Opinion
CIVIL 1:23-CV-322
10-02-2023
WARNER ERVIN BATTY, JR., Petitioner, v. BOBBI JO SALAMON, et al., Respondents.
Rambo Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
In 1975, Warren Batty Jr. committed a hideous crime, raping, sexually assaulting, and murdering Betty Bradford, a 26-year-old mother. Batty was a youth at the time of this murderous sex crime, as he was 15 years of age. Initially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Batty obtained a re-sentencing in 2017 following United States Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which rendered life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders unconstitutional and setting aside mandatory life sentences for juvenile killers like Batty. In 2017 Batty was resentenced to a term of 50 years to life imprisonment.
Pending before the court is Batty's petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1975, when he was 15 years old, Batty entered a guilty plea to criminal homicide generally. A degree of guilt hearing was held before a three-judge panel in April of 1976. The panel found Batty guilty of first-and second-degree murder. Batty was sentenced to life imprisonment on July 9, 1976.
Batty now asserts that his resentencing was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller and Montgomery. Additionally, Batty argues that his sentence of 50 years to life is not authorized under a codified statute and that the Pennsylvania General Assembly failed to write a valid sentencing statute. After consideration, we conclude that Batty's claims are without merit. Accordingly, it is recommended that this petition be denied.
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The factual background of the instant case was aptly summarized by the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, in its decision affirming the constitutionality of Batty's resentencing:
The basic facts of the crime are as follows: Betty Bradford, the victim in this case, was walking home from the store when the Defendant and his codefendant took her off the street into an unheated and abandoned building in the winter. They raped her, and the Defendant invited more friends to come back to the building and rape her as well. The Defendant and codefendant then beat Ms. Bradford, suffocated her, and then put a mattress over her and set it on fire. She died as a result.(Doc. 1-1, at 49-50). At the time of this heinous murder, the victim's oldest child was seven years old, and her youngest child was only a newborn. (Doc. 9-1, at 13). Following the murder, one of the children was cared for by the grandmother and the other children were adopted. (Id., at 14). Since the day these children's mother was brutally murdered, they have only spent a few hours together. (Id.)
Batty was arrested by the York City Police Department on February 6, 1975. (Doc. 1-1, at 78). Batty, who was 15 years old at the time, was charged with first, second, and third-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. (Id.) Batty pled guilty to criminal homicide. (Id.) A degree of guilt hearing was held before a three-judge panel in April 1976, and the panel found Batty guilty of first and second-degree murder. (Id., at 78-79). Batty was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Id. at 79). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. (Id.)
Batty filed several post-conviction petitions with York County Court of Common Pleas between 1985 and 2010. (Doc. 1-1 at 5). Specifically, on June 8, 2010, Batty filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition claiming his life without parole sentence was unconstitutional. (Id.) In August of 2012, Batty amended his petition following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama. (Id. at 6). In September 2012, Batty's post-conviction petition was denied. Batty appealed to the Superior Court and the Superior Court affirmed the denial and then Betty petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for an allowance of appeal, which was also denied. (Id.)
Prior to this, in 2004 Batty filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was found to be untimely filed. (Doc. 1-1 at 5). Eventually in 2013 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals permitted the filing of a successive habeas corpus petition. (Id. at 7). In 2016, Judge Sylvia H. Rambo granted Batty's request for habeas relief and ordered that Batty's case be remanded to the court of common pleas for resentencing in accordance with Miller and Montgomery. (Id. at 30).
The York County Court of Common Pleas resentenced Batty to 50 years to life imprisonment, with credit for time served on June 6, 2017. Shortly after this, Batty filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 1-1 at 80). On August 14, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed Batty's sentence. (Id. at 78-85). On June 2, 2022, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Batty's petition for allowance of appeal. (Id. at 87). Following the conclusion of his state court appeals, on February 23, 2023, Batty filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1).
Batty's petition raises several grounds for habeas relief. First, he asserts that his sentence is unconstitutional. Second, Batty claims that his sentence is illegal because Pennsylvania did not enact a valid sentencing statute and that his sentence is not authorized under a codified statute. Third, he asserts that he is suffering illegal imprisonment.
For their part, the respondents contend that Batty's sentence of 50 years to life imprisonment is constitutional under Pennsylvania and Federal law. After review of the petition and the underlying state court record, we conclude that Batty's claims are without merit. Accordingly, we recommend that that Batty's petition be denied.
III. Discussion
A. State Prisoner Habeas Relief-The Legal Standard.
(1) Substantive Standards
In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b).
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
(2) Deference Owed to State Courts
These same principles which inform the standard of review in habeas petitions and limit habeas relief to errors of a constitutional dimension also call upon federal courts to give an appropriate degree of deference to the factual findings and legal rulings made by the state courts during state criminal proceedings. There are two critical components to this deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
First, with respect to legal rulings by state courts, under § 2254(d), habeas relief is not available to a petitioner for any claim that has been adjudicated on its merits in the state courts unless it can be shown that the decision was either: (1) “contrary to” or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established case law; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) was “based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Applying this deferential standard of review, federal courts frequently decline invitations by habeas petitioners to substitute their legal judgments for the considered views of the state trial and appellate courts. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); see also Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2006); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2002).
In addition, § 2254(e) provides that the determination of a factual issue by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding was erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption in favor of the correctness of state court factual findings has been extended to a host of factual findings made during criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1990). This principle applies to state court factual findings made both by the trial court and state appellate courts. Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, we may not re-assess credibility determinations made by the state courts, and we must give equal deference to both the explicit and implicit factual findings made by the state courts. Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, in a case such as this, where a state court judgment rests upon factual findings, it is well settled that:
A state court decision based on a factual determination, ..., will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). We must presume that the state court's determination of factual issues was correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir.2000).Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2003). Applying this standard of review, federal courts may only grant habeas relief whenever “[o]ur reading of the PCRA court records convinces us that the Superior Court made an unreasonable finding of fact.” Rolan, 445 F.3d at 681.
B. This Petition Should Be Denied.
First, Batty argues that his sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). We disagree. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a juvenile, i.e., a person under the age of 18, to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 489. This rule was made retroactive on collateral review four years later in Montgomery v. Louisiana.
Following Miller, the Pennsylvania legislature's revised penalty statute only applied to individuals convicted after June 24, 2012. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102.1(a). Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”) set forth the resentencing regime for defendants like Batty who were convicted of murder as juveniles prior to 2012. The Batts II court recognized the dilemma with respect to pre- and post-Miller juvenile offenders and subsequently held that Miller did not preclude the imposition of a maximum term of life imprisonment for a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder so long as it was accompanied by a minimum sentence. Batts II, 163 A.3d at 420-21. Accordingly, Batts II set forth a sentencing scheme for those juveniles convicted of first-degree murder prior to June 24, 2012, directing that courts be guided by § 1102.1(a) when resentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior to 2012:
This aligns with the current expression of legislative intent for the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Section 1102.1(a) requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Subsection (e) makes clear that this is only the minimum sentence required, stating, “Nothing under this section shall prevent the sentencing court from imposing a minimum sentence greater than that provided in this section.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(e). In determining the minimum sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller, a sentencing court is to exercise its discretion to find the appropriate, individualized sentence in each case, just as it would when fashioning the minimum sentence for any other defendant before it.Batts II, 163 A.3d at 456.
On this score, we conclude that Batty's Miller-based unconstitutional sentence argument is meritless. The Court's narrow holding in “Miller did not foreclose a sentencer's ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195. It simply forbade mandatory life sentences for juveniles and called for consideration of the offender's youth when exercising sentencing discretion. Id. Cases construing the Court's decision in Miller, confirm that that the 50 years-to-life sentence imposed upon Batty is lawful and proper. Following the seminal decision in Miller, numerous courts have had occasion to examine whether the re-sentencing of juvenile offenders to serve a minimum sentence of a term of years under an indeterminate sentencing system violates the Constitution. Those courts have consistently held that such sentences are consistent with Miller and do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, provided that the length of these sentences are not tantamount to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See e.g., McCain v. Frakes, No. 8:18-CV-190, 2019 WL 2086001, at *3 (D. Neb. May 13, 2019); Jensen v. Young, No. 4:18-CV-04041-RAL, 2019 WL 653062, at *8 (D.S.D. Feb. 15, 2019); Garza v. Frakes, No. 8:17-CV-474, 2018 WL 1710183, at *4 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 2018).
Batty's next claims deal with matters of state law. Specifically, Batty argues that his sentence of 50 years to life is not authorized under a codified statute, and that the Pennsylvania General Assembly failed to write a valid sentencing statute.
At the outset, we note that state court determinations regarding substantive state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review. “[A] state inmate who has received a sentence within the limits prescribed by state law cannot state a claim for federal habeas relief unless that sentence itself violates federal law.” Hollway v. Bush, 2019 WL 2323821, at *13 (M.D. Pa. April 10, 2019) report and recommendation adopted 2019 WL 2296527 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2019) (citations omitted). Indeed, it is well settled that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Accordingly, to the extent Batty is challenging the length of his sentence of 50 years to life under Pennsylvania law, we conclude that this claim is not cognizable on habeas review.
Further, the Superior Court addressed Batty's claims in its decision affirming his conviction and sentence in 2018, holding that the sentencing court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to resentence Batty:
[A]ppellant contends that in light of the High Court's decisions in Miller and Montgomery, Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme for juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder pre-Miller is still illegal, and that Pennsylvania lacks a statute authorizing the imposition of a sentence of 50 years to life imprisonment to a juvenile
convicted of first-degree murder pre-Miller. This, issue has been addressed in great detail both by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A. 3d 410 (Pa. 2017), and by this court in Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A. 3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018). Specifically, our supreme court held as follows:
For those defendants for whom the sentencing court determines a[ LWOP] sentence is inappropriate, it is our determination here that they are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing[.]
Id. at 429, quoting Batts, 163 A. 3d at 421.(Doc. 1-1 at 81-82).
Accordingly, to the extent Batty urges us to revisit this decision of substantive state law by the Superior Court, we will decline such an invitation. Moreover, to the extent Batty asserts that his sentence is violative of federal law and Due Process, we note that following Miller, numerous courts have had occasion to examine whether the resentencing of juvenile offenders to serve a minimum sentence of a term of years under an indeterminate sentencing system violates the Constitution. Those courts have consistently held that such sentences are wholly in accord with Miller and do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, provided that the length of these sentences are not tantamount to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See e.g., Sourbeer v. Ferguson, 2022 WL 2346967, at *6-7 (May 25, 2022) (“[A]ny challenge to the Pennsylvania courts' reliance upon Batts II in the absence of a “statutory provision” does not raise an issue of federal law which can be addressed in a habeas corpus petition.”); Brome v. Ransom, 2021 WL 7451155, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2021) (“This subclaim asserts that Pennsylvania does not have a sentencing statute for pre-Miller juvenile defendants, and the sentencing court consequently had no authority to sentence Mr. Brome. Mr. Brome's argument is wholly meritless.”); Gonzalez v. District Attorney of Berks Cnty., 2020 WL 8835431, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2020); McCain v. Frakes, No. 8:18-CV-190, 2019 WL 2086001, at *3 (D. Neb. May 13, 2019); Jensen v. Young, No. 4:18-CV-04041-RAL, 2019 WL 653062, at *8 (D.S.D. Feb. 15, 2019); Garza v. Frakes, No. 8:17-CV-474, 2018 WL 1710183, at *4 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 2018).
Batty simply states his last claim for habeas relief as the following: “petitioner suffering illegal imprisonment.” (Doc. 1 at 10). We agree with the respondent's assertion that this claim fails because it does not allege a different ground for relief than the other claims raised. (Doc. 9 at 20). Accordingly, we conclude that these claims do not afford Batty federal habeas relief.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this petition for writ of habeas corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.