In 1978 Bell filed a race discrimination charge against Eagle Motor Lines, Inc. with the EEOC. Bell subsequently requested a right to sue letter. On December 18, 1979 the right to sue letter was delivered to Bell's residence, and accepted and signed for by his wife. Bell claims that he was out of town on December 18 and first learned of the right to sue letter on December 26. Bell filed this action on March 20, 1980, alleging a violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976). Eagle Motor moved for summary judgment on the ground that Bell filed the complaint more than 90 days after receipt of his right to sue letter. The district court granted summary judgment for Eagle Motor. Bell appeals.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that suit be brought within 90 days after receipt of notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). The district court calculated the 90 day period from the date Bell's wife received the notice at his residence. Bell argues that the period should begin to run from the date of his actual receipt of the EEOC notice.

This court has refused to establish an inflexible rule determining when a complainant has "received" notice of his right to sue. As the Eleventh Circuit recently stated in Lewis v. Connors Steel Co., 673 F.2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 1982):

We need not embrace the doctrine of constructive receipt, nor close our eyes to the liberal construction the act is entitled to in order to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of this case. There is no reason why a plaintiff should enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. Plaintiff should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute.

Approaching the issue on a case by case basis as we did in Lewis, we find that the receipt of the EEOC notice by Bell's wife at his residence triggered the running of the 90 day period. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Summaries of

Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Dec 16, 1982

693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982)

finding 90-day period for filing suit began to run when plaintiff's wife received the letter at their shared place of residence

Summary of this case from Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp.

finding the plaintiff's claim time-barred because, after the plaintiff's wife received the letter at a residence shared with the plaintiff, the plaintiff failed to timely sue

Summary of this case from Zwick v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs.

finding ninety-day period for filing suit began to run when plaintiff's wife received the letter at their shared place of residence

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finding ninety-day period for filing suit began to run when plaintiff's wife received the letter at their shared place of residence

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finding 90-day period for filing suit began to run when the plaintiff's wife received the letter at their shared place of residence

Summary of this case from ALVARADO v. BOCA RATON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

affirming dismissal of Title VII complaint as untimely where plaintiff's wife received the right-to-sue letter while plaintiff was out of town, but plaintiff did not actually receive the letter until a week later

Summary of this case from Winsor v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

In Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982), the right-to-sue letter was delivered to plaintiff's address and signed for by his wife on December 18. Plaintiff was out of town and first learned of the letter on December 26. Applying the case-by-case approach suggested in Lewis, the court held that receipt of the letter by plaintiff's wife at the residence triggered the running of the 90-day period, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff actually learned of the letter some eight days later.

Summary of this case from Stallworth v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp.

In Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982), the claimant's wife signed for a letter on December 18, 1979.

Summary of this case from Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Department

following Lewis and adopting case-by-case approach, held claimant had notice when wife signed for letter, not when claimant actually received letter eight days later

Summary of this case from Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing, Inc.

In Bell, the Eleventh Circuit applied a "case-by-case" approach and determined that receipt by Bell's wife commenced the running of the ninety-day period.

Summary of this case from Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.

In Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982), we were presented with a situation where the notice of right to sue letter was signed for by Bell's wife on December 18, 1979, but Bell claimed he was out of town and first learned of the letter on December 26, 1979. "Approaching the issue on a case by case basis as we did in Lewis," we found that "the receipt of the EEOC notice by Bell's wife at his residence triggered the running of the 90 day period."

Summary of this case from Law v. Hercules, Inc.

resolving same dispute where plaintiff's wife received the EEOC letter

Summary of this case from I.D. v. Westmoreland School Dist.

explaining the court will approach the matter of determining when receipt occurred on a case by case basis

Summary of this case from S.C. CVS Pharm. v. KPP Hilton Head, LLC

Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

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Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

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Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

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Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc.

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