Opinion
FSTFA020189558S
04-27-2017
Pamela Barlow v. Christopher Barlow
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR POST-MAJORITY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT ORDER
Donna Nelson Heller, J.
The plaintiff Pamela Barlow, now known as Pamela Pritchard, and the defendant Christopher Barlow were divorced on August 13, 2003. In paragraph 9.3 of their August 13, 2003 separation agreement (#147.10), incorporated by reference in the dissolution judgment (Grogins, J.) (#148.55), the parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction for entry of a post-majority educational support order with respect to the college education of their daughters Sienna and Sydney.
On November 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for a post-majority educational support order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c (#183.01). The plaintiff seeks an order requiring the parties to contribute according to their respective incomes and circumstances to Sienna's college education. Sienna is currently enrolled as a freshman at the University of Memphis.
The defendant previously filed a motion for, inter alia, " clarification of post-majority support" pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c, which he did not pursue at that time (#169.00).
The parties were before the court on January 23, February 14, and March 13, 2017. The court heard testimony from both parties and reserved decision at that time. The defendant, who is representing himself, filed a post-hearing memorandum on March 17, 2017. The plaintiff filed her post-hearing memorandum on March 20, 2017. The plaintiff also submitted an order from the Family Court of the State of New York, entered on February 15, 2017 in a child support proceeding between the parties, which the court has made a court exhibit.
The plaintiff's counsel sought a brief extension of time due to her other professional and personal commitments, which the court granted.
I
The parties are justifiably proud of their daughter Sienna. Sienna is an accomplished vocalist who was awarded a four-year, full tuition scholarship from the University of Memphis after graduating from Middletown High School and the Educational Center for the Arts in New Haven. She is a full-time student, majoring in commercial music with a concentration in music business, at the University of Memphis. She is in good academic standing.
In addition to the tuition award that she received from the University of Memphis, Sienna qualified for federal student loans for the 2016-2017 academic year. She was awarded a federal unsubsidized loan, in the total amount of $6,000 ($3,000 for each semester). Sienna was also awarded a federal subsidized loan in the amount of $3,500. This loan was cancelled because Sienna did not accept it in time.
The plaintiff testified that she discussed student loans with Sienna. She advised Sienna that she and the defendant would be in court to address their respective parental contributions for Sienna's college education. It appears that Sienna forfeited the $3,500 federal subsidized loan in the belief that her parents would cover the remainder of her college expenses. The $3,000 federal unsubsidized loan awarded for the spring semester is apparently still available.
Sienna's room, board, books, and other necessary expenses for the 2016-2017 academic year total approximately $11,000. The plaintiff testified that she paid approximately $7,000 for Sienna's housing and other expenses in the fall term. Sienna has contributed approximately $2,300 from her own savings for the spring semester. As of the last hearing date, approximately $2,700 to $2,800 remained to be paid for Sienna's spring semester, which could be covered by the $3,000 federal unsubsidized loan.
The plaintiff seeks a post-majority educational support order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c. In her view, she and the defendant should contribute to Sienna's college education so that Sienna will not be burdened with school loans after she graduates. The defendant, on the other hand, believes that Sienna should exhaust all resources available to her-including school loans-before the parties are required to pay anything for her education. He also objects to the entry of a post-majority educational support order because he incurred considerable expense in connection with Sienna's college application process, including paying for audition visits to six of the schools, to which the plaintiff did not contribute.
General Statutes § 46b-56c provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor's or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age. (b)(1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and no educational support order may be entered thereafter unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion or petition for an educational support order may be filed by either parent at a subsequent date ... (c) The court may not enter an educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact. After making such finding, the court, in determining whether to enter an educational support order, shall consider all relevant circumstances, including: (1) The parents' income, assets and other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child's need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private occupational school considering the child's assets and the child's ability to earn income; (3) the availability of financial aid from other sources, including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be funded considering the child's academic record and the financial resources available; (5) the child's preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private occupational school the child would attend. (d) At the appropriate time, both parents shall participate in, and agree upon, the decision as to which institution of higher education or private occupational school the child will attend. The court may make an order resolving the matter if the parents fail to reach an agreement. (e) To qualify for payments due under an educational support order, the child must (1) enroll in an accredited institution of higher education or private occupational school, as defined in section 10a-22a, (2) actively pursue a course of study commensurate with the child's vocational goals that constitutes at least one-half the course load determined by that institution or school to constitute full-time enrollment, (3) maintain good academic standing in accordance with the rules of the institution or school, and (4) make available all academic records to both parents during the term of the order. The order shall be suspended after any academic period during which the child fails to comply with these conditions. (f) The educational support order may include support for any necessary educational expense, including room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, but such expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at the time the child for whom educational support is being ordered matriculates, except this limit may be exceeded by agreement of the parents. An educational support order may also include the cost of books and medical insurance for such child.
Both parties are currently employed and have some financial resources available to assist Sienna in paying for her college education. The plaintiff's overall financial picture is brighter than that of the defendant. The plaintiff works for Danone. Her annual salary is approximately $130,688, according to her current financial affidavit. The plaintiff's current financial affidavit reflects net weekly income of $2,363 (which includes child support paid by the defendant) and total weekly expenses including liability expenses) of $2,304. The plaintiff owns a home valued at $525,000, with equity of $40,000. Her assets total $140,281, including $57,000 in retirement accounts.
The defendant is employed by Webster Bank. His gross annual salary is $135,603, as set forth on his current financial affidavit. He also has nominal earnings of $500 annually from Contemporary Services Corp. Although the defendant's gross annual income is greater than the plaintiff's, his net weekly income, after substantial deductions, is $1,318. His weekly expenses (including liability expenses) total $2,681. The defendant has no assets except a 2003 Acura, valued at $3,500, and $446.67 in his checking accounts.
The defendant pays $470 per week to the plaintiff in child support for their daughter Sydney. He pays the plaintiff an additional $125 weekly on a New York State judgment for past due child support. The defendant also supports a son from his current relationship who has special needs.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant's child support obligation was reduced by the New York court, effective February 17, 2017, and the child support arrearage has been satisfied. The amount set forth on the defendant's current financial affidavit appears to reflect the February 17, 2017 reduction.
II
As a predicate to entering a post-majority educational support order, the court must find that " it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact." General Statutes § 46b-56c(c). In this case, where both parties have already contributed financially to Sienna's pursuit of higher education, there is no question that they would have provided support for her college education had they remained together.
Subsection (c) of § 46b-56c further provides that, having made such finding, the court should consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether to enter an educational support order, including: " (1) The parents' income, assets and other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child's need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private occupational school considering the child's assets and the child's ability to earn income; (3) the availability of financial aid from other sources, including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be funded considering the child's academic record and the financial resources available; (5) the child's preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private occupational school the child would attend." Id. The central issue between the parties arises from the third of these six factors-the availability of financial aid, including grants and loans. The parties disagree as to whether Sienna must accept all of the financial aid available to her-including the full amount of any student loans-before they would be required to contribute to her college education.
The plaintiff contends that she and the defendant should provide financial assistance to Sienna so that she does not have to accept the student loans that have been offered to her. According to the plaintiff, as a matter of public policy, parental funding of a child's college education is preferable to the child's incurring student loan debt. The court does not agree that the public policy underlying General Statutes § 46b-56c is quite so expansive. Prior to the enactment of General Statutes § 46b-56c, " the law with respect to postmajority support was well established. As a general matter, [t]he obligation of a parent to support a child terminates when the child attains the age of majority, which, in this state, is eighteen ... This rule was modified by the provisions of § 46b-56c, allowing the issuance of an educational support order upon motion of a party and after the making of certain subsidiary findings by a court ... In the absence of a statute or agreement providing for postmajority assistance, however, a parent ordinarily is under no legal obligation to support an adult child." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barbour v. Barbour, 156 Conn.App. 383, 400-01, 113 A.3d 77 (2015).
While the plaintiff's desire to see Sienna graduate without incurring significant student loan debt is understandable, our legislature has expressly provided that the court must consider all of the financial aid available to a child, including student loans, when entering a post-majority educational support order. Thus, the defendant is correct that all of the student loans awarded to Sienna must be taken into account before an educational support order will enter.
Histen v. Histen, 98 Conn.App. 729, 911 A.2d 348 (2006), cited by the plaintiff, is not on point. In Histen, the parties' separation agreement provided that the plaintiff would be responsible for paying one-half of the " actual cost" of the children's college tuition, room and board and books. Our Appellate Court found that the trial court had properly concluded that the term " actual cost" included the educational expenses that were covered by student loans. Id. at 734-35. The court noted that there was no need for the trial court to issue an educational support order under General Statutes § 46b-56c, which had recently been enacted, because the parties had reached a voluntary agreement that addressed the issue of their children's post-majority educational expenses. Therefore, the terms used in the statute had no bearing on the construction of the language in the parties' separation agreement. Id. at 734, n.4.
III
After considering all of the relevant circumstances, including the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56c(c), the witnesses' testimony, the documentary evidence admitted, and the parties' post-hearing memoranda, the court makes the following findings and enters the orders that issue below.
The court finds that the parties would have financially supported Sienna in her post-secondary educational efforts, and that Sienna was likely to pursue post-secondary education, had the parties remained together. Sienna is currently enrolled as a full-time student at the University of Memphis, where she is in good standing. Sienna has the aptitude for and the commitment to her vocal performance education at the University of Memphis, for which she was well prepared at Middletown High School and the Educational Center for the Arts.
The total annual cost of Sienna's tuition and room and board at the University of Memphis is $31,500, which is reasonable in light of Sienna's academic record and the financial resources available to her. Sienna has been awarded a financial aid package that includes a $21,000 full tuition scholarship and $9,500 in student loans. After applying the full amount of the student loans, plus her own earnings, to the cost of her housing, meal plan, books, and other necessary educational expenses, Sienna may need a modest contribution from her parents to pay her remaining expenses. The parties have the financial resources to cover this shortfall, taking into account their respective incomes, assets, and other obligations, including their obligations to their other dependents.
Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for a post-majority educational support order is hereby GRANTED. It is ORDERED that the defendant shall pay 30 percent of the balance remaining as of the date of this order for Sienna's spring 2017 semester expenses, after applying Sienna's scholarship, loans, and personal earnings to her tuition, room, board, books, and other necessary educational expenses, up to the maximum amount allowed under the statute. The defendant shall pay his share of the outstanding expenses for Sienna's spring 2017 semester to the plaintiff on or before May 15, 2017. The plaintiff shall remit payment on behalf of both parties directly to the University of Memphis or as designated by the University. This order is not retroactive.
At this time, the maximum amount of an educational support order under General Statutes § 46b-56c is $31,280, which is the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student for the 2016-2017 academic year.
It is further ORDERED that, commencing with the fall 2017 semester, the parties shall review Sienna's entire financial aid package at least thirty days before the first day of classes for each semester, confirm that Sienna has accepted all scholarships and student loans awarded to her, and determine the amount that Sienna is to contribute from her own earnings and the outstanding balance, if any, to be paid by the parties. The defendant shall pay 30 percent of the outstanding balance for each semester to the plaintiff in four equal monthly installments, commencing on the first day of the month in which the semester begins and continuing on the first day of each of the three months that follow. The plaintiff shall remit payment directly to the University of Memphis or as designated by the University.
This order shall remain in effect until the earlier of (i) Sienna's ceasing to attend the University of Memphis or another institution of higher education for the purpose of obtaining an undergraduate degree; (ii) Sienna's completion of four full academic years of undergraduate education; or (iii) Sienna's twenty-third birthday. The defendant's obligation for each academic year shall be no greater than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student for that year.