Opinion
98-CV-0578E(Sr)
February 14, 2001
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Doris A. Corbonelli-Medina, Esq., 254 Rounds Ave., Buffalo, N.Y. 14215.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT: Ann C. Williams, Esq., Asst. Attorney General for NYS, 107 Delaware Ave., Buffalo, N.Y. 14202.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in this action January 5, 2000, claiming that the above-captioned defendants had acted to deprive him of civil rights guaranteed to him by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as those rights secured to him "by the statutes[,] codes[,] rules, regulations, [and] common law of the State of New York." Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343 and 1367. Presently before this Court is defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint except insofar as plaintiff has asserted an ADA claim. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion will be granted.
Preliminarily, the undersigned notes that, since the filing of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff has apparently acted without the benefit of counsel, despite Doris A. Carbonell-Medina, Esq., having signed the Amended Complaint. By Order dated November 13, 2000, such counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney for plaintiff was denied without prejudice on the basis that "good cause" therefor had not been shown. Nevertheless, plaintiff has continued to act as a pro se litigant, as is evidenced by the facts that the response to the instant motion was signed by the plaintiff and not his counsel and that he has requested that this Court appoint counsel for him. While such lack of representation might normally preclude consideration of a motion to dismiss, in light of the fact that the instant motion to dismiss challenges only the legal efficacy of plaintiff's Amended Complaint and such having been submitted by counsel, consideration of such motion is not prejudicial and will proceed.
The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint in accordance with the standards governing motions to dismiss under or pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"). See Cooper v. Parksky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, in ruling on a FRCvP 12(b)(6) motion, federal district courts are "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint" and must "consider documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint"). Plaintiff is of Puerto Rican descent and suffers from, inter alia, a disabling back condition. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15, Ex. J. During the 1996/1997 academic year, plaintiff was admitted to pursue a course of graduate study in the Department of Anthropology at the State University of New York at Buffalo ("SUNYAB"). Am. Compl. ¶ 11. By letter dated October 30, 1996, plaintiff wrote New York State Governor George E. Pataki "concerning [the] unprofessional conduct"of certain Department of Anthropology faculty and complained of disparate treatment. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Such allegations were allegedly investigated. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. During the next academic semester and as a result of health-related issues that arose in the Spring of 1997, plaintiff made inquiries of a number of SUNYAB faculty members as to whether he could postpone the completion of certain tests and assignments. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23. As to none of such requests, however, did plaintiff obtain satisfactory relief. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that defendants would not grant him grades of "Incomplete" in two Department of Anthropology courses, that defendants refused his request to delay taking the "Physical Anthropology Qualifying Examination," that defendants prevented him from commencing "field work" in the Summer of 1997, that defendants refused to grant him a leave of absence in 1998 and that defendants wanted plaintiff to "resign" from SUNYAB. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-82. Sometime in late May 1997, moreover, plaintiff wrote the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights complaining about what he believed was the discriminatory basis for many of the aforementioned acts, for which complaint he was allegedly threatened by defendants. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 101. Plaintiff alleges that these threats, as well as the discriminatory treatment, were motivated by impermissible considerations such as race, color, national origin and disability. Since the 1997/1998 academic year, plaintiff has not been registered as a student. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84-85.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCvP 12(b)(6) may not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). This Court must not consider whether the claim will ultimately be successful, but merely "assess the legal feasibility of the complaint." Cooper, at 440. As stated previously, this Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint, consider documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the Amended Complaint, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ibid. However, conclusory statements are not proper substitutes for minimally-sufficient factual allegations. ECC v. Toshiba America Consumer Products, Inc., 129 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1997). Further, this Court must not presume that plaintiff will be able to prove facts that are not alleged in the Amended Complaint or that are not consistent with facts alleged therein. Ibid.
Insofar as plaintiff has alleged ADA claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, such claims fail because the ADA does not provide for individual liability. Title II thereof states, in relevant part, that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As this Court has previously held, because [n]othing in the legislative history of Title II of the ADA indicates that individual liability was intended" and because "Title II applies only to `public entit[ies]' and such term was not defined to include individuals," imposition of "liability upon individuals for violations of Title II was not intended by the drafters of the ADA." Smith v. University of State of New York, No. 95-CV-0477E(H), 1997 WL 800882, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1997); see also Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp.2d 1235, 1241 (D.Colo. 1999) (ruling that "individual defendants in their individual capacities are not properly subject to suit under the . . . Disability Act"). Accordingly, all ADA claims alleged against the defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
Similarly, plaintiff's Title VI claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities fail because this act does not provide for individual liability. Title VI states, in relevant part, that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. As a plain reading of the text of Title VI indicates and as other federal courts have found, "Title VI was designed to prohibit discrimination by organizations receiving assistance." Farmer v. Ramsay, 41 F. Supp.2d 587, 592 (D.Md. 1999). The undersigned agrees that "the proper defendant in a Title VI case is an entity rather than an individual. . . ." Jackson v. Katy Indep. School Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (S.D.Tex. 1996). Accordingly, all Title VI claims alleged against the defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's section 1983 claims fail as against SUNYAB and the individual defendants in their official capacities. As was stated by this Court in this action by Memorandum and Order dated May 11, 2000, "state defendants are protected by the Eleventh Amendment from damages claims brought by private parties for alleged constitutional violations" and neither "`a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983.'" Memorandum and Order, at 3 (May 11, 2000) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Accordingly, plaintiff's section 1983 claims against SUNYAB and the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's remaining section 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities also fail because he has only implicated those rights protected by Title VI and the ADA in his Amended Complaint and plaintiff cannot use section 1983 to assert rights based solely on violations of the ADA or Title VI. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Comm. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142-143 (2d Cir. 1993). In other words, plaintiff's section 1983 claims, as pled, are not separate and distinct from his Title VI and ADA claims. Where Congress has established enforcement mechanisms containing remedial devices that are sufficiently comprehensive, as it has done with Title VI and the ADA, those enforcement mechanisms may not be bypassed by bringing suit under section 1983. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). Accordingly, plaintiff's remaining section 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claims as they relate to a $2,729.70 loan that defendants "failed" to apply to his student account must be dismissed on the ground of claim preclusion. Federal courts must grant a prior state court decision the same preclusive effect — whether by claim preclusion or its subset, issue preclusion — that the courts of that state would give to it. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998). "Simply put, the doctrine states that once a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, that judgment will bar any subsequent litigation by the same parties or those in privity with them concerning `the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose.'" Maharaj v. BankAmerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)). By Decision and Order dated August 12, 1999, Justice E. Michael Kavanaugh of the New York State Supreme Court, Albany County, dismissed with prejudice, inter alia, claims by plaintiff that SUNYAB had attempted "to collect an illegal debt" based on plaintiff's assertion that a summer loan left in [SUNYAB's] account a credit of $2,729.70." See Reply Brief Exhibits entitled "Motion to Vacate" "Complaint." In that order, Justice Kavanaugh ruled that plaintiff's allegations had already been deemed to be "without merit [in a previous state court action] to establish a defense to . . . [the] action to collect the debt" and that "plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action." Bayon v. Greiner, Index No. 1581-99, at 3 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., Albany County, Aug. 12, 1999). Inasmuch as plaintiff seeks to relitigate in the instant action his allegation that "SUNYAB has failed to account for the $2,729.70 credit," it is plain that a different judgment in this action regarding such allegation would act to "destroy or impair interests established by the first [state court action]." Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B. C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307 (1929). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims as they relate to such loan are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Internal quotation marks omitted.
Insofar as plaintiff seeks to assert causes of action based on unnamed "statutes, codes, regulations and common law of the State of New York," such fails for two reasons. Firstly and as defendants indicate, "a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when — as here — the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself." Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984); see also Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, when "SUNYAB" is sued the State of New York is the real party). Secondly and insofar as such claims are meant to be asserted against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, in light of the fact that such Amended Complaint was signed by an attorney and the fact that plaintiff has had two previous opportunities in which to amend his pleading in a way which specifies the basis for such claims, such unidentified claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with the FRCvP. "`The function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the claim asserted. Fair notice is that which will enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and identify the nature of the case so it may be assigned the proper form of trial.'" Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶¶ 8.13). Under no set of circumstances can the undersigned imagine such "claims" as being anything other than "confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible" such that their "true substance, if any, is well disguised." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). In short, such claims must be dismissed because they do not comport with FRCvP 8 and further leave to amend will not be granted. See id. (stating that "where leave to amend has previously been given and the successive pleadings remain prolix and unintelligible," a court may dismiss such claims without further leave to amend).
Finally, insofar as plaintiff seeks punitive damages for the claims that remain — viz., the ADA and Title VI claims against SUNYAB and the individual defendants acting in their official capacities —, such damage claims must be dismissed because punitive damages may not be assessed against the remaining state defendants under either act. Given the fact that both provisions are silent as to whether a plaintiff may be entitled to punitive damages thereunder, the general rule that government entities are not subject to punitive damages applies. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). Moreover, the fact that the 1991 Civil Rights Act explicitly amended Title I of the ADA (which guarantees equal employment opportunities), 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117, by providing for the award of punitive damages counsels against any inference that punitive damages are available under Title II of the ADA without such statutory authorization. Such an inference would be "inappropriate" within the meaning of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), wherein was reiterated the longstanding rule that courts "presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise." Id. at 66 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (allowing a complaining party under Title I of the ADA to recover punitive damages).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's section 1983 claims are dismissed in their entirety, that plaintiff's ADA and Title VI claims are dismissed as against all defendants except SUNYAB and the individual defendants acting in their official capacities, that plaintiff's claims as they relates to a "$2,729.70 loan" are dismissed, that plaintiff's claims are dismissed insofar as they assert causes of action based on unspecified New York law, that plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is dismissed, that — in the interest of eliminating undue complication without affecting the substantial rights of the parties — this Court substitutes SUNYAB as the defendant in this action in place and stead of all defendants named in their official capacities — FRCvP 21 ("[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just") — and that the caption of this case shall be changed to read
"CARLOS BAYON, Plaintiff, vs. THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO, Defendant."