Bassett v. Lakeside Inn, Inc.

Full title: ROBERT C. BASSETT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LAKESIDE INN…

Court: Court of Appeal of California, Third District

Date published: Jun 21, 2006

140 Cal.App.4th 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)

44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827

Opinion

No. C050514.

June 21, 2006. [CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION^_]

_ Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part I of the Discussion.

Appeals from the Superior Court of Lassen County, No. SC20040157, Suzanne N. Kingsbury,^† Judge.)

† Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Thomas J. Dunnion, Jordan Morgenstern and Gerard A. Rose for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Laxalt Nomura, Angela M. Bader; Jacobson, Hansen, Najarian McQuillan and Leith B. Hansen for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

MORRISON, Acting P. J.

After their daughter was killed by a drunk driver while crossing the street on her way to school, plaintiffs Robert C. and Teddi Bassett brought suit against the driver and two other individuals and numerous entities for wrongful death. They appeal from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained the demurrers of defendants Lakeside Inn, Peter Douthitt, Lee Smith, and Lake Tahoe Unified School District (the District) without leave to amend. The Bassetts contend Lakeside Inn and security guards Douthitt and Smith contributed tortiously to the accident because they had assumed a duty to protect patrons of the Lakeside Inn and the public and they breached that duty by escorting an obviously drunk patron to his car and allowing him to drive off. The Bassetts contend the District had liability because it designated a schoolbus stop in a dangerous intersection. We agree with the trial court that Lakeside Inn and its employees had no duty to the Bassetts' daughter, and that the District has immunity under Education Code section 44808 because the accident occurred off campus and outside the supervision of the District. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because the matter arises after demurrer has been sustained, we must treat all properly pled facts as true. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58].) The operative complaint as to Lakeside Inn, Douthitt, and Smith is the second amended complaint. The operative complaint as to the District is the third amended complaint.

On September 2, 2003, about 7:00 a.m., Marissa Bassett was on her way to her first day of high school. As she crossed the street at a crosswalk at 15th Street and Eloise Avenue in South Lake Tahoe, she was struck by a car driven by Jesse Whitworth, a drunk driver. She died later that day. The District had designated a schoolbus pickup point at that intersection.

Throughout the night before the accident, Whitworth and four companions engaged in a night of partying, with excessive consumption of alcohol. Within an hour before the accident, Whitworth and his companions were finishing up their night of partying at Taberna Restaurant, located within Lakeside Inn. They were intoxicated, loud, and obnoxious. Someone called the security guards. Douthitt and Smith responded and told the Whitworth group to quiet down. Ten minutes later, Douthitt and Smith responded again and escorted Whitworth and his companions to Whitworth's car. The security guards watched as Whitworth drove off onto an adjacent thoroughfare.

Douthitt and Smith were aware that Whitworth and his companions were intoxicated, incapable of operating a vehicle safely, and would be driving on public roads. Notwithstanding this knowledge, they did nothing to stop Whitworth from driving off. In fact, they encouraged him to do so.

Within one year following the accident, the Bassetts brought suit, naming as defendants Whitworth, Lakeside Inn, Douthitt and Smith, the City of South Lake Tahoe, State of California Department of Transportation, California Transportation Commission, El Dorado County, and the District. The complaint sought monetary damages for wrongful death and a survivor's action against all defendants and against Whitworth for assault and battery.

Douthitt and Smith demurred, asserting the complaint did not state a cause of action against them. Their demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. The Bassetts amended the complaint and Douthitt and Smith again demurred.

The Bassetts filed a second amended complaint. By stipulation of the parties, the demurrer of Douthitt and Smith, which was joined by Lakeside Inn, applied to the second amended complaint. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

The Bassetts filed a third amended complaint. The District demurred to this complaint, requesting that the trial court take judicial notice that the District did not own the public property where the accident occurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

A judgment of dismissal was entered as to Lakeside Inn, Douthitt, Smith, and the District. The Bassetts appealed.

DISCUSSION I. Demurrer of Lakeside Inn, Douthitt, and Smith^_

_ See footnote, ante, page 863.

The trial court sustained the demurrer of Lakeside Inn, Douthitt, and Smith (the casino defendants) because the Bassetts could not state a common law cause of action against them. The court found the casino defendants had immunity for alcohol-consumption related injuries under Business and Professions Code section 25602 and the Bassetts failed to plead a special relationship. The Bassetts contend the trial court erred because (1) the immunity of section 25602 has no extraterritorial effect and the Lakeside Inn is located in Nevada; and (2) the alleged tortious act is not the furnishing of alcohol, but the breach of the duty, assumed by the casino defendants, to protect patrons and third parties. Civil liability for injuries incurred as a consequence of the service and consumption of alcoholic beverages has been subject to dramatic shifts in California law. The traditional common law rule denied recovery from a tavern keeper for injuries caused by a customer who, as a result of intoxication, injures a third person. ( Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 157.) In Vesely, the California Supreme Court rejected this rule and held a tavern keeper could be liable based on concepts of proximate cause when he violates Business and Professions Code section 25602 by serving alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person. ( Vesely v. Sager, supra, at p. 165.) In response to a series of cases finding that one who furnishes alcoholic beverages could be liable for injuries caused by the intoxicated person ( Vesely v. Sager, supra, 5 Cal.3d 153; Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144; Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313), the Legislature acted. It amended Civil Code section 1714 and Business and Professions Code section 25602, to restore the traditional common law rule. (Stats. 1978, ch. 929, §§ 1-2, pp. 2903-2904.) Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides that every one is responsible for the result of his willful acts and for injuries caused by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his person or property. The 1978 amendment added subdivision (b), which provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager ( 5 Cal.3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club ( 16 Cal.3d 313), and Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b).) Business and Professions Code section 25602, subdivision (a) provides it is a misdemeanor to sell, furnish, or give any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person. Although the violation of a statute usually gives rise to a presumption of negligence (Evid. Code, § 669), there is immunity for one who sells, furnishes, or gives alcoholic beverages. "No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage." (Bus. Prof. Code, § 25602, subd. (b).) The civil immunity provided by this statute is "sweeping." ( Strang v. Cabrol (1984) 37 Cal.3d 720, 724.) There is an exception in cases of sales by a licensee to an obviously intoxicated minor. (Bus. Prof. Code, § 25602.1.) Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, this is the single exception to the sweeping immunity of the 1978 amendments. ( Strang v. Cabrol, supra, at p. 725.) The casino defendants assert they have immunity for the injuries caused by Whitworth's drunken driving under Business Professions Code section 25602. The Bassetts first contend the immunity provided by section 25602 does not apply to the casino defendants because the statute has no extraterritorial effect and Lakeside Inn is located in Nevada. They rely on Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, supra, 16 Cal.3d 313, even though its holding was abrogated by the 1978 amendments to Business and Professions Code section 25602. ( Strang v. Cabrol, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 724.) Bernhard addressed a prior version of Business and Professions Code section 25602, that made the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person a misdemeanor, but did not provide civil immunity. The court held that the presumption of negligence for violation of a statute did not apply because the criminal statute had no extraterritorial effect, but found Harrah's could be negligent under the common law. ( Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 323-325.) Now, Business and Professions Code section 25602 has a civil component; it provides immunity for one who furnishes alcoholic beverages. The Bassetts cite no authority for the proposition that a civil immunity statute has no extraterritorial effect. "We need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished. [Citation.]" ( Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384.) The Bassetts next contend the statutory immunity does not apply because their complaint did not allege that Lakeside Inn furnished alcoholic beverages to Whitworth. Rather, the casino defendants' liability is premised on breach of their duty to protect the public from danger emanating from the Lakeside Inn. The casino defendants respond the immunity under Business and Professions Code section 25602 is not limited to cases where there is an express allegation of furnishing alcoholic beverages. In DeBolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 269, Kragen held a beach party for its employees and minor Christine Eigsti was a guest. Eigsti became so drunk and disorderly that Kragen asked her to leave and knew she would be driving since that was the only available transportation. After buying gasoline, Eigsti headed south on Interstate 5 and plowed into a motorcycle, killing the driver and passenger. ( Id. at pp. 271-272.) The heirs of the deceased brought suit against Kragen and Kragen demurred. The heirs contended their cause of action sounded in general negligence based, not on providing alcoholic beverages, but on Kragen's asking Eigsti to leave knowing she was intoxicated and could not drive safely but knowing that she would drive and not attempting to supply a safer alternative. ( Id. at p. 273.) The court rejected the heirs' attempt to avoid the immunity statute by characterizing Kragen's "fault" as ordering Eigsti to leave and failing to provide alternative, safe transportation. "`[T]he effect of the statute cannot be avoided by alleging the wrong, not as furnishing the alcohol,' but as forcing a person to leave a party or failing to provide safe transportation. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 274.) The DeBolt court relied on Andre v. Ingram (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 206: "In Andre v. Ingram, a fact pattern not unlike the instant case, there was no allegation the defendant furnished the beverages, but plaintiff alleged the host should have warned her not to get in the car with the driver or should have stopped the driver from driving; failure to do so was a breach. We must agree with the conclusion reached there. Simply put, `the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.' [Citations.] If we found liability possible here, soon complaints would be easily couched in language apart from furnishing or selling liquor. Plaintiffs would claim liability for inviting a person to a party where drinks are served knowing he/she might become intoxicated, failing to keep someone from driving as in Andre v. Ingram, or any number of possibilities. `[I]t is [however] the consumption alone . . . of liquor which causes the resultant deaths and injuries.' [Citation.] Social host immunity is applicable here. [Citation.]" ( DeBolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 274-275, italics in original.) In Biles v. Richter (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 325, plaintiff and defendants had been drinking at various restaurants and social clubs. Afterwards they went to defendants' residence where other social guests joined them and the drinking continued. Defendants put plaintiff to bed because he was intoxicated and they went to bed while there were still guests in their house drinking and smoking cigarettes. A discarded cigarette caused a fire, injuring plaintiff. ( Id. at pp. 3273-28.) This court rejected plaintiff's attempt to posit liability on defendants' failure to supervise intoxicated guests. "If a plaintiff could hold a social host liable for failure to supervise those to whom he had furnished alcohol, the immunity afforded by subdivision (c) of section 1714 would be seriously eroded. This is because the duty of supervision is premised upon the need to look after those whose coordination and judgment have been adversely affected by the consumption of alcohol. If allowed, the duty would appear to exist in many if not most cases where alcohol is furnished by social hosts. We therefore hold that, to the extent plaintiff's theory of liability rests on defendants' failure to supervise their guests to whom they had furnished alcohol, defendants are shielded by immunity. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 331.) The reasoning of DeBolt, Andre, and Biles applies equally to the immunity granted to commercial establishments by Business and Professions Code section 25602, subdivision (b). ( Leong v. San Francisco Parking, Inc. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 827, 834.) In Leong, the court rejected an "overly technical" reading of section 25602 that would have it apply only where the allegation was that defendant furnished alcoholic beverages. ( Id. at p. 833.) The court upheld the sustaining of a demurrer to a complaint that alleged defendant encouraged and permitted members of the public to bring alcoholic beverages to the premises and consume them, and knew and permitted them to drive under the influence of alcohol. ( Id. at p. 831.) The Bassetts cannot avoid the effect of the immunity statute by alleging a different negligence than furnishing alcoholic beverages where it is clear the injuries were caused by the consumption of alcohol. The Bassetts next contend this case is outside the liability limitations of sections 1714 and 25602 because they alleged a special relationship between the casino defendants and Whitworth that gave rise to a duty to protect their daughter. The complaint alleged that in their role as security guards and agents, or employees, of Lakeside Inn, Douthitt and Smith had ipso facto contracted with Lakeside Inn to provide security services and to protect third persons from harm originating in or around Lakeside Inn. The allegations continued: "Defendants Douthitt and Smith had thus created a special relationship to defendant Whitworth, and therefore had assumed an affirmative duty to protect Whitworth and also third persons, and to act reasonably with respect to dealing with defendant Whitworth's intoxicated state and his subsequent operation of a motor vehicle. That duty extended to persons whom would foreseeably be injured by Whitworth's intoxicated driving, . . ." The Bassetts rely on Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 142 ( Williams). In Williams, plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision with a patron who left a restaurant in an intoxicated state. Plaintiff claimed one of the restaurant's employees had undertaken to withhold the patron's car keys if the patron was not fit to drive. The restaurant moved for summary judgment and the motion was granted. ( Id. at pp. 145-146.) In opposition to the motion, the restaurant provided excerpts from trial testimony of its night manager in the related criminal case. The night manager of the restaurant had testified he knew of Chandler's (the patron's) drinking habits as he was a regular customer; Chandler would turn over his car keys every time he went to the restaurant pursuant to a prior arrangement; and the manager would not have returned Chandler's keys if he had been under the influence. ( Id. at p. 150.) The appellate court reversed, finding a triable issue of fact whether the restaurant had liability under the provisions of section 324A of the Restatement Second of Torts. ( Williams v. Saga Restaurant, Inc., supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 151.) Section 324A states: "One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if, [¶] (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or [¶] (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or [¶] (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking." Williams, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 142 is distinguishable because Lakeside Inn did not undertake to prevent Whitworth from driving while intoxicated. There was no allegation that any of the casino defendants knew of Whitworth's drinking habits or arranged with him to withhold his keys to prevent him from driving if he was under the influence. The Bassetts also rely on Trujillo v. G.A. Enterprises, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1105, in which the court reversed a summary judgment. In Trujillo, a fast-food restaurant hired a security guard. Some youths threatened a patron; the guard removed one assailant, but did not extricate the patron from the threatening situation, call the police, or return quickly to quell the disturbance. Noting the special relationship between a business and its patrons, the court found a triable issue of fact whether the security guard acted reasonably under the circumstances. ( Id. at pp. 1108-1109.) More similar to this case is Elizarraras v. L.A. Private Security Services, Inc. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 237, which also implicates the immunity provisions of Business and Professions Code section 25602. There, a restaurant that served alcoholic beverages hired a company to provide security at a dance party. Two intoxicated minors attended the party and got involved in an altercation. After they left, the driver collided with a light pole, and both girls were killed. The heirs of the deceased passenger brought suit against the security company. ( Id. at pp. 239-240.) The court found no duty of care to the deceased passenger. There was no liability under Business and Professions Code section 25602.1 because it was undisputed that the security company did not furnish alcohol to the minors. ( Id. at p. 243.) "Second, although a security guard may have `a special relationship' with a business patron under some circumstances, sections 25602 and 25602.1 restrict liability concerning the sale or furnishing of alcohol. [Citations.]" ( Id. at pp. 243-244.) Although the restaurant may have employed the security company in part to ensure that minors did not consume alcoholic beverages, "that job responsibility is not equivalent to a legal duty of care to underage patrons to prevent them from drinking or driving while intoxicated. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 244.) Neither Lakeside Inn nor its security guards had a duty to prevent Whitworth from driving while intoxicated and thus had no duty to protect the Bassetts's daughter from Whitworth's drunk driving. In Knighten v. Sam's Parking Valet (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 69, 74, the court noted the general rule precluding liability of police officers who detain a drunk driver, but then allow him to proceed. "If police officers have no special relationship with intoxicated citizens under such circumstances, [the restaurant] and [the parking service] can hardly be said to have any such relationship with [the drunk driver]. Similarly, if police officers have no duty to protect the general public by preventing drunk driving, restaurants and parking services can hardly be charged with such a duty." ( Ibid.) Given the sweeping immunity of Business and Professions Code section 25602 and the lack of allegations that the casino defendants adopted a "good Samaritan" role similar to that in Williams, the casino defendants owed no duty of care to the Bassetts's daughter, and the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer of the casino defendants.

II. Demurrer of Lake Tahoe Unified School District

The Bassetts' theory of the District's liability was that the District had designated a dangerous location for its schoolbus stop. The third amended complaint alleged that the intersection at 15th Street and Eloise Avenue had no traffic control signs. This absence together with the presence of such signs on nearby streets and highways prompted local motorists to use 15th Street as a shortcut to Highway 89 at unsafe speeds. There was an S-curve just before the intersection that distracted drivers and discouraged them from focusing on the intersection; it positioned them so their line of sight of the intersection was obscured by trees. The presence of a residential structure also obscured the line of sight, making it difficult to discern the intersection ahead, and distracted drivers, making it difficult or impossible to see pedestrians in or near the intersection. The presence of a pathway encouraged pedestrians to use the northwest portion of the intersection at a location where it was difficult for motorists to see them. The District's designation of a schoolbus pickup point where the pathway meets the intersection "encouraged and enticed" students to use the intersection at a point where it was difficult for drivers to see pedestrians.

The trial court sustained the District's demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that there was no evidence the District owned or controlled the bus stop and the District had immunity under Education Code section 44808.

"The liability of public entities is entirely statutory. ([Gov. Code,] § 815, subd. (a).)" City of Huntington Beach v. Petersen Law Firm (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 562, 567-568 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 568].) (2) The Bassetts rely on Government Code section 835, which provides that a public entity may be liable for an injury caused by the dangerous condition of its property, "[e]xcept as provided by statute[.]" A "`dangerous condition'" is one that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner. (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).)

The public property itself need not be dangerous; "hazards present on adjoining property may create a dangerous condition of public property when users of the public property are necessarily exposed to those risks." ( Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 149 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 65 P.3d 807].) For example, users of a model airplane park were at risk from power lines on adjacent property in Branzel v. City of Concord (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 68 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 167], and users of a public street were at risk from a railroad right-of-way in Holmes v. City of Oakland (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 378 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 197].

The Bassetts contend the location of the bus stop, adjacent to a dangerous intersection, constituted a dangerous condition of public property, citing Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, supra, 30 Cal.4th 139. In Bonanno, the plaintiff was seriously injured when she stepped into a cross-walk on her way to a bus stop. The Supreme Court held the location of a bus stop may be a dangerous condition of public property. ( Id. at p. 144.) The transit authority owned and controlled the stop because it had authority to remove it, even though the county could veto the location of any bus stop. ( Id. at p. 147, fn. 2.) That plaintiff was injured on adjacent property that the transit authority did not own or control did not eliminate the transit authority's liability. The location of the bus stop caused users to be at risk from the adjacent dangerous intersection and the plaintiff was using the bus stop when she crossed the street to reach it. ( Id. at p. 151.)

Liability under Government Code section 835 applies only where the public entity owns or controls the property. (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c).) The District argues, and the trial court found, that the District did not own or control the bus stop. The District apparently established, through judicial notice, that it did not own the crosswalk or the property on which the bus stop was located, but that is not the issue. The District's superintendent has authority to designate the location of the schoolbus stop. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, § 1238, subd. (a).) That power may be sufficient to constitute ownership or control of the bus stop for purposes of Government Code sections 830 and 835. (See Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 151 [determining transit authority "owned and controlled its own bus stop" when it had power, subject to county's veto, to remove it].)

We note that in the third amended complaint, there is no allegation the designation of the schoolbus pickup spot caused or contributed to the accident. In the original, the first amended, and the second amended complaints, the Bassetts alleged their daughter was struck and killed "as she traversed a crosswalk on her way to a school bus pickup area." In the third amended complaint, the operative one for the District's demurrer, this allegation is deleted. The complaint merely alleges the Bassetts' daughter was crossing the street on her way to school. There is no allegation that she intended to take the bus. Generally, "[a]n amended complaint `supersedes the original and furnishes the sole basis for the cause of action. [Citations.] The original complaint is dropped out of the case and ceases to have any effect as a pleading, or as a basis for a judgment. [Citation.]'" ( Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 891, 901 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 675].)

At oral argument, however, counsel for plaintiffs stated the complaint could be amended to state that Marissa was on her way to the schoolbus stop and intended to take the bus to school. In considering whether there is a reasonable probability a defect in the complaint could be cured by amendment, courts may consider counsel's statements at oral argument. (See Palacin v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 855, 867 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 731]; McMartin v. Children's Institute International (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1393, 1408 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 437].) Accordingly, the complaint could be amended to allege the District's location of the schoolbus stop was a dangerous condition of public property and Marissa was using the bus stop, crossing the street to reach it, when she was killed.¹

1 At oral argument, the District stressed the facts of Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, supra, 30 Cal.4th 139, that the bus stop could be reached from the south by only two routes, both of which were dangerous, and the plaintiff chose the less dangerous of the two. The District suggests the complaint was defective because there was no allegation that the bus stop could be reached only by crossing a dangerous intersection. Factual matters of this type are better resolved by a motion for summary judgment.

A school district's liability, however, is limited by Education Code section 44808 (section 44808), which provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district, city or county board of education, county superintendent of schools, or any officer or employee of such district or board shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district, board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, [¶] In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district, board, or person shall be liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee of such district or board."

"Under Education Code section 44808, the District would not be liable for injuries off campus and after school unless they were the result of the District's negligence occurring on school grounds or were the result of some specific undertaking by the District, which was then performed in a negligent manner." ( Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1264 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 724].) "In essence, the section grants a district immunity unless a student was (or should have been) directly supervised during a specified undertaking." ( Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 129 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 280].) The portion of section 44808 that refers to failing to exercise reasonable care does not create a common law form of general negligence; it refers to the failure to exercise reasonable care during one of the mentioned undertakings. ( Guerrero v. South Bay Union School Dist. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 264, 271 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 509].)

A public entity's liability, including that of a school district, must be based on statute. ( Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1263.) Section 44808 begins, "Notwithstanding any other provision of this code," and so could be read to provide immunity only for liability imposed under the Education Code. The statute has not been interpreted so narrowly. In Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 232, 235 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 537], the court held the predecessor to section 44808 limited the liability of employees of a school district who otherwise had liability for negligent acts under Government Code section 815.2.

The Bassetts contend that section 44808 does not provide immunity because the District undertook to provide transportation to the school and "failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances" in designating the location of the bus stop. They rely on Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 292 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 712], in which a student was seriously injured when she was struck by a car while crossing the street to enter the school grounds through an open school yard gate. The District argued it was immune under section 44808 because it had no duty to supervise students going to and from school. The court held there was no immunity under section 44808 because liability was not based on lack of supervision, but on "an open gate that enticed children to cross an adjacent dangerous intersection." ( 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.)

In finding section 44808 immunity did not apply, the Joyce court relied on Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 517 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 1, 585 P.2d 851] ( Hoyem) (Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) In Hoyem, a student left school without permission during the schoolday and was injured by a motorist. The child and his mother sued the school district alleging negligent supervision. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer and dismissed the case. ( Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 512.)

The Supreme Court reversed, finding a school district has a duty to supervise students while on school premises and may be liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in that supervision. ( Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 513-516.) The court rejected the argument that the school district was immune under section 44808. First, noting that section 44808 grants a school district immunity for injuries to students not on school property, the court stated: "the section goes on explicitly to withdraw this grant of immunity whenever the school district, inter alia, ` has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." ( Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 517, original italics.) In a footnote, the court noted the reasonable care exception was not accidental, but added by Senate amendment. "The intent of the Legislature is clear: when a school district fails to exercise reasonable care the immunity of this section evaporates."² ( Id. at p. 517, fn. 2.)

2 We agree with the observation in Stockinger v. Feather River Community College (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1034 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 385]: "This statement is perplexing, since the very concept of immunity presupposes a failure to exercise reasonable care."

Second, the Hoyem court discussed the decisional history preceding section 44808 and concluded the Legislature intended to limit the school district's liability in very different circumstances. Case law "demonstrated[d] that the Legislature was principally concerned with limiting a school district's liability for injuries to pupils either before or after school hours while children were either going to school or coming home after school." ( Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 517.)

While the language of Hoyem could be read to withdraw immunity whenever a school district fails to exercise reasonable care, it has not been so interpreted since. (E.g., Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 129; Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 41, 48-49 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 752].) Indeed, the Hoyem court explained, "defendant's liability in this case is posited not on an alleged failure to supervise [the student] when he was off the school premises, but rather on an alleged failure to exercise due care in supervision on school premises." (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 523, original italics.) Thus, Hoyem, consistent with the language of section 44808, withdraws immunity only when the student is or should be under the school's direct supervision. To the extent Joyce v. Simi Valley United School Dist., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 292, seeks to withdraw section 44808 immunity when there is a dangerous condition of property, regardless of whether the injured student was or should have been supervised, we respectfully disagree and decline to follow it.

Since Marissa was injured not on school property and not while she was or should have been under the direct supervision of the school, section 44808 applies and the District has immunity. The trial court did not err in sustaining the District's demurrer without leave to amend.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

Robie, J., and Cantil-Sakauye, J., concurred.