Summary
finding that a common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers; its liability is based on negligence
Summary of this case from Price v. Canadian AirlinesOpinion
No. 4555.
Argued February 6, 1957.
Decided April 10, 1957.
1. While the standard of care required of common carriers toward passengers high one the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
2. In the absence of evidence that the defendant railroad company or its agents had knowledge that the plaintiff passenger was blind and required assistance in descending the steps of its railroad car negligence may not be predicated upon its failure to offer such assistance.
3. The mere fact that the plaintiff wore dark glasses in the course of her journey in the summertime did not charge the defendant with notice that the plaintiff was blind and required assistance.
4. So also, proffered evidence on the issue of notice that the plaintiff had been assisted in the course of her journey by trainmen at various points in Canada would not give rise to a duty to assist her upon arrival here when her husband assumed full responsibility for her departure from the train, and the evidence was properly excluded.
ACTIONS OF CASE, TO RECOVER damages for personal injuries suffered by Yvonne Beaudet, hereinafter called plaintiff, when she fell while alighting from a Boston and Maine Railroad car at Manchester. Suit was brought during her lifetime and upon her death her husband and executor, Henri Beaudet, was substituted as party plaintiff. An action was also brought by the husband for hospital and medical expenses. At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit in each case which was granted. The plaintiffs' exceptions to the nonsuits and to the exclusion of certain evidence were reserved and transferred by Griffith, J.
The plaintiff, sixty-two years of age, blind, wearing dark glasses and accompanied by a traveling companion who was seventy years of age, was returning from Canada to Manchester, New Hampshire, on July 29, 1950. Her husband met her at the station and after removing her baggage from the defendant's railroad car, returned to assist her in alighting from the train. The plaintiff was descending the steps of the railroad car while holding on to the left arm of her husband when she missed a step and fell down on the platform. Neither the plaintiff nor anyone in her behalf requested assistance from the defendant or others in alighting from the train. Her husband testified that he did not think he needed the help of his niece who was standing nearby. The record discloses the following testimony in the cross-examination of plaintiff's husband: "Q. And if you had held on to her by the arm as she went down the steps, just held on to her, you probably would have gotten down safely; is that right? Do you think you would have? A. Yes." A witness for the plaintiff, who witnessed a portion of the accident, saw two Boston and Maine conductors standing outside of the train on the platform near the opposite end of the car from which the plaintiff fell "and they were talking and laughing." The plaintiff did not use a cane.
Craig Craig (Mr. William H. Craig, Jr. orally), for the plaintiffs.
Sheehan, Phinney, Bass, Green Bergevin and Richard A. Morse (Mr. Morse orally), for the defendant.
The "ordinary standard of care required of carriers toward passengers is a high one." Wright v. Railroad, 83 N.H. 136, 140. A common carrier of passengers for hire must use great caution to protect them consistent with the practical operation of the business. Prosser, Torts (2nd ed. 1955) 147. There "is general agreement that the reasonable man engaged in the public transportation business would recognize the great potential dangers which attend rapid transit and would take all practicable precautions to guard his passengers against them." 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) s. 16.14. However a common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of passengers and its liability for injuries to a passenger is based on negligence. Boucher v. Railroad, 76 N.H. 91.
In the absence of any apparent necessity for assistance to a passenger in boarding or alighting from a train, the carrier is under no duty to furnish it. Shipman v. United Electric Railways Co., 68 R. I. 39. Special circumstances, however, may place a duty on the carrier to render personal assistance. Wheeler v. Railway, 70 N.H. 607. If a conductor offers to assist a physically handicapped person to alight from a train but the assistance is inadequate, the carrier is liable for the resulting injuries. Foss v. Railroad, 66 N.H. 256. If the place where the passenger alights is dangerous, a duty of assistance by the carrier arises. Wilson v. Street Railway, 84 N.H. 285, 286. When the passenger is blind or otherwise incapacitated, the carrier is under a duty to render assistance in alighting from the train if assistance is requested or the carrier has knowledge that it is necessary. Ingerson v. Railway, 79 N.H. 154. While some jurisdictions hold that the duty of assistance arises if the carrier should have known of its necessity (note 12 N.C.C.A. (n. s.) 219), that is not the law in this state. "To charge the railroad with greater care in his case it must appear the defendants knew his condition, not merely that they ought to have known it or could have learned it by care." Ingerson v. Railway, supra, 158.
In the present case it is undisputed that neither the plaintiff, her husband, nor anyone in their behalf requested assistance in alighting from the train in Manchester. So far as appears from the evidence the plaintiff had capable and sufficient assistance and requested no other. The only duty the carrier had toward the plaintiff was to render assistance if it knew that it was necessary. The fact that the plaintiff wore dark glasses in the summertime does not establish this fact. While it is true that agents of the carrier had an opportunity to observe the plaintiff on her trip to Canada and her return one week later, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant had any knowledge that assistance was needed when she alighted from the train. "It is not the duty of a conductor to assist passengers in alighting unless it is obvious that they need assistance." Di Nora v. Rhode Island Co., 43 R. I. 7, 10. See also, Tefft v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 285 Mass. 121. We can find no evidence in the record to support an inference that the defendant or its agents had knowledge that the plaintiff required assistance when she was descending the steps of the railroad car at Manchester. Consequently the Court was correct in granting the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the ground that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff on the evidence in this case. This makes it unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff husband was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Certain witnesses were asked whether the plaintiff had been assisted by trainmen at various intermediate points in Canada. This evidence was offered "on the question of notice" but was excluded by the Presiding Judge because he did not consider it "relevant." The fact that the defendant's agents may have assisted the decedent at some point in Canada would not give rise to a duty to assist her upon her arrival in Manchester when her husband assumed full responsibility for her departure from the train.
Judgment for the defendant.
WHEELER, J., took no part in the decision; LAMPRON, J., concurred in the result; the others concurred.