Opinion
No. CV 05-4006037 S
July 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO DISMISS #113
On January 4, 2005, the plaintiff, Charles E. Batts, who appears pro se and is presently incarcerated at the Garner Correctional Facility, commenced a two-count action against the following three defendants; the Corrigan Correctional Facility (facility); Arlene Doe, a nurse at the facility; and Theresa Lantz, the commissioner of the department of correction. In the first paragraph of the complaint, the plaintiff indicates that he is bringing claims against the defendants for injuries to his character which occurred as a result of the defendants falsifying evidence that caused him to be arrested, misleading state officials and state and federal agencies by fabricating evidence, sending misleading information by electronic means to other facilities or agencies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation by libel and slander and reporting false charges in violation of General Statutes § 7-465.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a "motion for compulsory joinder" in which he sought to properly identify Arlene Doe as Arlene Raymond. The court, Rodriquez, J., denied the motion.
In the first count, the plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at the facility in 2003, Doe knowingly, intentionally and maliciously made false statements to other personnel regarding his criminal history, his conduct and behavior while incarcerated and his mental status, and that she fabricated documents regarding these matters. He alleges that she engaged in this conduct with the intent of misleading others into thinking that the facility could not meet the plaintiff's needs and that he is a sexual predator and a serial rapist. He further alleges that the defendants disseminated this false information to other state and federal agencies in violation of state and federal electronic and wire communications regulations and that they conspired to falsely imprison him in a psychiatric ward. According to the plaintiff, the defendants' conduct defamed him, injured his reputation, caused him to be arrested, restrained, falsely imprisoned and placed in administrative detention, and caused him to suffer emotional distress.
For example, the plaintiff alleges that Doe falsely informed other officials that he has a history of predatory behavior and sexually assaulting other inmates and that he had approached other inmates for sex.
In the second count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' conduct was wilful, reckless and malicious, and that they are liable to him as a matter of law in that their conduct caused him to be restrained and removed from the general population and constituted a breach of contract, and that their conduct was intended to and did injure his reputation and character and damaged his emotional state, his prison record and his family name.
The plaintiff seeks the following relief: compensatory damages for the mental, emotional and physical injuries he has suffered as a result of the defendants' actions; exemplary damages for Doe's wilful, intentional and malicious actions, injunctive relief in the form of a statement from Doe recanting her false statements regarding the plaintiff and an order prohibiting the defendants from referring to the statements and requiring them to remove certain materials from his prison records.
On February 24, 2005, the plaintiff filed a document entitled "Take Notice of Jurisdiction Statement." In this document, the plaintiff states that he is bringing the present action under article 1, sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Connecticut constitution. He also alleges that the court has jurisdiction over this action in that it pertains to state constitutional and tort law claims for violations of his civil rights by an employee acting unlawfully in a state facility. He states that his claims for money damages are authorized by article 1, section 10 of the constitution and his request for injunctive relief is authorized by General Statutes §§ 7-465, 52-471, 52-473, 52-474, 52-475, 52-476 and 52-477.
Article I of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part:
Sec. 7. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person shall . . . issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation . . .
Sec. 9. No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law.
Sec. 10. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
General Statutes § 7-465 pertains to the liability of municipalities, i.e., cities and towns, for the conduct of municipal employees.
General Statutes § 52-471 et seq. pertain to actions for injunctive relief.
On March 16, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the entire action on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in that the action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity. According to the defendants, the plaintiff is suing them in their official capacities and has failed to establish that they acted in excess of their statutory authority. In addition, the defendants argue that to the extent that the plaintiff's claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, they are barred by the statutory immunity provided by § 4-165 in that he fails to allege that the defendants engaged in conduct that went beyond the scope of their authority or was wanton, reckless or malicious. On March 28, 2005, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in which he objects to the motion to dismiss on the grounds that in § 4-165, the legislature waived the defense of sovereign immunity for actions against state employees when their conduct is reckless, wilful and malicious, his claims are based on such conduct, Doe and Lantz can be held liable to him in their personal capacities, he has private claims against the defendants for violating his constitutional rights, and the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action under article 1, § 10 of the Connecticut constitution and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The same is true for the doctrine of statutory immunity. Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002).
"When a court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . [A] court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
As a preliminary matter, it is noted that it is difficult to ascertain whether the plaintiff is suing the individual defendants in their official or personal capacities. The matter is further complicated because the plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Because the court is required to construe the allegations in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff in deciding a motion to dismiss, the court will examine the allegations to determine whether they are sufficient to establish that the court has jurisdiction over the action against the individual defendants in either their official or their individual capacities and whether either category of relief is available to him. Because the facility is an entity, it can only act in an official capacity, thus the official capacity analysis will also apply to the plaintiff's claims against the facility.
"The determination of whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged claims against the defendants in their individual capacities is governed by the test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). In Spring . . . [t]he court agreed with the attorney general that `[t]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent . . . The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding.' . . . Id. The court then set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is `in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without is consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns, some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.' . . . Id." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
I Official Capacity
Our Supreme Court has "long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . [The court has] also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state. . . . While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has nevertheless been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler but rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws . . .
"[Accordingly], [the court has] held that a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313-14, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Pursuant to this standard, in order for the plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against the defendants in their official capacity to withstand the doctrine of sovereign immunity, he must show that his claims are brought pursuant to a statute in which the legislature has waived sovereign immunity. Here, the plaintiff appears to contend that his claims for monetary relief are viable in they are based on conduct by the defendants that was (1) in excess of their statutory authority, and (2) in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights.
The plaintiff also refers to General Statutes § 7-465. As previously noted, however, § 7-465 applies to claims against municipal employees, and not to claims against state employees.
As to the first argument, in Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 315, the Supreme Court clearly decided that the exception for conduct by state officials acting in excess of their statutory authority only applies to claims in which a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, and not to claims in which a plaintiff seeks monetary damages. As to the second argument, in Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 422, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989), the court decided that constitutional claims against the state do not "abrogate the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity."
The plaintiff has not pointed to a statute in which the legislature has waived sovereign immunity for claims for monetary relief such as those that he alleges in his complaint, nor is the court aware of any such statute. In the absence of another statute that expressly waives sovereign immunity, a plaintiff seeking to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first bring a claim to the claims commissioner. "When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim. See General Statutes §§ 4-141 through 4-165b." Id., 421. As the Supreme Court explained, "[t]his legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, "[w]hen a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state [that is not authorized by another statute], he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." (Emphasis added.) Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003).
It is noted that in General Statutes § 4-165b, the legislature expressly waived sovereign immunity for claims by "[a]ny inmate of any institution of the Department of Correction . . . who suffers an injury which results in a fatality or in a permanent handicap . . ." "There is [however] no comparable waiver for claims of emotional distress or for physical injury which results in non-disabling harm." Torres v. Butler, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X07 CV 02 0079052 (February 3, 2003, Sferrazza, J.). Moreover, § 4-165b also provides that "[s]uch claim shall be heard and decided in accordance with the provisions of this chapter"; which includes the provisions regarding the authority of the claims commissioner.
In the present case, neither party presented any evidence that the plaintiff received permission from the office of the claims commissioner to bring his claims for monetary damages against the defendants. Although the defendants did not expressly raise this issue in their motion to dismiss, the court is required to consider the issue in that "subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Commission, 264 Conn. 812, 822-23, 826 A.2d 1077 (2003). Until the claims commissioner waives the state's sovereign immunity and gives the plaintiff permission to bring his claims for monetary damages, "the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars those claims"; Prigge v. Ragaglia, supra, 265 Conn. 349; and "the Superior Court has no jurisdiction to hear any such monetary claim." Krozser v. New Haven, supra, 212 Conn. 423. See also Schub v. Department of Social Services, 86 Conn.App. 748, 751, 862 A.2d 382, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 920, 871 A.2d 1029 (2005) (trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to dismiss action for money damages against state in that plaintiff did not have permission from claims commissioner to bring action and did not plead valid exception to sovereign immunity).
Moreover, General Statutes § 4-160(c) provides that "[i]n each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section . . . the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted." Our Supreme Court has stated that pursuant to this statute "in an action authorized by the . . . claims commissioner, the claimant must allege when authorization to sue was granted . . . because that date triggers the time frame within which the action must be brought." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 265, 272, 684 A.2d 696 (1996). Relying on this language, judges of the Superior Court have granted motions to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in cases in which "the record does not reflect that the plaintiff exhausted this administrative remedy by obtaining and pleading such authorization to sue . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. UConn Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 04 0832437 (November 10, 2004, Booth, J.); see also cases cited therein. Thus even if the plaintiff has obtained authorization from the claims commissioner to bring his monetary claims against the defendants, his failure to plead that he has done so is sufficient ground for the court to dismiss those claims.
As to the plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that show that their conduct qualifies for the exception that applies to conduct that exceeded the actor's statutory authority or was undertaken pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. In Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 327, the court decided that the scope of this exception is broad and that it includes essentially "any conduct that was unauthorized." Therefore, the court concluded, "when a process of statutory interpretation establishes that the state officials acted beyond their authority, sovereign immunity does not bar an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief." Id.
In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants filed false reports regarding his criminal history, communicated false information that he had engaged in unlawful conduct while incarcerated and violated federal and state laws regarding wire communications and the transmission of false information by electronic means. The plaintiff also appears to allege that the defendants' conduct caused him to be held in administrative detention and transferred from Corrigan to the mental health facility at Garner.
In his notice regarding jurisdiction and his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff also alleges that the defendant's conduct violated his state and federal constitutional rights and several other statutes. In Miller v. Egan, the court addressed a similar situation in which a plaintiff asserted that his complaint contained particular allegations that the court did not find in the pleading. The court noted that "the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited by the allegations of [his] complaint . . . We do not countenance a variance [from the allegations of a complaint] which alters the basic nature of a complainant's cause of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 309. Moreover, the plaintiff had the option of filing a request to amend the complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60, but did not do so. Therefore, the court is limited to considering the allegations in the complaint.
General Statutes § 53a-180c(a) provides: "A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (1) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (2) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (3) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein." If, as the plaintiff alleges, the defendants filed false reports that he had engaged in unlawful conduct, they have violated this statute, and, have, by implication, acted beyond their authority. Therefore, the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a claim for injunctive relief against the defendants. A trial court properly denies a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's allegations "if proven, would be sufficient to establish that the defendants acted in excess of the authority vested in them . . ." Cox v. Aiken, 86 Conn.App. 587, 594, 862 A.2d 319 (2004), cert. granted, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 370 (2005).
Given this determination, it is not necessary for the court to consider the plaintiff's other allegations regarding the defendants' conduct in this portion of the decision.
II Personal Capacity
General Statutes § 4-165 provides in relevant part: "no state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter . . ." As interpreted by our Supreme Court, pursuant to this statute, "[s]tate employees do not . . . have statutory immunity for wanton, reckless or malicious actions, or for actions not performed within the scope of their employment. For those actions, they may be held personally liable, and a plaintiff who has been injured by such actions is free to bring an action against the individual employee." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 319. In the context of a motion to dismiss, the issue is whether the plaintiff "has alleged sufficient facts . . . with respect to personal immunity under § 4-165, to support a conclusion that the defendant[s] [were] acting outside the scope of [their] employment or wilfully or maliciously." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 376.
The defendants move to dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiff does not allege conduct by the individual defendants that was either outside the scope of their employment or sufficiently egregious to amount to wilful or malicious behavior. "In order to determine if a state actor's conduct is caused in discharge of his or her duties . . . it is necessary to examine the nature of the alleged conduct and its relationship to the duties incidental to the employment." Id., 377. In discussing this issue, the Supreme Court has explained that even when the actor engages in conduct that is within his authority, his actions may be beyond the scope of employment if the purpose of the conduct is wrongful. Id. For example, the court has found that allegations that the defendant has misused governmental authority for personal gain or manipulated governmental authority to justify erroneous conduct are sufficient to allege conduct that is `beyond the ambit of the employment context and, accordingly, not protected by sovereign immunity." Id., 378.
Here, the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant disseminated false information pertaining to his history and conduct for the purpose of changing his status within the facility or to cause him to be transferred to another facility sufficiently allege that they were motivated by interests other than those of her employer.
In the portion of their memorandum regarding statutory immunity, the defendants inexplicably state that "the plaintiff alleges that he fell into a hole during construction." An allegation of this nature is not contained in the plaintiff's complaint.
In addition, these allegations are sufficient to meet the exception for conduct that is "wanton, reckless or malicious." In discussing this exception, the Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n order to establish that the defendants' conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts. . . . [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . Indeed, in some instances, the mere fact that an official has acted in excess of his or her authority may suffice to prove that the conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 379.
Clearly, if corrections department employees disseminated the type of false information about an inmate that the plaintiff alleges the defendants disseminated about him, the employees have engaged in conduct that meets this test. See Torres v. Butler, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X07 CV 02 0079052 (February 7, 2003, Sferrazza, J.) (plaintiff's allegations that correction officers broadcasted the "pedophilic nature" of his crimes to other inmates to provoke assault on plaintiff were sufficient to allege wanton or malicious activity), and Torres v. Armstrong, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0427057 (September 6, 2001, Thompson, J.) (plaintiff's allegations that correction officers harassed him, filed false grievances and ignored his grievances were sufficient to allege that officers acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously). Therefore, the defendant's conduct is not shielded by the immunity provided for in § 4-165.
CONCLUSION
Consequently, the motion to dismiss is granted as to the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion is denied as to the plaintiff's remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities or his claims for monetary damages against Doe and Lantz in their individual capacities.
Thompson, J.