Opinion
March 12, 1941.
1. QUIETING TITLE: Tax Deed. In an action to quiet title where plaintiff claimed under two tax deeds for taxes delinquent for the year 1935, such tax deed with its proper recitals was prima facie evidence in all courts that the taxes were not paid at any time before the sale and that the real property conveyed had not been redeemed from the sale taxes; that all things whatsoever required by law to make a good and valid tax sale and vest the title in the purchaser were done.
But being only prima facie evidence, it could be overcome by evidence to the contrary.
2. QUIETING TITLE: Tax Deed: Taxes Not Included. Under Section 6208, Revised Statutes 1929, notice of a tax sale is required to state time and place, and among other things all delinquent taxes and assessments, and in an action to quiet title by plaintiffs claiming under a tax sale of property in a city of the first class, for taxes delinquent for the year 1935, where taxes were also delinquent for the years 1931 and 1932, not mentioned in the notice of such sale, such sale was void.
3. TAX SALES: Statutes. It is the rule well established that when an administrative officer sells property at a tax sale a strict compliance with the statutes is required.
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. — Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ( with directions).
Strop Strop for appellants.
(1) The entire record in this cause may be examined since defendants' answers converted this cause into an equitable proceeding. Dinkelman v. Hovekamp, 80 S.W.2d 682, 336 Mo. 572. (2) The tax deed is void because the purported notice given prior to the tax sale did not include a list of all delinquent taxes against the property in controversy, and because the city treasurer issued a certificate of sale before he had received a sum of money equal to all delinquent taxes against the property due at the time of sale. R.S. 1929, secs. 6208, 6215; 26 R.C.L., p. 394, sec. 354; Comfort v. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 293, 35 S.W. 612; Reeds v. Morton, 9 Mo. 887; 61 C.J., pp. 1199, 1313, secs. 1616, 1837. (3) The tax deed is void because the purported notice published prior to the sale did not contain a proper description of the property to be sold. 61 C.J. 1183, sec. 1596; Comfort v. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 291, 35 S.W. 612. (4) The tax deed is void on its face because it shows that the city became the purchaser of the property at the tax sale, and does not show that the city auditor had been directed by the comptroller of the city to bid off the property for the city at the sale. R.S. 1929, sec. 6215; Voights v. Hart, 285 Mo. 113, 226 S.W. 251; Hartman v. Owens, 293 Mo. 508, 240 S.W. 116. Comfort v. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 294, 35 S.W. 613. (5) The tax deed is void because it recites that the property was sold at an adjourned sale, but does not recite that the city treasurer kept a notice posted in a conspicuous place in his office during the time that elapsed between the adjournment of said sale and the sale. R.S. 1929, sec. 6214; Meriwether v. Overly, 228 Mo. 234, 129 S.W. 6. (6) The tax deed is void because it merely recites that the property was sold in conformity with all the requirements of the statutes in such cases made and provided, and does not recite the facts showing compliance with the law. Spurlock v. Allen, 48 Mo. 180; Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo. 307; Yanke v. Thompson, 51 Mo. 240; Burden v. Taylor, 124 Mo. 21, 27 S.W. 351. (7) The tax deed is void because the consideration paid therefor was so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of a court of equity. Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 520, 141 S.W. 657.
Maurice Pope for respondents.
(1) The tax deeds are valid because they follow exactly the form of tax deed prescribed by statute and such deeds are presumed to be good on their face. Sec. 6229, R.S. 1929. (2) The Legislature has full power and authority to prescribe the form for a tax deed; where the statutory form of tax deed prescribes a recitation of conclusions on prerequisite facts, the deed need not set forth these acts and proceedings in order to be valid on its face. Sec. 6229, R.S. 1929; Treese v. Ferguson, 251 P. 91; 37 Cyc. 1434. (3) The form of deed prescribed by Section 6229, Revised Statutes 1929, requires no recital that the comptroller specifically authorized the city auditor to bid off, for the city, the property described in the deed. Sec. 6229, R.S. 1929. (4) There need be no recital in the deed that a notice of adjourned sale was kept posted. Secs. 6214, 6229, 6237, R.S. 1929. (5) Under Section 6238, Revised Statutes 1929, the description of the property in the notice of sale was sufficient, because from said description the property was and could be identified and located. Sec. 6238, R.S. 1929. (6) No fraud, accident, or unfairness appears from the evidence, and the consideration paid for the tax deed raises no presumption of fraud.
The respondents brought an action to quiet title to certain described real estate in the city of St. Joseph, Missouri. Their title is derived from two city tax deeds of that city dated January 7, 1938. Prior to the tax sale, the title to this property was vested in the appellant Isaac T. Curd, subject to a deed of trust in which the appellant Frank W. Smith was trustee. This deed of trust secured two notes payable to Susan Duncan who had assigned one note to the appellant American National Bank, and the other to the appellant Empire Trust Company. The appellants, by their separate answers, sought to have the two tax deeds declared void and to have the title quieted in the appellant Isaac T. Curd, subject to the deed of trust. The trial court found that the fee simple title was vested in the respondent T.I. Beckwith, that the respondent Blanche Beckwith is entitled to rights of inchoate dower in the real estate, and that the appellants have no title or interest in this real estate.
It is admitted that the city taxes for the year 1935 were the only taxes advertised as delinquent in the notice given prior to the sale, but that the city taxes for the years 1931 and 1932 were delinquent at the time the notice was given; in fact, when the respondents' tax deeds were issued, the city taxes for the years 1931 and 1932 were still unpaid. The appellants paid the city of St. Joseph the sum of $7.33 for the two deeds conveying to them the land described in their petition and had at the time of trial paid by way of taxes, interest and penalties $158.24, which amount the appellants have tendered into court for respondents' benefit.
Section 6229, Revised Statutes 1929, provides:
"The tax deeds executed by the city treasurer shall be substantially in the following form; (Here follows the form.)
"Said deed shall be signed by the city treasurer, in his official capacity, with the seal of the city affixed, and acknowledged before some officer authorized to take the acknowledgements of deeds, and when substantially thus executed and recorded, shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of this state in all controversies and suits in relation to the rights of the grantee in said deed, his heirs and assigns, to the real property thereby conveyed or purporting to be conveyed, that the taxes were not paid at any time before sale; that the real property conveyed was subject to taxation for the year or years stated in the deed; that the real property conveyed had not been redeemed from the sale at the date of the deed; that the tender of redemption had not been made to the city treasurer before the execution and delivery of the deed; that the real property conveyed had been duly assessed for the year or years named in the deed; that the taxes were levied according to law; that the real property conveyed was duly advertised for sale; was duly sold for taxes, as stated in the deed; that the manner in which the assessment, levy, notice and sale were conducted was in all respects regular and as the law directed; that the grantee named in the deed was the purchaser, or that the certificate of purchase had been duly assigned to the grantee; that all the prerequisites of the law and ordinances of the city of . . . were complied with by all the officers who had or whose duty it was to have had any part or action in any transaction relating to or affecting the title conveyed, or purporting to be conveyed, from the assessment of real property up to the execution of the deed, both inclusive; and that all things whatsoever required by law to make a good and valid sale, and to vest the title in the purchaser, were done, except only in regard to the points named in this section, wherein the deed shall be prima facie evidence only."
The two deeds executed by the city of St. Joseph substantially complied with the form set forth in Section 6229, supra; therefore, this was prima facie evidence that all the provisions of the law in regard to the tax sale had been complied with, including that phrase which states that the manner in which the "notice and sale were conducted was in all respects regular and as the law directed." But this section does not say that such deed shall be conclusive evidence that the provisions of the law were complied with, but only that it shall be prima facie evidence in all courts that the law had been complied with. Of course, such prima facie evidence may be overcome by positive evidence to the contrary.
The parties to this action admitted at the trial that the notice of the sale did not include a list of all delinquent taxes against this property. The notice of the sale listed the 1935 taxes, but did not include the taxes for the years of 1931 and 1932.
The method for the collection of delinquent taxes on real estate in cities of the first class, the class to which St. Joseph belongs, is governed by Sections 6206 to 6229 inclusive, Revised Statutes 1929. This is a summary method for the collection of back taxes.
Section 6208, supra, provides:
"The notice to be given of the sale of real property for delinquent taxes shall state the time and place thereof, and contain a description substantially the same as in the land tax book of the several parcels of real property to be sold, and all delinquent taxes and assessments thereon, and such real property as has not been advertised and sold for the taxes of any previous year or years, and on which taxes or special assessments remain due and delinquent, and the amount of taxes and special assessments, interest and cost against each parcel of real property." (Italics ours.)
It is the contention of the appellants that the failure of the city to list all delinquent taxes in the notice as required by the above section made the sale void, this for the reason that when the summary method for the collection of delinquent taxes is employed, the law requires a literal and strict compliance with the statutes authorizing such sales.
In the case of Comfort v. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 281, l.c. 293, 35 S.W. 609, l.c. 612, we said:
"When the process of collecting taxes by the sale of lands for their nonpayment is a summary remedy, as in the case at bar, and the law requires that certain things be done by the officer making such a sale in connection therewith, nothing less than a strict compliance with such requirements will suffice, and, unless it appear that the law has been strictly complied with, the sale will be void."
In the case of Reeds v. Morton, 9 Mo. 868, l.c. 877, we said:
"He who wishes to obtain an estate worth thousands, for less than ten dollars, under and by virtue of the law, is not to be permitted to ask why he should be required to do this or to do that. It is an answer, that it is required by law. Ita lex scripta est. He claims by the law, then by that law let his pretensions be judged."
The author, in 26 Ruling Case Law, page 394, paragraph 354, says:
"There is no presumption in favor of the validity of a tax title based upon a sale by a collector as an administrative act. One who claims title to the property of another by virtue of a sale for nonpayment of taxes is bound to show the existence of every fact necessary to give jurisdiction and authority to the officer who made the sale, and a strict compliance by him with all things required by the statute in carrying out the sale. That the variation from the requirements of law was trivial and did the owner no harm is not sufficient reason for disregarding it. The maxim `De minimis non curat lex' if applicable to tax sales at all should be applied with great caution."
We think the rule is well established that when an administrative officer sells property at a tax sale, a strict compliance with the statutes is required. The omission of the 1931 and 1932 taxes from the notice of sale voided the sale by the city to the respondents because the notice did not include all the delinquent taxes as required by Section 6208, supra.
It follows that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions for the trial court to enter judgment in conformity with the prayers in appellants' answers. It is so ordered. All concur.