Opinion
No. 4-224 / 03-1518.
June 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants Steve Benham and Christine Benham appeal the trial court's grant of defendant-appellee Ronald E. King's motion for directed verdict following a trial on plaintiffs' claims of negligence and loss of consortium arising out of the collapse of defendant's dental chair. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Patrick O'Bryan, Des Moines, for appellants.
Stephen Powell and Jim DeKoster of Swisher Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Zimmer, JJ.
Plaintiffs-appellants Steve Benham and Christine Benham appeal the trial court's grant of defendant-appellee Ronald E. King's motion for directed verdict following a trial on plaintiffs' claims of negligence and loss of consortium arising out of the collapse of defendant's dental chair. On appeal plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in directing a verdict because there was sufficient evidence to generate a jury question as to defendant's negligence. We reverse and remand
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
There was testimony at trial that on October 19, 2002 plaintiff Steve Benham was at defendant's dental office, seated in a reclining dental chair for a routine teeth cleaning. Following the cleaning, dental assistant Linda Frick attempted to raise the chair. The chair collapsed, and Mr. Benham was flipped up against the sink and cabinet behind the chair. Mr. Benham testified he hit his head and shoulder. Ms. Frick yelled for help, and defendant came into the room. When he got there, Mr. Benham was on his feet. Ms. Frick apparently told defendant he would have to fix the chair again. Defendant testified he may have responded by saying he would fix the chair, but that he did not state he would have to fix the chair "again." Mr. Benham could not remember whether defendant had simply said he would fix the chair or whether he would fix it "again."
Defendant bought the chair at issue in 1981. Its collapse was caused by a broken worm screw. Defendant's deposition testimony was that possibly up to "once or twice a year" when the chair would suddenly become immobile, he had fixed it by screwing its loose set screws back in. Defendant testified he had not had to fix the set screws for seven years prior to the accident, and that following the accident he checked the set screws and found they were in place. The set screws apparently held in place and turned two metal pieces which in turn held in place the worm screw, which was part of the lift mechanism for the chair. When the set screws were loose and in need of repair, defendant testified the chair simply would not move. According to defendant, the set screws, which at the time of the accident were not in need of repair, did not cause or contribute to the worm screw failure. Defendant testified he always checked the worm screw gear after fixing the set screws. Defendant also testified he had had the chairs installed by the chair seller, and that neither the sellers/installers nor the manufacturers recommended to him an inspection program. He further testified that the operator's manual did not contain any such recommendation. Defendant had never seen or heard of any similar chair collapse before, and he claimed there was no indication from the operation of the chair that it was on the brink of collapse. In fixing the chair, defendant ordered a new part and had it installed.
A week after the incident Mr. Benham was examined by his family doctor because he had numbness in his left arm. A year later he went to see his family doctor again due to pain in his legs. He was referred and had an MRI and was given cortisone injections. He ultimately underwent surgery and suffered some complications. Defendant claimed he had medical bills totaling $12,530.63 and some disability. He also claimed lost wages.
During the trial and outside the presence of the jury the court asked defendant some questions for purposes of gaining a better understanding of the chair mechanics, including the set screws and worm screw and whether the collapse of the chair had anything to do with the set screws. Defendant stated it did not.
Following the plaintiffs' case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to show defendant had a duty to Mr. Benham, as there was no evidence defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care would have known about the defective worm screw. The court granted the directed verdict.
Plaintiffs argue it is a jury question "as to whether the defendant's exclusive use of a nineteen-year-old mechanical chair known to have mechanical problems which had never been serviced by professionals was reasonably prudent care for [Mr. Benham's] safety." Plaintiffs further argue it is a jury question "as to whether the defendant should have implemented an inspection and maintenance program on his old equipment."
In granting defendant's motion for directed verdict, the trial court stated,
Negligence and/or premises liability negligence requires knowledge or reason to know of a potential injury. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there is no reason to believe [defendant] knew or had reason to know the plastic white housing to the metal worm gear would give way and that if it did, catastrophic injury could occur to an individual such as Mr. Benham. The failure of the chair on October 18, 2000, had nothing to do with the set screws and had everything to do with the failure of a part to the chair which had never presented a problem in the past.
The uncontroverted evidence is that no set screw had worked its way loose on October 18, 2000. Even assuming the set screw had worked its way loose on October 18, 2000, it would be speculation to believe [defendant] knew or reasonably should have known that a loose set screw could cause injury to an individual such as Mr. Benham.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Our supreme court has recently summarized appellate review of rulings granting motions for a directed verdict:
Our review of rulings granting motions for directed verdict is for correction of errors at law. In our review, "we view the evidence in the same light as the district court to determine whether the evidence generated a jury question." We therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. . . . If reasonable minds could differ on an issue of fact, the issue is for the jury.
In ruling on such motions, the district court must decide whether the nonmoving party has presented substantial evidence on each element of the claim. "Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence." A directed verdict is appropriate if the evidence is not substantial.
Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted).
The following are the elements of a negligence claim: (1) a duty to conform to a standard of conduct in order to protect others; (2) failure to conform to that standard; (3) proximate cause; and (4) damages. See Hartig v. Francois, 562 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1997). The question of whether a duty arises out of the relationship of the parties is always a matter of law for the court. Shaw v. Soo Line R.R., 463 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Iowa 1990), cited in Gremmels v. Tandy Corp., 120 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1997).
In order to ascertain the duty owed by landowners to entrants upon their land, courts classify entrants as either invitees, licensees, or trespassers. See Morgan v. Perlowski, 508 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1993); see also Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1998)). An invitee is a person who enters or remains on land open to the public by invitation or permission and is owed the highest standard of care. Morgan, 508 N.W.2d at 727 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. a, at 176 (1965)). "A business invitee is one `who is invited to enter or remain on land for the purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land'" Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332, at 175). The possessor of land is under a duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. Id. This duty requires the possessor to use reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises. Id. The duty also requires the possessor to make the area reasonably safe or to give warning of the actual condition and risks involved. Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged in Richardson v. Commodore, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 693, 698 (Iowa 1999) n. 3, that although the plurality in the Sheets case would have abrogated these distinctions, the majority of the court did not approve, so the status of the plaintiff continues to be relevant in premises liability law.
Owners or occupiers of land are not insurers of the premises. Sheets , 581 N.W.2d at 606. "The business owner is not subject to liability on a claim of negligence if the owner and its agents did not know, or could not have known, by exercise of reasonable care, of the condition that caused the harm." Gremmels, 120 F.3d at 105.
III. ANALYSIS
In appealing, plaintiffs argue the question of whether defendant should have routinely serviced the dental chair is a fact question for the jury. Defendant counters that the real issue is whether defendant had a duty to Mr. Benham, as a matter of law, to discover the defective worm screw.
Plaintiffs introduced no evidence and do not contend that defendant knew of the defective worm screw. Defendant testified he was unaware of any problem with the worm screw. The only malfunction defendant ever fixed on the chair was when it stopped moving, at which time defendant tightened the set screws. Defendant testified he would check the worm screw after fixing the set screws. Defendant testified that the failure of the chair was not related to the set screws. Plaintiff did not introduce affirmative evidence to the contrary.
The question then becomes whether defendant could have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, of the faulty worm screw, and whether this is properly a question for the court or the jury to resolve.
Evidence at trial regarding the discoverability of the faulty worm screw was that defendant had not installed the chair himself, but had hired the chair suppliers to install the chair; there was no instruction in the owner's manual advising defendant to perform any routine maintenance; there was no indication the set screws were faulty at the time of the accident; there was no articulated connection between defendant's past adjustment of the set screws and the malfunction of the worm screw; chair malfunction in the past had only resulted in its immobility, never its collapse; and the chair showed no signs of problems immediately prior to the accident.
The plaintiffs claim there is a question of whether a reasonable person would nevertheless have discovered the faulty worm screw. They contend that claim should have been sent to the jury because the chair was old, defendant had adjusted its set screws multiple times, and the chair was not routinely maintained.
Defendant, in construing this case as solely an issue of duty for the court, relies heavily on Gremmels v. Tandy Corp., 120 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1997), where the Eighth Circuit determined, as a matter of Iowa law, that the defendant Radio Shack had no duty to plaintiffs, business invitees, to discover and protect plaintiffs against a defective chair in its store. In that caseplaintiffs argued employees at Radio Shack had constructive knowledge that a chair's backrest and caster had been fixed in the past and were possibly defective. Gremmels, 120 F.3d at 105. The plaintiffs in Gremmels conceded, however, that the employees did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care would not have known that the particular weld junction in the chair which failed was defective. Id. Because the parties did not know of or could not have discovered the defective weld, the Eighth Circuit found there was no duty owed to plaintiff and that the case was properly resolved on summary judgment. Id. at 106. In making its determination the court cited the well-settled principle that the question of whether a duty arises out of the relationship of particular parties is always a matter of law for the court. Id. at 105; see Shaw, 463 N.W.2d at 53.
Defendant analogizes his case to Gremmels. As in this case, in Gremmels the defendant had fixed a defective part of a chair that broke and injured the plaintiff, defendant had not performed any regular inspection of the chair, and a different part of the chair ultimately malfunctioned. Unlike in Gremmels, the plaintiff in this case did not concede that defendant would not have discovered the defective worm screw in the exercise of a reasonable inspection. Plaintiffs, however, offered no concrete evidence indicating how the worm screw cracked, whether it had been cracking for a long period of time, and how the crack would have been discoverable upon reasonable inspection.
In Richardson v. Commodore, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 693, 698 (Iowa 1999), the court concluded the extent of defendant's duty as landowner to a business invitee was a jury question not properly resolved on summary judgment by the court. In that case a part of a plaster ceiling in a bar fell on the plaintiff. Richardson, 599 N.W.2d at 695. Knowledge of the dangerous condition in the plaster ceiling was not imputed to defendants, but the supreme court concluded the question of defendants' duty of inspection owed to the plaintiff and the extent of that duty should be submitted to a jury. Id. at 697-98. In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned that the defendants were aware of the age of the ceiling, a falling ceiling would pose a serious danger to patrons of their business, and inspecting the ceiling was not particularly onerous. Id. at 698. The court also determined in Richardson that a jury should also decide if the defect in the ceiling was reasonably discoverable upon inspection. Id.
In this case defendant was aware of the age of the chair and its past need for repair, a falling chair would clearly pose a serious danger to a patient, and inspecting the chair would not prove particularly difficult. A dental patient is entitled to certain expectations for his safety when he is seated in a dental chair in a dentist's office. See id. The chair was twenty years old, it had recurring malfunctions in the past, and up to twenty patients sat in the chair each day. It should be up to the jury to determine whether a reasonable inspection would have uncovered the defective screw. See id. We reverse the directed verdict and remand for a new trial.
Under what is commonly referred to as the Uhlenhopp rule, a trial court should generally submit a case to a jury rather than directing a verdict, even when judgment for the defendant as a matter of law is appropriate, in order to avoid wasting the considerable resources already invested in the case which will have to be reinvested if error is found and a new trial is necessary. See Reed v. Chrylser Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 228-29 (Iowa 1992).
The plaintiffs also claim the trial court abused its discretion in asking questions about the mechanics of the chair for purposes of clarification outside the presence of the jury, and the court relied on evidence so gathered in directing a verdict. As a preliminary matter, it is doubtful that the error claimed here was preserved, as plaintiffs' counsel made no objection to the court's questions, see State v. Harmon, 238 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Iowa 1976), and plaintiffs' counsel even asked his own questions of the witness.
A trial court has the power to clarify evidence through the questioning of witnesses when in the exercise of sound discretion it is reasonably deemed necessary. State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Iowa 1980). The question is whether the court abused its discretion in asking questions and considering testimony introduced at trial outside the presence of the jury regarding the set screws, the worm screw, and the interaction of the two, which were essential details to this case.
While the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized the power of the trial judge to question witnesses, it has cautioned the courts against assuming the role of an advocate. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d at 532-33 (holding that a trial court's attempt to clarify evidence regarding the perimeters of the time of death was not abuse of discretion where the underlying evidence of those perimeters had previously been presented, and noting in so holding that the trial court had not undertaken the introduction of evidence). Judges are encouraged not to enter the fray with their own interrogation of witnesses. Id. at 533. When cause to do so exists, restraint must be used. Id. The Cuevas court reasoned that by engaging in the examination of witnesses the court becomes vulnerable to a multiplicity of criticisms, among them bias, prejudice and advocacy. Id. As the court noted, even facial expressions, gestures and voice modulation could be construed to evince an attitude or feeling toward a witness or party. Id.; see also State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1976).
Because we are reversing on other grounds we need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, but we advise it to exercise restraint in similar matters in the future.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Huitink, J., concurs; Zimmer, J., specially concurs.
I concur in the results of the majority opinion.