Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC347285, Mel Red Recana, Judge.
The Lemmer Law Firm, Don S. Lemmer; Benedon & Serlin and Gerald M. Serlin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Kenneth M. Stern and Kenneth M. Stern for Defendant and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Beverly Belletich (plaintiff) filed a workers’ compensation claim and a civil complaint against her employer Carley, LLC (Carley). She settled her workers’ compensation case, releasing “all claim [sic] whether civil, administrative, federal, or state against [Carley] . . . .” In plaintiff’s civil action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carley based on the release language of the settlement agreement in her workers’ compensation case.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that her extrinsic evidence raised a triable issue of fact concerning the parties’ intent to release her civil claims as part of the workers’ compensation settlement. We hold that the release language of the settlement agreement is not reasonably susceptible to the narrow interpretation urged by plaintiff. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Because we are resolving this appeal based on the release, we state only the facts relevant to the analysis of that issue.
In early 2004, Carley hired plaintiff as an assistant manager of its Wetzel’s Pretzels franchise located in the Glendale Galleria. After plaintiff had performed in that position for several months, Carley’s owners, Brian and Roberta Caplin, met with plaintiff, told her she was not management material, and asked her to either quit or demote to the position of cashier. Plaintiff accepted the cashier position.
Approximately three weeks after her meeting with the Caplins, plaintiff slipped and fell at work. The next day, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim form. Attorney Will D. Johnson represented plaintiff in her workers’ compensation insurance case against Carley.
Five days after she fell, plaintiff was terminated from her employment with Carley based on a dispute regarding her not reporting for work that day. Almost a year after she was terminated, plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint against Carley with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), alleging that she was fired because of her age, sex, and disability. The DFEH issued a notice of case closure three weeks later.
On February 10, 2006, plaintiff filed a civil action against Carley in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Attorney Don Lemmer appeared as her attorney of record in that civil action. Her civil complaint asserted five causes of action alleging that she had been demoted and terminated because of her sex, age, and disability in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and one cause of action for failure to make prompt payment of her final check in violation of the Labor Code.
Government Code section 12900 et seq.
Several months after plaintiff filed her civil action, attorney Johnson represented her at a settlement conference in the workers’ compensation case. Attorney Glen Rosenberg represented Carley. The workers’ compensation case settled as a result of the conference. To memorialize the settlement, plaintiff and her attorney executed a preprinted “Compromise and Release” form (Release). The Release provided that “[t]he parties agree to settle the above claim(s) on account of the injury[ies] by the payment of the sum of $25,000. On the signature page of the Release, in a blank box entitled “Comments,” the following handwritten notation was inserted: “This [Release] contains adequate consideration to settle any and all claims for a job displacement voucher. This [Release] settles all claim [sic] whether civil, administrative, federal, or state against defendants Carley LLC & State Farm.”
The first page of the Release identifies “State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.” as the “Insurance Carrier(s) Claims Administrator(s).”
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2006, Carley filed a motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s civil action. Carley’s initial argument was that the Release in the workers’ compensation action encompassed the claims asserted in plaintiff’s civil complaint and operated as a bar to the prosecution of those civil claims.
In support of her opposition, plaintiff submitted the declaration of attorney Johnson in which he stated that (i) the handwritten language in the comments portion of the Release “was intended to refer only to [plaintiff’s] workers’ compensation claims and did not include her civil claims in the lawsuit . . .;” (ii) he “was never authorized by [plaintiff] to settle her civil action against Carley,” and (iii) he “expressly told Carley’s (and State Farm’s) attorney, Mr. Rosenberg, at the settlement conference that [plaintiff] had a pending civil action . . . against Carley in which [he] did not represent her.” Attorney Johnson, however, did not testify that he told attorney Rosenberg that he, Johnson, lacked authority to settle the civil case or that he and attorney Rosenberg had an express agreement or understanding that the civil case would be exempted from the settlement. Moreover, plaintiff did not submit any testimony concerning her intentions at the conference or that she had told anyone in attendance at the conference that she had no intention of settling her civil case in exchange for the $25,000 payment from Carley and State Farm.
The trial court held a hearing on Carley’s motion for summary judgment on January 22, 2007. After hearing oral argument, the trial court explained: “I’ll take this matter under submission, but I’ll alert you, counsel, this is the way I’m going to look at this: Number one, my first approach is to deal with the issue of was there really a complete release of all claims [in the Release]. Now, when I make a determination that there was no release, then I will go to the arguments that you made. [¶] Now, in the event that I say, yeah, there was a release, then obviously, I will anticipate that probably the other side will go to the Court of Appeals [sic]. And if the Court of Appeals [sic] says . . . you’ve got it wrong, and I get it back, then we already have our argument here. And then I’ll just ask you folks—I’ll have the argument. I’ll get the transcript. I will read the transcript and make my ruling as to the motion for summary judgment and adjudication.”
On April 5, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Carley. The judgment provided, “After oral argument [on Carley’s summary judgment motion], . . . the Court issued its order, granting the summary judgment, upon the ground that this matter was settled, compromised and release[d] in plaintiff’s Workers’ Compensation case, against Carley, L.L.C. [¶] Therefore, judgment is hereby rendered for defendant, Carley . . . against plaintiff . . . .”
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].) We make ‘an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ (Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 222 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 35].) A defendant moving for summary judgment meets its burden of showing that there is no merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849, 853 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].)” (Moser v. Ratinoff (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1216-1217.)
“In performing our de novo review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the losing parties. [Citation.] In this case, we liberally construe plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendants’ own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiffs’ favor.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.)
B. Scope of the Release
Plaintiff contends her extrinsic evidence establishes that the handwritten language in the Release was not intended to include the claims raised by her civil complaint in the trial court. According to plaintiff, that evidence shows that attorney Johnson was not authorized to settle her civil claims; Carley’s workers’ compensation attorney was aware of the pendency of those civil claims in the trial court and that attorney Johnson did not represent plaintiff in her civil action; and the conjunctive Release language―“Carley LLC & State Farm”―limited the scope of the Release to claims plaintiff may have had against Carley and State Farm jointly, and did not extend to the claims against Carley asserted in her complaint.
Plaintiff’s argument requires us to consider the interplay between the parol evidence rule and the rules governing the interpretation of ambiguous agreements. “The parol evidence rule is codified in Civil Code section 1625 [footnote omitted] and Code of Civil Procedure section 1856 [footnote omitted]. (See Marani v. Jackson (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 695, 701 [228 Cal.Rptr. 518] (Marani).) It ‘generally prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence, whether oral or written, to vary, alter or add to the terms of an integrated written instrument.’ (Alling v. Universal Manufacturing Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1433 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 718] (Alling).) The rule does not, however, prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence ‘to explain the meaning of a written contract . . . [if] the meaning urged is one to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible.’ (BMW of North America, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 980, 990, fn. 4 [209 Cal.Rptr. 50] (BMW).)” (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343.)
“Unlike traditional rules of evidence, the parol evidence rule ‘does not exclude evidence for any of the reasons ordinarily requiring exclusion, based on the probative value of such evidence or the policy of its admission. The rule as applied to contracts is simply that as a matter of substantive law, a certain act, the act of embodying the complete terms of an agreement in a writing (the “integration”), becomes the contract of the parties. The point then is, not how the agreement is to be proved, because as a matter of law the writing is the agreement.’ (Estate of Gaines [(1940)] 15 Cal.2d [255,] 264–265.) Thus, ‘[u]nder [the] rule[,] the act of executing a written contract . . . supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.’ (BMW [of North America, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1984)] 162 Cal.ApP.3d [980,] 990, italics added.) And ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to prove what the agreement was, not for any of the usual reasons for exclusion of evidence, but because as a matter of law the agreement is the writing itself. [Citation.]’ (Ibid.) ‘Such evidence is legally irrelevant and cannot support a judgment.’ (Marani [v. Jackson (1986)] 183 Cal.ApP.3d [695,] 701.) [¶] . . . In other words, the evidentiary consequences of the rule follow from its substantive component—which establishes, as a matter of law, the enforceable and incontrovertible terms of an integrated written agreement.” (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 344.)
Notwithstanding the parol evidence rule’s clear prohibition against the admission of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements, plaintiff contends that the extrinsic evidence of her attorney’s understanding of the Release is relevant and admissible. According to plaintiff, the handwritten language of the Release is ambiguous and therefore her extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid in the interpretation of that ambiguity. To resolve this evidentiary issue, we must determine whether such an ambiguity exists using well-established rules of contract interpretation.
“As California courts previously have observed the ‘meaning of language is to be found in its applications. An indeterminacy in the application of language signals its vagueness or ambiguity. An ambiguity arises when language is reasonably susceptible of more than one application to material facts. There cannot be an ambiguity per se, i.e. an ambiguity unrelated to an application.’ (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.ApP.3d 855, 859, fn. 1 [223 Cal.Rptr. 246]; see also Herzog v. National American Ins. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 5 [84 Cal.Rptr. 705, 465 P.2d 841] [‘language which might be considered ambiguous as applied to some circumstances is not necessarily ambiguous per se’].)” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc, (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 391.)
“Accordingly, ‘[e]ven if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, a latent ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence which reveals more than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably susceptible.’ (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 573].) ‘The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.’ (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641], citing numerous authorities.)” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 391.)
“The interpretation of a contract involves a two-step process. ‘“First, the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract. [Citation.]” [Citation.] The trial court’s determination of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law, subject to independent review on appeal. [Citation.] The trial court’s resolution of an ambiguity is also a question of law if no parol evidence is admitted or if the parol evidence is not in conflict. However, where the parol evidence is in conflict, the trial court’s resolution of that conflict is a question of fact and must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.’ (WYDA Associates v. Merner (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1710 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].)” (Beard v. Goodrich (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.)
The handwritten language of the Release, even when viewed in light of plaintiff’s evidence of the parties’ intentions, is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation plaintiff advances. According to plaintiff’s evidence, that handwritten language must be read to exclude from the settlement all of her civil claims, despite the use of the broad term “all claim[s]” and despite the specific reference to “civil” and “state” claims. That is not a reasonable interpretation of the language in issue.
Even with the aid of plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence, the language that expressly states plaintiff is releasing all civil and state law claims cannot reasonably be read to mean “except civil or state law claims.” Moreover, the reference to “federal” claims definitively rebuts plaintiff’s theory that the Release dealt exclusively with workers’ compensation claims. And, although plaintiff’s evidence shows that Carley’s workers’ compensation attorney was aware of the civil action and that attorney Johnson did not represent plaintiff in that action, it did not establish a prior or contemporaneous agreement or understanding that the civil claims would be excluded from the settlement. On the contrary, that the parties were aware of the civil action and did not expressly exclude it in the handwritten language would indicate that there was no intention to exclude it. In any event, the uncommunicated intent of a party is not admissible to contradict the express terms of an agreement. (Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 338, 346.) Thus, under the authorities discussed above, we conclude that the language of the Release is not ambiguous and plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence contradicting that language is inadmissible.
Even if that evidence were admissible, it does not dispel the clear meaning of the release language. There is no extrinsic evidence of plaintiff’s intent concerning the settlement of her civil action, even though she attended the settlement conference and presumably had some involvement in the negotiations that led to the settlement. And, as noted, plaintiff’s workers’ compensation attorney merely declared that Carley’s attorney was aware of the pendency of plaintiff’s civil action and aware that plaintiff’s workers’ compensation attorney did not represent plaintiff in that civil action. Although plaintiff’s workers’ compensation attorney asserted that he had no authority to settle the civil action, he did not state or imply that Carly’s attorney was aware of that fact. Similarly, plaintiff’s workers’ compensation attorney did not testify that he had an agreement or understanding with Carley’s attorney, or otherwise state plaintiff’s intent, to exclude plaintiff’s civil claims from the settlement. “[I]t is elementary that the uncommunicated subjective belief of a contracting party is not competent evidence to prove the meaning of the contract.” (Stewart Title Co. v. Herbert (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 957, 964.)
Having resolved the evidentiary issue, we agree with Carley that the contractual issue raised by this appeal is governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299 (Jefferson). In that case, the plaintiff was a part time teaching assistant who claimed she was sexually harassed by the classroom teacher and his students. (Id. at pp. 301-302.) She filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging job-related injuries due to sexual harassment. (Ibid.) She also filed a sex discrimination claim with the DFEH based on essentially the same allegations that supported her workers’ compensation claim. (Ibid.) The DFEH issued a right to sue letter approximately a year after the filing of the plaintiff’s discrimination claim. (Id. at p. 302.)
Prior to filing a civil suit, the plaintiff in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 settled her workers’ compensation claim using the mandatory “Compromise and Release” form adopted by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). (Id. at p. 302.) As consideration for the compromise and release, the plaintiff received in excess of $41,000. (Ibid.) After reviewing the agreement, the WCAB approved the settlement. (Id. at p. 303.)
The preprinted portion of the release form recited that the plaintiff “‘releases and forever discharges [the defendant] from all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained, or which may hereafter arise or develop as a result of [the claimed] injury.’” (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 303 .) A typed attachment to the form stated: “The Applicant [the plaintiff] desires to avoid the hazards of litigation and the defendants wish to buy their peace. . . . [¶] [A]pplicant agrees that this release will apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting from such accident . . . .” (Id. at pp. 302-303.) The attachment went on to provide that the plaintiff expressly waived all of her rights under Civil Code section 1542. (Ibid.) The attachment also provided that the release extended to employees of the defendant employer. (Id. at p. 303.)
Civil Code section 1542 provides: “A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
Shortly after the settlement in the workers’ compensation action, the plaintiff filed a civil action against the defendants. (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 303.) After several of the plaintiff’s causes of action were dismissed, the only remaining claim in the civil action was a sex discrimination claim under the FEHA based on the same events that gave rise to the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. (Ibid.) The defendants filed a summary judgment motion as to that remaining claim based on the language of the workers’ compensation release. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the motion and the Court of Appeal affirmed the resulting judgment. (Ibid.)
In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 explained that: “‘“The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding.”’ (Palmquist v. Mercer (1954) 43 Cal.2d 92, 98 [272 P.2d 26], quoting Smith v. Occidental etc. Steamship Co. (1893) 99 Cal. 462, 470-471 [34 P. 84].) We have been particularly rigorous about strictly enforcing broad release language in workers’ compensation settlements, because, in that context, WCAB oversight helps to ensure fairness. (Johnson v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 973 [88 Cal.Rptr. 202, 471 P.2d 1002] (Johnson).) At the same time, however, we have sought to protect the interests of workers who execute workers’ compensation settlement documents without a full appreciation of what claims or rights might later arise. (Sumner v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 965, 972-973 [191 Cal.Rptr. 811, 663 P.2d 534] (Sumner).) We conclude that the broad settlement language at issue here is enforceable as written. Two points in particular support our conclusion: (1) the parties included an attachment in their settlement agreement that made clear their intent to settle matters outside the scope of workers’ compensation; and (2) Jefferson offered no extrinsic evidence establishing the parties’ intent to exclude her FEHA claim from the settlement.” (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 303-304.)
Here, the facts in support of the trial court’s ruling are arguably more compelling than those at issue in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299. Unlike the attachment in Jefferson, the handwritten notation in this case refers to a release of “all claim[s],” including civil, administrative, federal, and state. Such broad language clearly indicates an intent to release claims beyond those raised in the workers’ compensation proceeding. Although that language did not expressly identify plaintiff’s civil lawsuit, it was specific enough in its reference to “civil” and “state” claims to cover plaintiff’s claims in that action. In Jefferson, “the critical points [were] that the parties incorporated the attachment into their compromise and release agreement and that it clearly establishe[d] their intent to include civil claims within the scope of their settlement.” (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 307.) Likewise, in this case the parties incorporated the handwritten notation into the Release, and it serves to clarify and establish that state law civil claims, such as those set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, were within the scope of their settlement. Moreover, because the WCAB presumably approved the settlement, the broad release language in the notation must be strictly enforced according to its terms. (Id. at p. 303.) Under Jefferson, plaintiff “‘“is estopped from saying that the [handwritten notation is] contrary to [her] intentions or understanding.”’” (Ibid.)
As noted, the reference to “all claims and causes of action” in the release in Jefferson appeared in the preprinted portion of the mandatory form, not on the typed attachment. (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 303.)
Plaintiff argues that Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 is distinguishable because in that case there was no civil action pending at the time of the settlement and because the parties there conceded that no extrinsic evidence was available to aid in the interpretation of the agreement. Therefore, according to plaintiff, the decisions in Asare v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 856 (Asare) and Lopez v. Sikkema (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 31 (Lopez) control the interpretation of the release and compel the conclusion that the handwritten notation was not intended to extend to her civil claims.
Although the plaintiff in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 had not yet filed a civil complaint for discrimination under FEHA at the time of the settlement, she had filed a claim with the DFEH alleging discrimination in violation of FEHA. Thus, the parties to the settlement in that case were well aware of the potential for a civil lawsuit under FEHA at the time of their settlement. The plaintiff stated in the attachment that she desired to avoid the “hazards of litigation” and the defendants stated that they wanted to “buy their peace.” (Id. at pp. 302-303.) Moreover, the plaintiff released not only her claims against the employer, but also claims against its employees. Because the plaintiff had no claims against those employees in her workers’ compensation action, the language of the attachment strongly suggested that she was releasing potential claims against them that arose outside the workers’ compensation proceeding. (Id. at p. 307.) In addition, because the filing of a FEHA claim is a prerequisite to the filing of a civil action for FEHA violations, the parties in Jefferson should reasonably have anticipated the looming spectre of a subsequent civil action based on FEHA. Therefore, that no formal civil complaint had been filed in Jefferson at the time of the settlement does not distinguish it from the facts of this case.
Similarly, the absence of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the agreement in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 does not mean that the extrinsic evidence offered by plaintiff in this case is admissible. As explained above, the handwritten notation is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation plaintiff urges, even when viewed in light of plaintiff’s proferred extrinsic evidence. Rather, her evidence supports an interpretation regarding the exclusion of plaintiff’s civil claims from the scope of the Release that is directly at odds with the plain language of the notation. Thus, as in Jefferson, there is no extrinsic evidence to consider in interpreting the settlement agreement.
Finally, plaintiff’s reliance on Asare, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 856 and Lopez, supra, 299 Cal.App.3d 31 is misplaced. As the court in Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 observed, those cases each involved the standard preprinted language of the required form release. The issue in both cases was whether the preprinted, broad form release language in the required form releases, standing alone, was ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent not to release civil claims was admissible. Neither case involved a typewritten attachment to the form release, as in Jefferson, or handwritten notation on the form release, as here, that clearly established the parties’ intent to include civil claims within the scope of their release. In Jefferson, the court stated “the Court of Appeal decisions that have considered the issue have been consistent in their view that the preprinted language on a workers’ compensation compromise and release form should be narrowly construed to apply only to workers’ compensation claims. . . . [The] extrinsic evidence in Asare established the parties intent not to settle the FEHA case. . . . Because Lopez and Delaney [v. Superior Fast Freight [(1993)]14 Cal.App.4th 590]did not consider the legal significance of a comparable attachment [that existed in Jefferson] we find those cases factually distinguishable.” (Id. at pp. 309-310.) Accordingly, we hold that the parties’ intentional insertion of the handwritten notation on the form release distinguishes this case from Asare and Lopez, and compels the conclusion that plaintiff clearly manifested an intention to release all state law civil claims she may have had against Carley as part of the consideration for the $25,000 settlement payment. (See Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367, 378 [execution of standard mandatory preprinted release form, without more, settles only workers’ compensation claims; settlement of claims outside the workers’ compensation system should be reflected in separate writing].)
Because of our conclusion that the Release encompassed all of plaintiff’s civil claims against Carley, we do not have to reach the other grounds raised by Carley in support of its position that the trial court’s judgment in its favor should be affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Carley is awarded its costs on appeal.
Carley’s motions for sanctions on appeal are denied, as is plaintiff’s request for sanctions in her opposition brief.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., KRIEGLER, J.