Opinion
112,452.
04-03-2015
Danny E. BEAUCLAIR, Appellant, v. James HEIMGARTNER, Appellee.
Linus A. Thuston, of Chanute, for appellant. Michael J. Smith, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellee.
Linus A. Thuston, of Chanute, for appellant.
Michael J. Smith, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., GREEN and LEBEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LEBEN, J.
Danny E. Beauclair, a Kansas prison inmate, was denied good-time credits—which reduce the time an inmate will actually serve in prison based on the inmate's good behavior—because he failed to participate in an assigned sex-offender treatment program. He filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60–1501, alleging that denying him good-time credits violated his constitutional rights because he had health problems that would make his participation in the sex-offender treatment program extremely painful. The district court summarily denied the petition, and Beauclair appealed.
We find no constitutional-rights violation. Beauclair's petition mentioned two constitutional rights that could be at issue—a liberty interest and the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A prisoner has no liberty interest in potential good-time credits that have never been awarded, and merely losing the opportunity to earn good-time credits is not a denial of a basic human need and therefore is not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the district court's judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
In May 2013, Beauclair filed a grievance with his correctional facility, arguing that he was being denied good-time credits based on his failure to complete an assigned sex-offender treatment program. He argued that his medical problems prevented him from completing the program. His unit team responded to the grievance, telling Beauclair that he had no work restrictions that would prevent him from completing the program. The response also indicated that Beauclair's inmate program plan—which he had signed in 2002—stated that sex-abuse treatment was recommended and that “fail[ing] to participate in or successfully complete recommended programs shall result in the withholding of good time credits.”
Beauclair then appealed to the warden, who told him that no further action was necessary regarding the grievance. In response, Beauclair appealed to the Secretary of Corrections, who also declined to take any action.
On July 8, 2013, Beauclair filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 60–1501. In his petition, he alleged that the warden of the correctional facility had violated his constitutional rights by denying him good-time credit for failure to participate in the sex-offender treatment program. He claimed that he should be excused from the program based on his medical problems; he said those problems included noise sensitivity, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, myofascial pain syndrome, a herniated disk, osteoarthritis, chronic knee pain and instability, urinary frequency (benign prostatic hypertrophy ), photosensitivity, and startle syndrome. He also said that he suffers from overwhelming body weakness that is made worse by activity so that he must lie down frequently during the day.
The district court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that Beauclair's arguments did not implicate his constitutional rights:
“The Court sees no violation of protected liberty interests. There is nothing atypical about [Beauclair's] confinement.... [R]equiring participation in the [Sexual Offender Treatment Program] for good time credits does not implicate [Beauclair's] 5th or 14th Amendment rights, and [Beauclair] cannot claim such a harm prospectively.”
The district court also assessed court costs—$176—against Beauclair.
Beauclair filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Beauclair then appealed to this court.
Since the district court summarily dismissed Beauclair's claims without hearing evidence or argument, our general standard of review in this appeal is the same as the district court's. Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 649, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). We must accept the factual assertions in Beauclair's petition, which may be dismissed only if “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached thereto that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief in the district court.” K.S.A. 60–1503(a) ; Hogue v. Bruce, 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005). To avoid summary dismissal, the petition must allege shocking or intolerable conduct or the violation of constitutional rights. Johnson, 289 Kan. at 648.
Analysis
I. The District Court Did Not Err in Summarily Dismissing Beauclair's Habeas Petition.
Beauclair argues that the district court should not have summarily denied his habeas petition. While his arguments on appeal are somewhat unclear, he claimed in his petition that the denial of good-time credits unless he participated in the sex-offender treatment program violated a liberty interest and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. These claims raise constitutional issues. See State v. Turner, 300 Kan. 662, 683–84, 333 P.3d 155 (2014) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that government provide due process before depriving person of significant liberty interest); State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 720, 280 P.3d 203 (2012) (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that government not inflict cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners).
We will discuss each of these potential bases for a claim that Beauclair's constitutional rights are being violated. Before doing so, however, we should briefly review how good-time credits are earned so as to place Beauclair's arguments in their proper context.
The Department of Corrections regulation governing good-time credits for inmates who fail to participate in an assigned program is substantially the same now as it was at the time of Beauclair's offense. For convenience, we will reference the current regulation, K.A.R. 44–6–115a(e)(1) (2014 Supp.). It provides that good-time credits will be withheld from inmates who refuse to participate in assigned programs unless the inmate is physically or mentally incapable of participating in the program:
“If an inmate refuses to work constructively or participate in assigned programs, 100% of the good time credits available for program classification review periods shall be withheld until the inmate reenters and constructively participates in the assigned program at a time that permits the inmate to complete the program, unless the facility health authority determines that the inmate is physically or mentally incapable of working or participating in a particular program or detail.”
Under the regulation, Beauclair is being denied the opportunity to earn good-time credits. The unit team awards good-time credits beginning with the inmate's first classification review. At that time, the inmate's unit team makes an initial award of goodtime credits—those available from the beginning of the sentence to the date of the initial award. K.A.R. 44–6–101(a)(4) (2014 Supp.) ; K.A.R. 44–6–115a(b)(1) (2014 Supp.). Then at each subsequent review, inmates may be awarded good-time credits available since their last classification review. K.A.R. 44–6–101(a)(4) (2014 Supp.) ; K.A.R. 44–6–115a(c) (2014 Supp.). An inmate's performance in a program assignment is one factor considered in determining whether to award good-time credits. K.A.R. 44–6–115a(d)(2) (2014 Supp.) ; see also K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6821(a) (authorizing the Secretary of Corrections to adopt regulations governing the award and forfeiture of good-time credits based on program participation). Under the facts Beauclair has alleged, his medical problems prevent him from participating in the sex-offender treatment program, and that is causing him to lose the opportunity to earn good-time credits.
Beauclair complains on appeal that he should have received an evidentiary hearing on his claim and that an inmate is entitled to due process when a liberty interest is at stake. But Beauclair's underlying claim relates to the denial of potential good-time credits that could be awarded, and the loss of mere potential good-time credit in Kansas (where there is no statutory right to these credits) is not a protected liberty interest. See In re Habeas Corpus Application of Pierpoint, 271 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 8, 24 P.3d 128 (2001) ; Hardaway v. Lamed Correctional Facility, 44 Kan.App.2d 504, 505, 238 P.3d 328 (2010). An inmate has a protected liberty interest—and a constitutional right to due process—only with respect to good-time credits that have been awarded. 44 Kan.App.2d at 505. With no protected liberty interest at stake, Beauclair was not entitled to a dueprocess hearing regarding his inability to earn future good-time credits.
Beauclair also claims cruel and unusual punishment. His argument seems to be that he is forced to choose between getting good-time credits and suffering pain while attending the sex-offender treatment program. We understand him to be claiming that being forced to participate in a painful treatment program is a condition of his confinement that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In reviewing his argument, we accept as true that participating in the program would be painful for Beauclair and consider whether his allegations—that losing good-time credits for refusing to be in pain during the program is cruel and unusual punishment—have merit. See Hogue, 279 Kan. at 850.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits more than just physically barbarous punishments; conditions of confinement may constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they cause serious deprivations of basic human needs—meaning they deny inmates the “ ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’ “ Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ; see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) ; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) ; Harman v. State, No. 108,478, 2013 WL 3792407, at *3 (Kan.App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 298 Kan. –––– (2013). To enforce these standards, Kansas inmates may file habeas petitions to protect their “entitlement to adequate food, light, clothing, medical care and treatment, sanitary facilities, ... and protection against ... unnecessary indignity-in short, the basic necessities of civilized existence.” Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 448, 497 P.2d 265 (1972).
Other courts have determined that merely requiring that an offender complete a sex-offender treatment program in order to receive good-time credits does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1228 (10th Cir.2004) ; Carroll v. Simmons, 89 Fed. Appx. 658, 661 (10th Cir.2004). Beauclair makes a further claim—that he would be in pain during the program. He argues that this turns the program-participation requirement into cruel and unusual punishment.
Once again, however, the only thing Beauclair loses by not participating in the sex-offender treatment program is the chance to earn future good-time credits. That is not a denial of a basic human need and does not deprive the inmate of the “ ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’ “ Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 ; see also Hanvey v. Pinto, 441 F.2d 1154, 1155 (3d Cir.1971) (finding that a prison's treatment of inmate was not cruel and unusual when the inmate was transferred to a new prison job, which afforded less of an opportunity to earn good-time credits); Smith v. Swenson, 333 F.Supp. 1258, 1259–60 (W.D.Mo.1971) (finding that denying an inmate the opportunity to earn good-time credit by placing him in maximum-security confinement for safety reasons was not cruel and unusual punishment). Beauclair has not raised a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
Because Beauclair has not raised any valid constitutional issues and has raised no other claim of shocking or intolerable conduct, the district court properly dismissed his claims.
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering Beauclair to Pay the Costs of His Action.
Beauclair also argues that the district court abused its discretion in assessing him $176 in costs. We review the district court's assessment of court costs for an abuse of discretion. See Amos v. Simmons, 32 Kan.App.2d 366, Syl. ¶ 3, 82 P.3d 859, rev. denied 277 Kan. 923 (2004). A district court abuses its discretion only when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on an error of fact or law. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013).
Two statutes provide that the district court must assess costs against an inmate when it summarily dismisses the inmate's petition for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60–1501. See K.S.A. 60–1503(a) (“If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached thereto that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief in the district court, the petition shall be dissolved at the cost of the plaintiff.”); K.S.A. 60–1505(a) (“If the plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections and the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the inmate is entitled to no relief, the writ shall be dissolved at the cost of the inmate.”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Beauclair pay the costs of his action. See Amos, 32 Kan.App.2d at 367–68 ; Requena v. Cline, No. 111,040, 2014 WL 3732022, at *6–7 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed August 25, 2014.
We affirm the district court's judgment.