Opinion
5:19-cv-248-MTT-CHW
06-02-2023
RALPH HARRISON BENNING, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles H. Weigle, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Ralph Benning filed a case alleging that Defendants were not providing him with Kosher meals, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (“RLUIPA”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff and Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the case after entering into a settlement agreement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(A). (Doc. 52). In October 2021, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(a)(2), the Court dismissed the case with prejudice but retained jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2), which would permit the Plaintiff to move to reinstate the action. (Doc. 53). Citing violations of two portions of the settlement agreement and his alleged attempts to address the violations with Defendants without success, Plaintiff now moves to reinstate this action. (Doc. 55). Defendants concede that the Court has jurisdiction to reinstate the action, but they assert that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff's allegations do not present a current cause of action for a violation of federal law. (Doc. 56). Because the Court retains jurisdiction to reinstate the action but has no authority to enforce the terms of a private settlement agreement, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion to reinstate this action (Doc. 55) be DENIED.
The parties entered into a private settlement agreement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(A), which provides:
Nothing in this section shall preclude parties from entering into a private settlement agreement that does not comply with the limitations set forth in subsection (a), if the terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.
The statute distinguishes a private settlement agreement (PSA) from a consent decree entered by a court, which must comply with the PLRA's limitations on prospective relief, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B).The Court did not enter a consent decree in this case. The private settlement agreement, the joint motion to dismiss, and the order dismissing the action all contemplated the Court's ability to retain jurisdiction of the case as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(A). (Docs. 52, 52-1, 53). Reinstating this action for the reasons proffered by Plaintiff is improper, nevertheless, because the Court is without jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the private settlement agreement. Plaintiff's motion to reinstate should therefore be denied.
With regard to prospective relief, including consent decrees, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) provides:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
Plaintiff originally filed this suit alleging that Defendants were denying him a Kosher diet. The private settlement agreement (PSA) provides that the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) will provide Kosher meals to Plaintiff, with the meals being prepared in the Georgia Correctional Industries' (GCI) kosher kitchen under the supervision of Innovative Kosher Consulting, LLC. (Doc. 52-1, ¶¶ 2-4). The parties agreed that the Kosher pre-packaged meals would be doubled sealed and that the meals would be “comparable in nutritional value and caloric intake to the current restricted alternative meal plan.” (Id., ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff's basis for reinstating this action comes from these paragraphs because, he argues, the meals do not contain enough calories and are often not packaged correctly. (Docs. 55, 57). Nothing in his motion or reply brief suggests that Defendants have refused to provide him with a Kosher diet. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion, regardless of how he has labeled it, is rooted in a breach of the PSA's terms and not in a violation of federal law.
While the Court retains jurisdiction to reinstate the underlying action which the PSA resolved, the Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a PSA under the PLRA. Two cases are instructive here, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) and Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2007). In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court contemplated whether a district court retained jurisdiction over the terms of a settlement agreement where neither the stipulation to dismiss nor the order to dismiss reserved the district court's jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The Supreme Court explained that enforcement of a settlement agreement “is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. The Court then considered the potential bases for jurisdiction before finding that the district court had no jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The only order in the case was the one dismissing the action, “a disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement.” Id. at 380. The Court explained that the outcome would be different “if the parties' obligations had been made part of the order of dismissal,” but in Kokkonen the district court had no jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement because the provisions of the agreement were not made part of the dismissal order. The parties did not incorporate their obligation to comply with the terms of the agreement into the order, the order itself did not incorporate the settlement agreement, and the “judge's mere awareness and approval of the [settlement] terms” were not sufficient” to incorporate them in the order. Id. at 381. The Court suggested that dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), the dismissal provision used here, “the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement contract (or the court's “retention of jurisdiction” over the settlement contract) may... be one of the terms set forth in the order.. ..Absent such action, however, enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 381-382.
The Eleventh Circuit compared a district court's role in enforcing consent decrees and private settlement agreements under the PLRA in Rowe v. Jones. In Rowe, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that under the statute, private settlement agreements “are not subject to judicial enforcement other than through reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.” 483 F.3d at 796 (emphasis in original). The opinion also examined legislative history indicating a congressional intent to “[limit] the use of consent decrees to resolve prison condition suits, while freely allowing the use of private settlement agreements,” so that “[p]arties may continue to enter such agreements to avoid lengthy and burdensome litigation, but they cannot expect to rely on the court to enforce the agreement.” Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No.104-21, at 24-25 (1995)). In Rowe, the court ultimately found that PSAs are not judicially enforceable and that there are only two remedies for a breach of the PSA's terms: “‘reinstatement of the action that the agreement settled' or a state law claim.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that Rowe squarely supports reinstating this action, which “is the only action available to the Court.” (Doc. 57, p. 5). However, interpreting both Kokkonen and Rowe together suggests that Plaintiff's only recourse is an action in state court and not reinstatement of the action. The order of dismissal did not incorporate the terms of the PSA or retain any authority to enforce its terms, and the motion to reinstate does not allege an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not alleged that he is not being provided with a Kosher diet. Instead, the motion to reinstate plainly shows that Plaintiff alleges breaches of two paragraphs of the private settlement agreement. As recognized by the PLRA, Kokkonen, and Rowe, Plaintiff's remedy for a breach of the private settlement agreement's terms is a new action in state court and not reinstatement of his lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion to reinstate action (Doc. 55) be DENIED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof.
Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED.