Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1672-14T3
03-22-2016
FEDERICO BENCOSME, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH KANNANKARA, Defendant-Respondent.
Brandon J. Broderick argued the cause for appellant (Brandon J. Broderick, attorney; Simcha Davidman, on the brief). Darren C. Kayal argued the cause for respondent (Rudolph & Kayal attorneys; Mr. Kayal, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and Vernoia. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2632-13. Brandon J. Broderick argued the cause for appellant (Brandon J. Broderick, attorney; Simcha Davidman, on the brief). Darren C. Kayal argued the cause for respondent (Rudolph & Kayal attorneys; Mr. Kayal, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals an October 28, 2014 order granting summary judgment to defendant and dismissing plaintiff's complaint based on the court's finding that plaintiff was uninsured and therefore barred from bringing a claim for economic and non-economic losses under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). We affirm.
I.
We discern the following undisputed facts from the record and view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). On April 12, 2011, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident during which plaintiff suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was uninsured for medical expense benefits coverage as required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, and -4.
For most of the seven-year period prior to the accident, plaintiff was insured under his mother's automobile insurance policy, and he contributed $75 per month toward the cost of that coverage. In March 2011, he was removed from his mother's policy and endeavored to obtain his own policy. Plaintiff performed an internet search, called a company that advertised itself as an insurance broker, and scheduled a meeting with a broker. Plaintiff met with the broker, paid $150 in cash for six months of liability coverage, and received an insurance identification card bearing the name Proformance Insurance Company covering a six-month period.
Plaintiff believed he purchased six months of liability insurance. He was told by the broker that if an accident was his fault "it would have to come out of [his] pocket and basically, fix the other car." He also understood that "if [he] were to get into a collision it wouldn't cover, . . . payments of any injury [he] sustained or anything like that. It would just be to protect [him] from the — from any type of fraud or anything like that so [he] wouldn't get into any issues with the law."
After plaintiff's April 12, 2011 accident with defendant, it was discovered he had been the victim of a scam. The broker was a fraud, and plaintiff did not have any automobile insurance at the time the accident occurred.
Plaintiff was working for his employer at the time of the accident. His medical bills were paid under his employer's worker's compensation insurance policy. --------
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, claiming he suffered economic and non-economic losses as a result of the accident. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff was barred from bringing suit under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). The court heard argument and granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff appealed.
II.
We conduct a de novo review of the trial court's decision on defendant's motion and apply the same standard as the trial court for granting a motion for summary judgment. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and decide whether the motion judge correctly found that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540. Issues of law are subject to the de novo standard of review, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), and we "do not defer to the trial court's . . . interpretation of 'the meaning of a statute.'" Davis, supra, 219 N.J. at 405 (quoting Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013)).
When interpreting a statute, we are required to determine the "intent of the Legislature," Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101 (2009), and must first consider the plain language of the statute because that is the best indicator of legislative intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). We are to
"ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." . . . Courts are cautioned against "rewrit[ing] a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language." If the language is "clear on its face," courts should "enforce [the statute] according to its terms."
However, "where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control." . . . Accordingly, "when a 'literal
interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should be rejected."
[Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01 (2006) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101; then quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001)).]
Plaintiff does not contend there were any genuine issues of material fact in dispute that precluded the proper granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment. He asserts only that the court erred in its legal conclusion that plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) because of plaintiff's admitted failure to maintain medical benefits expense coverage. We therefore turn our attention to the court's application of the statute to the undisputed facts here.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:
Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by section 4 of P.L. 1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-4), section 4 of P.L. 1998, c. 21 (C. 39:6A-3.1) or section 45 of P.L. 2003, c. 89 (C. 39:6A-3.3) shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.Plaintiff concedes that on April 12, 2011, he "fail[ed] to maintain" the mandated medical expense benefits coverage required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). He argues, however, that he should be exempted from the statutory bar to suit because he made a good faith effort to purchase the requisite insurance. We disagree.
We are satisfied that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) bars plaintiff's claims against defendant. The statute expressly provides that a person, such as plaintiff, who fails to maintain "medical expense benefits coverage . . . shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). Plaintiff does not argue the language is ambiguous and acknowledges that "[o]n its face, the statute deprives an uninsured motorist of the right to sue for any loss caused by another." Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 598 (2011).
If the words of a statute are clear, a court should not infer a meaning other than what is plainly written in the statute. Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101. "Only 'if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation' do we turn to extrinsic evidence, such as 'legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.'" Aronberg, supra, 207 N.J. at 598 (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93). We are convinced that because it was undisputed that plaintiff was uninsured at the time of the accident, the court correctly concluded that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) required the dismissal of plaintiff's claims.
We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that we should ignore the unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) in favor of an interpretation that provides an exemption for individuals who acted in good faith to obtain insurance but failed to do so. Although we may consider extrinsic evidence if a strict application of the statute "leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language," Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101 (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 493), application of the statutory bar under the circumstances presented here is consistent with the statute's purpose.
New Jersey's No Fault Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, was "intended to serve as the exclusive remedy for payment of out-of-pocket medical expenses arising from an automobile accident." Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 466 (2004) (citing Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 503, 512 (1994)). The protections provided by the Act were meant to completely replace the courtroom oriented fault system that was perceived to be too inefficient. Id. at 467.
The Legislature had four objectives in reforming the automobile accident tort system: (1) providing benefits promptly and efficiently to all accident injury victims (the reparation objective); (2) reducing or stabilizing the cost of automobile insurance
(the cost objective); (3) making insurance coverage readily available for automobile owners (the availability objective); and (4) streamlining judicial procedures involved in third-party claims (the judicial objective).
[Ibid. (citing Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 105-06 (1981)).]
The original legislation, which did not include N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5, was not successful in slowing the rise of insurance costs or lessening the burden on the court system. Id. at 467-68. To address the issue of rising costs, the Legislature created the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act (Cost Containment Act), which "gave motorists the option of reducing insurance premiums by increasing deductibles and reducing benefits" and excluded some categories of motorists from claiming personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Id. at 469.
The Cost Containment Act did not sufficiently reduce insurance costs. As a result, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5. Ibid. The original version of the statute required motorists to meet a $1500 medical-expense threshold in order to sue for noneconomic damages, and a 1988 amendment to the statute changed the requirement to a verbal threshold. Id. at 469-70. In 1997, the Legislature amended the statute to its current form, creating a complete bar to recovery for certain motorists, including those who operate an automobile without having medical expense benefits coverage. Id. at 470.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) "advances a policy of cost containment by ensuring that an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute." Id. at 471. In finding the statute was constitutional, the Court in Caviglia declined "to second-guess the Legislature's common-sense reasoning that section 4.5a has the potential to produce greater compliance with compulsory insurance laws and, in turn, reduce litigation, and result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the consuming public." Id. at 477.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage. In Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. 95, the Court interpreted another part of the Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(2), which bars individuals from recovering PIP benefits if they were "occupying or operating an automobile without the permission of the owner or other named insured." The plaintiff in Hardy suffered injuries in an automobile accident and argued that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(2) should not bar his claims because he was unaware the car he occupied was stolen. Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 97.
The Court rejected plaintiff's contention, finding that because the Legislature included a scienter requirement in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(a) but omitted it from N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b) could not be properly interpreted to include a scienter requirement. Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 104. The Court rejected the inclusion of an exemption to the statutory bar based on an individual's reasonable belief or knowledge because the plain language of the statute did not provide for one. Id. at 104-05.
The Court's reasoning in Hardy applies here. The statutory bar to suit contained in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(c) requires a finding that a plaintiff acted "with specific intent." The Legislature did not include a similar scienter requirement in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). The inclusion of a scienter requirement in subsection (c), and absence of the requirement in subsection (a), manifests a legislative intention to bar the claims of uninsured motorists without regard to a motorist's good faith belief regarding the status of his or her coverage. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5. We cannot impose a scienter requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to do so. Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 104-05.
For the same reason, we reject plaintiff's contention that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) bars the claims of only the "culpably uninsured." Although the term has been employed in cases applying N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), it has not been used to suggest the statute includes a scienter requirement. Instead, it has been used to identify individuals who, under varying circumstances, were deemed to be uninsured within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Perrelli, supra, 206 N.J. at 208 (finding N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) barred the claims of an uninsured passenger because to hold otherwise "would allow the culpably uninsured person to violate the law and not suffer its consequences"); Dziuba v. Fletcher, 382 N.J. Super. 73, 81-82 (App. Div. 2005) (finding plaintiff's beneficial ownership of an uninsured automobile rendered him "culpably uninsured" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b), but also finding that plaintiff's claims were not barred under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) because the statute only applies when "the uninsured vehicle [is] the vehicle involved in the accident"), aff'd, 188 N.J. 339 (2006).
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) has been described as a "blunt tool" that may result in harsh outcomes, but that is because "[t]he statute's self-evident purpose" is "to give the maximum incentive to all motorists to comply with this State's compulsory no-fault insurance laws." Aronberg, supra, 207 N.J. at 599, 601. Harsh consequences, however, do not permit a departure from the express language in the statute because "[i]t is not within [the Court's] province to second guess the policymaking decisions of the Legislature when no constitutional principle is at issue." Id. at 602.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, our decision in Jendrzejewski v. Allstate Insurance Co., 341 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2001), did not recognize a good faith exception to the statutory bar in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). Unlike plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Jendrzejewski purchased auto insurance but the insurance company was subsequently declared insolvent. Id. at 464-65. The plaintiff was injured in an accident, and we found he was not barred from bringing suit because "[h]e complied with the requirements set by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a . . . by obtaining a policy of insurance from an insurer which was then in good standing." Id. at 465. Moreover, the plaintiff actually had insurance coverage through the New Jersey Property Liability Insurance Guaranty Association, as a result of his insurance carrier's insolvency. Id. at 461-62. None of the circumstances upon which we permitted the plaintiff to proceed in Jendrzejewski are present here.
As noted, the express language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not support plaintiff's request for an exemption from the statutory bar for those that claim to be victims of insurance fraud. Recognizing such an exemption would be inconsistent with the Act's purpose of reducing auto insurance costs and would undermine one of the original goals of the statute, the streamlining of the judicial process, Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 467 (citing Gambino, supra, 86 N.J. at 105-06), because it would result in litigation over whether a plaintiff was knowingly uninsured.
We also reject plaintiff's contention that the court erred by failing to view the facts in the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540. Our review of the record confirms that the court did not rely upon or resolve any genuine issue of material fact in its grant of defendant's summary judgment motion. The court accepted the undisputed fact that plaintiff was not insured at the time of the accident and, based upon that fact alone, correctly concluded that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and dismissed the complaint under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION