Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-cv-4074-AT
2022-03-07
Brenda BATES, as Representative of the Estate of Jimmy Atchison, and on behalf of his minor children; and Lakeisha James, Plaintiffs, v. Sung KIM; Kelly Lambert; Mark Gardner; Christian Malstrom; Scott Priestly ; Matthew Winn; and Officers John Doe # 1–5, Defendants.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS BRENDA BATES, LAKEISHA JAMES: Tanya F. Miller, DuBose Miller, LLC, Atlanta, GA. ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SUNG KIM: Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Donald Franklin Samuel, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C., Atlanta, GA. ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS KELLY LAMBERT, MATTHEW WINN : Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Taylor Wayne Hensel, Timothy J. Buckley, III, Buckley Christopher, P.C., Atlanta, GA. ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS MARK GARDNER, CHRISTIAN MALSTROM, SCOTT PRIESTLY: Ken Davis, Lawrence J. LoRusso, LoRusso Law Firm P.C., Atlanta, GA, Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS BRENDA BATES, LAKEISHA JAMES: Tanya F. Miller, DuBose Miller, LLC, Atlanta, GA.
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SUNG KIM: Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Donald Franklin Samuel, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C., Atlanta, GA.
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS KELLY LAMBERT, MATTHEW WINN : Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Taylor Wayne Hensel, Timothy J. Buckley, III, Buckley Christopher, P.C., Atlanta, GA.
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS MARK GARDNER, CHRISTIAN MALSTROM, SCOTT PRIESTLY: Ken Davis, Lawrence J. LoRusso, LoRusso Law Firm P.C., Atlanta, GA, Darcy F. Coty, Office of the United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA.
ORDER
AMY TOTENBERG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. Introduction
This Order addresses a case where law enforcement's attempted execution of a federal arrest warrant turned into a raid resulting in the death of Jimmy Atchison, a resident of Atlanta. The raid entailed a joint effort by a joint task force of federal agents and cross-deputized Atlanta Police Department ("APD") officers. The warrant was executed not at Atchison's own home but at an apartment rented by the mother of his child. In the process of apprehending Atchison, one of the officers involved in the raid fatally shot Atchison in the face. Following this incident, the representative of Atchison's estate, Brenda Bates, and the mother of Atchison's child, Lakeisha James, jointly filed suit against the City of Atlanta and a number of the officers involved in the raid. The City of Atlanta moved to dismiss shortly after Bates and James filed their lawsuit. The City's motion involved just a single claim in Plaintiffs’ 10-claim Complaint — the claim that the City was liable for the officers’ conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In its motion, the City argued that Plaintiffs could not proceed with a Section 1983 claim against the City because the officers were acting as members of a federal task force executing a federal warrant, and were therefore acting under color of federal law rather than state law. As a consequence, the City argued that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims should be limited to Bivens claims against the individual officers.
The Court ultimately granted the City's motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, two sets of individual Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss two more of Plaintiffs’ claims — Plaintiffs’ alternatively plead claims that these Defendants committed an unconstitutional search of James's apartment under either Section 1983 or Bivens. These latest two motions to dismiss are the subject of the present Order.
Currently pending before the Court are Defendants Mark Gardner, Christian Malstrom, and Scott Priestly's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] and Defendants Kelly Lambert and Matthew Winn's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART both motions.
II. Background
The factual background of this case was described in detail in the Court's Order granting the City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss. (Order, Doc. 36.) As discussed in that Order, APD initially obtained a state arrest warrant on January 7, 2019, to arrest Jimmy Atchison on suspicion of committing an armed robbery — specifically, stealing a cellphone at gunpoint. (Am. Compl., Doc. 63 ¶¶ 24, 49.) The warrant authorized APD to apprehend Atchison at his home address in Atlanta. (Id. ¶ 24.) But instead of acting on that warrant, Defendants, along with officers from the FBI Atlanta field office, opened a preliminary investigation to determine whether Atchison posed an inter-state flight risk. (Id. ) According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Sung Kim was responsible for investigating Atchison and obtaining the warrant, though other officers were involved as well. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 52, 54.) And the officers ultimately chose to obtain a federal Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution warrant ("UFAP warrant") from a federal magistrate judge based on their representation that Atchison posed an inter-state flight risk even though, in reality, Atchison posed no such risk. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 52.)
As in the Court's prior Order, the relevant facts in this Order are drawn from the operative complaint. For purposes of resolving the pending motions to dismiss, the Court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Hill v. White , 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs amended their original complaint on February 23, 2022 in response to the Court's order of that same date granting Defendant Mark Gardner's motion to strike certain disputed language from the original complaint. Aside from that one modification, the Amended Complaint is substantively identical to the original complaint. Because the Amended Complaint is now the operative complaint in this case, the Court has included citations to the Amended Complaint instead of to the identical passages of the original complaint.
Unlike the state arrest warrant, the UFAP warrant authorized the officers to apprehend Atchison at the home of Plaintiff Lakeisha James, the mother of Atchison's child, instead of at Atchison's home address. (Id. ¶ 53.) And at the time they sought the UFAP warrant, Defendants were aware that (1) the apartment belonged to James rather than Atchison; (2) Atchison did not live at the apartment or have a leasehold interest in the property; and (3) children were likely present, including Atchison and James's infant son. (Id. ¶ 59.)
The warrant was then executed on January 22, 2019 in a raid performed by officers participating in the FBI Atlanta Metro Major Offender Task Force. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Kim was the officer responsible for organizing the raid, which took place at approximately 7:30 A.M. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 54.) Defendants did not obtain a search warrant for James's apartment beforehand, nor did they seek James's consent to search the apartment. (Id. ¶ 60.) Although Atchison did not live in the apartment, he had arrived there earlier that morning to provide childcare while James was at work. (Id. ¶ 58.)
After arriving at James's apartment, Defendants broke down the door to apprehend Atchison, who was present in the apartment. (Id. ¶ 57.) Atchison then escaped through a window, partially clothed and unarmed. (Id. ¶ 61.) In the process of searching for Atchison, the officers threatened other tenants in the complex with arrest if they refused to allow the officers to search their apartments. (Id. ¶ 4) The officers soon learned that Atchison was hiding in the apartment of another resident named Tameka Pless, where the officers found Atchison hiding in a closet. (Id. ¶¶ 63–65.) When they apprehended Atchison, the officers simultaneously demanded that he "not move" and show his hands and surrender. (Id. ¶ 66) When Atchison responded by raising his hands, Kim shot him in the face, killing him. (Id. ¶ 67.)
The FBI later assumed jurisdiction and conducted an investigation of the shooting. (Id. ¶ 73.) The FBI did not investigate Kim's use of force against Atchison on the ground that he was operating under APD's use of force policy; however, the FBI did determine that the officers had insufficient evidence to support a UFAP warrant and that the officers should have engaged SWAT hostage negotiators before entering Pless's apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 79, 83.) In addition, APD withdrew from the AMMO task force in or around June 2019, citing Atchison's shooting and the federal prohibition on task force officers using body cameras during raids. (Id. ¶ 85.) Kim also resigned from APD in the aftermath of the shooting, and APD conducted its own investigation some months later. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 76.) Like the FBI, the APD did not investigate the use of force by Kim, but it did cite several other officers for policy violations based on their conduct in the course of the raid. (Id. ¶¶ 77–78.)
Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 2, 2020, raising 10 claims against the City of Atlanta and individual officers who were involved in the raid. (Compl., Doc. 1.) The individual officers named in the Complaint are Officers Sung Kim, Mark Gardner, and Scott Priestly of APD; Sgt. Kelly Lambert of APD; special agent Matthew Winn of the FBI; and five John Doe officers. Plaintiffs’ only claim against the City, which has now been dismissed, was a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim under Section 1983 (Claim 5). However, Plaintiffs raise multiple separate claims against the individual officers. Specifically, Plaintiffs raise several claims against Kim individually, including Section 1983 and Bivens claims for excessive force (Claims 1 and 2), and claims of common law assault, common law battery, and wrongful death (Claims 6, 7, and 8). Plaintiffs also raise Section 1983 and Bivens claims against Kim and the John Does for falsely obtaining a UFAP warrant (Claims 3 and 4). Finally, Plaintiffs raise Section 1983 and Bivens claims against Lambert, Gardner, Malstrom, Priestly, Winn, and the John Does for an unconstitutional search of James's apartment (Claims 9 and 10). The last two claims are raised only by James.
The City moved to dismiss Claim 5 on October 28, 2020, and the Court granted that motion in its August 26, 2021 Order. (Order, Doc. 36.) In that Order, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint were insufficient to justify a departure from the general rule that federally deputized officers exercising federal warrants are acting under color of federal law rather than state law, and that Plaintiffs therefore failed to state a claim against the City under Section 1983. (Id. at 3.) However, the Court provided Plaintiffs with an opportunity to amend their Complaint to provide additional factual allegations that might justify a departure from that general rule in these specific circumstances. (Id. ) Plaintiffs ultimately chose not to amend their Complaint and the City was dismissed from the case.
On the same day that the Court granted the City's motion to dismiss, Defendants Gardner, Malstrom, and Priestly ("the Gardner Defendants") filed their own separate motion to dismiss. (Doc. 37.) Several weeks later, Defendant Kim filed an Answer to the Complaint, (Doc. 46), and Defendants Lambert and Winn ("the Lambert Defendants") filed a motion dismiss, (Doc. 47.) The Gardner Defendants’ motion to dismiss and the Lambert Defendants’ motions to dismiss are currently pending. Both sets of motions seek dismissal of Claims 9 and 10, which are the only claims that Plaintiffs have raised against these specific Defendants.
In conjunction with his motion to dismiss, Defendant Mark Gardner also moved to strike bullet point 2 of paragraph 89 of the complaint on the ground that it included allegations against him that were "blatantly false." (Doc. 38.) Plaintiffs subsequently responded that they did not oppose Gardner's motion. (Doc. 43.) On February 23, 2022, the Court granted Gardner's motion to strike and directed Plaintiffs to file a corrected version of their complaint omitting bullet point 2 of paragraph 89. (Doc. 62.) Plaintiffs filed a corrected version of their complaint later that day. See (Am. Compl., Doc. 63). Aside from the one correction, the Amended Complaint is substantively identical to the original complaint. The Court will therefore treat the two pending motions to dismiss as motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
The Court also directed the Clerk to place the original complaint under seal. See (Doc. 62 at 2).
III. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true; however, the court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Although the plaintiff is not required to provide "detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
IV. Discussion
A. James's Section 1983 Claim Against the Officers (Claim 9)
To start, both sets of Defendants argue that James's claims must be brought under Bivens instead of Section 1983. They argue that this Court has already found that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to justify a departure from the general rule that federal task force officers executing federal warrants are acting under color of federal law, and that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the City therefore cannot proceed. By the same logic, Defendants argue that James's Section 1983 claims against the individual officers cannot proceed either. Plaintiffs concede this point in their oppositions, and they state that they do not intend to amend the complaint to allege additional facts in support of a Section 1983 claim.
At this stage, Plaintiffs have effectively abandoned all of their Section 1983 claims and elected to pursue their Bivens claims as an alternative. The Court will therefore DISMISS Claim 9.
B. James's Bivens Claim Against the Officers (Claim 10)
Both the Gardner Defendants and the Lambert Defendants argue that James fails to state a Bivens claim because the officers’ search of her apartment was constitutionally justified, and that, to the extent there was even an arguable constitutional violation, they are protected by qualified immunity. The Lambert Defendants also raise a separate defense that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the search occurred while they were executing a court-authorized warrant. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
1. Qualified Immunity
As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, "[u]nder the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from suit unless the official's conduct violates clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Keating v. City of Miami , 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, if Defendants can establish that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, the burden then shifts to Plaintiffs to show (1) that Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that this right was "clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty. , 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010). And for Plaintiffs to get past a qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must determine "both that the allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, establish a constitutional violation and that the constitutional violation was ‘clearly established.’ " Sebastian v. Ortiz , 918 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Keating , 598 F.3d at 762 ).
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority at the time of the search of James's apartment because the search occurred while Defendants were performing investigatory and arrest functions in their capacity as law enforcement officers. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this means Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, and the Court agrees that Defendants have satisfied this initial burden. As a consequence, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show that, if the allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true, Defendants committed a constitutional violation, and that the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established, such that "a reasonable person would have known" that the conduct was unlawful. Keating , 598 F.3d at 762.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated James's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches because they entered her apartment to apprehend Atchison without a search warrant even though they knew that Atchison did not reside there. Although Plaintiffs note that Defendants did have an arrest warrant for Atchison, they argue that as a matter of clearly established constitutional law, Defendants could not search James's apartment based solely on their possession of an arrest warrant for a third-party nonresident.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house" such that "[a]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant," and specifically a search warrant. Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ; see, e.g., Bates v. Harvey 518 F.3d 1233, 1245 n.12 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that under Supreme Court precedent "an arrest warrant is not enough to permit lawful entry into a third party's home"); Shorter v. Dollar , No. 3:11-cv-531, 2011 WL 5358652, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) (holding that "on the face of the facts, the Defendants entered the Plaintiffs’ residence with an arrest warrant for a non-resident, and such an act violates a clearly established right of the Plaintiffs"). In short, because Defendants did not have James's consent to search the apartment and no exigent circumstances were present, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants needed a search warrant before they could enter James's apartment. And because Defendants entered James's apartment to apprehend Atchison without a search warrant, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated James's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
As Defendants point out though, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the search warrant requirement when the officers reasonably believe both that the subject of an arrest warrant resides at the location in question and that he would be physically present in that location at the time of the search. See Payton , 445 U.S. at 602, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (stating that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within"). The Supreme Court provided additional clarification about this test in Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). In Steagald , though the Court acknowledged its prior holding in Payton that "an arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a suspect's own residence to effect his arrest," id. at 221, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (emphasis added), the Court ultimately found that a search warrant requirement should be strictly enforced when the subject of the arrest warrant does not actually reside at the location in question.
In so holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that arrest warrants and search warrants are not synonymous, and in fact protect two distinct types of interests. Whereas an arrest warrant "primarily serves to protect an individual from an unreasonable seizure," a search warrant "safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police." Id. at 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642. And when the defendants in Steagald entered a third party's home to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant, the Court observed, "the agents sought to do more than use the warrant to arrest [the suspect] in a public place or in his home; instead, they relied on the warrant as legal authority to enter the home of a third person based on their belief that [the suspect] might be a guest there." Id. The Court concluded, "while the warrant ... may have protected [the suspect of the arrest warrant] from an unreasonable seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect [the third-party homeowner's] privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home." Id. The Court therefore held that a search warrant was required under the circumstances and that, absent a search warrant, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 216, 222, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court added that "[a] contrary conclusion ... would create a significant potential for abuse" because "[a]rmed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the police could search all the homes of that individual's friends and acquaintances." Id. at 215, 101 S.Ct. 1642.
The Supreme Court's decision in Steagald therefore clearly establishes that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, a search warrant is required when law enforcement officers seek to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant at a third-party residence.
However, as Defendants point out, the question in this case is whether James's residence should instead be treated as a first-party residence for Fourth Amendment purposes, such that an arrest warrant alone would grant Defendants the limited authority to enter the apartment. In other words, Defendants’ conduct may nevertheless be constitutionally permissible if Defendants reasonably believed both (1) that James's apartment was in fact Atchison ’s residence, and (2) that Atchison would be present in the apartment at the time of the search. Steagald , 451 U.S. at 221, 101 S.Ct. 1642 ; Payton , 445 U.S. at 602, 100 S.Ct. 1371.
Beginning with the first prong, in their motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that notwithstanding the allegations in the Amended Complaint, this case is distinguishable from Steagald because Defendants had additional information tying Atchison to the residence in question that led to them to reasonably believe James's apartment was in fact Atchison's residence. In an effort to provide that additional information, each of the three Gardner Defendants attaches a declaration to their motion to dismiss expounding on their factual bases for that belief. Relying on those declarations, they argue that there were a number of factors that led them to believe James's apartment was actually Atchison's residence: that James was the resident of record and she and Atchison had a child together; that Atchison's mother had informed them that Atchison was at the apartment frequently to assist with childcare while James was at work; that Atchison often spent the night at the apartment; and that Atchison had been arrested due to an incident at a nearby apartment in the same complex. Much like the Gardner Defendants, the Lambert Defendants argue that they were entitled to rely on Kim's representations to them prior to the raid that Atchison actually resided at James's apartment. However, none of these factual allegations are contained in the pleadings, and they cannot be considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss. In their reply, the Gardner Defendants argue that the declarations can be considered under Local Rule 7.1(A)(1), which states, "Every motion presented to the clerk for filing shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law which cites supporting authority. If allegations of fact are relied upon, supporting affidavits must be attached to the memorandum of law ." (Gardner Defs.’ Reply, Doc. 45 at 3) (emphasis in original) (quoting LR 7.1(A)(1), NDGa). But that Rule is not specific to motions to dismiss. When specifically resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court is ordinarily limited to considering the facts alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the motion would have to be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See 5C Charles Allen Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that "whenever outside matters are presented to and not excluded by the court, the matter will be considered by the appellate court as one for summary judgment"). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized a limited exception to this general rule for when "the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim." Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). In such circumstances, "the Court may consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal," meaning that "the defendant's attaching such documents to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of the motion into a motion for summary judgment." Id. This exception applies when the materials cited are both (1) "central to the plaintiff's claim" and (2) "undisputed." Horsley v. Feldt , 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, as Plaintiffs argue, the declarations should not be considered at this stage because they are not incorporated by reference into the complaint. Though the factual assertions the Gardner Defendants include in their declarations may be central to James's claims, they certainly are not "undisputed." And as Plaintiffs note, Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to scrutinize any of those assertions through discovery. The Gardner Defendants also cite Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin , 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that "where the extrinsic exhibits ‘contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern .’ " (Gardner Defs.’ Reply, Doc. 45 at 4) (quoting Griffin Industries , 496 F.3d at 1206 ). But that case was addressing exhibits the plaintiff had attached to its complaint that were therefore treated as incorporated by reference into that complaint, not self-serving declarations that the defendants had attached to their motion to dismiss.
The Gardner Defendants alternatively argue that if the Court will not consider their declarations for purposes of their motion to dismiss, the motion should instead be converted to a motion for summary judgment. But as Plaintiffs contend in their opposition, it would be improper to construe the Gardner Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because the Gardner Defendants have not included a statement of undisputed material facts to their motion as required by the local rules, and Plaintiffs have not yet had the opportunity to perform discovery. The Court therefore declines to treat the Gardner Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
Aside from the declarations, Defendants also cite to a number of cases from the Eleventh Circuit, and one from the Eighth Circuit, for the proposition that warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible when law enforcement officers reasonably believe that the suspect of an arrest warrant lived at a third party's residence, such as that of a parent or significant other. In one of these cases, like in this case, there was also an outstanding arrest warrant at an address other than the one where the officers conducted the search. See United States v. Bervaldi , 226 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). And as these cases suggest, "[t]he fact that a suspect may live somewhere else from time to time does not categorically prevent a dwelling from being the suspect's residence." United States v. Bennett , 555 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 2009) ; see also United States v. Risse , 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We have found no authority to support Risse's implicit assumption that a person can have only one residence for Fourth Amendment purposes."). But unlike in this case, the cases Defendants cite all included factual allegations that would support a reasonable conclusion that the suspect of the arrest warrant was actually residing with a parent or significant other, as opposed to merely being a frequent visitor. See United States v. Mastin , 972 F.3d 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2020) (upholding warrantless search of hotel room when fleeing felon's girlfriend checked into hotel in her own name with at least one other person and officers had reason to believe that the suspect's girlfriend had reserved the room in her own name so that the suspect could avoid detection); Bennett , 555 F.3d at 965 (finding warrantless search of suspect's mother's house permissible when an FBI agent had stated to officers that the suspect had been staying with his mother and the landlord's observations corroborated that statement); Bervaldi , 226 F.3d at 1263 (finding that officers reasonably believed that suspect resided at house where he had been observed and previously told officers that he lived, even though he used his parents’ address as his "permanent residence" — e.g. , for his driver's license — and the arrest warrant listed his parents’ address instead of the house where he lived); Risse , 83 F.3d at 215–17 (finding warrantless search permissible when officers executed arrest warrant at suspect's boyfriend's home — despite officers’ actual knowledge that the suspect had her own separate residence — because the suspect had previously told officers that she was residing with her boyfriend and that information was corroborated by an informant).
In this case, the pleadings suggest that Defendants were aware of two things: (1) that Atchison did not live at James's apartment but actually resided at another address, which was the address listed on the underlying state warrant; and (2) that Atchison often visited James's apartment for purposes of performing childcare. There are no additional factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that would support the additional inference that Atchison actually resided in James's apartment, as opposed to merely being a frequent visitor. Though the Gardner Defendants attempt to provide those additional facts through the declarations they have attached to their motion to dismiss, as previously noted, the Court cannot consider those factual contentions at the pleading stage.
Therefore, read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the allegations in the Amended Complaint suggest that Atchison was a "guest" in James's apartment rather than a "co-resident" of the apartment. Assuming for purposes of the pending motions to dismiss that this was in fact the case, it is clearly established law that a search warrant was required in these circumstances. See Risse , 83 F.3d at 216 (noting that "if the suspect is just a guest of the third party, then the police must obtain a search warrant for the third party's dwelling," but "if the suspect is a co-resident of the third party, then Steagald does not apply, and Payton allows both arrest of the subject of the arrest warrant and use of evidence found against the third party"). Therefore, assuming that the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are true, and construing those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, James has plausibly alleged that Defendants’ search of her apartment violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
That said, the Court acknowledges that if Defendants are able to satisfy both prongs of the Payton test, then a search warrant would not actually be required. On the first prong, Defendants may be able to show, on a fully developed factual record, that they did in fact have a reasonable belief that Atchison resided at James's apartment, as opposed to merely being a guest. Because the Court finds that there are currently unresolved factual questions with respect to the first prong, the Court need not consider the second prong of the Payton test at this stage — whether Defendants reasonably believed that Atchison would be present in the apartment at the time of the search.
As a fallback, the Gardner Defendants argue that their search of James's apartment did not violate James's Fourth Amendment rights because the search was authorized by state law. The Gardner Defendants specifically point to O.C.G.A. § 17-4-3, which states, "In order to arrest under a warrant charging a crime, the officer may break open the door of any house where the offender is concealed." The parties appear to agree that this statute is effectively a codification of the Payton test. And the parties’ arguments as to whether Defendants’ search of James's apartment complied with this statute are essentially duplicative of their arguments with respect to the Payton test. As such, the Gardner Defendants’ contention that the search was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-3 does not alter the foregoing analysis. So at least for present purposes, Defendants’ qualified immunity defense fails. Additionally, the Court notes that to the extent that Defendants implicitly argue that O.C.G.A. § 17-4-3 should be construed in a manner that is inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent in Steagald and Payton , this argument must fail.
2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The Lambert Defendants raise a separate argument in their motion to dismiss that was not raised in the Gardner Defendants’ motion; namely, that the Lambert Defendants are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. More specifically, the Lambert Defendants argue that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because when the alleged constitutional violation occurred they were merely executing a facially valid court order — the UFAP warrant. They contend that none of them were responsible for applying for the warrant and that their role was simply the ministerial one of executing the warrant that was authorized by the magistrate judge. In support of this argument, the Lambert Defendants primarily rely on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Roland v. Phillips , 19 F.3d 552 (11th Cir. 1994), and its subsequent unpublished decision in Bias v. Crosby , 346 F. App'x 455 (11th Cir. 2009).
In Roland , the Eleventh Circuit found that a county sheriff was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for making an arrest pursuant to a judge's temporary restraining order. As the court observed there, "[n]onjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge's absolute immunity when their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’ " Roland , 19 F.3d at 555 (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman , 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980) ). And whether quasi-judicial immunity applies in a given case depends on "a functional analysis of the action taken by the official in relation to the judicial process." Id. (emphasis in original). In determining that quasi-judicial immunity should apply in the circumstances at issue in Roland , the court observed that "[e]nforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding" because "[t]hese implementing individuals ‘are themselves ‘integral parts of the judicial process.’ " Id. (citations omitted). The court also observed that "[t]he public interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees," and that "[a]bsolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a judge's orders is necessary to insure that such officials can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal counsel." Id. at 556 (quoting Valdez v. Denver , 878 F.2d 1285, 1288–89 (10th Cir. 1989) ). In coming to that conclusion, the court reasoned that in executing functions that are integral parts of the judicial process "[l]aw enforcement officials ‘must not be called upon to answer for the legality of decisions which they are powerless to control’ or ‘be required to act as pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges.’ " Id. (quoting Valdez , 878 F.2d at 1289 ).
Here, though, the officers were not "powerless to control" the warrants that their own colleagues applied for in the same way that they would be powerless to control a court-initiated restraining order. As Plaintiffs argue in their opposition, the court order at issue in Roland was not a police-initiated arrest warrant; it was a court-initiated restraining order. Further, as the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, law enforcement officers applying for warrants "act on their own initiative and not at a judge's direction." Washington v. Rivera , 939 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019). And these officers "perform a function that [the Eleventh Circuit] would characterize as investigative rather than one having ‘an integral relationship with the judicial process.’ " Id. (quoting Roland , 19 F.3d at 555 ). The Lambert Defendants’ relationship to the law enforcement-initiated warrant at issue here is thus functionally different from the sheriff's relationship to the order at issue in Roland . And unlike the court-mandated order in Roland , the court-authorized warrant here was not one that was "issued in the regular course of [a] judicial proceeding by that court" that "the officer of the court in whose hands it was placed is bound to obey." 19 F.3d at 556 . Indeed, at the time the officers sought the UFAP warrant, there was no "judicial proceeding" involving James. Simply put, this was not the same type of "direct judicial order" that the court confronted in Roland. Id. at 556 n.4.
The Lambert Defendants’ reliance on Bias is similarly misplaced. In Bias , the Eleventh Circuit found that the prosecutors who charged the plaintiff there with rape and sexual assault — charges for which he was later acquitted — and the sheriff who arrested him in connection therewith were both entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Notably, the arrest warrant that the officer executed in Bias flowed from the actions of the prosecutor who charged the plaintiff, whereas the UFAP warrant at issue here was the product of a warrant application from APD officers who, unlike a judge or prosecutor, were not officers of the court. As was the case with the sheriff's relationship to the restraining order in Roland , the sheriff's relationship to the order in Bias is functionally different from the Lambert Defendants’ relationship to the UFAP warrant in this case.
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Scott v. Dixon , 720 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983), whether quasi-judicial immunity applies depends on "whether the act performed by the officer is discretionary or ministerial in nature." Id. at 1546. The act of applying for and executing a warrant is a quintessential discretionary law enforcement junction; it is not a mere ministerial act carried out to implement a separate discretionary function that is "normally handled by a judge," or, for that matter, a prosecutor. Id. Consequently, the Lambert Defendants’ conduct is not "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" like the officers’ conduct in Roland or Bias . Washington , 939 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Hughes v. Chesser , 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) ). Thus, the Lambert Defendants were not performing a "sufficiently judicial function" to trigger quasi-judicial immunity. Id.
Granted, as the Lambert Defendants note, the Eleventh Circuit did find in Bias that law enforcement officers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity "when they are acting in furtherance of their official duties and in reliance on valid written or verbal judicial orders." 346 F. App'x at 457 (citing Roland , 19 F.3d at 557 ). But the court also noted that when law enforcement officers are instead "performing discretionary functions" the officers are only entitled to qualified immunity. Id. For the reasons stated above, such is the case here. In fact, all parties to the present motions have agreed that applying for and executing warrants is a discretionary law enforcement function — one that is distinct from the kind of discretionary function that is ordinarily performed by a judge or prosecutor. The Lambert Defendants’ performance of that discretionary nonjudicial function may trigger a potential qualified immunity defense, but not a potential quasi-judicial immunity defense.
The Supreme Court made that distinction clear in Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). As the Supreme Court explained in that case, the act of an officer applying for a warrant "is further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment." Id. at 342–43, 106 S.Ct. 1092. For that reason, the Supreme Court explained, "[i]n the case of the officer applying for a warrant, it is our judgment that the judicial process will on the whole benefit from a rule of qualified rather than absolute immunity." Id. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092.
In their reply, the Lambert Defendants cite one out-of-state district court case for the proposition that quasi-judicial immunity still "extends to nonjudicial officers when they are acting to enforce a judicial order, including effectuating an arrest warrant." Murdock v. Montgomery Cnty., Ala. , No. 2:16-cv-444, 2021 WL 4254862, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 2021). But for the reasons previously discussed, "an arrest warrant pursued by law enforcement on their own volition is not the type of court order warranting quasi-judicial immunity." (Pls.’ Opp'n to Lambert Defs.’ Mot., Doc. 49 at 12).
Though the Lambert Defendants argue that quasi-judicial immunity should nevertheless apply in their case because they were not among the specific officers who actually applied for the warrant, the fact that some other nonjudicial officers with whom the Lambert Defendants worked were the ones who actually initiated the warrant application does not transform that warrant into a court-initiated order. The requisite "integral relationship with the judicial process" is still lacking. Moreover, if law enforcement officers could manufacture absolute immunity from suit for any unconstitutional searches simply by dividing up the roles of applying for and executing warrants, it would create the same "significant potential for abuse" that the Supreme Court warned against in Steagald. Quasi-judicial immunity should not apply in these circumstances.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART both the Gardner Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] and the Lambert Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to Claim 9 of the Amended Complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs cannot proceed with claims against these Defendants under Section 1983. However, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim. The parties are AUTHORIZED to immediately commence discovery and DIRECTED to confer and submit a preliminary scheduling order within 14 days, consistent with the Court's local rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2022.