Opinion
No. 12, 2003.
Submitted: July 8, 2003.
Decided: July 24, 2003
Court Below: Family Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County File No: CN99-08345 and Petition Nos. 02-16863, 02-29706 and 02-02958.
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
WILLIAM C. BEHRENS, Appellant, and Petitioner Below v. BARBARA R. BEHRENS, Appellee, and Respondent Below. No. 12, 2003. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: July 8, 2003. Decided: July 24, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
Jack B. Jacobs, Justice
This 24th day of July, 2003, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The Petitioner Below, Appellant, William C. Behrens ("Father") has appealed from an order of the Family Court of the State of Delaware, denying his Petition for Specific Performance of a May 2, 2000 Stipulation and Order into which Father and the Respondent Below-Appellee, Barbara R. Behrens ("Mother") entered in connection with their divorce.
(2) The portion of the Stipulation that Father sought to have specifically performed states that:
7. Mother agrees that father would be dependent upon mother should he be obligated to pay anything additional above his obligation to pay one-half of the tuition at St. Thomas the Apostle for the children's attendance at any Parochial school as hereinbefore set forth. Mother agrees that she waives further support for the children above such tuition payment, however, should she file and obtain a support Order against father, then she agrees that she would be obligated to pay father non-deductible alimony in the same amount as any increase above father's tuition obligation. The parties agree that this is an integrated agreement. Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, each party waives and releases with prejudice all claims against each other which were or could have been asserted in these proceedings for all alimony or support pursuant to 13 Del. C. §§ 1509 or 1512.
(3) The Stipulation also contained a provision on child support, which states as follows:
6. Father agrees that in lieu of child support, he shall pay one half of the tuition cost for the children to attend St. Thomas the Apostle through the eighth grade. Thereafter, if the children attend Parochial school, father agrees that he shall continue to pay an amount equivalent to one half of the tuition at St. Thomas the Apostle paid during the children's [sic] attendance during the eighth grade in lieu of child support.
(4) In February, 2002, Mother filed a petition for child support, alleging that Father had failed, without just cause, to comply with his duty to support his children. Father filed an Answer, which claimed that (i) he had been paying his obligations as provided by the May 2, 2000 Stipulation, and that (ii) the Stipulation provided that should Mother seek an increase in support, she would then be obligated to pay non-deductible alimony to Father in the same amount as the increased support. Thereafter, in May, 2002, Father filed a Petition for alimony, which was amended so as to be designated as a Petition for Specific Performance of Paragraph 7 of the May 2, 2000 Stipulation.
(5) The Family Court denied the Petition for Specific Performance on the legal basis that:
[T]his Court cannot enforce an agreement which contracts away the right of children to receive adequate and fair child support, Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1286 (1983). Realistically, the Stipulation . . . required [Father] to pay one-half of the children's tuition at a parochial school in lieu of child support. [Mother} agreed not to seek child support above the tuition payment, but if she did so in the future, then she would have to pay the difference between the child support and [Father's] share of the tuition payment back to [Father] as non-deductible. This creative wording does nothing more than state that the child support can never exceed one-half of the parochial school tuition. To honor such a provision would restrict [Mother's] right to receive child support and the parties would have contracted away the rights of two children to be adequately supported. They cannot do so. When balancing contract law principles against the best interests of children, the children's best interests must always prevail.
(6) On this appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the Stipulation was unenforceable, and that instead, the Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on the fairness and validity of that Agreement. The standard of review of a grant or denial of specific performance of a contract is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Where, as here, specific performance is denied because the contract is found to be unenforceable on its face, the standard of review is whether the trial court committed legal error requiring reversal. In this case, the Family Court, in denying specific performance of the Stipulation, did not commit legal error, nor did that Court abuse its discretion.
(7) The Family Court committed no abuse of discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing, because the issue was whether the Stipulation was unenforceable on its face. That was an issue of law, which the trial court decided correctly, because the clear and unambiguous effect of the contested provisions was to limit the amount of Father's child support obligation to a fixed amount. Because as a matter of public policy the Family Court cannot be precluded by private contract from determining the level of support that is in the best interests of minor children, the Stipulation was correctly found to be unenforceable as a matter of law, requiring, as a consequence, that Father's Motion for Specific Performance be denied.
(8) Although the trial court's ruling properly vindicated the rights of the children (and of Mother, as their representative), the relief that it granted was improperly one-sided. That ruling invalidated the Stipulation insofar as it restricted Mother's right to seek additional child support, but (inadvertently, it appears) did not invalidate the provision that restricted Father's right to seek alimony, even though those two rights were integrated and mutually dependent upon each another. To the extent the trial court's ruling denied enforcement of one party's (Mother's) promise while holding the other party (Father) to terms made in reliance on that promise, that ruling was not a sound exercise of discretion. The case will, therefore, be remanded to the Family Court to modify its Order to the extent necessary to enable Father to file a new Petition for Alimony.
Brown v. Giles-Brown, 1997 WL 878705 at *3 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1997); see U.S. Dimension Products, Inc. v. Tassette, 290 A.2d 634, 635 (Del. 1972) (holding that "whether the [trial judge] should have awarded . . . specific performance . . . was a matter within the discretion of the Court below.")
See Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1282 (Del. 1983).
G.W.F. v. G.P.F., 271 A.2d 38, 39 (Del. 1970) ("[P]arents may not, by agreement between themselves, bargain away or adversely affect the right of a minor child to look to his father for support and maintenance. Parents are not precluded from contracting with respect to the support of their children, but they may not, by agreement, prevent in futuro the re-examination by a court of the adequacy of the support for minor children agreed upon by the parents. It is only when the parents' contract is consistent with the welfare and best interests of the child that the agreement for support may be given controlling effect."); accord, Coneys v. Coneys, 269 A.2d 634, 635 (Del. 1972) ("[A] prior support agreement between the parents does not preclude the Court from allowing a greater amount.")
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 (1981) ("Under the rule stated in [§ 184], an agreement may be unenforceable as to corresponding equivalents on each side but unenforceable as to the rest. If it is not possible to apportion the parties' performances in this way so that corresponding concessions are made on both sides, a refusal to enforce only part of the agreement will necessarily result in some inequality.") In this case, it is possible to avoid that "inequality" by treating as unenforceable the "corresponding equivalent," in this case, Father's agreement not to petition for alimony as the quid pro quo for Mother's promise to cap the amount of child support. Cf. also, Willcher v. Willcher, 294 A.2d 486 (D.C.App. 1972); Gelmi v. Gelmi, 172 A.2d 888 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Order and Judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED, and that the matter is REMANDED to the Family Court for proceedings consistent herewith.
Jurisdiction is not retained.