Summary
finding that an unjust enrichment claim that "seeks precisely the same damages as . . . claim for breach of contract" must be dismissed as duplicative
Summary of this case from Crespo v. BiyomboOpinion
2014-06-24
Maria Webster BENHAM, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. ECOMMISSION SOLUTIONS, LLC, etc., et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Miranda Sambursky Slone Sklarin Verveniotis LLP, Mineola (Michael A. Miranda of counsel), for appellants. Fensterstock & Partners LLP, New York (Alison G. Greenberg of counsel), for respondent.
Miranda Sambursky Slone Sklarin Verveniotis LLP, Mineola (Michael A. Miranda of counsel), for appellants. Fensterstock & Partners LLP, New York (Alison G. Greenberg of counsel), for respondent.
SWEENY, J.P., RENWICK, ANDRIAS, SAXE, KAPNICK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan M. Kenney, J.), entered January 9, 2014, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint's first through seventh and tenth causes of action, sounding in disability- and gender-based discrimination in violation of the New York State and City Human Rights Laws (HRL), breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Because the alleged conduct occurred while plaintiff was physically situated outside of New York, none of her concrete allegations of harassing behavior or other discriminatory conduct had the “impact” on plaintiff in New York required to support claims under the State and City HRL ( Hoffman v. Parade Publ., 15 N.Y.3d 285, 289–291, 907 N.Y.S.2d 145, 933 N.E.2d 744 [2010];Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 27 A.D.3d 169, 175–176, 806 N.Y.S.2d 553 [1st Dept.2005], lv. dismissed7 N.Y.3d 859, 824 N.Y.S.2d 597, 857 N.E.2d 1129 [2006] ). Plaintiff's HRL claims must thus be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since the statutes do not apply to the conduct at issue ( seeCPLR 3211[a][2]; Hoffman, 15 N.Y.3d at 289, 907 N.Y.S.2d 145, 933 N.E.2d 744).
Plaintiff's argument that, because she filed New York State nonresident income tax returns and paid income taxes here, she is entitled to the “protections, benefits and values” of New York government, including the State and City HRL (Matter of Zelinsky v. Tax Apps. Trib. of State of N.Y., 1 N.Y.3d 85, 95, 769 N.Y.S.2d 464, 801 N.E.2d 840 [2003],cert. denied541 U.S. 1009, 124 S.Ct. 2068, 158 L.Ed.2d 619 [2004];see Matter of Huckaby v. New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 4 N.Y.3d 427, 438, 796 N.Y.S.2d 312, 829 N.E.2d 276 [2005],cert. denied546 U.S. 976, 126 S.Ct. 546, 163 L.Ed.2d 459 [2005] ), is unavailing. Whether New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonresident plaintiff's claims under the HRLs turns primarily on her physical location at the time of the alleged discriminatory acts, and not on her taxpayer status ( see Hardwick v. Auriemma, 116 A.D.3d 465, 983 N.Y.S.2d 509 [1st Dept.2014]; Sorrentino v. Citicorp, 302 A.D.2d 240, 755 N.Y.S.2d 78 [1st Dept.2003]; see alsoExecutive Law § 298–a [distinguishing among claims by residents and nonresidents] ).
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as non-movant, the record indicates that, at most, the parties had a mere “agreement to agree” that plaintiff should receive some sort of equity stake in defendant eCommission Solutions, LLC (ECS), with the terms of that stake subject to future negotiations and approval. The failure of the parties to agree on the precise form of the equity stake causes plaintiff's contract claim to fail for lack of definiteness in the material terms of her equity compensation ( see Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 [1981];Mark Bruce Intl. Inc. v. Blank Rome, LLP, 60 A.D.3d 550, 551, 876 N.Y.S.2d 19 [1st Dept.2009]. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. The lack of definiteness in the promise of equity compensation is similarly fatal to plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 10 A.D.3d 489, 491, 782 N.Y.S.2d 12 [1st Dept.2004]; see Glanzer v. Keilin & Bloom, 281 A.D.2d 371, 372, 722 N.Y.S.2d 540 [1st Dept.2001] ).
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, which seeks precisely the same damages as her claim for breach of contract, is “indistinguishable from [her] claim for breach of contract” ( Martin H. Bauman Assoc. v. H & M Intl. Transp., 171 A.D.2d 479, 484, 567 N.Y.S.2d 404 [1st Dept.1991] ), and must be dismissed as duplicative of the contract claim ( see Corsello v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, 790–791, 944 N.Y.S.2d 732, 967 N.E.2d 1177 [2012];Walter H. Poppe Gen. Contr. v. Town of Ramapo, 280 A.D.2d 667, 668, 721 N.Y.S.2d 248 [2d Dept.2001] ).
Plaintiff's allegations fall well short of the level of outrageousness necessary to establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress ( see Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 [1983];Zephir v. Inemer, 305 A.D.2d 170, 170, 757 N.Y.S.2d 851 [1st Dept.2003] ).