Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11281.
January 19, 2005.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Harold M. Brown, Judge, Superior Court No. 3KN-97-00796 Civil.
James P. Bennett, pro se, Soldotna, Appellant.
Robert J. Molloy and Kristine A. Schmidt, Kenai, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
James Bennett and Ardis LeBlanc married in 1974, separated in 1997, and divorced in 1998. The superior court entered a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in 2000 that included, as part of the marital estate, benefits earned between the date of separation and the date of divorce. Bennett appealed the entry of the QDRO, and this court held that the marital portion of Bennett's retirement benefits should include only those benefits accrued up to the date of separation, not to the date of divorce. On remand, Bennett raised a new argument that the marital portion of his retirement benefits should be calculated by averaging his salary for his three highest earning years prior to the date of separation. The superior court declined to adopt Bennett's proposal, changing only the accrual date in the QDRO. Bennett appeals once again. Because Bennett raised a new argument on remand that he could have raised before his first appeal, we affirm the superior court's entry of the QDRO.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
James Bennett and Ardis LeBlanc married in 1974. They separated on March 1, 1997 and signed a property settlement agreement on July 17, 1998. Superior Court Judge Harold M. Brown entered a decree of divorce for the parties on August 11, 1998.
On April 11, 2000, the superior court issued a QDRO dividing the retirement benefits that Bennett had accrued under the Alaska Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). The order awarded fifty-five percent of Bennett's monthly TRS benefits accrued before August 11, 1998 (the date of divorce) to LeBlanc. Neither party disputed that LeBlanc should receive fifty-five percent of the marital portion of Bennett's retirement benefits, the amount they had agreed to in their property settlement agreement. Bennett objected to the QDRO on the ground that the court should have designated as marital property only those TRS benefits accrued before March 1, 1997, the date that Bennett and LeBlanc separated. The superior court declined to calculate the benefits based on the date of separation, and Bennett appealed to this court.
On August 28, 2002, we held that the superior court erred when it declined to use the date of separation rather than the date of divorce as the date for determining the marital portion of the benefits. Quoting our decision in Hanlon v. Hanlon, we reasoned that "`the date for segregating marital from post-marital property is ordinarily the date of the functional termination of the marriage.'" We also concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to award Bennett forty-five percent of LeBlanc's Individual Retirement Account (IRA). We remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings.
Bennett v. LeBlanc, Mem. Op. J. No. 1099 (Alaska, August 28, 2002), 2002 WL 1998451, at *3 (quoting Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 231 (Alaska 1994)).
Id. at *4.
On October 15, 2002, LeBlanc gave notice that she was filing a new proposed QDRO regarding Bennett's TRS benefits in response to our remand in Bennett v. LeBlanc. The proposed QDRO used the separation date rather than the date of divorce. Bennett received the proposed QDRO on October 18, 2002 and filed a response on October 23, 2002 objecting to the proposed QDRO. In his objection, Bennett raised a new contention that the court should fix his base income by averaging the highest three years of his salary prior to March 1, 1997 (the date of separation) in order to determine the marital portion of his TRS benefits. Bennett's argument was premised on the fact that, without court intervention, TRS would average the three highest earning years in his job in order to determine his base salary under its defined benefits plan.
Under the Teachers' Retirement System, teachers receive monthly benefits equal to one-twelfth of the member's average base salary during any three school years of membership multiplied by a percentage of the credited service that varies based on the length of the member's employment. AS 14.25.110(d). The average base salary is obtained by averaging the member's three highest years' base salary. AS 14.25.220(5).
The superior court entered a revised QDRO regarding Bennett's TRS benefits on January 13, 2003 and distributed it on January 17, 2003. The QDRO did not incorporate the change proposed by Bennett, instead awarding LeBlanc fifty-five percent of the TRS benefits accrued by Bennett before the date of separation, as directed in our remand order. Stated otherwise, the QDRO awarded LeBlanc fifty-five percent of the marital portion of Bennett's TRS benefits, as determined using the standard coverture fraction employed by Alaska trial courts for defined benefit plans.
The revised QDRO states: "ARDIS D. LEBLANC, as Alternate Payee, shall receive from the Plan, from the benefits which otherwise would be payable to the Participant, a benefit equal to: FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) of the total monthly benefit the participant has acquired under the plan as of February 28, 1997."
Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 1003 (Alaska 2002) (stating that "[t]he marital share of a pension is typically determined by the coverture fraction, whose numerator is the number of months of employment during coverture, and whose denominator is the total number of months of employment at the time of vesting").
The TRS pension plan is a defined benefit plan. Under the coverture fraction method employed by Alaska trial courts, the numerator of the fraction consists of the time Bennett was employed during the marriage (in this instance using the separation date as the ending point) while the denominator consists of the total time Bennett is employed by the school system. The marital share of Bennett's pension plan will decrease with every additional year that he works, since the numerator of the fraction remains constant while the denominator increases. Thus, as the duration of Bennett's employment with the school system increases, the marital share of Bennett's pension decreases.
See BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (2d ed. 1994).
In response to Bennett's objections to the revised QDRO, the superior court ruled that the issue had not been raised before and that it would have the effect of unilaterally amending the parties' original property settlement agreement. Bennett filed a motion for reconsideration on January 28, 2003 and submitted his own proposed QDRO to the court. The superior court did not rule on Bennett's motion for reconsideration and it was therefore deemed denied under Alaska Civil Rule 77(k)(4). Bennett filed a notice of appeal on November 6, 2003.
We conclude that the trial court correctly decided that Bennett could not raise his objection to the division of his TRS benefits on remand because he could have raised it when he objected to the initial QDRO prior to his first appeal. Because we find that Bennett improperly attempted to inject a new issue on remand, we need not reach the merits of Bennett's appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in determining a property division in a divorce action. The division of property in a divorce action is a three-step process. The trial court (1) determines what property is available for distribution; (2) values the property; and (3) determines the most equitable allocation. We review the trial court's determination of the property available for distribution under an abuse of discretion standard. The valuation of available property is a factual determination that is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. If the trial court made legal determinations in the course of a property division, we review those determinations under the "independent judgment" standard. We also review questions of law de novo, adopting "the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason and policy."
Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(4) and Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 639 (Alaska 1989)).
Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 68 (Alaska 1993) (citing Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 223-24 (Alaska 1986)).
Cox, 882 P.2d at 913.
Faulkner, 46 P.3d at 996 (citing Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 95 (Alaska 1999)).
Cox, 882 P.2d at 913.
Upon remand of a case, the trial court has a duty to obey the mandate and render judgment in conformity with the remand. Whether the trial court has correctly applied this court's mandate on remand is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. B. Timeliness of Bennett's Appeal
Williams v. Crawford ex rel. Estate of McVey, 47 P.3d 1077, 1089 (Alaska 2002).
LeBlanc argues that Bennett's notice of appeal was untimely under Appellate Rule 204(a)(1) because Bennett did not file the appeal within thirty days after the superior court distributed the revised QDRO. Because Bennett appropriately waited to file his appeal until the superior court had resolved all of the issues on remand, we conclude that Bennett's appeal was timely.
Alaska Appellate Rule 204(a)(1) states: "The notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from the date shown in the clerk's certificate of distribution on the judgment appealed from. . . ." LeBlanc moved to dismiss Bennett's appeal on January 6, 2004 on the basis that it was untimely. We denied LeBlanc's motion but noted that the parties could brief the issue as an alternative ground for affirming the superior court's order.
Bennett filed his notice of appeal from the January 13, 2003 QDRO on November 6, 2003, well after the thirty-day deadline for appealing a final judgment under Appellate Rule 204(a)(1). But Bennett filed the appeal within thirty days of the superior court's issuance of a property division order regarding LeBlanc's IRA on October 8, 2003. Like the earlier order regarding Bennett's TRS benefits, the October 8, 2003 order stemmed from our remand in Bennett v. LeBlanc. Bennett argues that he waited to appeal until the superior court had resolved all of the issues stemming from the remand.
The January 13, 2003 QDRO was distributed on January 17, 2003.
The superior court mailed the property division order to Bennett on October 10, 2003.
Bennett, 2002 WL 1998451 at *4.
Bennett's argument is supported by the fact that the superior court's January 13, 2003 order discussed both the TRS QDRO and the division of LeBlanc's IRA and indicated that the court would consider other issues relating to the couple's retirement accounts after additional briefing. The order treated all of the retirement accounts as related matters, giving Bennett reason to believe that the division of the retirement plans was a single matter for purposes of appeal. Moreover, we relax procedural requirements for pro se litigants. Pro se litigants are expected to make a good faith effort to learn the rules of procedure and to comply with those rules. Because Bennett appealed within thirty days of the superior court's issuance of its final order in connection with our earlier remand, and because Bennett made a good faith effort to comply with procedural rules, we find that Bennett's appeal was timely.
See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002) (citing Bauman v. State, Div. of Family Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989)).
C. Introduction of a New Issue on Remand
LeBlanc argues that Bennett waived his claim regarding how to calculate his TRS benefits because he did not raise it during the adoption of the original QDRO or during his first appeal to this court. While we do not consider this a waiver case in the traditional sense, we conclude that Bennett could have introduced his proposal prior to the first appeal, and thus could not introduce it on remand after the appeal.
LeBlanc also argues that adoption of Bennett's proposal would violate her due process rights due to lack of notice and deprivation of property. She cites one case for the proposition that neither Alaska nor the United States may deprive any person of property without due process of law, but does not otherwise advance any legal arguments in support of her due process claims.
Bennett first raised his novel proposal regarding division of his TRS benefits on October 23, 2002, when he submitted a response to LeBlanc's proposal for a revised QDRO following our decision in Bennett v. LeBlanc. The superior court declined to adopt Bennett's proposal in part because Bennett did not raise the issue earlier.
This case is not a traditional waiver case because Bennett does not introduce on appeal an issue he failed to raise in the trial court. But he raised this new issue for the first time on remand from this court's review of the trial court's initial QDRO. As we observed in State Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson, "[s]uccessive appeals should narrow the issues in a case, not expand them. . . . The basis for this rule is that `[j]udicial economy and the parties' interests in the finality of judgments are in no way furthered if parties are allowed to engage in piecemeal appeals.'" Bennett initially did not oppose the first QDRO, which stated that LeBlanc would receive a benefit equal to fifty-five percent "of the total monthly benefit" acquired by Bennett under the TRS plan as of the date of divorce. This language made clear that the court would calculate LeBlanc's portion of Bennett's TRS benefits as a fraction of his total monthly benefits under the defined benefit plan. When Bennett did oppose the first QDRO, he objected only to the benefit accrual date but did not object to the method of division.
State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Carlson, 65 P.3d 851, 873-74 (Alaska 2003) (quoting MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998)).
On appeal from Bennett's initial objection, we determined that the date used by the trial court to determine the marital portion of Bennett's pension was incorrect. We then remanded the case to the trial court for "recalculation of the division of Bennett's TRS benefits using the date of separation." Our remand was limited to the question of the date used in the QDRO and was not intended to broaden the scope of the dispute. Because Bennett had all of the information he needed to object to the method of division when the initial QDRO was filed, we conclude that he was required to do so at that time. The trial court was correct in determining that Bennett should be precluded from introducing a new objection to the QDRO for the first time on remand.
Bennett, 2002 WL 1998451 at *3.
While we do not reach the merits in this case, we note that Bennett will benefit from remaining in the TRS system because the marital share of his pension will continue to decrease under the traditional coverture fraction method of division. Bennett argues that "[i]f Mr. Bennett had resigned his position commencing the date of separation and began employment in another occupation with a separate retirement system, LeBlanc could not claim those post-separation date retirement funds. In that situation, [LeBlanc's] benefits would be based on the highest three years' salary average as of the date of separation." But this argument does not acknowledge that the marital share of Bennett's pension will decrease as Bennett extends the duration of his employment or that under this method LeBlanc would receive less than the agreed-upon fifty-five percent of benefits paid for the months of the marriage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Bennett could have objected to the initial QDRO, his objection on remand was inappropriate. We AFFIRM the superior court's entry of the QDRO regarding Bennett's TRS benefits.