Opinion
Case No. 20001012-CA.
Filed May 16, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Sandra Peuler.
Preston S. Howell, West Valley City, for Appellant.
David R. Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Although several issues are presented, each is readily resolved under applicable law.
An action may be brought "[w]ithin four years" upon a "contract . . . not founded upon an instrument in writing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1992). The trial court found that the contract was first breached in January of 1986. The trial court found the last use of the bulldozer occurred no later than July 22, 1988. Plaintiff did not file his contract claim until July 22, 1992. Thus, Plaintiff's contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations under either view of when the claim arose. See id.
The trial court made no written findings, except those relative to the award of attorney fees. However, a number of other findings can be gleaned from its oral ruling. See Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) ("The court's findings may be written separately or `gleaned from the transcript[.]'") (quoting State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)). Bartel has not marshaled the evidence supporting the court's findings and then showed why the evidence so marshaled is insufficient to support the findings, see State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108, nor has he included a complete transcript of the trial in the record on appeal. We therefore do not question the trial court's findings and rely on them in reviewing the correctness of its legal conclusions. See Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 1110. Moreover, "where we are without an adequate record, we must assume the regularity of the proceedings below."Id.
An action may be brought "[w]ithin four years . . . for relief not otherwise provided for by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). Again, given the trial court's finding that no work was done with the bulldozer after July 22, 1988, and the fact that Plaintiff did not file this action until July 22, 1992, Plaintiff's equitable claim for quantum meruit is also barred by the statute of limitations. See id. Plaintiff argues that the equitable doctrine of laches defeats application of the statute of limitations to his quantum meruit claim. However, "[e]quitable claims will be barred after the time fixed by the analogous statue of limitations unless extraordinary circumstances make the application unjust." CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 966.See id. at ¶¶ 9-11. We see no extraordinary circumstances in this case that would make application of the statute of limitations unjust.
The Hills' possession of the bulldozer came about under the contract, and, according to Plaintiff, that possession continued permissively after 1990 when Plaintiff told Robert Hill he could retain possession of the bulldozer. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against defendant Leone Hill for the value of the bulldozer depends on her status as a party to those agreements. The only finding bearing on Leone's status as a party to the original contract is that she sat in the cab of a truck while, outside the truck, her husband discussed the arrangement with Plaintiff and others. This finding adequately supports the trial court's conclusion that Leone was not a party to the original contract. See John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987) ("[T]here can be no contract without the mutual assent of the parties."). Furthermore, the trial court made no finding, and Plaintiff does not suggest, that Leone directly entered into the subsequent agreement with Robert Hill. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against Leone for the value of the bulldozer fails.
Plaintiff argues that he should have been allowed to put on evidence that Leone was bound by the agreements under an agency theory. Even assuming the trial court erred in excluding evidence of agency, however, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any such error was prejudicial. In the absence of a proffer in the record before us of the evidence Plaintiff wished to admit, we cannot determine whether exclusion of the intended evidence was prejudicial. See generally State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶¶ 33, 36, 25 P.3d 985. See also Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 1110 (noting that without transcript, appellate court cannot review whether error was prejudicial).
"Actions to enforce . . . liens . . . must be begun within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1988). The trial court found that the work under the agreement here was completed by July 22, 1988. Plaintiff did not commence his mechanic's lien action until July 22, 1992, well beyond the statutory deadline. Thus, "both his rights and remedies under the [lien] statute are extinguished." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
"In any action to enforce any lien . . . the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney fee[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1988). "A successful party includes one who successfully . . . defends against a lien action." Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, ¶ 9, 991 P.2d 1113. Defendant successfully defended against Plaintiff's lien claim, and the trial court found both that the attorney fees incurred by Leone were reasonable and that Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim was "closely related and require[d] proof of the same facts" as Plaintiff's other claims. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's award of attorney fees. See id. at ¶¶ 12-15.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, and James Z. Davis, Judge.