Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1623 Section "C"(4)
June 13, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
The parties have submitted three post-trial motions for this Court's consideration. For the reasons explained below, the Court (1) DENIES Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter if Law and Remittitur (Rec. Doc. 102); (2) GRANTS plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment and/or for Relief from Judgment (Rec. Doc. 104); and (3) DENIES defendants' Motion to Review Clerk's Order to Tax Costs (Rec. Doc. 116).
I. FACTS
This case was tried before a jury on April 24-26, 2000. On April 25, 2000, after argument at the close of Plaintiff's case, the Court partially granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, thereby dismissing Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Clyde Naquin and Paul Boudreaux and accordingly dismissing as moot Plaintiff's claim for vicarious liability for emotional distress against her employer Kody Marine, Inc. ("Kody Marine"). See Rec. Doc. 95. On April 26, 2000, the jury returned a verdict (1) finding Kody Marine liable for $25,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for hostile work environment sexual harassment; (2) Paul Boudreaux liable for $40,000 in compensatory damages for battery; (3) finding Kody Marine vicariously liable for Boudreaux's battery; (4) finding Kody Marine not liable Le for constructive discharge; and (5) finding Kody Marine not liable for breach of contract in relation to alleged unpaid bonuses. The jury's verdict was entered as this Court's judgment on April 28, 2000. See Rec. Doc. 98.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Remittitur
Defendants move the Court for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Remittitur on the following matters: (1) capping Plaintiff's damages for sexual harassment under the limits provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; (2) cutting Plaintiff's award for battery as excessive; and (3) reversing as legally unfounded the jury's verdict finding Kody Marine vicariously liable for Boudreaux's conduct.
1. Standard of Review
a. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Defendants' post-trial motion is technically a "renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) rather than a "motion for judgment s a matter of law." Nevertheless, the standard of review is the same upon first considering the moth n at the close of the opposing side's case and then reconsidering the motion post-trial.
Federal Rule of Procedure 50 provides for motions for judgment as a matter of law. A court considers all the evidence and inferences in favor of the non-moving party in evaluating a motin for judgment as a matter of law. Treadaway v. Societie Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1990). In an action tried to a jury, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter if law after trial where it determines that "there [was] no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" as it did. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). See also Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997). Stated differently, the court must deny the motion if "reasonable and fair-minded jurors" might reach different conclusions. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1154, 115 S.Ct. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1995).
b. Motion for Remittitur
"[W]here a damage award is excessive or so large as to appear contrary to right or reason, the award is generally subject to remittitur . . ." Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1994). A court reviews a motion for remittitur claiming excessiveness by comparing the questioned d award with rulings in factually similar cases decided under the relevant controlling law. See id.
2. Effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a's Statutory Cap on Sexual Harassment Damages
As mentioned above, the jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiff $25,000 in compensatoy damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Plaintiff asserted her sexual harassment claim under both federal and state law — Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Louisiana antidiscrimination law, La. R.S. 23:333 and various other sections in Title 23, respectively. The problem posed by the jury's award is as follows: Under federal law, compensatory and punitive damages together are capped at $50,000 for employers that employ or e hundred or fewer employees during the relevant period. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). However, under Louisiana law, there is no cap on damages but punitive damages are unavailable. See La. R.S. 23:303(A).
In response the a specific jury interrogatory, the jury found that Kody Marine employed one hundred or fewer employees during the relevant period.
Defendants urge the Court to solve the problem by limiting Plaintiff's total award for sexual harassment to $50,000 ($25,000 in compensatory damages plus $25,000 in punitive damages), arguing that any award allowing additional recovery under state law would constitute in impermissible double award under two theories for the same injury. Plaintiff, on the other hand, acknowledges the statutory cap on Title VII damages but proposes that the Court allocate the $25,000 in compensatory damages to her state law claim and then allocate $50,000 in punitive damages to her federal law claim, thereby reducing the jury's award on the sexual harassment claims by only $50,000.
In support of their argument, Defendants cite to other federal cases that have held that the statutory caps in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a apply to each party to an action rather than to each claim See. e.g., Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 1999); Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1199-1201 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877, 119 S.Ct. 64, 142 L. Ed.2d 50 (1998); Muller v. Costello, 997 F. Supp. 299, 303 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), affd on other grounds, 187 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, none of these cases presents the situation facing the Court presently: whether a plaintiff can recover a total award above the statutory caps by allocating a jury's verdict between federal and state claims. The cases addressing that situation are therefore more appropriate for analogy to the instant case. The Court discusses those cases in the main body of this opinion.
Although the Fifth Circuit has yet to decide the issue of whether a district court can allocate sexual harassment damages between federal and state claims, other federal courts have considered the issue. Most of those other federal courts have concluded that a district court has discretion to allocate damages between federal and state claims. See Passantino v. Johnson Johnson Consumer Products, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 97-36191 98-35036, 2000 WL 562037, at *11-*12 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2000); Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc., 178 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1155, 145 L.Ed.2d 1065 (2000); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 675 (E.D.N Y 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997). But see Oliver v. Cole Gift Centers, Inc., 85 F. Supp.2d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 2000) (rejecting allocation in favor of applying federal cap to total recovery under both federal and state law but also qualifying that, under the facts of the case, "the plaintiff [was] adequately compensated by the damage award as capped under the federal scheme").
The situation in Passantino, recently decided by the Ninth Circuit, is quite similar to the situation in the instant case and provides a thorough analysis of the issues before this Court. In that case, the plaintiff pled claims of sexual harassment under both Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. After considering the effect of the federal cap on total damages, the district court concluded that it would allocate all of the compensatory damages, front pay, and backpay awarded by the jury to the plaintiffs state law claim and then allocate the capped amount in total punitive damages to the Title VII claim. The defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in allocating the damages rather than applying the federal statutory cap to all damages awarded for sexual harassment.
Considering the appeal, the Ninth Circuit first noted that a "district court generally has discretion regarding how to allocate the [jury's] damage award." 2000 WL 562037, at *11. The appellate court then proceeded to explain that the jury's award did not specify any particular allocation and thus that
the most reasonable assumption is that the jury awarded the same damages on both the federal and state claims. The damages were duplicative, however, because the two claims were essentially the same; they involved the same conduct and were evaluated under the same legal standard. In the absence of a contrary directive, such as a statutory mandate that damages be allocated to one claim rather than another, the district court had authority to allocate the damages to either claim. As the jury had awarded damages without differentiating between the claims, the awards were effectively fungible, and the district court's action was entirely within its discretion and consistent with the jury's verdict.Id.
The appellate court further explained that Title VII, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, explicitly prohibits limiting state remedies. See id. at *12. Moreover, the appellate court found that applying the statutory cap to the total award, as opposed to the district court's allocation method,
would conflict with the district court's general obligation to preserve lawful jury awards when possible, The jury's entire compensatory damage award was lawful under state law, and its punitive damage award was lawful under federal law (subject to any constitutionally valid limitation imposed by the statutory cap). An allocation that would serve to reduce lawfully awarded damages would fail to respect the jury's verdict and conflict with the purpose and intent of one or both statutes. Thus, we hold that the district court's allocation decision was not an abuse of discretion, and furthermore that, in circumstances such as these, subjecting the whole damage award to Title VII'S cap would be inconsistent with Title VII's provisions.Id.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis addresses the similar situation presented by the instant case. In its instructions to the jury, the Court informed the jury that Plaintiff had claims under both federal and state antidiscrimination laws but that the elements of both claims were identical. The Court therefore did not ask the jury to differentiate between the two claims.
As noted above, Title VII explicitly prohibits limitation of state remedies. Moreover, neither Title VII nor Louisiana law prohibit or mandate allocation of damages between federal and state antidiscrimination claims. Accordingly, the Court finds, as did the Ninth Circuit, that it is most logical to assume that the jury awarded the same damages on both the federal and state claims. Because the damages are fungible, it is most consistent with the intent of the jury to permit Plaintiff to recover the maximum amount possible, thereby allocating $25,000 in compensatory damages to Plaintiff's state law discrimination claim and $50,000 in punitive damages to Plaintiff's federal discrimination claim.
The Court must address one more argument concerning the allocation method before proceeding. In a footnote in Defendants' reply memorandum, they argue, without any citation, that Plaintiff's proposed allocation of the jury's full compensatory damages award to the state claim would eliminate the possibility of any award of punitive damages under the federal claim. Defendants claim that punitive damages would be unavailable as a matter of law under Title VII without a predicate compensatory damage award under Title VII. See Defs' Reply Mem., at 5, n. 3.
The Passantino court encountered the same argument but concluded that it did not need to decide "if punitive damages may be awarded under Title VII in the absence of a compensatory or nominal damage award, because the jury did award compensatory damages." 2000 WL 562037, at *17. The Ninth Circuit explained that
[the plaintiff] did establish liability for compensatory damages on her federal claim, and the jury actually awarded her compensatory damages under federal law. It did so in the form of a general compensatory damages award that applied to both the federal and state claims. Because the standards for liability under state and federal law were similar, the damage awards were fungible and, barring some statutory or other reason. . . . could be allocated, by the [district] court, to either the state or federal claims, in whole or in part. Although the district court acted properly in allocating the compensatory part of the jury's damage award to [the plaintiffs] state law claim, the fact remains that the jury awarded compensatory damages under both federal and state law claims. That is all that is required to permit an award of punitive damages in cases in which predicate damages are necessary. A court's subsequent allocation of compensatory or nominal damages among various claims does not change that rule. . . . Accordingly, the compensatory damages are adequate to sustain the award of punitive damages, if such predicate damages are required.Id.
The same reasoning applies to the instant case. Because the jury did actually find compensatory damages for sexual harassment for which the elements were exactly the same under both federal and state law, that jury finding is adequate to sustain an award of punitive damages, if such predicate damages are in fact required.
The Court notes that Defendants' bald assertion that compensatory damages are a necessary predicate for punitive damages under Title VII is a far from settled proposition. Compare Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (punitive damages are available on Title VII claims even without any compensatory or nominal damage award) with Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1215 (1st Cir. 1995) (punitive damages inappropriate on Title VII claims without compensatory or nominal damages award).
The Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue for Title VII claims. In a case considering the issue for claims under the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., the court noted that "'[t]here is no established federal common law rule that precludes the award of punitive damages in the absence of an award of compensatory damages.'" Louisiana Acorn Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting People Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1326 (4th Cir. 1993)). The divided panel, over Chief Judge King's dissent, ultimately held that, under the FHA, it was proper to "limit punitive damages awards, absent an actual damages award, to cases w[h]ere a violation of a constitutional right has occurred." 211 F.3d at 303.
The caselaw therefore presents conflicting solutions to the problem, and the only Fifth Circuit case considering the issue focuses on a different federal statute. Nevertheless, as explained in the main text, it is unnecessary for the Court to resolve this question under the facts of this case because the jury actually found compensatory damages.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the proper allocation of the damages awarded by the jury for hostile work environment sexual harassment is $25,000 in compensatory damages for Plaintiff's state antidiscrimination claim and $50,000 in punitive damages for Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a's statutory cap only reduces Plaintiff's total recovery by $50,000.
3. Claimed Excessiveness of Jury's Award for Battery
Defendants argue that the jury's award of $40,000 for battery is excessive in light of the damages Plaintiff allegedly suffered. Defendants contend that Louisiana jurisprudence requires physical or severe emotional harm to support a substantial award for battery.
The Court however does not find that the jury's battery award "is excessive or so large as to appear contrary to right or reason." Marcel, 11 F.3d at 568. The cases cited by Defendants do not address the gravity of the facts present in the instant case. Here, unlike the cases cited, the offensive conduct occurred numerous times and was outrageous in nature. Plaintiff presented unrefuted evidence at trial that Boudreaux would grab her and also poke her in the genitals with the antenna of his remote-control radio. The offensive behavior escalated such that Boudreaux would rub the antenna back and forth in Plaintiff's vagina and buttocks. Moreover, Boudreaux even displayed such offensive behavior in front of Plaintiff's twelve year old daughter. Consequently, in light of such evidence, the Court finds that it is improper to compare the cases cited by Defendants to the instant case.
Recently the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, considered the proper amount o damages in a case in which a plaintiff alleged emotional injury from her supervisor's unwanted contact. See Lowrey v. Pettit, 737 So.2d 213, 217 (La.Ct.App. 2d Cir. 1999). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor, among other things, pressed his body against hers, placed his hands on her waist and hips, brushed against her breasts while adjusting her clothing, and grabbed her in an attempt to pull her into his lap. See id. at 217. Finding that the plaintiff had failed to produce any medicals records for her condition, that the duration of her symptoms was unclear, and that no evidence showed significant time lost due to emotional injury, the state appellate court reduced the trial court's award of $30,000 in general damages to $15,000. See id.
In the instant case, however, Plaintiff produced expert medical testimony establishing that she suffered depression and required treatment with anti-depressant drugs as a result of the workplace harassment she endured. Plaintiff further established that she had to leave her job in part due to her emotional injuries. The facts of this case also demonstrate more severe and outrageous conduct than was present in Lowrey. Therefore, the support found lacking for the trial court's award. of $30,000 in general damages in Lowrey is substantially present in the instant case. Considering the more severe and outrageous nature of the battery in the instant case, an additional $10,000 in general damages is not unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Court refuses to reduce the jury's award of $40,000 in comepnsatory. damages for Plaintiff's battery claim.
4. Vicarious Liability Finding
Defendants also claim that the jury's finding that Kody Marine was vicariously liable fox Boudreaux's battery of Plaintiff was clearly unreasonable and thus should be vacated. The Court however, does not find that the jury's finding was unreasonable under the applicable law. The Court gave the following instruction on vicarious liability to the jury:
Under Louisiana state law, a person is responsible to repair every act that causes damages to another for which that person is at fault. Our state has expanded that concept so that an employer is responsible for damages caused by one of its employees in the exercise of the functions for which the employee is employed. To find that an employer is vicariously liable, or in other words, liable for the acts of its employee, the following three facts must be proven:
(1) an employer/employee relationship;
(2) a tortious act by the employee; and
(3) the act complained of must be committed within the course and scope of the employee's employment.
To determine whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment, you must look to the alleged tortious action and consider the following factors:
(1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted;
(2) whether the tortious act was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties;
(3) whether the act occurred on the employer's premises; and
(4) whether it occurred during the hours of employment.
These factors are not definitive but are rather a guide to determine whether an alleged tortious act occurred within the course and scope of employment and thus that an employer may be vicariously liable for that act.
Jury Instructions, Rec. Doc. 97, at 9-10.
The Court's instruction on the non-definitive elements relevant to finding that an employee's actions were within the course and scope of his employment are the same as those enunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.2d 994, 996-97 (La. 1996). The Louisiana Supreme Court specifically noted that all four factors need not be met before liability car be found. See id. at 997 (citing Miller v. Keating, 349 So.2d 265, 268 (La. 1977)).
Defendants admit that Plaintiff clearly established the third and fourth factors but argue that Plaintiff failed to establish the first and second factors. The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff did establish these two factors. First, the battery committed by Boudreaux was primarily employment rooted. Boudreaux supervised Plaintiff and initiated the unwanted contact while clothed with that supervisory authority. Second, the battery was also reasonably incidental to the performance of Boudreaux's duties. Kody Marine's owner and president, Naquin, was aware of Boudreaux's actions and merely ignored them. The employer therefore permitted Boudreaux to carry out his supervisors functions in this inappropriate manner.
The facts of this case therefore establish each of the four Baumeister elements, and thus the jury's conclusion that Kody Marine was vicariously liable for Boudreaux's tortious actions was no unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the jury's findings.
B. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment and/or for Relief from Judgment
Plaintiff moves the Court to amend the judgment to include judicial interest from the date of demand until the date paid. Defendants offer no substantive argument against Plaintiff's request Rather Defendants argue only that Plaintiff's post-judgment motion for pre-judgment interest is governed by the ten day limit provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for motions t amend or alter a judgment and that Plaintiff's motion is untimely under that Rule.
Defendants, however, are mistaken: Plaintiff did file her motion no later than ten days after entry of judgment as provided by Rule 59(e). The Court entered judgment on April 28, 2000 Plaintiff then filed the motion in question on May 12, 2000. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the day of the event, in this case entry of judgment, is excluded from computation of time periods specified by any rule. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). Moreover, for time periods less than eleven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are also excluded from any computation See id. Applying these computation parameters to the April and May 2000 calendars, Plaintiff filed her motion exactly ten days after entry of judgment. Plaintiffs motion is therefore timely.
Defendants' only proffered reason for denying Plaintiff's motion for judicial interest is therefore incorrect. Defendants offer no other reason why Plaintiff's requested relief should not be granted. Moreover, the Court finds no reason to deny. Plaintiff this requested relief. "Absent statutory mandate, the award of prejudgment interest generally is discretionary with the trial court." Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1306 (5th Cir. 1988). Moreover, "[p]rejudgment interest is not granted 'according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness.'" Id. (citation omitted). As explained above, Plaintiff properl: established the claims upon which she prevailed. She should not be penalized by denying her interest on her award from the time she originally lodged her demand. Accordingly, the Court find; it fair and equitable to award Plaintiff judicial interest as ordered below.
C. Defendants' Motion to Review Clerk's Order to Tax Costs
Defendants move this Court to review the Clerk of Court's order denying Defendants' bill of costs. Defendants argue that they are entitled to their costs because the Court dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress on Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law during trial and because the jury found in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's claim for unpaid bonuses.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). court views a case "as a whole to determine who was the 'prevailing party;' [and] a party need not prevail on every issue in order to be entitled to costs." Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1991).
It is clear from all the facts and circumstances of this case that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. All of her state and federal claims, except for the contractual claim for the alleged unpaid bonus, were based on sexual harassment in the workplace. The jury found that Plaintiff was subjected to unlawful sexual harassment and related battery in the workplace and found damages i: i her favor in the amount of $165,000. The jury did not, as Defendants claim, find that Plaintiff owe; Kody Marine any money; rather it found that Plaintiff already received $24,037 that should be credited toward any claimed bonus.
The Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's ancillary claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the jury's finding that Kody Marine owed Plaintiff nothing for claimed unpaid bonuses pale in comparison to the jury's finding of Defendants' liability in this case. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff was the true prevailing party in this case. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to their costs under Rule 54(d).
It is true that the Court dismissed all claims asserted against Naquin individually. However, considering that defense counsel represented all three defendants — Kody Marine, Boudreaux, and Naquin — collectively and that the defenses to Plaintiff's claims were indistinguishable among the three defendants with regard to legal theory and factual development, the Court finds that it would be unrealistic to attempt to apportion the costs of Naquin's individual defense.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby ORDERS the following:
1. Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Remittitur (Rec. Doc. 102) is hereby DENIED;
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment and/or for Relief from Judgment (Rec. Doc. 104) is hereby GRANTED such that Plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest from the time of demand until the date of judgment at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (a; determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price from the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the filing of this case (4.513%); and
3. Defendants' Motion to Review Clerk's Order to Tax Costs (Rec. Doc. 116) is hereby DENIED.