Opinion
NO. 5-16-0219
11-27-2017
DONALD E. BEARD, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD, Defendant-Appellee, and THE PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, Defendant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/27/17. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph County.
No. 15-MR-144
Honorable Eugene E. Gross, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Overstreet concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for mandamus.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, Donald E. Beard, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint for mandamus relief wherein he alleged that his sentence was incorrectly calculated, resulting in a sentence in excess of that allowed by the truth-in-sentencing guidelines. We affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The plaintiff is currently an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections. In 2002, he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony. Because of the Class X status, the plaintiff's sentence included a statutory three-year mandatory supervised release (MSR) period. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2002).
¶ 5 In May of 2015, the plaintiff filed a grievance with the Administrative Review Board (ARB), asking that his sentence be recalculated. He argued that his 3-year MSR time period must be included within his 20-year sentence and that he should be released from prison to begin his MSR term after serving 85% of 17 years (14 years). He asserted that adding the MSR onto the end of his sentence violates the truth-in-sentencing law. The ARB responded stating his grievance should be submitted as a letter to the Prisoner Review Board (PRB). The plaintiff did so, but never received a response. The plaintiff then filed a petition for mandamus relief seeking recalculation of his sentence by either the ARB or PRB. While the PRB did not respond, the ARB filed a motion to dismiss the action based upon the plaintiff's failure to state a claim in that he had no clear right to have his sentence recalculated and that the ARB has no authority to calculate sentences. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's petition, finding that he had no clear right to the relief requested. The plaintiff now appeals.
¶ 6 ANALYSIS
¶ 7 On appeal, the plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint for mandamus and that the defendants should be compelled to adhere to the truth-in-sentencing law and include his MSR within his 20-year sentence. We do not agree.
¶ 8 We begin by noting our standard of review. "The grant of a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a cause of action filed pursuant to section 2-615 or a motion for an involuntary dismissal based on defects or defenses in the pleadings pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2004)) is subject to de novo review." Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433, 876 N.E.2d 659, 663 (2007) (citing White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282, 856 N.E.2d 542, 546 (2006)). "Where the dismissal was proper as a matter of law, we may affirm the circuit court's decision on any basis appearing in the record." Id. (citing MKL Pre-Press Electronics/MKL Computer Media Supplies, Inc. v. La Crosse Litho Supply, LLC, 361 Ill. App. 3d 872, 877, 840 N.E.2d 687, 691 (2005)).
¶ 9 Further, questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. Morawicz v. Hynes, 401 Ill. App. 3d 142, 148, 929 N.E.2d 544, 549 (2010). When construing a statute, a reviewing court seeks to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the best indicator of the intent of the legislature is the language of the statute. In re Marriage of Rosenbaum-Golden, 381 Ill. App. 3d 65, 72, 884 N.E.2d 1272, 1280 (2008). Where language is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as it is written, without adding any exceptions, limitations, or conditions. Id. at 72-73, 884 N.E.2d at 1280.
¶ 10 "Mandamus is an extraordinary civil remedy that will be granted to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official nondiscretionary duties by a public officer." Rodriguez, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 876 N.E.2d at 663 (citing Lee v. Findley, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1130, 1133, 835 N.E.2d 985, 987 (2005)). "A mandamus action is not an appropriate means for seeking judicial review of an administrative proceeding." Id. (citing Newsome v. Prison Review Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 776 N.E.2d 325, 327 (2002)). "Mandamus will issue only where the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden (see Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 840, 774 N.E.2d 457, 461 (2002)) to set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate that (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant to act, and (3) clear authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting mandamus relief." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 433-34, 876 N.E.2d at 663-64 (citing Baldacchino v. Thompson, 289 Ill. App. 3d 104, 109, 682 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1997)). "Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to set forth a legally recognized claim and plead facts in support of each element that bring the claim within the cause of action alleged." Id. at 434, 876 N.E.2d at 664 (citing Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369, 789 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (2003)). "To survive a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, a complaint must be both legally and factually sufficient." Id.
¶ 11 The gist of the plaintiff's argument is that to conform to the truth-in-sentencing law, his sentence should be calculated as follows: (1) 20-year sentence minus 3-year MSR term, leaving 17 years; (2) 17 years multiplied by 85% time (for Class X
sentencing), leaving 14 years of incarceration; (3) meaning, the plaintiff argues he should be serving 14 years of incarceration, followed by 3 years of MSR.
¶ 12 Section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provides that "[e]xcept where a term of natural life is imposed, every sentence shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment. *** For those sentenced on or after February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a mandatory supervised release term." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2000) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-15(c) (West 2016)). Section 3-3-3(c) of the Code provides that a convicted person "shall serve the full term of a determinate sentence less time credit for good behavior and shall then be released under the mandatory supervised release provisions of paragraph (d) of Section 5-8-1 of the Code." 730 ILCS 5/3-3-3(c) (West 2000). Section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Code provides that "a prisoner serving a sentence for *** aggravated criminal sexual assault *** shall receive no more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2000).
¶ 13 The language of the statutes above demonstrates that a felony sentence consists of a term of imprisonment and a period of MSR, which begins when the convicted person completes his or her determinate sentence and is released from the penitentiary, and that the sentence credit provides that the truth-in-sentencing law apply only to the term of imprisonment.
¶ 14 The plaintiff cites People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 723 N.E.2d 1246 (2000), as supportive of his argument. Smart, like many of the cases upon which the plaintiff relies, stands only for the proposition that MSR is part of the total sentence-a proposition
with which we do not disagree. The plaintiff in this case did not receive a total sentence of 20 years; he received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of MSR.
¶ 15 The plaintiff cites People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), as a "prime example" of his argument. In Whitfield, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea for a 25-year sentence, but was not admonished by the court regarding the 3-year MSR term he would be required to complete after his incarceration. Id. at 179-80, 840 N.E.2d at 661. Because he was not admonished correctly by the trial court and because his 3-year MSR term was mandatory, the supreme court found the appropriate remedy was to modify his term of imprisonment to 22 years with an MSR of 3 years, so that he received the benefit of the agreement of 25 years. Id. at 205, 840 N.E.2d at 675. This reduction of his term of incarceration was necessitated by the trial court's failure to admonish the defendant that he would have to serve a term of MSR-it was not because the MSR was to be included within the term of imprisonment. The plaintiff here does not allege that the court failed to admonish him as to the required MSR. Therefore, the current case and Whitfield are not analogous and the plaintiff's reliance on it is misplaced. Had Whitfield received the proper admonishment of 25 years with a 3-year MSR, he would have served a 25-year incarceration term, and then he would have been released and served an additional 3-year MSR term. It did not treat, nor does it any way indicate, MSR as part of or included within the term of imprisonment.
¶ 16 The plaintiff has the burden to show that (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant to act, and (3) clear
authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting mandamus relief. Rodriguez, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 433-34, 876 N.E.2d at 663-64 (citing Baldacchino, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 109, 682 N.E.2d at 186). In this case, as the plaintiff has not shown that he has a clear right to the recalculation of his sentence, the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition is affirmed.
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Randolph County is affirmed.
¶ 19 Affirmed.