Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:01-CV-086-BG.
May 9, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE WITH PREJUDICE
On this day came to be considered Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 8, 2002, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 13, 2002. Having considered all relevant arguments and evidence, this court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Benjamin filed a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Ronald Quinney on May 29, 2001. The case was reassigned to the United States Magistrate Judge on June 6, 2001. Consent to proceed before the United States Magistrate Judge was obtained from Benjamin and Defendant Quinney.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the period of time covered in his complaint, Benjamin was an inmate housed at the French Robertson Unit in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division. Benjamin alleges in his complaint that Defendant Quinney used excessive force against him on July 18, 1999.
Specifically, Benjamin claims that on July 18, 1999, Defendant Quinney escorted him to a minor disciplinary hearing and then back to cell 7-B-35 when the hearing was over. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 1.) As Defendant Quinney and Benjamin were leaving the hearing, Lieutenant T. Welch nodded his head to Defendant Quinney. ( Id.) While standing in the hallway, Defendant Quinney began handling Benjamin's arm aggressively and told Benjamin to stop looking at him. ( Id.) Benjamin responded to Defendant Quinney, "These are my eyes." ( Id.) Defendant Quinney then grabbed Benjamin behind the head, placed his leg across Benjamin's body, and threw Benjamin to the floor. ( Id.) At all times Benjamin's hands were restrained behind his back. ( Id.) Defendant Quinney then called Benjamin a degrading name. ( Id. at 2.) Benjamin was escorted to medical for a use-of-force physical, examined by a physician the next day, and given a 600 mg prescription. ( Id.)
Major Use-Of-Force report M-04237-07-99 confirms that an incident involving Benjamin and Defendant Quinney occurred on July 18, 1999. (Def's Br., Exh. D-1.) According to authenticated records, Benjamin was escorted from a hearing back to his cell by Defendant Quinney and Officer Kenneth Thorpe. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 15.) Defendant Quinney admitted being involved in a major use-of-force on the date in question and to placing Benjamin on the floor after an attempted assault. (Def.'s Br., Exh. E)-6 at 3-4; see also Exh. D-1 at 15, 27, 28.) Also witnessing the incident were Officers Thorpe and Rivers. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 34, 35, 36.)
Benjamin was escorted to the medical facility by Officers Elam and Hollis, and a physical examination was conducted by LVN Margaret Gray. (Def's Br., Exh. D-1 at 30, 37, 38, 42, 48, 54.) Nurse Gray noted no injuries, although Benjamin complained of pain on his left-side rib area. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 46.) Sergeant Jason Cook took four still photographs of Benjamin. ( Id. at 30, 42, 48, 49, 58.) Officers Elam and Hollis then returned Benjamin to his cell. ( Id. at 31, 38, 40, 43, 49.) On July 19, 1999, Benjamin was examined in the unit's clinic. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-2, at 21.) Authenticated medical records disclose that there were "no contusions, swelling or abrasions." ( Id. at 20-21.) X-rays disclosed "[n]o fractures, lytic or blastic bone lesions." ( Id. at 12.) Benjamin received a prescription for ibuprofen lasting 10 days. ( Id. at 20, 21.)
On August 3, 1999, Captain B. Bardin conducted a disciplinary hearing where Benjamin was charged with disciplinary infractions arising from the July 18, 1999, incident. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-3 at 26-35.) Benjamin was found guilty of attempting to headbutt Defendant Quinney and failing to obey an order to stop talking in the hallway; punishment included cell restriction and loss of personal property for 45 days. ( Id.) This disciplinary action was later set aside by the classification committee. (Def.'s Br, Exh. D-5 at 12; Exh. D-6 at 6.)
Unit Warden Emily Bond reviewed the use-of-force that occurred on July 18. 1999, and found no evidence to indicate that the actions of Defendant Quinney were inappropriate at the time of the use-of-force. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 15.)
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence to show a triable issue of fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Benjamin brings this excessive force claim against Defendant Quinney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In response, Defendant Quinney moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the facts preclude a finding of excessive force and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The court addresses these arguments below and concludes that summary judgment on Benjamin's § 1983 claim against Defendant Quinney is appropriate.
Whenever a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1992): "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321)). Under the Whitley approach, the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation, "or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat `reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,' and "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." "The absence of serious injury is therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry but does not end it." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed the factors a court must look to in determining whether an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim has been made out including:
1. The extent of the injury suffered;
2. The need for application of force;
3. The relationship between the need and the amount of force used;
4. The threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and
5. Any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1992) (on remand).
In the wake of the Hudson decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that some physical injury is an indispensable element of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432-33 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding Hudson does not affect the rule that requires proof of injury, albeit significant or insignificant, `injury' properly defined as physical injury); Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Because he suffered no injury . . . [there] was a de minimis use of physical force . . . not repugnant to the conscience of mankind.").
In the case at hand, the evidence presented shows that Defendant Quinney responded to a perceived threat by Benjamin. (Def.'s Br., Exh D-6 at 6; Exh. D-1 at 27-28.) Regardless of the lack of consensus about the content of the verbal altercation, Benjamin admits that he exchanged words with Defendant Quinney. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at I.) Following the incident, Benjamin complained of sore ribs. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 42, 46, 48.) At the use-of-force physical no injuries were noted. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-1 at 46; Exh. D-6 at 3.) Benjamin was evaluated the following day and no contusions, swelling, or abrasions were noted. (Def.'s Br., Exh. D-2 at 20-21.) Further, x-rays disclosed "[n]o fractures, lytic or blastic bone lesions." ( Id. at 12.) Benjamin received a prescription for ibuprofen lasting 10 days. ( Id. at 20-21.) Further, Benjamin has not alleged any lasting injuries from the use-of-force committed on July 18, 1999.
The complained-of use of force here is not of a sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Compare Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (sore and bruised ear lasting for three days was de minimis injury), with Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999) (where court found as a matter of law that Plaintiffs injuries, caused by being knocked down and repeatedly punched in the face and head by officers, were not de minimis). Benjamin has not raised a valid Eighth Amendment claim for excessive use of force nor does he have the requisite physical injury to support a claim for emotional or mental suffering. Accordingly, Defendant Quinney's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Further, based on the foregoing reasoning and the arguments and evidence presented in Defendant's Brief, Defendant Quinney is also entitled to qualified immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
The court finds that there are no outstanding issues of material fact as to Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Quinney. For the reasons set forth above, and for those reasons set forth in Defendant's Brief, Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiffs case is DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
This is a consent case assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) with authority to enter Judgment. Any appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(3).
All other relief not expressly granted is hereby DENIED.
All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.