Beckett v. Nash

Full title: JAMES CARROLL BECKETT v. JOHN NASH, et al

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Dec 11, 2003

CIVIL ACTION No. 03-3717 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2003)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION No. 03-3717

December 11, 2003

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PETER SCUDERI, Magistrate Judge

This is a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by James Carroll Beckett ("Petitioner"), an individual who was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Schuylkill, Pennsylvania, at the time the petition was filed. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the petition be dismissed.

On October 23, 1991, Petitioner was sentenced in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to a term of imprisonment of 262 months upon convictions for bank robbery and armed bank robbery. Petitioner sought to appeal his convictions and sentence, but trial counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to bring the issue of the notice of appeal to the court's attention. Eventually, Petitioner was re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 180 months. He has remained in federal custody in connection with these offenses since October 4, 1990.

Petitioner claims that on February 4, 2003, he learned that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") allegedly had been misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which provides that federal prisoners serving more than a one (1) year "term of imprisonment" may receive up to 54 days of good time credit for each year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). As a result, on June 18, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that, pursuant to the good time credits allegedly due him under the statute, he should be released on August 25, 2003. In response, Respondents argue that this matter must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (because the petition arguably should have been filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where Petitioner was confined at the time he filed the petition), lack of venue, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies (because Petitioner failed to file a grievance with the warden of FCI Schuylkill). In the alternative, Respondents argue that the BOP has not misinterpreted § 3264(b), and that Petitioner's release date of December 3, 2003, was based upon correct calculation of his good time credits.

I conclude that I need not reach the merits of Petitioner's petition, nor address the counter-arguments raised by the Respondents, because the instant petition is moot. As previously mentioned, Petitioner seeks the remedy of release from federal custody earlier than the BOP's release date, specifically, Petitioner asks the court to direct the BOP to credit him with 100 additional good time credits, and to order his release on August 25, 2003. Obviously, that date has come and gone. Moreover, the court has been informed by the United States Attorney's office that Petitioner was released from custody, pursuant to standard BOP good time calculations, on December 3, 2003. Because Petitioner is no longer in federal custody, and because the court cannot fashion any remedy whatsoever, this matter is moot.¹

1 As previously mentioned, Petitioner filed his habeas petition on June 18, 2003, seeking an order for his release on August 25, 2003. By Order dated August 5, 2003, the District Court referred the matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. Thereafter, in recognition of the time factor involved in this matter, I issued an Order giving the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania only twenty-one (21) days to file a response to the petition. The government then filed a timely Response to the Petition; Petitioner's counsel filed a Reply to the Government's Response; the Government filed a Supplemental Response; and, on October 20, 2003 — nearly two (2) months after the date upon which Petitioner sought to be released based upon his good time calculations — Petitioner's counsel filed a Traverse to the Government's Sur-Reply. I then considered the matter ahead of several other previously-pending petitions.

Generally, a habeas petitioner's release from physical custody will not render his or her petition moot because some concrete injury or "collateral consequence" of the conviction may continue to exist.See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998); Carafes v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238 (1968). The initial question is whether a petitioner's release causes his or her petition to be moot because it no longer presents a "case or controversy" under the Constitution. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. As the Supreme Court explained in Spencer:

An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole — some "collateral consequence" of the conviction — must exist if the suit is to be maintained.

Id. (citations omitted). However, collateral consequences are deemed to arise from a prisoner's conviction, not his or her sentence. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-8; see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 248 (1971) (stating "[n]ullification of a conviction may have important benefits for a defendant . . . but urging in a habeas corpus proceeding the correction of a sentence already served is another matter"). It follows, therefore, that where a petitioner only challenges the computation of his or her sentence — and nothing else — any alleged remedy can no longer be enforced once the petitioner has fully served the imposed sentence and has been released from custody. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (holding that "since respondents elected only to attack their sentences, and since those sentences expired during the course of these proceedings, the case is moot");Hernandez v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 389, 390 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding habeas petition moot where petitioner attacked only the length of his confinement, and was no longer in custody).

Here, Petitioner claims that federal authorities violated his constitutional rights by extending his sentence approximately 100 days (from August 25, 2003, to December 3, 2003) as a result of misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), and thereby miscalculating the good time credits provided for by that statute. However, every court that has considered variants of this claim has found that the cases become moot once the petitioner is released from custody. See e.g., Diaz v. Kinkela, 253 F.3d 241, 243-244 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding federal habeas petition moot where petitioner challenged additional period of incarceration for "bad time," but petitioner already released from prison after serving the additional "bad time"); Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding federal habeas petition moot where petitioner challenged state's application of good time credits, but petitioner had completed term of incarceration and a favorable decision would not reduce his probationary period); Wharton v. Hood, 2001 WL 1664465, at *1 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (holding habeas petition moot where petitioner challenged computation of good time credits, and petitioner had been released from custody); Graham v. Duckworth, 175 F.3d 1019, 1999 WL 147109, at *1 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) (same).

Petitioner does not raise any issue regarding the legality of his original conviction, the performance of counsel or the prosecutor, or any other substantive claim. Because Petitioner only challenges the calculation of his good time credits, and because his sentence has expired under both Petitioner's calculation and in fact, there is simply no injury for which the court may afford a remedy. See Lane, supra; Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). As a result, Petitioner's sole claim is moot.

Therefore, I make the following:

RECOMMENDATION

AND NOW, this day of December, 2003, IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be DISMISSED. There has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requiring the issuance of a certificate of appealability.

ORDER

AND NOW, this ___ day of ___, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi, and any objections made thereto, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.

2. The petition deemed filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED.

3. There is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.