Summary
stating that the OML "was clearly intended to afford the public access to a broad range of meetings at which public business is considered"
Summary of this case from Marble v. DarienOpinion
No. 27860
Decided May 15, 1978.
Action by appellant for injunctive relief against appellee, alleging that Senator Harold L. McCormick, as chairman of the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, was not providing "full and timely notice to the public" of the committee's meetings, as required by the Open Meetings Law of the Colorado Sunshine Act of 1972. Trial court dismissed the complaint.
Affirmed
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Issue — Not Considered — Not Essential — Determination. Constitutional issue would not be considered by supreme court where resolution of the issue was not essential to a proper determination of the issues involved in instant case.
2. STATES — Open Meetings Law — Intent — Public — Access — Broad Range of Meetings — Public Business. Colorado Open Meetings Law, section 24-6-401, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 — as indicated by its provisions — was clearly intended to afford the public access to a broad range of meetings at which public business is considered.
3. Open Meetings Law — "Full and Timely Notice." Colorado's Open Meetings Law, section 24-6-401, et seq., C.R.S. 1973, requires that "full and timely notice" be given of meetings at which public business will be considered.
4. Open Meetings Law — "Full and Timely Notice" — Flexible Standard — Fair Notice to Public — Requirement — Depends on Meeting. The "full and timely notice" requirement of Colorado's Open Meetings Law establishes a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public; consequently, whether the statutory notice requirement has been satisfied in a given case will depend upon the particular type of meeting involved.
5. Open Meetings Law — "Full and Timely Notice" — Requirement — Satisfied. The "full and timely notice" requirement of the Colorado Open Meetings Law was held to have been satisfied, where appellee, in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, directed the Secretary of the Senate to publish a list of all Bills capable of being considered on a particular day by his committee in the Senate calendar; a copy of the Senate calendar was subsequently posted outside the Senate Chambers, and four other copies were delivered to members of the press in the Capitol pressroom.
6. Open Meetings Law — Officials — Perform Duties. The Open Meetings Law was not intended to interfere with the ability of public officials to perform their duties in a reasonable manner.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Robert T. Kingsley, Judge.
James R. Benson, Jr., pro se.
David J. Hahn, Special Counsel for defendant-appellee.
The appellant, James R. Benson, Jr., commenced this action for injunctive relief against the appellee, Senator Harold L. McCormick. Benson alleged that McCormick, as chairman of the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, was not providing "full and timely notice to the public" of the committee's meetings, as required by the Open Meetings Law of the Colorado Sunshine Act of 1972. Section 24-6-401, et seq., C.R.S. 1973. The trial court held that the Open Meetings Law did not conflict with the provisions of our constitution, found that "full and timely notice to the public" had been given, and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
[1] We do not reach the constitutional issue in this case. Our disposition of the issues in this case does not require that the constitutionality of a statute be determined because that issue is not essential to a proper determination of this case. Weissman v. Board of Education of Jefferson County School District No. R-1, 190 Colo. 414, 547 P.2d 1267 (1976); Tyler v. School District No. 1, 177 Colo. 188, 493 P.2d 22 (1972); Times-Call Publishing Co. v. Wingfield, 159 Colo. 172, 410 P.2d 511 (1966).
The appellee, in his capacity as committee chairman, directed the Secretary of the Senate to publish a list of all Bills capable of being considered on a particular day by his committee in the Senate calendar. A copy of the Senate calendar was subsequently posted outside the Senate Chambers, and four other copies were delivered to members of the press in the Capitol pressroom.
The thrust of the appellant's appeal is not that the notice provided by the appellee in the Senate calendar was not "timely," but that it failed to provide the "full" notice contemplated by Colorado's Open Meetings Law. The appellant contends that notice under the statute must include an agenda limited to those Bills which may reasonably be reached at a given meeting. We disagree.
[2] Colorado's Open Meetings Law, section 24-6-401, et seq., C.R.S. 1973, was clearly intended to afford the public access to a broad range of meetings at which public business is considered:
" 24-6-401. Declaration of policy. It is declared to be the policy of this state that the formation of public policy is public business and may not be conducted in secret.
" 24-6-402. Meetings — open to public. (1) All meetings of two or more members of any board, committee, commission, or other policy-making or rule-making body of any state agency or authority or of the legislature at which any public business is discussed or at which any formal action is taken by such board, committee, commission, or other policy-making or rule-making body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, except as may be otherwise provided in the constitution.
"(2) Any meetings at which the discussion or adoption of any proposed resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action occurs or at which a majority or quorum of the body is in attendance shall be held only after full and timely notice to the public." (Emphasis added.)
[3] Our Open Meetings Law, enacted by initiative in 1972, reflects the considered judgment of the Colorado electorate that democratic government best serves the commonwealth if its decisional processes are open to public scrutiny. Absent adequate and fair notice, however, the salutary purposes of the Open Meetings Law could easily be defeated. The statute, therefore, requires that "full and timely notice" be given of meetings at which public business will be considered.
[4] This case presents a question of first impression to this court regarding the meaning of "full and timely notice." The Open Meetings Law itself neither establishes the manner in which notice must be given nor defines the content of the required notice. In view of the numerous meetings to which the statutory requirement is applicable, we hold that the "full and timely notice" requirement establishes a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public. "Full and timely notice" for legislative committee meetings, which may be held almost daily, differs from "full and timely notice" for a monthly meeting of a public board. Consequently, whether the statutory notice requirement has been satisfied in a given case will depend upon the particular type of meeting involved. The sole issue for determination in this case is whether the appellee has provided "full and timely notice" of the legislative committee meetings, as required by the Open Meetings Law.
[5,6] An examination of the record causes us to conclude that the trial court properly determined that "full and timely notice" had been given. Legislative committee chairmen, as a practical matter, are rarely able to predict with certainty which matters will be considered at a particular meeting. The absence of a Bill's sponsor or of an expert witness may require that consideration of a given Bill be postponed to a later date. Similarly, unforeseeable developments may cause a Bill, not expected to be considered, to be discussed out of order. The unique nature and pressures of legislative committee meetings, whose members often serve on more than one committee, are such that a precise agenda requirement would unduly interfere with the legislative process. The Open Meetings Law, however, was not intended to interfere with the ability of public officials to perform their duties in a reasonable manner.
The remaining allegations of error do not require discussion.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN dissents.