Opinion
Civil Action No: 99-3612, C/W 99-3624, SECTION: "R" (5)
September 14, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions brought by defendants, one by Maurice Winston and Michael Paulhus, both Postal Inspectors, and the United States Postal Service, and another by Deputy Brent Dufrene, Captain John Morse, Sheriff Craig Webre, and the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, summary judgment is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs sue various law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated their constitutional rights in connection with detaining and questioning them about a postal robbery. Defendants are the United States Postal Service, Postal Inspector Maurice Winston, Postal Inspector Michael Paulhus, the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office, Deputy Brent Dufrene, Captain John Morse, and Sheriff Craig Webre.
Plaintiffs' allegations involve three encounters between plaintiffs and defendants on the night of December 1 and early morning of December 2, and the nights of December 7 and December 8, 1998, respectively. At issue is whether the plaintiffs voluntarily met with and submitted to questioning by defendants on the dates in question or whether they were illegally detained in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court will relate the undisputed facts as submitted by the parties.
On November 4, 1998, two masked men robbed a contract postal driver at gunpoint at the postal facility in Raceland, Louisiana. Deputies from the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a complaint of an armed robbery at the postal facility. In addition, the United States Postal Service assigned Postal Inspector Maurice Winston and Postal Inspector Michael Paulhus to investigate the robbery. See Def. USPS's Summ. J. Mot. Ex. A. On November 30, 1998, James Cain contacted the Inspection Service, claiming to know the identity of the robbers. See id. ¶ 6. Cain named the plaintiffs, Wallace Belaire and Willie Gaudet.
Based upon this information, Captain John Morse of the Sheriff's Office obtained search warrants for Belaire's automobile located at Precision Tire Co. and his trailer located at 415 Highway 20 in Schriever, Louisiana. He also obtained warrants to search a car registered to Ellen Guidry, also parked at Precision Tire Co., as well as another car registered to Belaire's girlfriend, Debra Faul, located with the trailer in Schriever, Louisiana.
On December 1, 1998 at 6:00 p.m., Paulhus, Winston, Morse, and at least five other deputies executed the search warrants. Defendants first went to Precision Tire, where plaintiffs worked. As Belaire left Precision Tire, Dufrene and Paulhus stopped Belaire's vehicle and drove him back to the tire shop. Defendants located Gaudet and told both plaintiffs about the investigation and search warrants. Paulhus spoke to Belaire for about a half an hour, and Winston talked briefly to Gaudet. See id ¶ 8. Plaintiffs searched Belaire's car at the tire shop and found nothing. See id.
Defendants then told plaintiffs that they were going to search Belaire's trailer, and plaintiffs accompanied them to Schriever, where the trailer was located. Defendants finished executing the search warrants around midnight and then told plaintiffs that they wanted to talk with them. Plaintiff accompanied defendants to the sheriff's substation in Thibodaux. Defendants assert, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that defendants drew no weapons and used no handcuffs in bringing them to the station. Plaintiffs were questioned for about an hour to an hour and a half. Paulhus and Morse questioned Gaudet and Winston, while another deputy questioned Belaire. Defendants read each plaintiff his rights and each signed waivers. Defendants contend, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that defendants used no physical force or restraint during the interview. At the end of the questioning, each plaintiff also agreed to take polygraph tests in a few days. Belaire then drove his own car home and Gaudet left with his wife. See id ¶ 10.
Until December 7, 1998, there was no contact between defendants and plaintiffs with the exception of a phone call to tell plaintiffs that the polygraph tests were scheduled for December 7, 1998. Defendants assert, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that on December 7, plaintiffs were picked up, and they voluntarily went to the Holiday Inn in Thibodaux to take the tests. See id ¶ 11. Both plaintiffs failed the tests. Defendants then questioned plaintiffs further and drove them home. Defendants claim, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that at no time on December 7, did defendants use any physical force or coercion on them.
On December 8, 1998, Postal Inspectors Winston and Paulhus, and Detective Dufrene interviewed Gaudet again. After being advised of his rights, Gaudet confessed to the robbery. Inspector Winston transcribed this confession, and Gaudet signed this sworn statement that implicated himself and Belaire. ( See id. ¶ 12 and Def. Dufrene's Summ J. Mot. Ex. E.) Gaudet then accompanied defendants to the post office to go through the robbery's events. The following day, Paulhus, Winston, and other deputies arrested Belaire for the robbery. On December 14, 1998, Gaudet was also arrested for armed robbery.
Defendants claim that plaintiffs' complaints should be dismissed in their entirety against Inspector Paulhus, Inspector Winston, Captain Morse, and Deputy Dufrene because their actions were protected by qualified immunity; against Sheriff Webre because, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a government entity such as the Sheriff cannot be held liable for the torts of its employees; against the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued; and against the United State Postal Service because plaintiff cannot sue a federal agency for this cause of action.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law. See FED.R.C.V.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996). In addition, an affidavit will not defeat summary judgment if it contains no more than a scintilla of evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
B. Requisites for a Valid Section 1983 Claim
The Fifth Circuit recognizes a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for illegal detention or false imprisonment. See Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1998). In order to overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment, however, a plaintiff seeking recovery from a police officer for illegal detention must tender evidence establishing misconduct that exceeds mere negligence. See Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989).
C. Requisites for a Valid Bivens Claim
A Bivens action is analogous to an action under Section 1983 — the only difference being that Bivens applies to constitutional violations by federal, rather than state officials. See Abate v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 993 F.2d 107, 110 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1993). Bivens extends the protections afforded by Section 1983 to parties injured by federal actors not liable under § 1983. Id. Thus, in order to establish a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements under Section 1983.
D. Liability of the United States Postal Service
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff has no Bivens cause of action against federal agencies. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1006 (1994). Plaintiffs may only bring Bivens claims against federal agents in their individual capacity because the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer from violating civil rights. See Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1998). If courts were to allow damages claims directly against federal agencies, the aggrieved parties would not bring actions directly against the individual officers, and the deterrent effects of Bivens would be lost. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 1004.
Here, plaintiffs assert unlawful detention claims against the United States Postal Service. The United States Postal Service is a federal agency, and courts analyze unlawful detention claims against federal agencies under Bivens. Thus, under Meyer, plaintiffs have no cause of action against the United States Postal Service. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss the United States Postal Service as a defendant.
E. Liability of the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office
Defendants move to dismiss the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office because it is not a proper defendant. Under Louisiana jurisprudence, it is "well settled" that "a Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued." Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co., 691 So.2d 665, 668 (La. 1997) ( citing Ferguson v. Stephens, 623 So.2d 711 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993)). Because the Lafourche parish Sheriff's Office is not a legal entity, it cannot be sued. Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Lafourche Parish Office as a defendant.
F. Liability of Sheriff Webre
Plaintiffs' complaints are unclear whether they are suing Sheriff Webre in his individual or official capacity. The Court will address both possibilities. To sue Sheriff Webre in his individual capacity, plaintiffs must prove that he was more than negligent in his participation in plaintiffs' detention. See Herrera, 862 F.2d at 1160. The record does not indicate, and plaintiffs do not posit, any evidence from which the Court can infer what Sheriff Webre did in connection with plaintiffs' detention. Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgement to dismiss Sheriff Webre as a defendant in his individual capacity.
Plaintiffs' suit against Sheriff Webre in his official capacity is treated as a claim against Lafourche Parish, the government entity of which Webre is an employee, representative, or official. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362 (1991). In order to bring a successful Section 1983 claim against a municipality, plaintiffs must show a causal link between the local government entity and the deprivation of federal rights. Board of County Comm. of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). A municipality may be liable under Section 1983, if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives the plaintiff of one or more of his constitutional rights; however, a municipality cannot be liable under Section 1983 merely because it employed a tortfeasor. Monnell v. Department of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself, and show his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiffs do not cite any specific action by Sheriff Webre or his approval of any course of dealing that caused the deprivation of their rights. Sheriff Webre cannot be held liable under Section 1983 based on mere vicarious liability. Plaintiffs allege a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights due to an illegal search, seizure, and questioning; however, plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that suggests that Sheriff Webre showed deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' rights. Nor do they identify any policy that resulted in a violation of plaintiffs' rights. Therefore, the Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss Sheriff Webre as a defendant.
G. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, law enforcement officers may not be held liable for civil damages so "long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Enlow v. Tishomingo County, 962 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, officials who act reasonably but mistakenly are still entitled to the qualified immunity defense. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040-41. As the Supreme Court has explained, this defense "gives ample room for mistaken judgments," and protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986).
The examination of a qualified immunity claim is a two-step inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established right. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). Second, the court must determine whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules applicable at the time of the alleged violation. Id. This inquiry is conducted without regard for the law enforcement officer's actual state of mind or subjective motivations. Instead, the court attempts to put itself "in the shoes of a reasonable police officer as he or she approaches a given situation and assesses the likelihood of danger in a particular context." United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if no reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record, taken as a whole, that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established federal right. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3038-40. In Lampkin, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court, in evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, must determine the objective reasonableness of the official's act as a matter of law. Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1993) (following the holding and reasoning of Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226-28, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 (1991)). Therefore, the district court should evaluate the reasonableness of the official's conduct under the circumstances confronting him at the time the conduct occurred in order to determine at summary judgment whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at 226-28, 112 S.Ct. at 536-37.
1. The Fourth Amendment
The first inquiry under qualified immunity defense is whether plaintiffs assert a valid constitutional claim. Plaintiffs' complaints assert generally that on the night of December 1 and the early morning of December 2, 1998, defendants violated their constitutional rights by unlawfully detaining and questioning them. Belaire and Gaudet allege that defendants told them that they were required to accompany defendants on the search of Belaire's trailer, the search of his girlfriend's car, and that they were required to go to the sheriff's office for questioning. Gaudet also claims that defendants forced him to accompany them to the scene of the robbery on December 8, 1998. These claims implicate the Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment provides "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . ." U.S. Const. Art. IV. The Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable. See id. The legality of police-citizen encounters depends upon the degree to which the police intrude upon the liberty of the individual and the nature of the information upon why they act. See United States v. Webster, 750 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir. 1984). Voluntary interaction between state and its citizens, as well as police-initiated contact which a reasonable person would not feel compelled to continue, do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. See id.
A seizure of the person, however, must be supported by probable cause unless it falls within an exception to the probable cause requirement. This exception is reserved for police activity of minimal violence to the sanctity of the person. These types of seizures require only reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot. See id. ( citing Dunanway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248).
In determining whether the interaction was voluntary, the threshold requirement is one of reasonableness. The standard is broad in both scope and definition: whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhdall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877-78 (1980); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. 1982) (unit B) (en banc). See also United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (1979). The Government bears the burden of demonstrating "that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." United States v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983).
a. Detention at the Traffic Stop
Plaintiffs assert that defendants unlawfully detained them at the traffic stop when defendants searched plaintiff Belaire's car pursuant to a search warrant. In his declaration, plaintiff Gaudet claims that Belaire was detained and handcuffed for approximately ninety minutes.
In order to evaluate plaintiffs' claims and defendants' defense of qualified immunity, the court must address whether the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment allows authorities to lawfully detain the occupants of a premises that is being searched for contraband while the search is conducted. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981). The search warrant itself contains articulable facts amounting to a reasonable suspicion necessary to detain a person on less than probable cause. Id. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that the use of "some force on a suspect, pointing a weapon at a suspect, ordering a suspect to lie on the ground, and handcuffing a suspect . . . dotes] not automatically convert an investigatory detention into an arrest requiring probable cause." United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 1993). The relevant inquiry in evaluating the legality of the force is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. Id.
In this situation, defendants knew that plaintiffs were suspects to an armed robbery and may have been dangerous. Defendants had a valid search warrant to search Belaire's vehicle. At the time of the search, the circumstances required the officers to balance several priorities in performing the search: to investigate alleged crime and make appropriate arrests; to prevent the commission of additional crimes and the destruction of evidence; not to infringe upon the plaintiffs or others' rights; and to ensure their own safety and the safety of others. See id. at 207. Even if defendants used handcuffs, such use of force did not constitute a full arrest requiring probable cause. Thus, handcuffing Belaire and detaining Gaudet, two suspected armed robbers, during the traffic stop was not unreasonable. Therefore, even accepting the plaintiffs' recount of the traffic stop as true, plaintiffs have not alleged a constitutional claim.
Furthermore, even if such a detention violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity requires that for defendants to be liable they must have acted objectively unreasonably. A district court, in evaluating a claim for qualified immunity, must determine the objective reasonableness of the official's act as a matter of law. Lampkin, 7 F.3d at 434-35. Given the fact that the plaintiffs were suspects to an armed robbery and possibly dangerous, defendants' conduct was not objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claims regarding the detention at the traffic stop on December 1, 1998.
b. Detention of Belaire subsequent to the traffic stop
Under Celotex, once the party moving for summary judgment has pointed out that evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The nonmovant may not rest on the pleadings and must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. Id.
In his complaint, Belaire alleges that defendants forced him to accompany them on the search of his trailer and to the sheriff's office for questioning. Belaire realleges these facts in his opposition memorandum but he does not submit an affidavit or refer to admissible evidence of specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Belaire has not fulfilled his burden under Celotex; therefore, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Belaire's claims regarding his detention and questioning after the December 1, 1998 traffic stop.
c. Detention of Gaudet subsequent to the traffic stop
Although defendants did not violate Gaudet's Fourth Amendment rights during the traffic stop, the question remains whether any subsequent detention violated these rights. Gaudet asserts that, after the traffic stop, defendants "forced" him to accompany them on subsequent searches and to the sheriff's office. In addition, Gaudet claims generally that from 6:00 p.m. on December 1, 1998 until 3:30 a.m. on December 2, 1998, he "was told" he had to remain at the sheriff's office for questioning and that he was threatened with violation of his probation, the arrest of his wife, and the forfeiture of his children to Social Services. The Court finds, however, that these assertions are either conclusory or are contradicted by plaintiff's own statements to the contrary.
As stated above, once the party moving for summary judgment has pointed out that evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The nonmovant may not rest on the pleadings and must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. Id. Neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the summary judgment burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. In Little, the Fifth Circuit explained, "[w]e resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. In addition, an affidavit will not defeat summary judgment if it contains no more than a scintilla of evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
Gaudet's briefs and affidavits are conclusory and inconsistent. First, he claims that defendants told him he had to remain at the sheriff's office for eight and a half hours on the night of December 1 and morning of December 2, 1998. But Gaudet also admits that he accompanied defendants on the searches of Belaire's trailer and cars and that the search of the trailer took three hours. The evidence indicates that the search warrants were issued-between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., and plaintiffs were first contacted by defendants around 6:00 p.m. In his brief, Gaudet says that the search of Belaire's residence was completed at 9:30 p.m., and he remained there apparently unaccompanied by defendants until around midnight when he was picked up to go to the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office. Therefore, plaintiff's statements that he accompanied the defendants on these searches and that he did not arrive at the sheriff's office until midnight belie his claim that he was interrogated for eight-and-a-half hours.
Further, defendants produced evidence, which Gaudet does not dispute, that defendants did not handcuff or show any force in bringing Gaudet to the station. See Def. USPS's Summ J. Mot. Ex. A ¶ 9. In addition, Gaudet does not refute the defendants' evidence that the room at the station where he was questioned was unlocked and that defendants did not use any type of physical force or restraint to keep him there. See id. ¶ 10. Furthermore, defendants have produced a waiver of Miranda rights and consent to questioning signed by Gaudet on the morning of December 2, 1998, which Gaudet does not even mention in his affidavit. See Def. Dufrene Summ J. Mot. Ex. A. Defendants also aver, and Gaudet does not dispute, that Gaudet agreed to take a polygraph test, claiming he had nothing to hide. He did take the test several days later.
Gaudet's affidavit contains conclusory assertions that defendants made statements, which he characterizes as "threats," concerning the violation of his probation, the imprisonment of his wife, and the forfeiture of his children to Social Services. Gaudet fails to identify the person who made the threats and that they were made to force him to cooperate. In other words, Gaudet fails to allege that defendants told him that if he left or did not cooperate, then defendants would charge him with violation of his probation, incarcerate his wife, and take away his children. Nor does he deny that he signed a waiver, which states that "no promises or threats have been made to me or coercion of any kind used against me" or explain under oath why he signed such a statement. Gaudet offers merely conclusory or self-contradictory evidence to support his claim that his encounter with the police was involuntary.
In their summary judgment motions, defendants cite many cases that support the proposition that a voluntary interaction with a police officer does not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S. Ct. 291 (1961). The question of voluntariness is one of fact that must be determined from the totality of circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1879. In evaluating the circumstances, the Court must consider the undisputed fact that Gaudet signed a waiver and such waivers are strong proof of voluntariness. See Blasingame v. Estelle, 604 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, the Court must consider that Gaudet never claims that defendants drew any weapons, used handcuffs or any other type of physical force. He never asserts that he tried to leave the situation, make a phone call, or go to the bathroom and was unable to do so. In addition, after the questioning, Gaudet returned to his home. Thus, the Court finds that, when viewing the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented, Gaudet does not offer evidence that could support a finding that he was involuntarily detained.
Even if defendants did violate Gaudet's Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully detaining the him, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they acted objectively reasonably. Whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable depends upon the circumstances of the detention and upon the clearly established law at the time. Based on the evidence cited, the Court finds that defendants' conduct was not objectively unreasonable on the night of December 1, and early morning of December 2, 1998.
d. Detention of Gaudet on December 8, 1998
Gaudet alleges in his declaration that defendants forced him to accompany them to the Raceland Post Office, where the robbery occurred on December 8, 1998. Gaudet's declaration merely states: "On December 8, 1998, I was forced to accompany Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Deputies and U.S. Postal Inspectors to the Raceland Post Office." Gaudet offers no facts to support his conclusory assertion that this encounter was involuntary or that he was detained by defendants at all. Police records indicate that Gaudet was read his rights and signed a waiver December 8, 1998, which contained the same language negating coercion as the December 2 waiver. Furthermore, defendants have submitted a sworn confession signed by Gaudet dated December 8, 1998 that implicated himself and Belaire. See Def. Dufrene's Summ. J. Mot. Ex. E. Gaudet offers no evidence to dispute that defendants read him his rights, that he signed the waiver, or that he signed the confession. His affidavit merely contains conclusory assertions that are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment on Gaudet's claims regarding his unlawful detention on December 8, 1998.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment by defendants dismissing the United States Postal Service, Inspector Winston, Inspector Paulhus, Detective Dufrene, Captain Morse, Sheriff Webre, and the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office as defendants in this case.