Opinion
Case No. 6:19-cv-2312-Orl-40GJK
06-02-2020
BARRACUDA, LLC, Plaintiff, v. GEICO MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Hans Kennon, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff. Theodore L. Shinkle, GrayRobinson, PA, Melbourne, FL, for Defendant.
Hans Kennon, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.
Theodore L. Shinkle, GrayRobinson, PA, Melbourne, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER
PAUL G. BYRON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This cause is before the Court without oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 13, 14), and the response (Doc. 16) thereto. Upon consideration and review of the record as cited by the parties in their respective briefs, Defendant's motion (Doc. 13) is due to be granted, and Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 14) is due to be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 1, 2019, Plaintiff's 2018 Statement Marine 35’ boat (the "Vessel ") sustained damage when Hurricane Dorian hit Marsh Harbor, Bahamas. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1). The Vessel appears to be a "total loss." (Doc. 14, p. 1).
As a result, Plaintiff initiated the instant action by filing a complaint in state court. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1). On December 9, 2019, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff and Defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are now ripe for the Court's review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judgment on the pleadings may only be granted when there are no material facts in dispute and the factual allegations contained within the parties’ pleadings demonstrate that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle her to relief. Horsley v. Feldt , 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002). If the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, the court must convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and must give the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all evidence that is relevant to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is only appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" to support its position that it is entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "The court need consider only the cited materials," but may also consider any other material in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
A factual dispute is "genuine" only if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating a lack of a genuine factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co. , 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). If the movant shows that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are, in fact, genuine factual disputes which preclude judgment as a matter of law. Porter v. Ray , 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
To satisfy its burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and "identify affirmative evidence" which creates a genuine dispute of material fact. Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574, 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must read the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve any reasonable doubts in the non-movant's favor. Skop v. City of Atlanta , 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment should only be granted "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
III. DISCUSSION
Both parties move for summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact and they each believe that they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. (Docs. 13, 14). The parties do not dispute the facts at issue. Therefore, the only remaining issue before the Court is the interpretation of Plaintiff's GEICO Marine Insurance policy (the "Policy ").
Marine insurance policies are governed by maritime law. All Underwriters v. Weisberg , 222 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000). However, "when neither statutory nor judicially created maritime principles provide an answer to a specific legal question, courts may apply state law provided that the application [ ] does not frustrate national interests in having uniformity in admiralty law." Id. It is well-settled that "insurance coverage is a creature solely of the contract at issue." Bonich v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 996 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Consequently, absent ambiguity in a policy's language, "insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy." Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. , 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003). Additionally, federal admiralty law mandates "strict construction of express warranties in marine insurance contracts ...." Lexington Ins. v. Cooke's Seafood , 835 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988) ; see also Aetna Ins. v. Dudney , 595 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("Federal courts have recognized that ... strict construction of navigational limit warranties has been an established admiralty rule of the federal judiciary.").
The Policy at issue here is clear and simple. The "Cruising Limits" stated on the Declarations Page notes that "There is no coverage outside of [the coastal and inland waters of the U.S. and Canada] area without ‘our’ written permission." (Doc. 1-1, p. 56). Additionally, the "Where Covered" section of the General Conditions page states that coverage will be provided "(1) [w]hile an ‘insured boat’ is afloat or ashore within the Cruising Limits shown on the Declarations Page ; and (2) [w]hile an ‘insured boat’ or its equipment is being transported by land conveyance in the United States or Canada." (Id. at p. 69) (emphasis added). By its express terms, the Policy only covers an insured vessel when it is within the "Cruising Limits" of the "Coastal and Inland Waters of the U.S. and Canada." (Id. ). Therefore, by the Policy's express terms, the Bahamas is not included in the Cruising Limits and Plaintiff's claim has no merit. See Dudney , 595 So. 2d at 239 (finding that coverage did not exist because "Nassau, Bahamas, is clearly beyond the limits of coastwise and inland and tributary waters of the United States").
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the distinction between "ashore" and "afloat" creates some ambiguity in the contract. (Doc. 14, p. 14). The Vessel was "ashore" at the time of the storm because it was stored on a lift, which was embedded in the ground under the water's surface. See
Plaintiff argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the provisions are inconsistent with each other and create ambiguity in the Policy. (Doc. 14). If insurance policies are ambiguous and cannot be reasonably reconciled, then well-established rules of construction must be applied. Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Beach Cars of West Palm, Inc. , 929 So. 2d 729, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). One such basic tenant is that ambiguous policy provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Dickson v. Economy Premier Assurance , 36 So. 3d 789, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Policy language is considered ambiguous within the ambit of this rule if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; one providing coverage and another limiting coverage. Garcia v. Federal Ins. , 969 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 2007). However, this "rule of adverse construction" is a "secondary rule of interpretation," or a "rule of last resort," which should not be used if the parties’ intent can otherwise be determined from a plain reading of the policy. Emerald Pointe Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Commercial Constr. Inc. , 978 So. 2d 873, 878 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). "If the relevant policy language is clear and unambiguous, the court must infer the parties’ intent from its plain language." Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. , 734 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Additionally, the "reasonable expectations" of the insured are not properly considered in the interpretation of clear and unambiguous policy language. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. , 711 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998) (noting that giving effect to insured's expectations would effectively rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are charged).
With these concepts in mind, the Court finds that the Policy language is unambiguous. The deductible provision states, "For any covered loss due to a ‘named storm’ ...." (Doc. 1-1, p. 56). Giving effect to the parties’ clear intent, the Court finds that the Policy's deductible provisions only apply if there is coverage in the first place, and it is the parties’ clear intent to only cover damages occurring within the navigable waters of the U.S. and/or Canada. Florida courts have recognized that
The notion that a deductible could be applied to a loss that is not covered by the policy is fundamentally unreasonable. A deductible is a clause in an insurance policy that relieves the insurer of responsibility for an initial specified loss of the kind insured. A deductible loses its meaning entirely if it is to apply to a loss that is not covered by the policy.
General Star Indem. v. W. Fla. Vill. Inn, Inc. , 874 So. 2d 26, 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Although the deductibles section of the Policy found within the Coverages paragraph simply defines jurisdictions that could apply to otherwise covered losses—and does not directly state that coverage would not apply in the Bahamas—finding an ambiguity with this one section would lead to an absurd result when the rest of the policy clearly states the parties’ intent to only cover losses occurring in the coastal and inland waters of the U.S. and Canada. Deni Assocs. Of Fla. , 711 So. 2d at 1140 (holding that "insurances policies will not be construed to reach an absurd result"). Therefore, the Court finds no ambiguity in the Policy and that Plaintiff's claim has no merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is GRANTED ;
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) is DENIED ;
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant, and thereafter, to close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on June 2, 2020.
Bessey v. Carnival Cruise Lines , 579 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ("[S]tructures such as piers and docks permanently affixed to land are extensions of the land and are not navigable [waters]. This is true even when the pier or dock extends onto or over navigable waters.").