Summary
In Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 753(4) (58 S.E.2d 823) (1950), this court said: "The question of whether or not an ordinance is reasonable is one of law for the court [Cits.]."
Summary of this case from Powell v. Board of CommissionersOpinion
17014.
APRIL 10, 1950.
Petition for injunction. Before Judge G. C. Anderson. Richmond Superior Court. December 23, 1949.
Cumming, Nixon Eve, for plaintiffs.
William P. Congdon, Congdon, Harper Leonard, and Fulcher Fulcher, for defendant.
1. "The business affairs of a municipality are committed to the corporate authorities, and the courts will not interfere except in a clear case of mismanagement or fraud." McMaster v. Waynesboro, 122 Ga. 231 (5) ( 50 S.E. 122); South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, 652 ( 151 S.E. 513); Lawson v. Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 703 ( 22 S.E.2d 592).
2. The fixing of water rates, from time to time, by a municipality, is a legislative or governmental power, and one council may not, by contract or ordinance, deprive succeeding councils of this legislative or governmental power. Code, § 69-202; Horkan v. Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 563 ( 71 S.E. 785); Screws v. Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 843 ( 8 S.E.2d 16); Barr v. City Council of Augusta (case No. 17013), ante, 750, headnote 2.
3. A municipal corporation may not compel any person outside its territorial limits to accept water service which it undertakes to furnish, nor may the municipal authorities be compelled to render such service. A municipal corporation may classify rates to be charged in outlying territories, and upon failure of customers to pay such charges, the municipal corporation may discontinue its service. An ordinance, which provides that rates for water service shall be higher in territory outside the corporate limits, is not unconstitutional and void as denying "due process" and "equal protection" under the Federal and State Constitutions. Collier v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 575 ( 173 S.E. 853).
4. The question of whether or not an ordinance is reasonable is one of law for the court. 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 1583, § 729; 37 Am. Jur., 801, § 172; Central Railroad Bkg. Co. v. Brunswick Western R. Co., 87 Ga. 392 ( 13 S.E. 520); Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 501 (7) ( 16 S.E. 49); Columbus R. Co. v. Waller, 12 Ga. App. 674 ( 78 S.E. 52). Under the preceding rulings, the ordinance of March 7, 1949, fixing a higher rate for water service outside the corporate limits of the city, was not unreasonable or discriminatory.
5. The courts will not inquire into the motives of a municipal council in the enactment of an ordinance. Barr v. City Council of Augusta (case No. 17013), ante, 750.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
No. 17014. APRIL 10, 1950.
The plaintiffs in Barr v. City Council of Augusta (case No. 17013) filed another action on the same date against the City Council of Augusta. In so far as germane to the questions insisted upon in this court, the plaintiffs alleged: The defendant operates a municipal waterworks, through which it has served its citizens and persons living in the environs of the city. The plaintiffs live in that portion of the county which lies wholly without the corporate limits of the city. The water main through which the defendant furnishes the plaintiffs with water was conveyed to the defendant by John P. Mulherin without cost. The defendant has no authority to make a charge for water whereby a net profit will result. The defendant conducts a public utility and occupies the status of a public-service corporation. The only charge that can legally be made by the defendant is the amount necessary to pay operating expenses, plus an amount for depreciation of the waterworks, and for the payment of interest and retirement of bonds. In the year 1948 the defendant received a large stated sum in excess of disbursements. The defendant owes stated amounts of unretired bonds and revenue certificates. In the year 1949 there will be no substantial change in the cost of operation of waterworks and the amount required for the payment of interest on bonds. The charge made in 1948 was greatly in excess of that authorized by law. On March 7, 1949, at a regular meeting of the city council, a resolution was adopted requiring users of city water outside the city limits to pay double the city water rate. The defendant claims the right to discontinue the water service to the plaintiffs if its charge for water is not paid. The plaintiffs are willing to pay the amount that is legal and necessary for the maintenance of the waterworks and the retirement of bonds. The resolution of March 7, 1949, is ultra vires and void, in that it constitutes an unreasonable discrimination against the plaintiffs and denies them equal protection of the law, in violation of the Constitution, art. 1, sec. 1, par. 2. It is unreasonable discriminatory, in that it purports to establish a charge for water on unreasonable and arbitrary grounds. The resolution was adopted through malice and in an illegal attempt to force the plaintiffs to consent that their property be brought within the corporate limits of the city. If the plaintiffs fail to pay the double rate, the water supply to their premises will be discontinued, and there will result jeopardy to the comfort, convenience, and health of the plaintiffs, and jeopardy to property values. Because of the jeopardy to which the plaintiffs' properties would be subjected, should the defendant discontinue furnishing water, they are forced to continue to pay an illegal charge, and are without an adequate legal remedy.
The prayers were: that the defendant be required to discover the amount of receipts from the operation of its waterworks, the cost of maintenance, the amount of bonds and revenue certificates outstanding, and the amount of capital allocable to that portion of the waterworks used for the purpose of furnishing water to the plaintiffs; for process; that the defendant be enjoined from charging an amount in excess of a rate necessary to pay cost and services, and from discontinuing water service to the plaintiffs; and for other relief.
The defendant's general demurrers were sustained, and the exception is to that judgment.