Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-183.
November 12, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of November, 2004, upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss (docket entry # 20), which we treat as a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff's response thereto, and the Court finding that:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits us to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment if we give all parties "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." In our Order of October 20, 2004, we notified the parties that, if Macera moved to dismiss Benefit Concepts's second amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds (as she does in the instant motion to dismiss), we would treat her motion as one for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence, and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n. 10 (1986). Once the moving party carries this burden, the nonmoving party must "come forward with `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The task for the Court is to inquire "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1287 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
(a) Macera argues that we should dismiss Benefit Concepts's claims because they are barred by the statute of limitations;
(b) The Supreme Court has explained that "state statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of action when the federal legislation made no provision, and in seeking the right state rule to apply, courts look to the state statute most closely analogous to the federal Act in need," North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 1930 (1995) (quotations and citations omitted);
(c) Here, we shall apply Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions because the parties agree that such an approach is appropriate, see Order of October 20, 2003 ¶ (h);
By citing exclusively to Pennsylvania law, the parties implicitly concede that Pennsylvania law applies here.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525(a)(8) (2004).
(d) That statute of limitations would not begin to run until the time when the "contracts" were breached, see Romeo Sons v. P.C. Yezbak Son, 652 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1995) ("[I]n an action for breach of contract the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the breach.");
(e) Regardless of when the statute of limitations began to run, the discovery rule tolls its running "until the point where the complaining party knows or reasonably should know that he has been injured and that his injury has been caused by another party's conduct," Gustine Uniontown Assocs. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 842 A.2d 334, 344 (Pa. 2004); see also Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000) (recognizing applicability of discovery rule in a promissory estoppel action);
(f) In this case, Benefit Concepts alleges that Macera "breached" the Plan and the Subrogation Agreement when she failed to reimburse it for the accident-related medical expenses that it paid on her behalf, but Macera's duty to reimburse Benefit Concepts did not arise until Macera recovered from a third party;
(g) The first amended complaint alleged that Macera recovered from a third party on December 1, 1999, see Am. Compl. ¶ 21, and the parties have not explained why the statute of limitations on Benefit Concept's suit would not begin to run on that date;
(h) Still, the discovery rule would toll the running of the statute of limitations from December 1, 1999 until Benefit Concepts knew or reasonably should have known about Macera's recovery;
(i) In support of her motion to dismiss, Macera has provided us with a December 30, 1999 letter from Benefit Concepts's agent to Macera's attorney requesting "reimbursement," Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G, and has suggested that Benefit Concepts would not have requested "reimbursement" unless it knew on that date that Macera had recovered from a third party;
(j) One of Benefit Concepts's principals, however, explained that the December 30, 1999 letter was a "form follow-up status letter," so Benefit Concepts believes that its request for "reimbursement" does not confirm — or even suggest — that Benefit Concepts had knowledge of Macera's recovery on December 30, 1999,see Pl.'s Resp. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A ¶ 13;
(k) This explanation raises a genuine issue of material fact as to when Benefit Concepts became aware of Macera's recovery;
(l) Because Benefit Concepts initiated this action on January 16, 2004, the statute of limitations would bar any claims that it knew about before January 17, 2000;
(m) Apart from the December 30, 1999 letter, Macera has not yet offered any evidence suggesting that Benefit Concepts knew of her recovery before January 17, 2000;
(n) Less than two months passed between Macera's December 1, 1999 recovery and January 17, 2000, and a reasonable jury could conclude that Benefit Concepts's alleged failure to learn about the recovery during that period was not attributable to any lack of diligence;
(o) Based on this record, we cannot yet enter summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds;
It is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and
2. Macera shall ANSWER the second amended complaint by November 19, 2004.