Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-0607, Section "N" (2).
March 31, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the "FRCP Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order," filed by Plaintiffs on March 9, 2005. (Rec. Doc. No. 35). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 2, 2004, Calvin Baptiste, Sr., Renee D. Del Valle, Wanda F. McCoy and Anthony Stewart (collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), all former employees of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office, filed a complaint with this Court, alleging various constitutional claims. Named as defendants were James Edward Layrisson, Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish ("Layrisson"); Tim Gideon, Chief of Police of the City of Ponchatoula, Louisiana ("Gideon"); and Tommy Cutrer, Chief of Police of the Town of Roseland, Louisiana ("Cutrer"). In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that each was ultimately terminated from their respective positions due to their views and/or positions for the election being held for the Tangipahoa Parish's Sheriff's Office. Plaintiffs allege (1) that Defendants violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech; (2) that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiffs' consitutional rights by depriving Plaintiffs of their employment; (3) that Defendants are liable for punitive damages because Defendants acted with malice and/or reckless indifference to Plaitiff's federally protected rights; and (4) that Plaintiffs were defamed by Defendant Layrisson's publication of a letter in the Hammond Daily Star.
By Order dated November 22, 2004, Defendants Gideon and Cutrer were dismissed with prejudice. (Rec. Doc. No. 16).
On February 18, 2005, the Court signed an order substituting Daniel Edwards in his official capacity as Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, in place of Defendant Layrisson (Rec. Doc. No. 25). According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Layrisson thereafter asserted that the February 18, 2005 order of substitution had the effect of dismissing all claims against him. Based on that assertion, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, in which they request that the Court enter an order clarifying that the substitution of Daniel Edwards does not terminate the litigation against Layrisson in his individual capacity.
During the pendency of this suit, Daniel Edwards was sworn into office as the new Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, succeeding Sheriff Layrisson in that public office.
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
On March 18, 2005, the Court conducted a telephone conference to address the Motion to Continue files by Defendant Edwards. At the same time, the Court also briefly discussed the pending Rule 60 motion, and advised the parties that the dispositive issue to be decided by the Court was whether Plaintiffs were barred from pursuing an individual capacity cause of action against Defendant Layrisson where their complaint did not specify the capacity in which Layrisson was sued, but where qualified immunity was raised in both the complaint and the answer. On this narrow issue, the Court ordered the parties to supplement their original memoranda in support of or in opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 60 motion.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit has established that a parties' capacity "need not be pled except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court." Parker v. Graves, 479 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(a)). In Parker, the Court held that "the allegations in the complaint must be examined in order to determine the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action," and that the failure to allege capacity was "merely a formal error and not a fatal defect." Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit looks to the substance of the claim, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a suit has been brought against a state official in his "official" or "individual" capacity. See Forside v. Mississippi State Univ., 2002 WL 31992181, n. 2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2002).
In examining the substance of the claim, the relief sought and the course of proceedings, courts following this approach have identified several factors indicating that suit has been filed against a defendant in his individual capacity. One such factor may be the plaintiff's failure to allege that the defendant acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom, or the lack of indicia of such a policy or custom on the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding a personal capacity claim where "the unconstitutional conduct alleged involves [the defendant's] individual actions and nowhere alludes to an official policy or custom that would shield him from individual culpability"). Another indication that suit has been brought against a state actor personally may be a plaintiff's request for compensatory or punitive damages, since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits. See, e.g., Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1988); Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993). The nature of the defenses raised in response to the complaint is an additional relevant factor. Because qualified immunity is available only in a personal capacity suit, Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105-06, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), the assertion of that defense indicates that the defendant interpreted the plaintiff's action as being against him personally. See Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 394 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856, 109 S.Ct. 147, 102 L.Ed.2d 118 (1988); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 604 (11th Cir. 1987). As demonstrated by these factors and others, the underlying inquiry throughout remains whether the plaintiff's intention to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly.
Applying the above analysis to the instant matter, the Court first examines the substance of Plaintiffs' complaint. Contrary to Defendant Layrisson's contention that Plaintiffs repeatedly frame his acts as having been done in an official capacity, the Court finds that the allegations made therein are directed to Layrisson's actions toward the individual plaintiffs and do not necessarily implicate an official policy or custom. See generally Complaint (Rec. Doc. No. 1). See also Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 ("[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right"). In addition, the reference in Plaintiffs' Complaint to qualified immunity indicates an intention on the part of plaintiffs to hold the defendant liable in his individual capacity. Complaint, ¶¶ 56-59. As to the relief requested, Plaintiffs seek reinstatement, general damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. See Complaint, ¶ 59 and Prayer for Relief. In comparison to the demand for reinstatement, which can only be available from Layrisson in his official capacity as Sheriff, Plaintiffs' demand for general and punitive damages indicates that the suit is brought against Layrisson in his individual capacity.
Examining the course of proceedings, Defendant Layrisson asserted, among other defenses, that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Answer of James Edward Layrisson (Rec. Doc. No. 10). This suggests that Layrisson perceived the complaint against him as an individual, since qualified immunity is unavailable in official capacity suits. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104. In addition, on January 11, 2005, Defendant Layrisson filed a Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply, wherein he moved the Court to order Plaintiffs to file a detailed Schultea reply as to specific matters set forth in his memorandum. (Rec. Doc. No. 17). While defendants sued in their official capacities do not get the added protection of heightened pleading standards, Anderson v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 184 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 1999), a § 1983 claim filed against a public official in his individual capacity must be pled with particularity. Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985). Further, as correctly stated by Defendant Layrisson in his memorandum in support of his Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply, "heightened pleading requires allegations of fact focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiff's injury." See Mem., p. 3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, it would have been an illogical and futile exercise for the Defendant to seek a Schultea reply if he perceived the claims as against him in only his official capacity.
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995).
Additionally, on January 24, 2005, the Defendant filed his witness list as "EDWARD LAYRISSON individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office." (Rec. Doc. No. 18). While that pleading is further indication that Defendant Layrisson was on notice that suit was brought against him in both his official and individual capacities, the Court does not give that pleading strong weight as, just weeks later, on February 11, 2005, the Defendant filed a Motion to Extend Deadline Date for Admissibility of Depositions for Trial and Discovery as "Sheriff J. Edward Layrisson, in his official capacity." (Rec. Doc. No. 23).
Nevertheless, the assertion of qualified immunity provides some indication that Defendant Layrisson is not prejudiced by the Court's treating Plaintiffs' Complaint as one brought against the defendant in his personal capacity. Overall, the relevant factors in this case clearly demonstrate that Plaintiffs intended to sue the defendants as individuals.
Because plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against Layrisson in both his official and individual capacities, the Court concludes that this finding renders moot Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from the February 18, 2005 Order of Substitution, as the February 18, 2005 order effected only a substitution of parties defendant as Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish. Contrary to the Defendant's assertions, the February 18, 2005 Order did not result in a dismissal of all claims against Layrisson.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:1. The "FRCP Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order," filed by Plaintiffs is DENIED AS MOOT; and
2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to delete from the record any notation that prosecution of the claim against defendant James Edward Layrisson has been "terminated."