the ALJ stated that Dr. Martire's opinions were not supported by sufficient objective signs or findings. Dr. Martire's own findings included a negative neurological examination (Tr. 317), intact reflexes, sensation and muscle strength in the lower extremities (Tr. 310, 315) and only mildly to moderately decreased range of motion, side-bending, rotation and flexion (Tr. 308, 311). Dr. Martire's opinion that Berg could only lift 10 to 15 pounds rarely was contradicted by Berg's own testimony that he could lift 10 to 15 pounds frequently (Tr. 59-60).
It is well-established that a treating physician's opinion should be granted substantial or controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 2002); Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2001). From the record, it is clear that Dr. Martire's opinion that Berg was incapable of gainful employment was inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record. In addition, as the Commissioner points out, Dr. Martire's opinion that Berg was unable to work was not a medical opinion, but rather an opinion on the application of the statute, a task assigned solely to the discretion of the Commissioner. Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, 416.927 (2003). The Court finds that in light of the evidence in the record as a whole, the ALJ's decision to discount the opinion of Dr. Martire as to Berg's ability to perform any type of work is supported by substantial evidence.
The second issue raised by Berg is that the ALJ did not have substantial evidence to support his determination that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that claimant could perform despite his disability. Vocational Expert James W. Berglie testified at the hearing before the ALJ. Berglie testified that, considering an individual of Berg's age, education, past relevant work experience, and Residual Functional Capacity as noted previously, there were jobs in the national or regional economy which such an individual could perform, in numbers which the ALJ found to be significant (Tr. 67-68). Berglie listed a few jobs that would fall within Berg's ability range, such as factory jobs, attendant positions, or unskilled office jobs.
Berg contends that the hypotheticals the ALJ used were incomplete because they did not accurately reflect all of the factors affecting Berg and his ability to perform at a job. Berg asserts that when Berglie was presented with a full listing of factors, he stated that Berg could not perform any job. Counsel for Berg engaged in the following exchange with Berglie:
Q:Okay. So that, if that was in the hypothetical that he's — his pain is not fully controllably [sic], that he might need some unscheduled breaks that would preclude all work for Mr. Berg? A:It would if the breaks were extensive at all or frequent at all. I mean if they're on an ongoing basis throughout the day I mean a person can get up and stretch and move about just generally for a few seconds during the day, but again if it requires you to leave the work site or you can't focus on your job, if it's at that severity level then yes, there would be no jobs that could be maintained. Q:Okay. And adding into the hypothetical Mr. Berg's testimony that he had difficulty concentrating, his lightheadedness, that kind of thing, would that also factor into his ability to hold a full-time job? A:It certainly is a factor again. It's an issue of severity.
(Tr. 70-71). Berg also points to his testimony at the hearing that his sleeping patterns are interrupted by pain (Tr. 49). Berg notes that he testified he has difficulty concentrating for any length of time due to the pain (Tr. 53).
In his decision, the ALJ found Berg's pain complaints were not fully credible. The ALJ stated that Berg applied for a deer license and permit to allow him to use his vehicle to hunt this year. The ALJ found that Berg goes to church regularly, takes care of his personal needs, cooks and drives. The ALJ also relied on Berg's own testimony that he could lift 60-70 pounds, but only 10-15 pounds repeatedly. Further, the ALJ noted that "[a]lthough he was initially injured on the job, his worker's comp benefits were discontinued after their doctors found he could return to work." Finally, the ALJ looked to Berg's admission that he has not been prescribed a back brace.
The ALJ is required to consider all of the evidence relating to Berg's subjective complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) his daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of his pain: (3) precipitating and aggravating factors: (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of his medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1994). An ALJ may not discount a claimant's subjective complaints simply because the medical evidence fails to support them. However, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. It is well established that a claimant's credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide. Edwards v. Burhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
Here, the ALJ properly considered Berg's subjective complaints. The mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of disability. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000); Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1989). Eighth Circuit case law recognizes that an ALJ makes credibility assessments, as well as the factual determination of whether a claimant's subjective complaints prevented him from working. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000); Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993); Baker v. Sullivan, 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court will not disturb the decision of an ALJ who seriously considers, but for good reason expressly discredits, a claimant's subjective complaints.
Overall, the ALJ considered Berg's subjective complaints of disabling symptoms and concluded that they were not entirely credible (Tr. 20). The ALJ properly considered the totality of the evidence in making his credibility determination. See Burns v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1218, 1219 (8th Cir. 1989). As previously noted, a claimant's credibility is "primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide." Edwards, 314 F.3d at 966. The record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision that Berg's subjective complaints of disabling symptoms were not entirely credible.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision that Berg did not meet the disability requirements of the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner's decision. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED (Doc. No. 12). Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED (Doc. No. 14).
IT IS SO ORDERED.