Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County No. BS102646, Dzintra Janavs, Judge.
Lackie & Dammeier, Dieter C. Dammeier and Michael A. McGill for Plaintiff and Appellant Emir Bautista.
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Paul B. Beach and Cheryl W. Hsu, for Defendants and Respondents County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Lee Baca.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Emir Bautista purportedly appeals from a “judgment” entered after the trial court denied the portion of his complaint seeking a writ of administrative mandamus. However, Bautista’s complaint contained two causes of action: The first cause of action petitioned for a writ of administrative mandamus; the second alleged a violation of his civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The trial court severed the second cause of action, tried the petition for writ of administrative mandamus and entered “a judgment” in favor of Bautista. The second cause of action has never been decided and remains pending. As a result, there is no appealable order over which this court has jurisdiction. (See Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743 [under “one final judgment rule” “an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining”]; see also Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697 (Griset) [“‘the denial of a petition for writ of mandate is not appealable if other causes of action remain pending between the parties’”].)
Citing Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th 688, Bautista asserts the judgment is appealable because the trial court effectively resolved all the issues between the parties when it found no First Amendment violation, the alleged constitutional violation underlying both the petition for writ of administrative mandamus and the civil rights claim. In asserting the judgment is appealable notwithstanding the “one final judgment” rule, however, Bautista misapprehends Griset. In Griset the Supreme Court stated that, when the trial court disposes of all causes of action framed by the pleadings, leaving no substantive issue for future determination, but fails to formally enter its rulings as a judgment, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to modify the trial court’s order in order to convert it to a properly appealable judgment and treat the notice of appeal as a premature but valid appeal from a proper judgment. (Id. at p. 700.) The order itself is not appealable absent the appellate court’s modification of the trial court’s order. (Ibid.) Bautista has not asked this court to modify the trial court’s order, nor, as a general rule, do we do so for the purpose of entertaining appeals from nonappealable orders. (See, e.g., Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 743; Harrington-Wisely v. State of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1495; Munoz v. Florentine Gardens (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1730, 1732.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: ZELON, J., WILEY, J
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.