Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00152-C
2020-07-20
Jose Manuel Rodriguez BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. Chad F. WOLF, el al., Respondent.
Elizabeth Luevano, Dunham & Jones PC, Dallas, TX, William Earl Clark, Jr., Dunham & Jones PC, Fort Worth, TX, for Petitioner.
Elizabeth Luevano, Dunham & Jones PC, Dallas, TX, William Earl Clark, Jr., Dunham & Jones PC, Fort Worth, TX, for Petitioner.
ORDER
SAM R. CUMMINGS, Senior United States District Judge
Petitioner Jose Manuel Rodriguez Beltran, an immigrant detainee in the Bluebonnet Detention Center (BBDC) proceeding with the assistance of counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner asserts that the conditions of his confinement at BBDC are unconstitutionally dangerous because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. He alleges that his detention is unlawful because the unsafe conditions at BBDC resulted in his contracting COVID-19 in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Petitioner requests that the Court direct ICE to release him on bond "with appropriate precautionary public health measures."
Respondent has not filed an Answer; however, as explained below, the Court finds that the petition should be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court may summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if it appears from the face of the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Wottlin v. Fleming , 136 F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary dismissal of Section 2241 petition); see also Rules 4 and 1(b) of the RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES.
I. HABEAS CORPUS
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Habeas only exists to "grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose." Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). "Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention." Id. at 935. "The Fifth Circuit follows a bright-line rule: ‘If a favorable determination ... would not automatically entitle [the detainee] to accelerated release, ... the proper vehicle is a [civil rights] suit.’ " Sacal-Micha v. Longoria , 2020 WL 1518861, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Mar 27, 2020) (quoting Carson v. Johnson , 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997) ).
If a petitioner's allegations do not entitle him to accelerated release, they are not cognizable in a habeas action. Schipke v. Van Buren , 239 F. App'x 85, 86 (5th Cir. 2007). And even if a petitioner proves that his conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he is not entitled to release from an otherwise lawful imprisonment or detention. Cook v. Hanberry , 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979). Even unconstitutional conditions that create a risk of serious physical injury, illness, or death do not warrant release. Spencer v. Bragg , 310 F. App'x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Carson , 112 F.3d at 820–21 ). The proper relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement would be to enjoin the unlawful practices that make the conditions intolerable. See Cook , 592 F.2d at 249.
A demand for release does not convert a conditions-of-confinement claim into a proper habeas request. See Springer v. Underwood , No. 3:19-CV-1433, 2019 WL 3307220, at *2 (N.D. Tex., Jun. 28, 2019) rec. accepted , 2019 WL 3306130 (N.D. Tex., Jul. 22, 2019). In sum, "allegations that challenge the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought in habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and procedures affecting conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions." Schipke , 239 F. App'x at 85-86 (citing Spina v. Aaron , 821 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1987) ).
It is well established in the Fifth Circuit that a detainee is not entitled to habeas relief if he raises civil rights claims related to the conditions of his confinement. Sanchez v. Brown , No. 3:20-CV-00832, 2020 WL 2615931 at *12 (N.D. Tex., May 22, 2020) (collecting cases). In fact, many district courts in this circuit have already applied this logic to conditions-of-confinement claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454, 463–64, No. 1:20-cv-104-H, 2020 WL 3246753, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 15, 2020) (collecting cases).
II. DISCUSSION
According to Petitioner, he is a citizen of Mexico who was detained by ICE upon completion of a federal prison sentence. He filed a motion for a bond redetermination hearing with the immigration court on June 10, 2020, but it is unclear whether the immigration court resolved his request before he filed this petition.
Petitioner alleges very few specific facts, but he complains generally that the conditions in a detention setting create insurmountable challenges to preventing the spread of COVID-19. Petitioner claims that he has struggled to comply with the recommended social distancing measures and personal hygiene because of the environment at BBDC, where he "shares toilets, sinks, and showers, eats in communal spaces, and is in close contact with the many other detainees and officers around him." (Doc. 3 at 16). He alleges that the conditions at BBDC must be unsanitary because there has been a significant outbreak—a total of 236 positive cases with 131 currently active cases under isolation and monitoring. He states in conclusory fashion that "detainees have reported that conditions have deteriorated in recent days and the Detention Facility has taken ad hoc, medically inadvisable and insufficient measures to try to contain the likelihood of transmission." (Doc. 3 at 9). But he does not describe these conditions, explain how they've deteriorated, or offer any substantiation for his claim other than the reported number of positive cases at BBDC.
Petitioner asserts that he is medically vulnerable because of preexisting health conditions including diabetes, hypertension, hyperthyroidism, obesity, dyslipidemia, hyperglycemia, and proteinuria. Because of these conditions, Petitioner is at a higher risk of complications from COVID-19. As a result, Petitioner argues that he must be released as a preventative measure to ensure his safety. But Petitioner has already tested positive for COVID-19. Petitioner argues that the fact that Respondents were unable to prevent him from contracting the disease has made his detention unconstitutionally punitive. Notably, Petitioner does not allege that he has been denied adequate medical treatment in response to his diagnosis. He acknowledges that he was tested at BBDC, received a positive result, and is now under isolation and monitoring.
Petitioner's primary argument focuses on the conditions of his confinement unrelated to the fact or duration of his detention. Under well-established Fifth Circuit precedent, his conditions-of-confinement claim is not cognizable in a habeas petition. Additionally, even if Petitioner could prove that his conditions of confinement are unconstitutionally dangerous, that fact would not invalidate an otherwise lawful detention. He would not automatically be entitled to release; rather, the proper remedy would be an injunction to correct the unsafe practices or conditions. Moreover, Petitioner's demand for release, and his conclusory assertion that release is the only acceptable remedy in this case, do not convert what should be a civil rights claim into a proper habeas claim. As a result, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his claims in a habeas context. Petitioner's habeas petition must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner asks the Court to either order his release to bond or review the immigration court's denial of bond, the Court lacks the authority to consider these requests. Under the relevant immigration statutes, the decision to release a detainee on bond is entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A) and 1226(a), (e) ; see also In re Bahadur , 441 F.Supp.3d 467, 486–87 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020). Any decision made by the Attorney General is not subject to judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
III. CONCLUSION
As a result, this habeas corpus petition must be DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
All relief not expressly granted is DENIED and any pending motions are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.